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Abstract 
The evolution of big business in manufacturing and some service industries, 
together with the role played in this by merger and acquisition (M&A) activity has 
been thoroughly researched and is well documented. However, despite' the 
increasing economic and social importance of the UK hotel industry, its 
development has been largely neglected. Therefore, this thesis set out to explore 
the development of big business in the hotel industry through the study of M&A 
activities. 
This study employs the multiple case study approach (four UK hotel companies), 
using M&A theory as the theoretical framework; extensive historical secondary 
data and semi-structured interviews were carried out for the study, covering a 
period of 26 years. The analysis was conducted by synthesising data with the 
M&A theory, in terms of two levels, organisational motives and macro 
environmental factors. The findings confirm those in the existing literature on what 
is encompassed by the term big business and the part played by M&A activity in 
the creation of big business. They also suggest that in the hotel industry the 
acquisition of brand name and brand rights is an important motive, one which has 
been neglected in the general M&A literature discussion. These findings added 
several new dimensions to big business concepts, through illuminating the role of 
brand and brand right acquisition in the context of the UK hotel industry. This 
thesis confirms the utility of deploying the wide range and large quantity of publicly 
available historical secondary information, which is rarely used. In addition, the 
application of a qualitative and longitudinal approach, applied to management 
theory, has broadened the research agenda in the study of hotel business, 
business history and business management theory. 
Keywords: Big business, Business history, Merger and acquisition, UK hotel 
companies, UK hotel industry 
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Chapter 1: 
Introduction 
This thesis explores the development of big business in the UK- hotel industry 
through the -study of merger and acquisition activity (M&A). Although M&A 
activities have been widely used as an expansion tool in the development of big 
business in many industries, they have not been investigated in the hotel industry. 
Therefore, there is a knowledge gap about hotel companies' development through 
the use of M&A activity. The questions this thesis asks are: 
9 What circumstances triggered hotel expansion? 
* How did these activities - hotel expansion and M&A activities - occur? 
This thesis therefore will engage in the analysis of historical context, to seek 
answers to the research questions, based on longitudinal research, which is widely 
agreed to be a useful approach for studying changes and the causes of changes 
over a period of time. 
In this chapter, section one presents an overview of the background for the 
research. Section two defines several terms used in this thesis. Section three 
evaluates historical studies of the development of the UK hotel industry. Section 
four examines studies related to M&A activities and the hotel industry. Section five 
states the aim and objectives of this thesis and the final section explains its 
structure. 
1.1. Background for the research 
This section provides the background for this study, by explaining what big 
business is and what it means in the hotel business, the rationale for focussing on 
the UK hotel industry and the specific period studied of 1979 - 2004. 
In the evolution of big business, M&A activities were used widely as an expansion 
tool in both the manufacturing and service industries. For instance, Hýnnah and 
Kay (1977) posited that M&A activities were the main driver of industry 
-1- 
concentration in the manufacturing industry between 1907 and 1973, and the 
driver of rapid growth in the size of large companies. Similarly, Hannah's (1983) 
study of the rise of the corporate economy between the early 1900s and the 1980s 
found M&A activities to be an important driver leading to the emergence of big 
business in the UK manufacturing industry. Channon (1978) examined the 
strategy, structure and financial performance of the 100 largest service industry 
corporations in the UK over the post-war period (1950-75) and posited that M&A 
activities played a pivotal role in achieving strategic change. Cassis (1997) also 
noted the use of M&A activities in the evolution of big business, highlighting the 
emergence of the five largest banks in 1918 as being a result of M&A activities by 
the then ten largest banks in Britain. In addition, the author pointed out that British 
companies have generated high profits [compared to other European countries], 
because 'one of the reasons for the overall higher profitability of British big 
business was*its diversity [in the service industry], the fact that expanding sectors 
could compensate for declining ones' (pp. 233). For example, brewing, tobacco, 
textiles, chemicals and electricity were strong segments in the industrial sector, 
whilst equally strong in the service sector were shipping, retailing, press and 
financial companies. However, despite the fact that many other sectors in the 
service industry have been widely investigated for their historical expansion, the 
hotel industry has been neglected. 
Cassis (1997) has pointed out that big business has often been identified with the 
largest industrial companies and linked to the manufacturing industry, which was 
why the concepts of big business were more 'designed' for this particular industry. 
This is particularly conspicuous in Schmitz's (1993) description of a big business in 
manufacturing industry as one characterised by owning huge capital assets and 
high headcounts. As a result of a need for a large amount of financial support for 
expansion, funds for development were generated from outside the company 
through financial institutions and the stock markets. 
-2- 
According to Cassis (1997, pp. 5), 
"Big business, however, is a wider concept. Excessive attention to the 
structure of the firm has led to losing sight of a basic fact: that big 
business is a matter of large-scale operations, of money and power, 
whatever the type of activity or the forms of organisation". 
Hotel companies and their activities are increasingly becoming important 
economic and social contributors to local economies, for instance, providing 
economic benefits through invisible exports such as the earnings from foreign 
currencies, and providing social contributions to the local community such as job 
creation and infrastructure development (Harris, 2006). Moreover, globalisation 
has made trading across borders easier as well as improving the mobility of 
people throughout the world. This has increased the demand for hotel services, 
and in turn, encouraged the development of hotel companies worldwide. Hotel 
companies have become a large-scale operation in terms of their presence 
worldwide. Hotel companies are structured to spread out over different locations 
at the same time. This is mainly due to it's the industry's dual nature of 
simultaneous production and consumption (Cooper et al., 2005). At the same 
time, opportunities from globalisation, coupled with the saturation of certain hotel 
markets led to the need to expand regionally or internationally. Therefore, the 
nature of this business requires companies to be present at several locations to 
offer their goods and services, has in turn driven the expansion of such companies 
across international borders and even in different cities within each country. 
A number of the characteristics of big business described so far fit in with the hotel 
industry. Firstly, the majority of the hotel companies, particularly the big hotel 
companies are running and selling a variety of different products, in terms of 
rooms at different market levels (one-star to five-star) and in a number of 
locations. This concurs with Schmitz's (1993) description of a big business that 
integrates the production and sales of a diverse number of products and / or 
geographic areas. In addition, this also coincides with Cassis's (1997) notion of 
large-scale operations, in any kind and form of activity and organisation. 
. 3- 
Secondly, the nature of the hotel industry has an inherent high fixed cost structure, 
and consequently, high investment costs (Lifteljohn, 2003; Phillips, 1997). This 
coincides with Schmitzs (1993) definition of big business i. e., 'owning a huge 
capital asset' and as a consequence of company expansion, resulting in increased 
financial burden. Therefore, funds for development had to be sourced from 
outside the companies (Cassis, 1997; Schmitz, 1993). 
Thirdly, the evolution of the UK hotel industry fits in with the big business argument 
proposed by both Schmitz and Cassis, whereby a limited number of large 
companies compete with one another in the same industry. This phenomenon is 
pronounced, with a decreasing number of hotel companies whilst the sizes of the 
surviving companies are increasing. An estimated 16,000 hotel companies were 
recorded in the UK in 1980, and the number has dropped to an estimate of 10,250 
in 2000 and 9,535 in 2003 (Hotel and Catering International Management 
Association, 2002; Key Note, 2003). 
Fourthly, the use of M&A activities in the evolution of big business is particularly 
pertinent to the hotel industry because of the nature of the business. The hotel 
business is cyclical in nature, as a consequence of change in the macro 
environment (Ward, 1997). In other words, demand for goods and services is 
dependent on economic growth or decline. During a period of economic growth, 
the demand for hotel room increases, but hotel room capacity is inadequate to 
meet demand because of high investment costs and time needed to build a hotel 
from scratch (Euromonitor, 2001; Reece, 2004). This applies particularly in the UK 
and Europe, where constraints such as a lack of suitable land and difficulties in 
obtaining permits for building new hotels caused the building of new rooms to lag 
behind the demand for them by 12 to 18 months (Euromonitor, 2001; Reece, 
2004). Therefore, M&A activities become, attractive for hotel owners and 
operators, as a means for expansion in the UK, as, well as a quick solution to 
bridge the time lapse between demand and supply of hotel rooms. 
This research has concentrated on the UK hotel industry for several reasons. 
First, the UK is the first industrialised country and was one of the first to develop its 
service economy (Cassis, 1997; Wardley, 1991). The UK hotel industry has 
-4- 
become a major player via its increasing economic contribution to the UK 
economy (Hotel and Catering International Management Association, 2002; Key 
Note, 2003; Office for National Statistics, 2006b). 
Figure 1.11: Comparing total employment in different sectors and industries in the 
UK 
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SoUrce: Lovegrove (2006); Macleay (2000) 
In Figure 1.1, employment in the manufacturing industry declined from 1990, whilst 
service industry continued to increase on the whole. Although there was a decline 
between the period 1990 - 1993 (due to recession, etc. see Chapter 2) in the 
service industry, this industry recovered quickly whilst manufacturing industry 
continued to fall. This figure not only reveals the growing importance of the hotel 
industry as part of the growing service industry, it also sheds light on its 
contribution to the UK economy in terms of its provision of stable employment 
while manufacturing industry, which was previously the biggest employer, 
declined. 
-5- 
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Figure 1.2: GDP indices of hotel and catering, all service industry and 
manufacturing industry in the UK, 1978 - 2005 
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Moreover, the hotel and catering industry contributed more in terms of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), to the economy on average, as compared to that of the 
service industry, particularly between the mid-1980s and the late 1990s (see 
Figure 1.2). The gap in GDP contribution to the UK economy between service and 
manufacturing industries closed from 2003 and the former, including hotel and 
catering industries, overtook the latter. 
Second, the UK continues to be one of the most visited countries for both business 
and tourist visitors. The historical attractions and London's position as one of the 
most important business cities are the drivers for increasing the number of tourist 
visits and nights spent (Economic and Social Research Council, 2006; Lovegrove, 
2006; Macleay, 2000). This is evident from the amount of income generated by 
overseas visitors' (business and holiday) spending in the UK (see Figure 1.3). 
-6- 
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Figure 1.3: Overseas visitors' spending in the UK by purpose (E million) 
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The declines in visitor spending shown in the years, 1992 and 2003, were partly 
the results of reductions in the volume of cross border travels caused by the first 
and second Gulf Wars respectively, and world recessions. In particular, the 
declines in the number of visitors between 1999 and the mid-2002 was due to the 
9/11 terrorist attack in New York City (2001), the foot-and-mouth outbreak in the 
UK (2001), the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic in the Asia 
Pacific region and North America (2003) and wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (since 
2002 and 2003 respectively). These events had created fear among travellers, 
and led to a fall in demand for hotel accommodation and visitors' spending in the 
UK and worldwide. 
The UK hotel industry has been growing and is growing as regards its economic 
contribution in terms of GDP and the stable supply of jobs in employment. In 
conjunction with the steady flow of visitors to the country and their increasing 
spending, the hotel industry has evolved into a big player in the UK economy and 
it warrants an in-depth investigation to understand its growth. 
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This particular period between 1979 and 2004 has been selected for this study 
because of changes in the macro environment in the UK and its wider context in 
terms of world events. 
Firstly, the UK economy went through two economic booms and two slumps 
during this period. In the 1980s, the boom was led by the anticipation of the 
deregulation of the UK financial sector in 1986, and more funds being made 
available for investment (see 2.2.2). The establishment of the Single European 
market in 1992 also induced a high volume of M&A activity within the UK and in 
other European countries (Garcia and Torre-Encisco, 1995; Goergen and 
Renneboog, 2004). The two economic slumps in the late 1980s and the late 
1990s were results of the world economic slowdown and adverse events 
mentioned previously. In addition, the UK economy was challenged by a high 
inflation and interest rates between the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
Secondly, this period is suitable for the purpose of this enquiry as competition in 
the UK hotel industry intensified with the entrance of foreign competitors. In the 
earlier periods (1960s and 1970s) of hotel development in the UK, the industry 
was dominated by two major players, namely Grand Metropolitan and Trust House 
Forte (Channon, 1978; Taylor and Bush, 1974). In contrast, the 1980s onwards 
saw major hotel companies in the US and Asia purchasing UK hotels. For 
example, US hotel companies wanted to expand out of the US due to market 
saturation in their country and Japanese companies were expanding because of 
their strong economic growth and a high balance of payment surplus, which 
enabled them to engage in M&A activities outside Japan (Caterer and 
Hotelkeeper, 1986i). 
The above discussion sets the stage for studying the emergence of big business in 
the UK hotel industry, between the periods 1979 - 2004 and in turn has illustrated 
the use of M&A activities as an essential tool to drive this emergence. M&A 
activities are not only an expansion mechanism, but are also considered as an 
'investment decision by the acquiring firm' (Halpern, 1983, pp. 298). Therefore, 
M&A activity would be an appropriate point of departure to investigate the 
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development of companies and industry into big business. The next section 
provides some definitions for key terms used throughout this thesis. 
1.2. Definitions 
The key terms will be defined in the following in order to enable a consistent 
comparative analysis. They are the terms 'hotel' and 'merger and acquisition 
activity' (M&A). 
(i) Hotel 
The word 'hotel' was used after 1760 in England (Medlik and Airey, 1978). It 
referred to large houses consisting of apartments for let by the day, week or 
month. The rental activity in hotels is usually supported by the provision of food 
and drink and other related services (Harris, 2006; Harrison and Johnson, 1993). 
Thus, not only is the character of hotels made up of a composite of activities, but 
hotels are also categorised into different kinds of room and service provision. 
Hotels can be classified based on the prices they charge, namely budget or 
economy, mid-scale and up-scale (Coopers et aL, 2005). Hotels may also be 
grouped under the types of specialised services and facilities they offer, such as 
family, all-inclusive and extended-stay, resort destination, airport, convention, all- 
suite and casinos (Coopers et aL, 2005; Vogel, 2001). Hotels are also 
categorised under one-star to five-star ratings, referring to the quality of provision 
from basic to excellent respectively (see Appendix A). These classifications are 
used by authoritative organisations, namely the English Tourism Council (ETC), 
the Automobile Association (AA) and the Royal Automobile Club (RAC) 
(VisitBritain, 2006). In this thesis, hotel refers to any or all of the above types and 
categories. However, to enable a smooth discussion throughout, the classification 
referred to by these organisations will be used. This classification covers a wider 
range, compared to economy, mid-scale and. up-scale. Moreover, the latter is 
generally used interchangeably with star ratings, in which mid-scale could refer to 
the two or three star hotel market. In addition, for each type of facilities offered, 
different market levels exist, namely an economy or one-star airport hotel and an 
up-scale or five-star airport hotel. 
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In this study, budget hotels will be treated as a separate category from the one- to 
five-star rating hotels. Most UK budget hotels were previously located close to 
main roads, within motorway service areas and / or other high-traffic locations. 
They can also be found in city centres currently (Mintel, 2005b). Most of these 
budget hotels offer en-suite shower, no-frills facilities, and normally do not have 
built-in restaurants. This type of hotel can and has developed into different hotel 
types, namely discount budget, middle budget and upper economy (Mintel, 
2005b). Therefore, to facilitate a smooth discussion, this study considers budget 
hotels as a separate category from one-star hotels, but as at the same time, 
considered as the same category within the same budget sector. 
(ii) Merger and acquisition activity (M&A) 
Several meanings for each of the terms 'merger and 'acquisition' have emerged 
as a result of research conducted in this area. According to Schoenberg (2003, 
pp. 96), an acquisition is the purchase by one company, which is called 'the 
bidder, of a controlling interest in another 'company, known as 'the target'. 
Acquisitions are also referred to as takeovers because the bidding company will 
take over the control of all assets, both tangible and intangible, of the target entity 
when an acquisition is completed. Ingram et al. (1992, pp. 196) shared a similar 
view when they defined a takeover as 'a game of strategy involving a number of 
players in which the management of one company attempts to gain control of 
another. Gaughan (2007) held a different view as he found the term 'takeover 
vague because it can refer to various types of transactions including both friendly 
and unfriendly mergers. Moreover, the term 'merger has also been widely used 
for combinations that involve companies of both different and similar sizes, so that 
the distinction is unclear. In contrast, Schoenberg (2003) argued that'merger' can 
be viewed as amalgamation of two separate organisations that are of 
approximately similar sizes, which simply combine all their assets rather than 
involving one acquiring the other. However, the author also pointed out that the 
terms - takeover and merger - generally represent similar purposes and factors for 
success and therefore in practice, these terms are often used interchangeably 
(Schoenberg, 2003). In view of the various existing ways of defining the terms 
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$acquisitions', 'mergers' and 'takeovers', the term mergers and acquisitions activity 
(M&A) will be used throughout this thesis. 
The next section evaluates previous historical studies into the development of the 
UK hotel industry. 
1.3. Historical studies of the development of UK hotel industry 
The purpose of this section is to discuss historical studies conducted in the area of 
UK hotel industry development in general, and to highlight the need to extend this 
kind of study both more widely and deeply. 
Borer (1972), Medlik and Airey (1978) and Taylor (2003) provided overviews of the 
UK hotel industry spanning A. D. 43 to 1987 (see Table 1.1). Borers (1972) book 
narrates the historical evolution of different types of accommodation from A. D. 43 
to the 1970s. She makes use of archival data and secondary sources to provide 
an account of the development of British accommodation, particularly emphasising 
the context of transportation change since the 13th century. It highlights the shift 
from the use of horses, stage coaches and mail coaches to railways and to motor 
cars, in relation to the different types of hotel conditions and degrees of hospitality 
received by travellers. 
Medlik and Airey's (1978) book presents a comprehensive profile of the UK hotel 
and catering industry in the 1970s. It is based on secondary sources, such as 
material from government departments, international organisations and trade 
journals. It offers a brief historical development and evaluates the characteristics 
and structures of these industries. Moreover, it highlights their economic 
perspectives, such as market demand, supply, employment and the various 
voluntary or government sponsored organisations. 
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Table 1.1: Historical studies on the UK hotel industry 
Period Author(s) Focus 
studied 
From the Borer (1972) Provided the account of the different types of accommodation 
A. D. 43 until evolving from the A. D. 43, when the first inn started. 
the 1970s 
From the Taylor and Highlighted the evolution of the UK hotel industry through the 
mid 1 gth Bush(1974) stories of major events that took place and several prominent 
century to hoteliers. 
1974. 
From the Medlik and Provided an overview of the evolution of the hotel and catering 
early Britain Alrey (1978) industry through a multi-level discussion comprising the 
days to companies, industry and institutions. 
1975 
1839-1914 Simmons Examined the development of UK hotel industry through the 
(1984) study of railway development between 1839 and 1914 
From 1837 Tayior (2003) Illustrated the history of the UK hotel industry, an extended 
to 1987 version from his previous co-authored book (see Taylor and 
Bush, 1974). 
From the N ickson (1997) Explored the historical development of the hospitality industry by 
early 20th reviewing the autobiographies and biographies of four industry 
Century entrepreneurs who started four well-known hospitality 
companies from the early 20th century onwards. 
1918-1939 Pope(2001) Examined the development of UK railway resort hotels. 
1924-1938 Pope(2000) Compared the performance of three hotel groups in the 1920s 
and 1930s. 
1930s - Stewart (199 1 Narrated the growth and development of Trust Houses and 
1980s Forte Holdings by tracing their past. 
1945-1989 Stewart (1996) Conducted a study of the growth of 12 hotel companies in the 
UK. 
The historical profile that Medlik and Airey (1978) provide is significantly relevant 
to the present, particularly with regard to method of capital investment used. The 
authors also highlight the constraints of this industry, for instance the highly 
capital-intensive requirements. Moreover, the turnaround for capital investment 
was said to be slow, requiring 10-12 years for returns to be made to investors. 
According to the same authors, 90% of the capital was invested in fixed capital 
alone, comprising land, buildings and interior facilities such as equipment and 
furniture. This leads to the need of outsourcing for funds to expand the hotel 
business. They point out that in the 1970s sa le-a nd-lease back deals became an 
important way to finance hotel expansions, as such arrangements reduced the 
capital requirement and hotel operators could become more asset-light. They also 
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identify that a number of hotel buildings were owned by developers, sometimes as 
part of some larger project, and leased to a hotel operator. This offers an 
interesting insight that sale-and-leaseback is not a recent phenomenon for hotel 
expansion, but it existed and was fairly widely used in the 1970s. In addition, they 
pointed out that hotel development through the use of management contracts and 
franchising was 'non-existing in the UK in 1977, except for some franchised hotels 
established by overseas companies' (pp. 133). 
Nickson's (1997) article provides a broad understanding of how the hospitality 
industry started through the examination of autobiographies and biographies of the 
entrepreneurs who created four large hotel companies: Forte Group pIc (UK), 
Hilton Hotels Corporation (USA), Marriott International (USA) and Holiday Inn 
Hotels (USA). This article points out the lack of research into the historical 
development of the hospitality 'industry, and emphasises the importance of 
historical knowledge suggesting that'some understanding of the industry past', will 
help to 'enhance our level of understanding of the current development' of the 
hotel industry (pp. 180). This article can be linked to the present management 
debate. For instance, all the pioneers of these four hotel companies: Charles 
Forte (Forte Group p1c), J. W. Marriott (Marriott International), Conrad Hilton 
(Hilton Hotels Corporation) and Kemmons Wilson (Holiday Inn Hotels) displayed 
centralised control mentalities and this is linked to the current hospitality debate on 
standardisation and globalisation of products and operations, or organisational 
structural issues. Although this article does not provide an in-depth discussion of 
the historical development of the hotel industry, it contributes to the provision of an 
agenda for further research in the area of historical analysis, specifically on the 
hotel industry. 
Taylor and Bush's (1974) book provides an informative narration of hotel 
development between 1837 and 1862. Their study is based on secondary sources 
such as books, trade journals and newspapers. They examine predominantly the 
growth of luxurious British hotels, to some extent that of the railway hotels and 
provide a brief introduction to lodgings for the poor. The focus on the luxury 
market (equivalent to the five-star market in this study) is not surprising as during 
the period studied, travellers who were rich and famous were the main patrons of 
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hotels. In 2003, Taylor's book extends the narration of the development of hotel 
industry in the book by Taylor and Bush (1978) from the 1970s to the 1980s. Data 
were also retrieved from secondary sources: books, trade journals and 
newspapers. This book covers more events, including the two World Wars and 
more entrepreneurs and hotel operators who contributed to the growth of the UK 
hotel industry. The two World Wars highlighted the fact that the role of hotels was 
not confined to being an economic contributor to the country, but also had its 
social contribution as a functional unit for the facilitation of food rationing, shelters 
for school children and accommodation for those displaced from their home, as 
well as for both domestic and overseas military groups. 
Simmons' (1984) article studies the development of railways and their impact on 
the growth of hotels and tourism in Great Britain, based on both archival 
documents from the Public Record Office (currently known as the National 
Archive) and secondary data such as books and trade magazines. In the context 
of rail development, the extension of rail lines facilitated hotel development in 
major cities and rural areas. According to this author, hotel development by 
railway companies was initiated by the motive of creating a 'feeder of traffic to 
themselves [railway transportation]' (pp. 206). In other words, railway companies 
developed hotel services to attract more customers to use their transport services. 
Simmons (1984) also highlights the expansion of hotels into major cities to cater to 
businessmen as well as tourists, between the period 1839 and 1914. This is 
significantly familiar if compared to the UK hotel industry in the 1980s. This was 
the period when conference hotels evolved to meet demand from the business 
community for conference rooms to be used for training and meet! ng"pu rpo ses. 
Stewart's (1991) article provides a comprehensive background of the early 
development of Forte Group pIc by describing how Charles Forte started his 
empire, highlighting the various methods Forte Group pIc used to expand. 
Examples include, the Hotel Development Incentives Scheme (HDIS) to increase 
its room numbers in the early 1970s and M&A. activities within the UK and across 
national borders from the late 1970s. The HDIS enacted under the Development 
of Tourism Act 1969 provided government grants of up to E1,000 per bedroom for 
new hotel projects that started before April 1971 and were completed before April 
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1973 (Stewart, 1991). He also briefly evaluates the success of Forte Group p1c. 
One of the successful factors for Forte Group plc was experience accumulated in 
M&A activities via a range of professional advice after its resistance of the Allied 
Breweries bid in 1971 and the other was Charles Forte, who was considered to 
possess a unique entrepreneurial style in businesses. This article was an early 
part of a larger piece of work in Stewart's (1996) PhD thesis. 
Stewart's (1996) thesis studies the development of 12 hotel companies between 
1945 and 1989. His sources are based on company archival documents and 
interviews with some hoteliers from these companies. The author segments the 
samples into three hotel sectors: the independent sector, the sector that was 
geared to the UK market and the sector that developed on an international scale. 
In this thesis, the research narrates the development of the 12 companies and 
evaluates their success factors. He concludes that the drivers of the successful 
growth and development of these companies include the dual roles of the hotel 
industry as property and retail operations, strategic locations, techniques and 
timing for M&A activity, the professional advice received and management 
techniques. He provides descriptive narration's of M&A activities to highlight the 
growth of each company and ascribes success in using M&A activity as a tool for 
expansion to management skills, management intuitions and management's ability 
to time these activities, including buying undervalued assets. 
In the authors evaluation, three out of the four international companies - Grand 
Metropolitan pIc, Queen Moat Houses pIc and Forte Group pIc - presented 
'opportunistic decision-making rather than a response to the economic 
circumstances of the economy as a whole' in their M&A activities before the 1980s 
(pp. 184). The fourth company, Bass Group p1c, was the only company in this 
international group to have made strategic moves in its hotel acquisitions (Esso 
Motor Hotels and the Coral Leisure Group Limited which included Centre Hotel). 
However, since his analysis of Forte Group plc's M&A activities included only J. 
Lyons (1977) and The Savoy (198 1 ), it is not surprising that his conclusion for this 
Group is based more on opportunistic rather than strategic moves, as will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter 6. 
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Pope's (2000) article studies the development of railway resort hotels in Great 
Britain from 1918 to 1939. He uses a combination of archival data retrieved from 
the Public'Record Office and secondary data obtained from articles, trade journals 
and government organisations to explain railway hotel development before the 
Second World War. Of particular relevance to the present are the strategic moves 
hotels took in response to changes in the external market environment and 
competition. ' For instance, in the 1930s, hot and cold running water and 
telephones were installed in the bedrooms. These demand-led changes are 
mirrored in the current situation of the UK and general hotel industry, as seen by 
the provision of facsimile machines in hotels in 1989 (Wall Street Journal, 1989a) 
and the installation of internet access services in guests' rooms in the early 2000s 
(Taylor, 2006; Young, 2004). Although history does not repeat itself (Kieser, 
1994), responses to situations by management are almost identical at different 
times and in different places. 
Pope (2001) approaches hotel development from a different angle, via the study of 
consumer service between the period 1924 and 1938. In this article, he uses 
financial documents of companies retrieved from the Public Record Office in the 
most part, and, to a smaller extent, trade journals and books, to examine the 
financial performance of three hotel companies. These companies are positioned 
in three different market levels in this industry: the Savoy (five-star); the London, 
Midland and Scottish Railway (three-star) (hereafter known as LMSR); and Trust 
Houses (two-star). Pope bases his analysis in the context of transportation 
changes and their influences on the demand for types or locations of hotels. As in 
his previous study, Pope's results draw attention to how the hotel business is 
highly dependent on the external environment. In addition, they also reinforce the 
importance of locations in this industry. For instance, the business of railway 
hotels situated next to the train station was affected adversely by the increasing 
number of motor-car travellers. 
In general, the historical studies discussed above provide a comprehensive 
narration of the evolution of the hotel industry from the A. D. 400 to the late 1980s. 
Half of these studies illustrate the chronological development of the UK hotel 
industry (Borer, 1972; Nickson, 1997; Stewart, 1991; Taylor, 2003; Taylor and 
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Bush, 1974) and some have analysed the development specifically linking to 
transportation changes (Borer, 1972; Pope, 2001; Simmons, 1984). Medlik and 
Airey (1978) and Stewart (1996) provide more evaluative studies by placing the 
development of the hotel industry in the context of broader economic and external 
environmental changes. Although Pope's (2001) study mentioned that Trust 
Houses used M&A activity as a major tool for expansion between 1932 and 1938, 
he did not provide a more in-depth investigation of this method. 
Stewart's (1996) thesis in particular disseminated a clear sense of the 
development of the UK hotel industry as compared to the other studies. Again, 
M&A activities were mentioned in these studies, but there was a lack of in-depth 
discussion on why and how M&A activities were used. Moreover, the period of 
study ends in 1987 and several major world and economic events have occurred 
since. For instance, globalisation and technological advancement have changed 
the way businesses operate. 
In 1987, the study of UK hotel development was further recognised through the 
publication of annual directories of UK hotel groups (1987 - 1996, and 2000) by 
'the Hotel & Catering Research Centre at Huddersfield Polytechnic (later University 
of Huddersfield). The centre was the first in the UK hotel industry to conduct 
research, with emphasis on hotel companies and their corporate affiliation, via a 
breakdown of public, private and hotel consortia. Since then, the analysis of hotel 
companies has been more the premise of industry analysts and consultancies. 
Although these directories do not provide a historical view of the hotel 
development, they are useful for learning the context of the external environment 
in which hotel companies operated at specific years as published. 
In view of the dynamism of the business environment, the understanding of the 
development of a company or an industry cannot be removed from the external 
environment. As mentioned previously, M&A activities can provide the platform 
from which to elicit this understanding. Therefore, to provide further information 
for the background of this study, the following section examines past studies with 
regard to the development of the hotel industry with specific focus on the use of 
M&A activities. 
1 
1.4. Hotel business and M&A activities 
In the area of study on hotel development and M&A activities, in particular, there 
have been relatively few studies conducted (see Table 1.2). Moreover, each study 
has focussed on different aspects of M&A activities, which will be evaluated in the 
following discussion. 
Stewart (1996) provides a comprehensive view of the development of hotel 
companies in the UK between World War 11 and the 1980s (see 1.3). His study 
posits that timing of M&A activities contributed to the success of the growth and 
development of UK hotel companies under study. Although his study was the only 
one concentrated on the UK and its hotel industry, M&A activities formed part of 
his bigger investigation of the industry development, and not a major evaluation of 
the companies and environmental factors specifically. 
Table 1.2: Studies of hotel development and M&A activities 
Period Author(s) Focus 
studied 
1945-1989 Stewart (1996) This thesis studies the growth of 12 hotel companies in the UK 
(see 1.4) 
1980S Kwansa (1994) This article focussed on acquired hotel companies, specifically 
on M&A activities and their effects on shareholders' wealth. 
1980S Mahjan et al. The focus of their paper is on proposing a methodology to deal 
(1994) with the question of how to determine the perceived importance 
of brand equity of a potential target company in M&A activity. 
1980S Arbel and The article provides a list of anti-takeover strategies to top 
Woods (1988) executives, as the volume of M&A activities increased during 
the period under study. 
1981-1988 Crawford-Welch The authors investigated M&A and alliance activities in the 
and Tse (1990) European hospitality industry (Hotels; Restaurants and bars). 
1982-1999 Canina (2001) This article focussed on acquiring and acquired hotel 
companies, specifically on M&A activities and their effects on 
shareholders' wealth. 
Kwansa's (1994) research focuses on M&A performances of acquired companies. 
The author's sample consisted of 18 publicly quoted hotel companies in the US, 
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between the 1980s and 1990. He uses the share prices to examine the returns of 
acquired companies, and concluded that shareholders of acquired hotel 
companies in the 1980s had benefited from the M&A activities. In another similar 
study, Canina (2001) extended Kwansa's research, in terms of the period of study, 
to the year 1999. In addition, she included data analysis of the acquiring 
companies, whilst Kwansa only examined the acquired companies. The author 
also uses share price reactions to merger announcements for her analysis. Her 
results show that shareholders of both acquiring and acquired companies gained, 
which also supports Kwansa's findings. 
The focus of Arbel and Woods' (1988) article was to provide a list of anti-takeover 
strategies as the M&A activities picked up during that period. The list has its 
practical implications, being meant for top corporate management as a precaution 
against being taken over. They divided their 'shark-repellent' strategies into two 
types - long-term pre-emptive strategies and short-term reactive strategies (pp. 
31). As they pointed out, the list provided was long, but not 'exhaustive' (pp. 39). 
However, this article was written not to evaluate the motives for M&A activities, but 
to provide a conceptual proposition, particularly about anti-hostile takeover 
strategies. Similarly, Mahjan et aVs (1994) paper aims to propose a methodology 
to practitioners. The authors recognised the increasing number of discussions 
emerging with regard to the power of brands and the added value they give to the 
acquiring and acquired companies. Their study explores how the perceived 
importance of brand equity of a potential target company in M&A activity can be 
determined, using the all-suites segment in the. US hotel industry as a pilot study. 
Therefore, both these studies have different aims from this thesis. Moreover, their 
geographical focus was on the US and the period examined was confined to the 
1980s; this reinforced the lack of previous study of M&A activities and the hotel 
industry from a longitudinal perspective. 
Crawford-Welch and Tse (1990) investigated M&A and alliance activities in the 
European hospitality industry in the period between 1981 and 1988. The hotel 
industry and the UK formed part of this hospitality M&A study. According to the 
authors, 83 transactions worth approximately US$10,118 million in the hotel 
industry represented an estimated 60% of the total hospitality M&A transactions 
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($19,877) during that period. Among these transactions, 71 deals involved 
transactions between US companies; nine deals concerned non-US companies in 
the acquisition of US companies (US$3,806.7 million) while only three US 
companies were engaged in overseas hotel acquisition. The authors posited that 
the high level of activity by European hospitality organisations entering the US, 
particularly UK companies, was ascribed to a lower rate of capital return (as low as 
6%) for the latter, in comparison to that of US companies (12-15%) (Crawford- 
Welch and Tse, 1990). 
The studies discussed above cover an extensive and important period for hotel 
development. These studies are linked to M&A activities and the hotel industry, 
but are limited to an organisation perspective, such as shareholder value (Canina, 
2001; Kwansa, 1994), and a mixture of industries, such as hotels, restaurants and 
bars (Crawford-Welch and Tse, 1990), with little investigation of the external 
influences from the macro environment. For example, Crawford-Welch and Tse 
commented that rate of capital return was an influential factor for European 
companies to acquire in Europe, explicitly . showing an organisation-centred 
motive. They did put forward their view with regard to M&A activities in an external 
environmental context - mentioning that more European companies would acquire 
US companies in anticipation of US economic growth. However, this was a 
prediction from the authors and was not an empirical study addressing the causal 
relationship between M&A activities during that period (the early 1990s) and the 
macro environment. It is thus observed that there is a lack of investigation 
concerning the holistic development of hotel companies and M&A activities 
specifically in relation to the macro environment. 
Therefore, the main thrust of this thesis attempts to explore 'how' and 'why' hotel 
companies became big business, through the understanding of 'how' and 'why' 
M&A activities took place, in relation to companies' motives and external 
influences from the macro environment. 
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1.5. Alm and objectives 
In summary, the reasons for choosing this topic are: 
1. The increasing importance of the hotel industry, in terms of its economic and 
social contributions to the UK economy, and the lack of study of this industry as a 
big business. 
2. The lack of previous studies into the hotel industry in the business history 
research area. 
3. There is insufficient research on the development of UK hotel companies, 
particularly in relation to the use of the M&A mechanism as an expansion tool. 
Given the above discussion, the overall aim of this research is: 
To explore and understand the development of big business in the UK hotel 
industry by examining the motives for M&A activity, the main expansion tool 
used in creation of big business. 
In order to achieve the above aim, the following objectives have been set: 
1. To analyse the expansion of the four leading hotel companies in the UK 
from their historical data. 
2. To analyse the use of M&A activity as' a mode of expansion among the 
hotel companies. 
3. To examine gaps as to 'how' and 'why' hotel companies expand through the 
understanding of 'how' and 'why' the M&A activities took place, in relation to 
the internal motives and external influences from the macro environment. 
4. To explore the strategic changes of hotel companies and their impact on 
the hotel industry in the UK, and vice versa. 
5. To contribute to the study of M&A and business history through historical 
analysis of the leading hotel companies in the UK. 
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1.6. Structure of the thesis 
This first chapter provides the rationale and states the aim and objectives for this 
thesis. The study of big business and hotel business is explored, and a common 
trait between the two was found to be M&A activity being used as a growth 
mechanism. A further gap has been identified as the lack of existing studies on 
M&A activities in the hotel industry. Moreover, there is also a lack of in-depth 
research into the historical development of the hotel industry. 
Chapter two explores and describes major events that took place in the UK 
economy between the 1970s and the early 2000s to provide a historical context for 
this thesis. The general environmental areas highlighted include: political and 
economic changes, the deregulation of the UK financial sector, the changes in the 
UK and EU takeover policies, the emergence of the Single European Market and 
technology advancement, particularly about Information Technology in the hotel 
industry. Specific industries such as gaming, brewing and the property market, 
which are closely linked to the analysis of the four samples, are also evaluated. 
Chapter three reviews the literature on M&A activities. The concepts are based on 
two different levels, found in the general M&A literature, namely organisational and 
macro environmental levels. On the organisational level, it is generally discussed 
in terms of two schools of thought: value maximising and non-value maximising 
motives. Value maximising motives are underpinned by efficiency theory, whilst 
non-value maximising motives are linked to managerial theory. For the macro 
environmental level, it is associated with the drivers of merger waves, and this is 
referred to as 'industry shocks' in the generic literature. Value maximising motives 
include economies of scale and scope, market power, speed and strategic fit. 
Non-value maximising motives are linked to growth (in terms of company sales 
and size) and managerial welfare. Under macro environmental factors, growth (in 
terms of industry growth or decline), deregulation, technology change, and foreign 
competition are evaluated. During the M&A literature review process, it is found 
that there is a gap in this literature. There is a lack of research adopting both 
organisational and macro environmental levels to provide a more rounded 
understanding of 'why' and 'how' M&A took place, in turn providing insights for the 
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development of companies and industry. Thus, the analysis of this study will be 
carried out, based on the theoretical framework derived, encompassing the 
interactions between organisational and macro environmental factors. 
Chapter four provides a general overview of the evolution of hotel industry in the 
context of transportation change from the coaching inn period to the mid -19 th 
century. This chapter also highlights the macro environmental factors such as 
economic boom and slump and their impacts on the characteristics or nature of 
the UK hotel industry, predominantly between the 1980s to the early 2000s. This 
in turn sheds light on the nature and vulnerability of this industry, and provides a 
context for its means of expansion through the use of M&A activities. 
Chapter five provides the explanation for choosing the particular research design 
and how this design had been operationalised to achieve the aim of this thesis. 
This epistemology is based on critical realism, which recognises the importance of 
multi-level study and this complements the aim of understanding the interactions 
of organisational and macro environmental factors leading to growth of companies. 
Longitudinal and qualitative approaches are taken, in conjunction with a multiple- 
case study research strategy. Four hotel companies were selected based on their 
ranking as the largest hotel companies (see Appendix B for Largest UK hotel 
companies, 1983 - 2004). Forte Group pic (Forte Hotels), Ladbroke Group plc 
(Hilton International), Bass Group plc (InterContinental Hotels; Holiday Inns) and 
Whitbread Group pic (Whibtread Hotel Company) have been selected as they 
represent a critical sample which will provide in-depth understanding of the 
historical development of the hotel industry. Secondary data collection is the main 
research method and this is complemented by semi-structured interviews to 
address validity, reliability and generalisability issues. Finally, the actual 
implementation of the research process and limitations of this research are 
explained. 
Chapters six to nine describe the development of four UK hotel companies, with 
particular attention given to several major M&A activities in each company. Each 
of these chapters presents a case study, and each company is the unit of analysis. 
In each chapter, a brief historical development of the company and findings about 
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major M&A activities between 1979 and 2004 are presented. A comparison of 
motives for M&A activities within each case is then made between secondary data 
collected from public sources and semi-structured interviews conducted with 
industry analysts. Finally, each case ends with a discussion on the development 
of the hotel division, in a wider context of each companys corporate development 
and the macro environment. 
Chapter ten sums up the findings across the four cases, presents a cross 
examination of the motives for M&A activities across four hotel companies, and 
evaluates findings that support and do not support the literature. It also traces 
strategy changes among the four companies, through the synthesis of hotel 
development in response to changes in the macro environment, to shed light on 
the emergence of big business in the hotel industry. 
The final chapter firms up this study by providing the conclusion for the research 
question. It presents the contributions to knowledge of this thesis and links them 
to the five objectives set out in chapter one. It also identifies areas for further 
research and reflects on learning outcomes from this research process. 
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Chapter 2:. 
The UK macro environment, the 1970s - early 2000s 
This chapter explores changes in the UK macro environment in the period 
between the 1970s and the early 2000s to provide a historical context for this 
thesis. The rationale for studying the UK hotel development within this period has 
been briefly mentioned in the previous chapter (see 1.1). It has been pointed out 
that changes within the macro environment are not confined within the UK, but 
also its wider context in terms of world events. Therefore, the first section in this 
chapter presents details of the macro environmental changes, and the second 
section summarises this chapter. 
2.1. Macro environment in the UK 
The changes in the UK macro environment is illustrated through general factors 
such as political and economic changes, the UK financial sector, UK and 
European takeover policies and the Single European Market. These factors are 
influential on business development in general, and pertinent in enhancing the 
understanding of this study in particular. Equally important are the industry- 
specific factors, namely gaming, brewing and property industries, in view of their 
business connections to the four hotel companies under study in this research. 
21.1. The political and economic changes 
In the 1970s, the UK went through a considerable economic crisis caused by both 
domestic and international environments. Between 1973 and 1975, the first oil 
crisis occurred and led to a rise in world commodity prices (Dow, 1998). This 
incident coincided with the expansionary economic policy adopted by the 
government, who floated the sterling currency in mid -1972. Thereafter, the value 
of sterling was controlled by market forces, rather than the central bank, and this 
event together with the oil crisis, resulted in a steep rise in import prices for the UK 
(Dow, 1998). In 1974, although there was a change of government from 
Conservative to Labour, the expansionary policies remained unchanged, despite 
the fact that oil prices had increased four fold (Burk and Cairncross, 1992). This 
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resulted in a -high inflation rate and a severe balance of payment deficit in April 
1975 because of the combination of higher public spending, higher commodity 
prices and wage inflation. In August 1975, a special Cabinet meeting was held 
and the government borrowed from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to solve 
the severe balance of payments problem (Burk and Caimcross, 1992). 
The UK economy met with another crisis between 1979 and 1981. During this 
period, the world encountered the second oil crisis and this coincided with a 
change in the UK government and its policy. In a move to counteract a high 
domestic inflation rate in 1979, the new. government decided to check inflation by 
controlling money supply via increases in taxes and interest rates (Dow, 1998; 
Jeremy, 1998). The interest rate reached a record level of 17% in 1979 (see 
Appendix C). The consequence was lower exports for the British as sterling 
became stronger and made UK exports more expensive and uncompetitive for the 
other countries in international markets to import (see Appendix D). The UK 
economy started to recover in autumn 1982, when the world economy recovered 
and interest rates in the UK started to fall to around 9% (Jeremy, 1998). 
In the early 1980s, the UK experienced a boom, stimulated by tax cuts and failing 
interest rates. The boom was also driven by deregulation of the UK financial 
sector (see section 2.2.2. ) and higher consumer expenditure on both durable and 
non-durable goods. The period of the boom ended in the late 1980s, as interest 
rates were raised to curb consumers' expenditure and rising house prices, 
complemented by a reduction in government spending (Clark and Dilot, 2004; 
Griffiths and Wall, 2004). The economic slow down extended into the early 1990s, 
which saw the UK economy being challenged by higher rates of inflation, interest 
and wages as compared to the other EU members (Griffiths and Wall, 2004; 
Jeremy, 1998). Thus, the government decided to join the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (ERM) in October 1990, in the hope that the fixed exchange rate 
imposed by the ERM would maintain the value of sterling and help to keep import 
costs low and ease inflationary pressures (Griffiths and Wall, 2004; Zurlinden, 
1993). However, sterling faced further tension, brought about by pressure in the 
foreign exchange markets in September 1992 due to the uncertainty arising from 
progress toward monetary union (Zurlinden, 1993). As the value of sterling 
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continued to fall, the Bank of England intervened, chiefly on the foreign exchange 
market, to prevent it from falling below the lower margin of 2.778 Deutsche Mark to 
the pound. ECU 10 billion (US$14.3 billion) in the international market was 
borrowed to increase Britain's foreign exchange reserves on September 3,1992 
(Zurlinden, 1993). The Bank also raised its base rate, but could not prevent 
sterling value from falling, which led to the UK's withdrawal from the ERM on 
September 16 (Hallet and Wren-Lewis, 1997; Zurlinden, 1993). Subsequently, the 
government continued to restrain public spending, in conjunction with tax cuts, in 
order to encourage efficiency in corporations and induce employment (Griffiths 
and Wall, 2004). 
The change of government in 1997 saw a change in macroeconomic policy, which 
emphasise on the stability of economy by controlling inflation via interest rates and 
by policy-making, through institutional changes (Griffiths and Wall, 2004; Howson, 
2004). In May 1997, the government restructured the Bank of England in order to 
improve the quality of financial sector supervision and to protect consumer 
interests in an increasingly complicated financial marketplace. An independent 
Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) of the Bank of England was established to 
monitor and adjust interest rates in order to sustain an inflation rate set at 2.5% 
(Howson, 2004). Bank of England also relinquished its supervising role of the 
banking sector to the Financial Services Authority (FSA) and its responsibility for 
debt management to the Treasury department (Howson, 2004). Since the 
institutional changes, the UK economy has been experiencing a stable inflation 
rate (between 2% and 3.1% in the period between 1997 and March 2007) 
(Financial Times, 2007). 
The intention of the above is to present an overview of the economic turmoil the 
UK faced, as a consequence of interactions between the UK political and 
economic policies and the world. More importantly, it shows how the world 
economy and businesses are becoming more interdependent, and the vulnerability 
of businesses in a more open global environment. Changes in government 
monetary policies such as interest rates, coupled with dynamic world events, could 
trigger a boom or slump in an economy, ar; d in turn, could lead to a high level of 
business activities or stagnancy. Similarly, the government's decision to 
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restructure its economy can also have an impact on businesses. This is most 
evident in the 1980s period, when the government decided to deregulate the UK 
financial sector, specifically to meet international competition in the financial 
market. The following section will evaluate the deregulation of the UK financial 
sector and its impact on UK businesses. 
2.1.2. The UK financial sector 
The deregulation of the UK financial sector was spearheaded by the change in the 
Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1956. Initially, the then Prime Minister - Edward 
Heath - had wanted to extend the Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1956 to include 
the control of services, by the establishment of the Restrictive Trade Practices 
(Services) Order 1976 (Reid, 1988). Under this new Order, all companies were to 
register with the Restrictive Trade Practices (Services) Order. During the 
registration, the Director General of Office of Fair Trading (OFT), Sir Gordon Borrie 
who administered the restrictive practice policy, took the view that the Stock 
Exchange's 170-item 'rule book' of restrictions contained restrictive practices and 
should be referred to the Restrictive Practices Court. This led to a six-year debate 
between the OFT and the Stock Exchange, which was headed by Sir Nicholas 
Goodison (Reid, 1988). In 1983, the case was settled out of court with conditions, 
such as the abolishment of minimum commission rules and the single capacity 
system on 27 October 1986 (Jeremy, 1998; Reid, 1988). The removal of minimum 
commission rules enabled stock exchange member companies to negotiate their 
commissions with clients, which made the market more competitive (Reid, 1988; 
Watson, 2004). The elimination of the single capacity system created an overlap 
in job scope for brokers and jobbers. The former used to act as investors' agents 
and the latter trade over the counter and each had its own distinctive responsibility 
in the UK stock market. The other consequence of this change in the single 
capacity system was the restructuring of the Stock Exchange trading system. The 
trading centre installed a new computer system in order to handle this change, as 
well as increasing global competition in trading (Reid, 1988). 
Although these changes in the UK financial sector, widely known as 'Big Bang', 
were to take place on 27 October 1986, the UK financial sector started to go 
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through a major restructuring from 1983 (Moir, 1986). For instance, a high volume 
of activities such as mergers, acquisitions, strategic alliances and joint ventures 
occurred and diffused traditional industry boundaries (Ennew et aL, 1990; Reid, 
1988). Different types of financial institutions took advantage of the opportunity to 
diversify their portfolios and compete directly across the financial sectors (Ennew 
et aL, 1990). Banks began to branch out into stock broking, which had been 
exclusive to stock broking companies previously (Reid, 1988). Banks also moved 
into the mortgage market and competed with building societies. In the insurance 
sector, the considerable commission earnings generated by retailing insurance 
products also attracted new entrants (Ennew-et al., 1990). In conjunction with 
these changes, the realisation of the importance of customers and the 
disappearance of traditional industry boundaries led many corporate strategies of 
financial institutions to become more customer orientated and to compete for the 
same customers (Ennew et aL, 1990; Moir, 1986). 
As a result of this structural change in the City from 1983, a bigger pool of funds 
became available for M&A activities. According to Jeremy (1998), funds from 
building societies' shares and deposits rose from E1,265 million in 1951 to 
E97,512.6 million in 1984 and life assurance premiums rose from E390 million in 
1952 to E31,077 million in 1984. As for pension funds in the UK, financial 
institutions handling these funds had increased from the amount E4.5 billion in 
1963 to E200 billion by the end of 1986 (Reid, 1988). Therefore, the 1980s' 
deregulation and restructuring of the UK financial sector created more 
opportunities for the use of these increasing resources. The availability of 
resources for reinvestment within the UK, together with international competition in 
stock trading had in part encouraged and induced the fourth and fifth merger 
waves. Correspondingly, regulations directly connected to M&A activities will also 
have effects on merger waves and this will be discussed in the following section. 
2.1.3. The UK and EU takeover policies 
The purpose of takeover policies is to regulate this kind of activities, so as to 
maintain fair competition among companies in the economy, reduce monopolistic 
power to command price, as well as to protect consumers' interests. It has been 
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pointed out that the UK had been less subject to government regulations and 
restrictions than countries such as the US (Cosh et aL, 1980). This is supported 
by Roberts (1992) who pointed out that there were no legal or formal rules for the 
M&A activities in the UK prior to the 1950s. Mergers were carried out by private 
negotiations between boards of directors and it was not necessary to have sets of 
rules for their conduct beyond the minimal framework provided by the Stock 
Exchange rule book, the Companies Acts, and the law of the land on fraud. 
According to Fairburn (1989, pp. 195), the lack of formal regulations and 
restrictions on M&A activities, and the opinion that these activities were 'a powerful 
means of restructuring British industry' was evident in 1966 through . the 
establishment of the Industrial Reorganisation Corporation (IRC), a new policy 
development. The IRC was largely made up of businessmen who were given few 
constraints by formal procedures. Thus, this establishment indirectly led to the 
mergers of industries determined to be too fragmented and small by IRC to enable 
British companies to compete effectively on world markets. Its principal role 
became one which promoted rationalisation of industries and facilitated mergers 
among them to encourage growth and efficiency (Fairburn, 1989). 
Therefore, this implies the absence of a structured system to monitor M&A 
activities, which could be part of the contributing factor to the merger waves. At 
this point, it will be appropriate to provide a brief background of previous merger 
waves to put these policies into context. Merger waves are periods of high volume 
merger activity, which are characterised by cyclical activity and are followed by 
periods when relatively fewer mergers take place (Gaughan, 2007). Globally, 
merger waves peaked in 1899,1929,1968 and 1988 (Schoenberg, 2003). The 
first wave occurred around the turn of the century, 1898 -1901; the second wave 
took place between the years 1929 - 1939; the'third happened from 1965 to 1969; 
the fourth wave appeared between 1981 and 1989; while the fifth started around 
1993 (Gaughan, 2007; Melicher et aL, 1983; Schoenberg, 2003; Weston and 
Chung, 1990 and Weston and Weaver, 2001). 
Generally, each merger wave was found to be tied to a special feature. The first 
wave (1898-1901) was dominated by horizontal integration, which led to the 
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consolidation of companies and move towards monopoly (Melicher et aL, 1983; 
Schoenberg, 2003; Stigler, 1950; Weston and Chung, 1990; Weston and Weaver, 
2001). The second merger wave (1929-1939) featured vertical integration and 
was deemed to give rise to oligopoly (Stigler, 1950; Melicher et aL, 1983; Mueller, 
1977). The third merger wave (1965-1969) took place after the World War 11, 
when companies were diversifying into non-related businesses, and this wave was 
also considered as the conglomerate age (Melicher et aL, 1983; Mueller, 1977; 
Schoenberg, 2003; Weston and Chung, 1990; Weston and Weaver, 2001). 
According to the Takeover Panel (2006), the Governor of the Bank of England and 
the Chairman of The Stock Exchange initiated the establishment of the Takeover 
Panel in 1968, as a non-statutory body to administer the City Code on Takeovers 
and Mergers in response to the high level of M&A activities taking place during 
that period. The Takeover Panel has no power to enforce law, but its objective is 
to ensure fair practices in takeover offers to protect the interests of shareholders of 
both listed and unlisted public companies (Competition Commission, 1999; Pike 
and Neale, 2006). The Takeover Panel consists of representatives from major 
associations whose members are involved with takeovers, such as advisors, 
shareholders and regulators. Members are drawn, for instance, from the City and 
other leading business institutions, such as the Stock Exchange and the Institute 
of Chartered Accountants in* England and Wales (Competition Commission, 1999; 
Pike and Neale, 2006). Subjects such as public interest are dealt with by the 
Office of Fair Trading (OFT), Competition Commission (CC), the Department of 
Trade and Industry (DTI) or the European Commission (EC) (The Takeover Panel, 
2006). 
The OFT monitors various industries' monopolies and anti-competitive behaviour, 
carries out initial inquiries and calls for in-depth investigations by the Monopolies 
and Mergers Commission (MMC) if necessary. The MMC was an independent 
tribunal, which investigated specific markets, or the behaviour of companies and 
their M&A deals, and decided whether they might be expected to operate against 
the public interest. The MMC was headed by the Director General of Fair Trading 
(DGFT) who also acts as the Registrar of Restrictive Trading Agreements and 
brings cases of restrictive agreements before the Restrictive Practices Court 
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(RPC). Although the MMC's role was to investigate and report on matters referred 
to it, it had no power to initiate its own investigations or to implement policy 
(Competition Commission, 1999). 
During the 1980s, the world experienced the fourth merger wave, which has been 
characterised in terms of 'mega mergers' due to a rise in total dollar value and the 
average size of transactions in the US (Gaughan, 2007; Schoenberg, 2003). 
Similarly, 'mega mergers' occurred in the UK, as evinced by the large sum paid for 
each deal in the 1980s. The total outlay in the UK increased from E7,090 million in 
1985 to El 5,370 million the following year (see Figure 2.1). At the same time, the 
average value per deal closed in 1986 was large, at E18.254 million (Figure 2.2). 
The fifth wave began in 1993 and was characterised as one of 'strategic mega- 
mergers'(Weston and Weaver, 2001, pp. 2). In the US, the average value of M&A 
deals during this wave was slightly higher than US$1.5 trillion towards the end of 
the period 1998 to 2000 (Weston and Weaver, 2001). In the UK, the total outlay 
peaked in 2000 at E106,916 million and the average value per deal closed was 
E182.4 million (see Figure 2.1 and 2.2 respectively). This is similar to the 'mega- 
mergers' of the fourth wave. However, the fifth wave also had the strategic 
element, which has been linked to factors such as the desire to gain scale 
economies and to provide a base for global expansion (Griffiths and Wall, 2004, 
Pike and Neale, 2006). 
During the fourth and fifth merger waves, a high volume of cross-border activities 
was also present (Conn et aL, 2003). According to Conn et al. (2003), the value of 
cross-border M&A activities between 1986 and 2000 accounted for 26% of the 
worldwide total value of these activities. Within this global trend, the UK played a 
dominant role, becoming the most active country in cross-border M&A activities, 
as well as accounting for 31 % of the total value of all cross-border acquisitions in 
2000 (Conn et al., 2003). 
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Figure 2.1: M&A activities in the UK (Total outlay closed in Em) 
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Figure 2.2: M&A activities in the UK (Average outlay per deal closed in Em) 
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In 1998, as part of the Government's reform of competition law, the Competiiion 
Act 1998 became law. Thus, MIVIC was dissolved on 1 April 1999 and its functions 
were transferred to the Competition Commission (Competition Commission, 1999). 
In the early 2000s, the Enterprise Act 2002 was passed, providing some significant 
amendments to previous legislation, but maintaining the UK merger control frame 
in terms of the 'turnover test' and the 'share of supply' test (Competition 
Commission, 1999, pp. 28). For the former, a relevant merger is one involving a 
target company with a UK turnover exceeding E70 million. The latter refers to 
merged enterprises which make up a total of 25% of all those particular goods or 
services supplied in the UK or a substantial part of the UK (Competition 
Commission, 1999). This takeover policies in turn had direct and indirect impact 
on the case companies in this thesis. For example, Forte Group p1c's growth in 
the hotel and catering industry (see 6.2.2) was almost delayed by the 25% market 
share rule in the Takeover code. Similarly, Bass and Whitbread, another two of 
the case companies were affected by the stringent takeover policies, leading to 
their failure to continue expansion into the brewing industry (see Chapter 8 and 9 
respectively). 
In conjunction with national monitoring bodies and legislation, the UK has also had 
to comply with European competition policy since 1990. The European 
Commission works closely with national governments and carries out 
investigations into whether mergers are compatible or incompatible with the Single 
European Market and, if they are found incompatible, may require that off-setting 
conditions are met or that the merger be banned (European Competition Policy, 
2006). However, with the enlargement of the European Union, new regulations 
were introduced in January 2004 and commenced on 1 May 2004 to coincide with 
its enlargement (European Commission Representation in the UK, 2005). 
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2.1.4. The Single European Market 
The Single European Market is defined as 
loan area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, 
persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of 
this Treaty" (Europa, 1986b). 
The objective of the Single European Act (SEA) enacted in 1986 was to open the 
way to political integration and economic and monetary union (Europa, 1986a). In 
1992, the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) was signed to modify previous treaties - 
Paris (1952), Rome, (1957), and the Single European Act (1986 - 1992) and the 
European Economic Community (EEC) (became known as European Union (EU) 
in 1993) (Europa, 1986a; 2007). Thus, the SEA provided for the transformation of 
the European markets into a single market in the EU states on 1 January 1993 by 
creating new Community competencies and reforming the institutions. 
Consequently, with the establishment of the SEA, issues such as the protection of 
national markets within the EU were removed. Companies were prevented by the 
EU's competition policy from fixing prices or dividing markets among them 
(Europa, 1986a). This translates into fair competition between different 
companies, originating from different countries in the EU. 
The benefits that were anticipated to become available when the Single European 
Market came into force in 1992 included the easing of labour movement, resulting 
in a bigger pool of talents to tap into; the removal of barriers to trade in services 
and manufacturing, implying efficiencies in production and lower prices for EU 
consumers; and unrestricted access to more than 456 million consumers by 
producers in the EU (Europa, 1986a). These benefits in part spurred the 
aggregate M&A activities that created the fourth and fifth merger waves. 
The anticipation of increased business volume when the SEA was established and 
the progress towards Economic and Monetary Union, has been widely proposed 
as an explanation for the high volumes of European cross-border activity (Nellis 
and Lockhart, 1995). As mentioned previously, the UK became a dominant player 
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in M&A activities from the 1980s, particularly in the US and Europe. Boyce and 
Ville (2002, pp. 97) noted that 'the UK and US are characterised by freely 
competitive markets, transparency in corporate affairs and regulatory structures to 
protect investors from the incompetence and dishonesty of agents'. According to 
Geroski and Vlassopoulos (1990), one of the reasons proposed for the high 
volume of acquisitions in the US by UK companies was the extremely open nature 
of the capital markets in both countries, and their similar business cultures. It had 
been recorded that 42.3% of the foreign-based acquisitions of US companies were 
closed by UK companies in 1985, and their share of total acquisitions rose to 
56.6% in 1988. However, it has also been observed that UK companies shifted 
their targets from the US to the European region in the late 1980s (Berton, 1990). 
Mark Dixon, editor of Translink's British American Deal Review, a newsletter on 
British mergers, noted that British companies had been making more acquisitions 
in Europe in the 1980s, amounting to $1.8 billion in France, $1.4 billion in West 
Germany and $1.3 billion in the Netherlands (Berton, 1990). In their study on M&A 
motives in the 1980s, Ingram et aL (1992, pp. 202) also found that 53% of their 
sample had been involved in overseas M&A activities, which they attributed to the 
increasing 'Europeanization of industry'. Geroski and Vlassopoulos (1990) studied 
the Continental mergers between 1983 and 1987 and found that the UK accounted 
for nearly three quarters of all European mergers in 1988, and for most of the 
value involved in such transactions. 
Similarly, Bleeke et a/. 's (1990) work also supported this view, as they found that 
UK companies accounted for 39% of the intra-European cross-border M&A 
activities between 1988 and 1989. According to Garcia and Torre-Enciso (1995), 
the expected industrial restructuring as a consequence of the emerging Single 
European Market drove the high level of M&A activities. The UK was particularly 
active in the early 1990s, evinced by 751 deals closed (26.9% of total deals), 
which were worth a total of $26.3 billion (32.26% of total value) in 1993. The UK 
also emerged with the greatest number of bids in the period between 1993 and 
2000, and accounted for 19 out of 69 cross-border bids as compared to the other 
European countries (Goergen and Renneboog, 2004). Faccio and Masulis (2005) 
also found that UK companies made up the largest group of bidders (65.3% of 
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total number of bidding companies) in European M&A deals, as well as the largest 
targeted group (47% of total targeted companies), between 1997 and 2000. 
The high volume of M&A activities across European countries reflected the 
opportunities created by the European Single Market, as well as the unrestricted 
access to more consumers. The implications of these opportunities for the UK 
hotel industry are increased in demand for accommodation, leading to a growing 
industry which is attractive to both domestic and international hotel companies. 
This regional development can be linked to a wider context, in which globalisation 
was taking place about the same period. Globalisation has been linked to 
technology change and advancement, which enabled ease of communications and 
travel across borders. The next section discusses technology change in general, 
and particularly information technology change and its link to the hotel industry. 
2.1.5. Information Technology (IT) 
According to Jeremy (1998), technology in the nineteenth century was dominated 
by the railway and in the twentieth century by a succession of transport and 
communications inventions, space vehicles and information technology (IT). In the 
early 1900s, technology in terms of mass production techniques was a partial 
explanation for the 'tide of increased scale economies ebb[ing] and flow[ing] in all 
industries at the same time' (Hannah and Kay, 1977, pp. 93). Since the 1990s, IT 
could be claimed as part of that 'tide. For instance, the use of 'geo-stationary' 
satellites permitted simultaneous cheap voice, data, and video links worldwide 
(Jones, 2005, pp. 35). 
In the hospitality industry, IT was first used in the 1950s by multinational hotel 
companies, as an experiment with the developing field of computer science 
(O'Connor and Piccoli, 2003). The experiment started with initial applications 
centred on accounting and automating repetitive and time-consuming tasks. In 
addition, software was borrowed, frorn other industries, such as the airline booking 
system, on the assumption that it could be easily adapted for use by hospitality 
companies (Hartmann, 2004). However, such conversions were usually only 
partially successful and a large number of changes to business processes and 
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procedures were often needed to accommodate the requirements of the 
computerised system (Hartmann, 2004; O'Connor and Piccoli, 2003). 
According to Harrington (1978), the nature of the hotel industry is fragmented, 
comprising many small individually owned hotel units did not justify the high cost of 
developing specialised programmes for individual hotel units. These programmes 
would have to cover a range of general and specific functions namely, 
reservations, conference bookings, room status, travel agents' commissions, 
accounting, front office guest accounting and the production of hotel statistics 
(Harrington, 1978). The hotel industry first modified the airline electronic booking 
system - Global Distribution System (GDS) - for room bookings. However, the 
airlines system was catering to a limited type of seats and journeys between two 
destinations whilst the complexity of the hotel business, in terms of its variety of 
room types and multiple locations made the room reservation and transaction 
process complicated (Hartmann, 2004). Therefore, the expense and technicality 
involved in both developing and running systems made the use of computerisation 
economical only for the largest companies (O'Connor and Piccoli, 2003). 
In the US, the group of Holiday Inns was the pioneer for the use of computers as 
an operational and management system in the hotel industry. The Group 
developed and improved it from the 1960s, produced the first computerised hotel 
reservation system with a succession of developments, and became the first hotel 
company with on-line reservation service in 1995 (Sangster, 2000b). In the UK, 
Trust House Forte, in the early 1980s, was the first hotel company to develop a 
hotel reservation system - Fortres - connecting all its hotels to the central 
reservation offices, by the use of micro computers (AR/ THF, 1984; Goymour, 
1985). Fortres demonstrated an evolution of UK hotel computer technology: from 
its invention and implementation in the early 1980s to the sophisticated computer 
reservation and operational system used worldwide in 2004. The Group 
commissioned Applied Communications, a subsidiary of Applied Communications 
Inc. of Nebraska, USA to develop its worldwide reservations system in 1981, and 
the system - Fortres - started operations in 1983 (Goymour, 1985). Applied 
Communications Inc. was well-known for pioneering the development of electronic 
funds transfer systems which enabled banking or charge cards to be authorised 
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and processed over telephone lines. However, the advancement of technology in 
general, and for the hotel industry in particular, was late, as hotel guests were still 
unable in 1985 to pay their bills via the authorising or processing of charge cards 
over telephone lines (Goymour, 1985). 
The use of IT in the hotel industry evolved from using computers, on a hotel unit 
level, related to accounting and costing records in the early 1980s, to other 
functions such as the integration of word-processing and information between 
accounting (back-office) and front-desk (front-office) billing records, thus cutting 
out the need to re-enter guest history files. By this time, smaller hotel companies 
and independent hotels in the UK were also beginning to use these integrated 
systems. In the mid 1980s, computer systems in the hotel industry had developed 
from operating to marketing functions (Whitehall, 1985). For example, the 
recording began with customers' personal data which enabled hotel companies to 
profile customers and market to their target more efficiently. This increasingly 
popular practice led to new legislation requiring hotel companies that kept 
personal staff or client information on computers to register under the new Data 
Protection Act by May 1 Oth 1986 (Caterer and Hotelkeeper, 1985f). 
By the mid 1990s, computers and other electronic systems had become common 
in hotels. They could make room bookings, take orders in restaurants and keep 
tracks on purchasing and stocks (Lanigan, 1996). Like all other service industries, 
the hotel industry aims to have repeat customers and IT had developed into a 
relationship marketing tool, between a hotel and its client via records of guests' 
preferences, and to respond to such preferences on subsequent bookings in 
electronic format (Baines, 1998). In addition, IT in the form of the Internet also 
enables smaller establishments, such as bed and breakfasts, to reach a larger 
market. The Internet disseminates information for these small companies to both 
local and international market (Lituchy and Rail, 1999). 
From the late 1990s, IT technology progressed from facilitating management 
control systems to interaction with customers (e-distribution) and suppliers (e- 
procurement) (O'Connor and Piccoli, 2003). The progress in technology is 
evidenced by the reduction in cost. For example, the cost of data storage reduced 
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from El per character in the 1960s to one penny per million characters in the 
2000s (O'Connor and Piccoli, 2003). The Internet in particular is increasingly 
being used to market destinations worldwide, because sales of travel products via 
the Internet reduce costs and present low entrance barriers in terms of financial 
investment and know-how (International Labour Organisation, 2001). Companies 
also increasingly saw IT as a key competitive advantage (Hotel Report, 1999b; 
O'Connor and Piccoli, 2003). This development is also evidenced by the shifting 
of responsibilities for web design from technical staff to include marketing and 
sales staff, because more people are booking their hotel reservations online 
(Allenson, 2004). In 2004, other electronic facilities became important in attracting 
customers, particularly business travellers. After the initial stage of installing high 
speed internet in guest rooms, the electronic attraction shifted to adopting self 
service check-in kiosks, Wi-Fi enabled roaming and recharging cradles in rooms 
for Apple Pod personal players (Woodyard, 2004). 
The changes in the development of technology in the service industry in general, 
and the hotel industry in particular, reflect the importance of technology as an 
influential factor on management decision-making processes regarding strategic 
issues in business operations and company expansion. The arrival of the Internet 
provided an impetus for the growth of the hotel industry. In view of the nature of 
this industry which made up of many scattered hotel units worldwide, IT enhances 
value by information disseminations and cost reduction by the capabilities of the 
technology in handling a vast amount of information. 
In summary, the discussion in the previous sub-sections reviewed general 
environmental factors such as political and economic policies, the liberalised 
financial sector, increasing stringency in takeover policies and IT as factors that 
either facilitate or slow down the development of companies. These factors were 
important drivers for M&A activities in the UK. during the fourth and fifth merger 
waves. In addition to these general environmental influences, industry-specific 
changes are equally influential on companies' growth: for instance, legislation in 
the gaming and brewing industry and the cyclical nature of property market. 
These industries and their changes have produced corresponding effects on the 
sample under study in this thesis. For instance, Ladbroke Group pIc originated in 
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the gaming industry while Bass Group plc was connected to this industry to a 
lesser extent (see Chapter 7 and 8 respectively). These changes in the gaming 
industry are discussed in the next section. 
2.1.6. The gaming industry 
In the UK, the Gaming Act was passed in 1968 and the Gaming Board was 
established to discourage gaming, to stamp out illegal commercial gaming and to 
ensure that gaming was honestly conducted in decent surroundings (Gaming 
Board, 2005). There was no amendment of the Act until the early 1990s, when the 
call for a change in the gaming regulations was first brought to attention by a 
proposal to launch the National Lottery (Hencke, 1993). The National Lottery 
launched in 1994 was deemed to be a threat to employment in other gaming 
sectors, particularly pools workers because of the similar nature of two games 
(lottery and pool) (Hencke, 1993). Besides the threat to employment, the National 
Lottery was given permission to roll over its prize money if no one won, while, 
under the Gaming Act 1968, the pools were not allowed to (Hencke, 1993). A 
further violation was the televised draw for the Lottery, which worked against the 
Gaming Act's forbidding of stimulating demand for gambling (Daneshkhu, 1997a; 
Hencke, 1993). 
These instances led to lobbying by other sectors in the gaming industry to relax 
the tight rules. By late 1997, restrictions on the advertisement of bingo and 
football pools (betting on the results of soccer games) was lifted, betting shops 
were allowed to open up their shop fronts and fruit machines were allowed higher 
stakes and prizes (Daneshkhu, 1998; Doward, 1997). However, the rules on the 
casino industry were still more stringent, such as limited advertising rights which 
disallowed casinos listing their addresses in a directory or placing advertisements 
on TV channels (Daneshkhu, 1998). It was estimated that only 3% of the adult 
population visit'casinos in the UK on a regular basis, as compared to much higher 
percentages in countries such as France and the USA, where the figure was 
closer to 20% (Harris, 2003). Moreover, sport betting industry, bingo industry and 
the National Lottery together accounted for 88% of the population who participated 
in gambling in one form or another, spending upwards of E13 billion per year on 
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the activity (Harris, 2003). This inconsistency in the gambling deregulation 
resulted in the gaming industry and Gaming Boards demanding for a thorough 
review of the legislation (Daneshkhu, 1998). ' Consequently, the Gambling Act 
2005 was enacted and the Gaming Board was replaced by the Gambling 
Commission on October 1,2005 (Gambling Commission, 2007). 
For the most part, these changes related to the gaming industry are specifically 
pertinent to the hotel business development of Ladbroke Group plc (see Chapter 
7), which started its business in the gaming industry, and, to a certain extent, to 
Bass Group p1c, which was the biggest bingo hall owner before changing its focus 
to the hotel industry in 1998 (see Chapter 8). Equally important to Bass Group plc 
is legislation changes in the brewing industry, since this Group's original business 
was brewing. Likewise, Whitbread Group plc also originated as a brewing 
company was affected by new brewing legislation (see Chapter 9) and the next 
section highlights changes pertinent to the brewing industry. 
2.1.7. The brewing industry 
Brewers in the UK have long been involved in the hotel industry, particularly 
through the initial establishment of rooms for customers who drank at their inns 
(Gourvish and Wilson, 1994). In the 1970s, several UK brewers began to venture 
into the hotel business, partly as a diversification strategy, and partly to explore the 
growing hotel industry. The Beer Orders introduced in March 1989 had a direct 
influence on many brewers, in particular on their hotel expansion strategies. 
The new legislation was established by the MMC to 'increase competition in 
brewing, wholesaling and retailing' (House of Commons, 2004, pp. 10). This 
legislation was an outcome of an investigation initiated by the Director General of 
Fair Trading (DGFT) following brewery consolidation and vertical integration in the 
beer market. The investigation was particularly aiming at the relationship between 
breweries and pubs in 1986 (House of Commons, 2004). There were four types of 
pubs in the UK, tied houses, free houses, retail pub chains and management 
houses. 'Tied houses' were linked closely to the national brewers because they 
were obligated by contract to sell only the brands of the national brewers. At the 
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other extreme, 'free houses' were pubs that were free to sell any brand of beer 
they chose. As for the retail pub chains and management houses, they were 
owned and operated by the brewers themselves (House of Commons, 2004). 
Therefore, the main concern of the Beer Orders was the relationship between the 
national brewers and the tied houses. In the report - The Supply of Beer - it was 
found that a monopoly system existed, in the form of contract agreements 
between brewers who owned tied houses or who had tying agreements with free 
houses in return for loans at favourable interest rates (House of Commons, 2004). 
Table 2.1: Estimate of public house ownership, 1989 and 2004 
1989 2004 
Company Numbers of Company Numbers of 
(Country) public houses (Country)* public houses 
Bass Group PIC 7,190 Enterprise Inns 8,739 
(UK) 
Allied Breweries 6,678 Punch Taverns 8,410 
Ltd. (UK) 
Whitbread Group 6,483 Spirit Group 2,468 
PIC (UK) 
Grand 6,419 Wolverhampton 2,112 
Metropolitan PIC &- Dudley 
(UK) Breweries 
Courage 5,002 Greene King 2,100 
(Australia) 
Scottish & 2,287 Mitchells & 2,077 
Newcastle (UK) Butlers 
Scottish & 1,094 
Newcastle 
Wellington Pub 835 
Company 
Avebury 750 
Taverns 
London & 696 
1 Edinburgh Inns I 
Total 34,059 1 1 29,281 
Source: Adapted from House of Commons (2004) 
*All these companies are under UK ownership. 
Under the Beer Orders, breweries that owned more than 2,000 pubs were forced 
to sell their excess properties by November 1,1992 (Goldsmith, 1993; Monroe, 
1990). The decision was aimed at reducing the monopoly power of the 'Big Six' - 
Bass Group p1c, Allied Breweries Ltd, Whitbread Group pic, Grand Metropolitan 
p1c, Courage, a unit of Australia's Fosters Brewing Group Ltd and Scottish & 
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Newcastle plc (House of Commons, 2004; Goldsmith, 1993; Monroe, 1990). The 
Big Six were vertically integrated national brewers, who were also the producer, 
distributor, wholesaler, and retailer and they controlled about 77% of the market; 
more than a third of the country's 83,000 pubs were tied to them in 1989 (see 
Table 2.1). After the implementation of the Beer Orders, the national brewers sold 
off some 11,000 pubs nationwide, which added to the level of M&A activities within 
the industry (Goldsmith, 1993). In 1993, a further consolidation between Courabe 
and Grand Metropolitan p1c, and Allied Breweries Ltd and Carl sbe rg-Tetley 
resulted in five big companies that held about 84% of the market share: Bass at 
21 %, Grand Metropolitan - Courage at 20%, Allied - Carlsberg at 17%, Whitbread 
Group plc at 14%, and Scottish & Newcastle at 12% (Goldsmith, 1993). 
According to the House of Commons (2004), although the Beer Order had 
reduced the monopolistic power of the biggest six brewers, the concentration in 
pub ownership had increased since the 1990s with the creation of pubcos. 
Pubcos are chains of tied public houses, owned and operated by companies that 
do not own breweries. The disposal of tied public houses by both national and 
regional brewers provided the chance for pubcos to become a dominant business 
sector in the brewing industry. For instance, concentration of this sector grew via 
M&A activity in the 1990s, so much so that the two largest owners of pubs, with 
8,739 and 8,410 respectively, owned more units than the top two in 1989 (see 
Table 2.1). Moreover, all pubcos, own around 70% of UK public houses, with the 
remaining 30% owned by free house operators by, 2004 (House of Commons, 
2004). In 2003, the Beer Orders were revoked as it was found that brewers 
affected by the Beer Orders previously no longer owned more than 2,000 public 
houses. 
This structural change has highlighted changes in both international and domestic 
scenes. As evident from Table 2.2, at the end of 2003 the top six brewers held 
84% of the on-trade market in terms of supply. The structural change in the UK 
brewing industry, as evident from the penetrat 
' 
ion of foreign owners, for example 
international brewing companies originating from USA, and Denmark, became the 
top six brewers, reflected the internationalisation of this industry. Thus, these 
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changes in the brewing industry also added to the volume of M&A activities in the 
fifth merger wave. 
Table 2.2: Top six brewers in Great Britain in terms of market share (year ending 
December 2003) 
Company Market Share 
On-Trade (%) Off-Trade 
Scottish Courage Ltd. 
(UK) 
26 23 
Coors Brewing Company 
(USA) 
20 17 
Interbrew UK (UK) 16 26 
Carlsberg-Tetley 
(Denmark) 
14 11 
Diageo plc (UK) 6 3 
Anheuser Busch (USA) 2 4 
84 183 
bource: Aaapte(I trom House ot Uommons (Zuu4) 
The decline in demand for beer and socio-cultural changes forced brewers to 
consolidate or look outside their core brewing business (Parker-Pope, 1995). 
According to Sylvain Massot, an analyst at Morgan Stanley & Co., 97% of world 
beer consumption was of lager while the majority of beer brewed in the UK was 
ale, which hindered the UK brewer from expanding in the international market. 
Another analyst pointed out that other European brewers, such as Heineken NV of 
the Netherlands and Belgium's Interbrew SA, which were facing the same problem 
with declining beer consumption in their home markets, had focused on expanding 
their core business in other drink markets (Parker-Pope, 1995). In contrast, the 
British brewers were diversifying for companies' growth and entered the leisure 
and food retailing industry. For example, Bass Group plc expanded through the 
operation of bingo shops, betting clubs and hotels (Parker-Pope, 1995), and 
Whitbread Group plc also diversified its businesses to concentrate on building 
itself up as a retailing company in food, restaurant and hotel sectors (AR/ 
Whitbread, 1993). 
Another important industry specific factor that plays _a 
major role in UK M&A 
activities in the fourth and fifth merger waves was real estate related. The cyclical 
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nature of the property market has a direct impact on the hotel industry since the 
latter is also an asset-heavy industry. The following section reviews the UK 
property market changes. 
2.1.8. The property market 
The UK property market experienced a boom in the early 1970s, stimulated by 
several events (Scott, 1996). First, there was a change to the Land Commission 
legislation. The government, which took office in 1971, relaxed the controls on 
office development and repealed this legislation in order to reduce upward 
pressure on rents and allow offices space to expand, in anticipation of increased 
demand following Britain's entry to the EU (Scott, 1996). Second, banks 
increased their lending to fund property developers due to the favourable 
performance of the property market (Scott, 1996). 
Third, the financial institutions were active in property development activity in the 
early 1970s because of the new Corporate Tax. According to Scott (1996), the 
new Corporate Tax had provided incentives for property companies to reinvest 
their profits rather than distribute them as dividends to shareholders. Financial 
institutions took this opportunity to own properties directly in order to avoid the 
payment of Corporate Tax. This led to a growth in assets and the low dividends 
depressed share prices, which led to a big gap between the market capitalisation 
of a company's shares and the net value of its assets. These conditions in turn 
escalated the concentration of the property company sector as more financial 
institutions and other property companies started to acquire undervalued property 
assets via corporate acquisitions (Scott, 1996). 
However, the boom was followed by the 1974 property crash (Baum, 1999; Scoff, 
1996). The crash was caused by the worldwide oil crisis, a high inflation rate and 
a rise in interest rates on bank loans in the UK (Scott, 1996). Thus, between 1974 
and 1978, over E2 billion worth of property assets were transacted by British 
property companies (Baum, 1999). The period between 1975 and 1982 saw the 
financial institutions displacing property companies to become the major owners of 
UK properties. The value which financial institutions held rose from V billion to 
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E27 billion, comprising 20% of all institutional investment (MacLeary and 
Nanthakumaran, 1988). 
In the mid 1980s, there was another property boom, primarily in the service and 
financial sectors (Baum, 1999). Over the period 1985 -1987, the financial 
deregulation and the arrival of overseas financial service companies increased 
demand for office space. For example, the number of foreign banks in the City 
rose from 77 in 1960 to 226 in 1973 and 399 in 1986 (Baum, 1999). According to 
Baum (1999) and Scott (1996), the boom was caused by a high demand and low 
supply in properties and a relaxation of the City Corporation's planning restrictions. 
The lack in supply of office space was claimed to have escalated rents, causing an 
increase of 108% between 1984 and 1988. During this period, developers and 
bankers became the main property investors rather than institutional investors, 
such as pension funds and insurance companies, because the latter were much 
more involved with investment in securities and shares (Scott, 1996). 
The UK property boom ended when rising unemployment and high inflation 
affected the demand for property in the late 1980s (Scott, 1996). As the 
government raised interest rates in October 1989 in an attempt to reduce 
inflationary pressures, it was considered as 'a double blow to the property 
development market' because the demand for new buildings would decrease while 
cost for building would rise (Scott, 1996, pp. 230). During the same period, a new 
group of overseas investors entered the UK property market. The relaxing of 
Swedish and German cross-border investment restrictions and changes in 
German tax policy had further driven funds out from these savings-oriented 
countries and into UK property (Baum, 1999). According to Jacobs (2005), during 
the 1990s, overseas banks from Ireland, Scotland and Germany, as well as private 
individuals, became the major investors. These banks' investments in UK 
commercial property rose from EO. 2 billion in 1987 to E3.3 billion in 1990, 
remaining well above El billion every year thereafter. Similarly, Baum. (1999) 
found that 12.5% of all property transactions over the period 1988 to 1995 in UK 
commercial property were bought by overseas owners. 
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Therefore, the property market is a sensitive industry, not only because it is 
dependent on the macro environment, but also it is a capital intensive industry 
which is dependent on various investors for capital. This industry's characteristic 
is very similar to that of the hotel industry. The hotel industry has traditionally 
been linked closely to property ownership because of its physical product (Stewart, 
1996). Thus, fluctuations in property prices have had important implications for 
this industry in terms of financing expansion and finding investors for capital 
investment. This affiliation between property market and hotel industry will be 
discussed in chapter 3. 
2.2. Summary 
In summary, it can be said that the fourth and fifth merger waves in the 1980s and 
1990s were driven by the interactions of factors within and outside of the UK. The 
former included events such as the liberalised financial sector, the change in 
political and economic policies, changes in legislation in different industries 
(gaming; brewing) as well as socio-cultural changes which affected consumers' 
demand for goods and services. The latter is. connected to the establishment of 
the Single European Market, EU takeover policies and technological 
advancement, which brought with them increasing international competition in the 
UK. 
Change in political and economic policies highlighted the interdependence of 
national and international changes, and the vulnerability of business which is 
dependent on both. Deregulation of the financial sector triggered a spill over effect 
into other industries, nationally and internationally, in terms of increase in funds 
made available by both domestic and international financial institutions. The 
previous relaxed takeover policies were seen as one of the drivers for M&A 
activities and increasing concentration in certain industries in the UK. The 
advancement in technology in general, and IT in the hotel industry in particular, 
provided an impetus for this industry to grow. In view of the nature of the hotel 
industry, as one which operates either on a small scale of one unit or a big scale 
comprising many units, scattered worldwide, IT provides the solution to information 
dissemination for marketing, as well as operational features such as room 
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management and maximisation of room sales. Changes in gaming and brewing 
legislation have not only displayed socio-cultural changes, but also reveal the 
drivers for hotel business development and strategy change in three of the four 
case companies. By the same token, the property market, which is similar to the 
hotel industry, in terms of high investment cost and its cyclical nature, reflected the 
difficulties hotel companies faced when planning to expand and finding investors 
to invest. This is particularly difficult when there were economic slow down and 
increased interest rates. 
The implications of this discussion highlight the macro environmental factors which 
would affect companies' business development in either positive or negative ways. 
Different companies would have been affected directly or indirectly in their 
business performance by one or more of the above changes and, in response to 
them, companies change their strategies. Since investment decisions are part of a 
company strategy, and M&A activities are one of those decisions, taken as a 
mechanism for change and expansion, the above serves as a context for further 
discussion in relation to the four case companies in particular and the UK hotel 
industry in general. 
The next chapter evaluates M&A literature with particular emphasis on the motives 
for engaging in these activities, both from the organisational perspective and in 
terms of macro environmental influences. 
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Chapter 3: 
Mergers and acquisitions 
The previous chapter reviewed several factors linked to the opportunities, created 
by both general and industry-specific factors, for companies to use M&A activities 
for expansion in general, and provided a historical context for this study in 
particular. The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the literature on M&A 
activities as the agent of expansion, and identify the gap in this theory and 
highlight the relevance of this gap in relation to this study. The literature review is 
also intended to provide a theoretical framework to firm up the analysis of the four 
cases. The first part explains the different types of M&A activity. The second and 
third parts study the motives for M&A activities at the organisational level from the 
value maximising and non-value maximising perspectives respectively. The fourth 
part examines the industry shocks concept, based on the relation between M&A 
activities and macro environment. The final part summarises the discussion. 
3.1. Types of merger and acquisition activity 
In general, the common types of M&A activities are conglomerate, horizontal and 
vertical integration (Gaughan, 2007; Ingram et al., 1992; Kitching, 1967). A 
number of authors have further segregated conglomerate mergers into related- 
and unrelated-diversification (Hayn, 1989; Salter and Weinhold, 1978). According 
to Ansoff (1957), diversification is a growth alternative when the company departs 
from and develops a product line and market structure that is different from its 
existing business. A conglomerate merger is one that has been sub-divided into 
product extension, market extension and other 'pure' varieties (Stern, 1969, pp. 
20). Pure diversification is generally linked to an unrelated-diversification when an 
acquirer purchases a target company where there are no similar products and 
markets (Salter and Weinhold, 1979). Lubatkin and Chatterjee (1994) posited that 
an unrelated diversification is based on the notion that a companies' unsystematic 
risk can be reduced. On the other hand, Singh and Montgomery (1987) suggest 
that both unrelated and related M&A activities are able to gain some efficiency and 
market power. However, they argue that the benefits of the former are more 
general as compared to the latter. For example, gains from unrelated M&A 
-50- 
activities may result in reduced financing costs, but the cost-benefits from these 
activities should also be available in related M&A activities. In contrast, the 
specific gains from related M&A activities are not expected to be present in 
unrelated M&A activities. Therefore, the authors expected companies engaging in 
related M&A activities to gain more benefits. 
According to Lee and Alexander (1998), a related M&A activity involves the 
purchase and consolidation of companies in the same or related product markets. 
This activity could occur in two simple forms: horizontal and vertical activities. A 
horizontal M&A refers to combining two companies that have the same or similar 
products existing at different geographical locations, and the purpose is to derive 
economies of scale or increase market share (Ingram et al., 1992; Kitching, 1967). 
A vertical M&A is the integration of supplier and customer of the buying company 
in the same industry (Gaughan, 2007; Kitching, 1967), and the purpose is to seek 
ownership or increase control of its supplier (backward integration) or distribution 
system (forward integration). Thus, vertical acquisitions assured companies of a 
stable supply of inputs for production, in addition to the ability to distribute 
effectively though its own distribution channels (Gaughan, 2007; Ingram et aL, 
1992). 
Therefore, the main difference between horizontal and vertical integration is that 
the latter integrates suppliers into the business operation, which neither increases 
the volume of production nor the product market share of the combined 
companies. However, the different types of M&A activities are interlinked upon 
closer scrutiny, particularly in the case of related activities. The motives for related 
M&A activities have been linked to expanding production capacity or extending 
distribution channels in order to maximise value for the company (Gaughan, 2007; 
Hitt et aL, 1998; Ingram et aL, 1992; Schoenberg, 2003; Singh and Montgomery, 
1987; Teece, 1980; Willig, 1979). 
In view of this thesis which is exploring how and why companies used M&A activity 
to expand their hotel business in the hotel industry, this study is thus closely linked 
to related M&A activities and particularly the motives of M&A activities. Therefore, 
the term 'related M&A activity' is used in this thesis in a broad sense to include 
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horizontal acquisitions, of companies with same products / markets, as well as 
acquisitions of companies with similar products / markets to those of the acquiring 
company. Companies that share a common skill, resource, market or distribution 
system to serve similar markets are also considered in terms of related M&A 
activities. Motives for M&A activities are generally argued in the form of two 
schools of thoughts - value and non-value maximisation. 
3.2. Value maximisation motives 
The value-maximising motive is based on expected value creation through 
synergies for shareholders of both the acquiring and acquired company 
(Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1993; Lee and Alexander, 1998; Seth, 1990a). 
According to Seth (1 990b, pp. 432), 
'The concept of value creation is synonymous with that of synergy. 
Synergy exists in M&A activities when the value of the combined entity 
exceeds the sum of the values of the two combined'. 
The underlying assumýtions to maximising or creating value in M&A activities are 
linked to the efficiency theory, such as cost reduction or value enhancement 
between two merging companies (Gaughan, 2007). 
These efficiency-related factors are generally based on the views that M&A 
activities have been planned and executed to achieve synergies, such as 
operational, financial, strategic and managerial synergies (Schoenberg, 2003; 
Trautwein, 1990). According to Trautwein (1990), operational synergies arise from 
combining operations of different operating units or from knowledge transfers, and 
these synergies result in lower costs for the combined business units or a higher 
value through new products and services. Similarly, Ghosh (2004) argued that the 
underlying force for operational synergy lies in better asset management and 
higher profitability, which is derived from a bigger market share. It is also argued 
that value is created through financial synergies when the combined companies 
increase the company's size, resulting in a lower expected risk with the enlarged 
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company size, thus getting access to financial capital at a lower interest rate 
(Kusewitt, 1985; Lubatkin, 1983; Uhlenbruck and De Castro, 1998; Yagil, 1996). 
Smalter and Lancey (1966) posit that strategic synergies are achieved when value 
is enhanced through diversification into growth markets and reducing dependence 
on existing activities for earnings growth. Value is also created through 
managerial synergies as a result of managerial efficiency, which ý improves 
production techniques in the combined companies' resources and capabilities and 
derives economies of scale or scope (Kim and Singal, 1993). The different 
synergies can be linked to motives of achieving value creation, based on the most 
consistently-observed assumptions from other studies in examining value 
maximisation motives, namely, (i) economies of scale and scope, (ii) market 
power, (iii) strategic fit and (iv) speed (Halpern, 1983; Hart, et aL, 1973; Salter and 
Weinhold, 1979; Seth, 1990a; Schoenberg, 2003; Singh and Montgomery, 1987; 
Smalter and Lancey, 1966; Teece, 1980; Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001; Willig, 
1979). Similarly, non-value creating motives can be based on (v) growth in sales 
and (vi) managerial welfare as the underlying assumptions (Baumol, 1967; 
Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1993; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Marris, 1964). 
The following sub-sections will discuss the relationship between factors that 
encompassed the efficiency theory and illuminate the value maximising motive for 
M&A activities. 
(i) Economies of scale and scope 
Economies of scale and scope are commonly cited in the belief that as the size of 
companies increases, scale economies are achievable, as per unit cost of 
production and distribution goes down (Gaughan, 2007). Likewise, as the 
company grows, economies of scope can be attained when the same resources 
are used to produce or distribute a wider range of products (Gaughan, 2007; Singh 
and Montgomery, 1987). In other words, t here has to be some degree of 
relatedness in the resources used for production or distribution in order to derive 
economies of scale and scope in M&A activities. 
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According to Salter and Weinhold (1979) the underlying forces for realising 
economies of scale and scope rest on the relationship between supplementary 
and complementary resources in the combined companies. Supplementary 
resources entails there being similar resources which reduce cost or add value to 
the existing products in the new entity, while the phrase complementary resources 
refers to the addition of the same kind of resources to reduce cost or add value to 
the combined company. Ingram et aL (1992) conducted empirical research on the 
motives for M&A activity and M&A performance by using the concept of 
supplementary and complementary resources, which supported the related- 
complementary and related-supplementary classification that Salter and Weinhold 
proposed. In their survey of 146 of the UK's top 500 companies, they found 
bidders were more concerned with buying a company whose operations suited 
precisely their particular needs rather than 'getting a bargain', and the important 
factor in the selection of target companies was 'the nature of the target company's 
operation' (Ingram et al., 1992, pp. 204). 
The elimination of excess capacity also leads to a lower cost of production and 
value enhancement, and in turn, derives operational and financial synergies for the 
combined companies. According to Halpern (1983), economies of scale are 
gained through horizontal M&A activities when excess capacity in some factor(s) 
of production, such as managerial or financial control, are eliminated. This is 
achieved through the reduction of people and physical facilities. Dutz (1989, 
pp. 12) also argued that the reorganisation of assets into more efficient 
configurations, to increase production and improve the product or service quality, 
will lead to 'operating efficiencies' and in turn, 'synergies' will emerge because of 
cost reduction in production or distribution. In the same vein, H5kkinen et al. 
(2004) agreed that lower costs in production and elimination of excess capacity 
through procurement, production, administration and marketing lead to operational 
synergies. Capron (1999) used the term asset divestiture to refer to the extent to 
which merging companies dispose of their physical assets and cut back their 
personnel in different areas, including R&D, manufacturing, logistics, sales 
networks and administrative services. According to Hart et al. (1973), M&A 
activities become a natural means of rapid growth for companies in an expanding 
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market and an efficient way of reallocating resources in order to eliminate excess 
capacity when demand is declining. 
Economies of scope are derived by producing and distributing a range of products 
to different markets, leading to operational efficiency for the combined companies 
after the M&A activity. Teece (1980) and Willig (1979) refer to economies of scope 
as the sharing or utilising of inputs by related activities to achieve a potential 
source of benefits. Economies of scope could also generate cost advantages 
when the same input is applied to generate a range of products and services 
(Gaughan, 2007; Teece, 1980; Willig, 1979). According to Singh and Montgomery 
(1987), scope economies can also occur outside the production area, for example 
in distribution systems, while intangible assets like brand names can be the source 
of scope economies if they are used for more than one product. In the same way, 
Teece (1980) and Willig (1979) posited that the sharing of specialised know-how is 
another important source of scope economies. Baldock (2000, pp. 1 8), pointed out 
that economies of scope 'reappeared in a new guise in the late 1990s', when 
companies were using diversification through related businesses and cross selling 
a wider range of goods with the same infrastructure. In this view, it is the notion of 
relatedness in resources between two different companies that brings benefits and 
operational synergies to M&A activities. 
According to Kusewitt (1985) and Lubatkin (1983), financial synergies are attained 
when M&A activity undertaken by companies sharing a common industry 
increases company size, leading to lower lending rates and reduced perceived 
risks. For example, the costs of capital are lower, due to lower interest rates and 
longer repayment periods, when two companies are merged (Halpern, 1983; Hitt 
et aL, 1998; Kitching, 1967). Likewise, Kitching (1967) and Lewellen (1971) 
argued that debt capacity increases because additional funds are more easily 
obtained when the asset backing of the merged companies is larger. Halpern 
(1983) also posited that economic motivations could be encompassed by the term 
synergy when the acquisition results in an increase in expected cash flows over 
their sum as independent companies. 
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The synergies discussed above, are derived from economies of scale and scope 
in the event of engagement in horizontal M&A activities, where companies holding 
related resources for production and distribution and / or same products are 
combined. Benefits could also be derived in related businesses through the 
acquisition and integration of competitors' market share. For instance, the 
purchase of competitors' market share decreases market competition as well as 
enables acquiring company to enjoy economies of scale through enlarged capacity 
for production and distribution. According to Ingram et al. (1992, pp. 197) the 
interaction between economies of scale and market power in the case of 
horizontal M&A activities has historically led to 'superior performance'. 
(H) Market power 
The merged company achieves greater market power through increased market 
share, thus achieving value maximising motives for M&A activities (Gaughan, 
2007; Hitt et aL, 1998; Ingram et aL, 1992; Singh and Montgomery, 1987 and 
Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001). This is attainable because the acquiring and the 
acquired company are operating in the same product market, or through product 
or market extension where a companies' effective size is increased relative to its 
competitors. Seth (1990b) relates the source of value creation to the ability of 
companies with dominant market share to manipulate the amount of input and 
output through their operating decisions. Correspondingly, Gaughan (2007) linked 
the source of market power to market share, in addition to product differentiation, 
barriers to entry and monopoly power deriving from the company's ability to set 
and maintain price above competitive levels. In a similar vein, Singh and 
Montgomery (1987) posited that market power effects when a market participant 
has the ability to influence price, quantity and the nature of the product in the 
market place. In other words, operational synergies are achieved in the enlarged 
companies when market share within the same product market increases to 
achieve market power and command prices. 
On the other hand, Lubatkin and Lane (1996) pointed out that it is easy to identify 
related features via the physical commonalities between products and markets, 
such as the bricks, mortar, and channels that link the different businesses in a 
related M&A activity. These visible features of relatedness are easier to 
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understand than realising the efficiencies between related businesses 
operationally. However, they emphasised managerial synergies as the source of 
value creation for the combined companies. According to them, managers' 
capabilities are essential to recombine resources and enhance competencies in 
the combined company in order to achieve managerial synergies and create value 
for the combined companies. In the same way, Chandler (1962) had posited that 
management capabilities play an important part in identifying opportunities and 
deriving economies of scale and scope for companies through the expansion and 
extension of the range of products manufactured and distributed. Likewise, 
Trautwein (1990), managerial synergies are realised when the bidders managers 
possess superior planning and monitoring abilities that benefit the target's 
performance. Salter and Weinhold (1981) also identify the addition of skills or 
resources to the acquiring company's existing unique capabilities, while 
maintaining the same product market in the context of a related acquisition, as 
valuable for strengthening its competitive position. In other words, acquisition of 
skills or knowledge is also an important motive, which is able to translate into 
managerial synergies and create market power for the acq Wring or combined 
companies. 
(iii) Strategic fit 
Strategic fit in terms of fitting into corporate strategy can be explained through 
synergies arise in terms of geographic and product line expansion (Smalter and 
Lancey, 1966). Advocating a similar view, Schoenberg (2003) suggested that 
strategic motives for M&A included penetrating an existing product market, 
entering a new product market, entering a new geographical territory, or 
diversifying away from a core business. Vermeulen and Barkema (2001) also 
argued that M&A allows companies to overcome barriers to entry, to enter new 
markets quickly and to acquire new knowledge and resources. From these views, 
it can be proposed that strategic fit in the context of M&A activities are viewed from 
two perspectives, related and unrelated acquisitions. For example, entering a new 
product could be a totally unrelated acquisitions compared to existing product 
market. 
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In the same way, entering a new geographical area can also be linked to buying 
existing or new product in different locations. At the core of these differences 
between related (existing) and unrelated (new), there are still synergies to be 
derived. According to Hitt et ah (1998), resource complementarities are more 
important than the product / market relatedness of a specific M&A. They pointed 
out that highly unrelated businesses are also able to undertake successful M&A, 
as long as there are related resources between acquiring and acquired 
companies. This coincides with the resource complementary and supplementary 
concepts proposed by Salter and Weinhold (1979). 
On the other hand, with related businesses, in a situation such as a mature 
industry that comprises a number of established players, M&A activities can 
reduce the 'competitive reaction that can accompany attempts to grow by organic 
growth; rather than intensifying the rivalry by adding further productive capacity, 
the potential competition is purchased' (Schoenberg, 2003, pp. 98). In the same 
vein, Powell and Yawson (2005) and Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) argued that 
M&A activity can derive strategic synergies by allowing a company to consolidate 
in an industry that was experiencing low growth. The consequence of this action 
would be a reduction in the number of competitors, leading to higher market share 
or greater market power. Moreover, strategic synergy is also achieved in view of 
M&A activities being a mechanism that enables a company to expand more 
quickly as compared to organic growth (Ingram et aL, 1992). 
ft) Speed 
M&A activities enable a company to expand more quickly than organic growth 
(Ingram et al., 1992). Speed embedded in M&A activities also enables a company 
to capture growth market quickly (Hart et al., 1973; Ingram et aL, 1992). From a 
strategic point of view, M&A activities enable a company to retreat from declining 
markets by reallocating its resources in the same or similar market. According to 
Schoenberg (2003), speed in M&A activities could provide the company with an 
established market position if the latter is a late entrant relative to its competitors 
into a particular product or geographic market. Schoenberg (2003, pp. 98) also 
argued that the acquisition of a company that is already operating in the desired 
product area gives 'immediate access' to an established distribution channel and 
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its valuable shelf space. Therefore, speed is an essential motive for achieving 
strategic synergy in M&A activities since it quickens the process of achieving 
operational and financial synergies, and in turn maximise value. 
In summary, value maximising motives for M&A activities can be achieved from 
operative, financial, managerial and strategic synergies. For example, by 
acquiring the same or similar products from its competitors, a company can 
increase its market share and achieve strategic synergy through its increased 
market power and reduced competition in the market. Underlying this 
achievement is the ability to identify the strategic fit in complementary and 
supplementary resources in the combined assets, operations and managerial 
capabilities, as well as to close the deal quickly. In this situation, managers' skills 
are important for identifying resources, and, at the same time, these skills are also 
recognised to be part of the resources to create managerial synergy for the 
success of M&A activities. As the company size increases, operational synergy is 
gained via the elimination of excess capacities, to derive cost saving and value 
enhancement. In turn, the company is able to achieve financial synergy by 
expanding its company further because of its enlarged size, which provides it with 
greater credibility in terms of creditors and reduced cost due to economies of scale 
and / or scope. 
Therefore, the core factors - economies of scale and scope, market power, 
elimination of excess capacity, speed and strategic fit - create synergies and 
maximise value in M&A activities. On the other hand, other researchers have 
provided alternative motives - non-value maximising motives - to explain the 
inverse relationship between the high volume of M&A activities and their financial 
performance. The following section will examine these alternative motives for 
M&A activities. 
3.3. Non-value maximisation motives 
The non-value maximising motive is attributed to managerial intent, which has also 
generated various propositions in attempts to provide explanations for the negative 
abnormal returns of M&A activities. In the study of non-value maximising motives 
for M&A activities, the managerial theory has been widely referred to managers 
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looking to expand their companies in order to enjoy these benefits, at the expense 
of their shareholders (Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1993; Marris, 1964; 
Schoenberg, 2003; Weidenbaum and Vogt, 1987; Wright et aL, 2002; Yagil, 1996). 
Fundamental to this theory are assumptions of managers' concerns for (1) 
company's growth and sales over profit (Baumol, 1967; Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Marris, 1964) and (ii) enhancing management welfare (Berkovitch and 
Narayanan, 1993; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
(1) Company growth 
A commonly argued assumption regarding non-value maximising motives for M&A 
activities lies in the managerial preference for growth over profit (Baumol, 1967; 
Marris, 1964). Baumol (1967) propose the concept of managers' concerns for 
company growth and sales over profit for companies and shareholders in M&A 
activities. The author argued that management-controlled companies may put 
more emphasis on higher growth rate and reduced risk rate, rather than profit rate. 
The non-value maximising effect here is illuminated by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) who proposed the agency theory. According to the authors, corporate 
managers serve as the agent of shareholders, and in the agency theory the 
relationship between shareholders and corporate managers is conflicting because 
of the choice between paying out excess cash to shareholders or re-investing in 
other projects. It is posited that paying out to shareholders reduces the resources 
under managers' control, thereby reducing managers' power. In a similar vein, 
Halpern (1983, pp. 229) argued that the intention of management in M&A activities 
is the desire; to maximise growth in sales or assets, or to control a larger empire. 
Although Marris (1964) agrees that non-value Maximising M&A activity exists, the 
author also pointed out that this kind of behaviour is not sustainable. For example, 
managers who pursued their own welfare at the expense of shareholders could 
only do so up to a certain point. Beyond that point, the company is considered 
underperforming in the market, and in turn, it will attract takeover bids to displace 
the management. The author refers this as a form of control for management and 
their non-profit maximising behaviour. 
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(H) Management welfare 
Jensen (1986) suggests that non-value maximising motives for M&A activities is 
related to managerial welfare, in terms of the change in managers' compensation 
is positively related to the growth of sales and size of the company. This is 
supported by Wright et aL (2002) who found that executive compensation is 
impacted by increases in company size, thus managerial motives for M&A are 
stronger when external monitoring is weak. In a similar vein, Weidenbaum and 
Vogt (1987)'posited that manager power grows positively with the size of the 
company and this is possible because shareholders' ability to monitor 
management decreases with a larger and more complex corporation. Cosh and 
Hughes (2001) share a similar view as they propose that managers may deploy 
corporate assets to their benefit when holding little equity in the company, while 
shareholders are too dispersed to enforce value maximisation. 
Therefore, non-value maximising motive can be ascribed to the intent of managers 
wanting to grow their companies' sizes - since this has the potential to increase 
their level of managerial control and power and have a direct impact on their 
monetary compensations. This kind of motive is considered detrimental to 
shareholder value. However, it can also be argued that non-value maximising 
motive are limited since companies' performance after M&A activities are 
monitored by the market and are prone to becoming takeover targets if they did 
not perform well as expected. 
In summary, the motives for M&A activities are derived from two schools of 
thought - value and non-value maximisation. Under the value maximising motive, 
it is the expected ability to reduce costs and / or enhance value for the acquiring 
company that makes M&A activity a widely used mechanism for growth. The 
principal value-maximising explanations of M&A activity include economies of 
scale and scope, market power, elimination of excess capacity, speed and 
strategic fit. Managerial theories generally refer to managers seeking to increase 
the- size and sales level of their companies via, M&A activities in order to enjoy 
managerial welfare, such as a higher compensation and greater managerial power 
at the expense of their shareholders. Analysis of motives such as managerial 
welfare is valid since the top management are usually the M&A decision-makers, 
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and they are the ones that obtain higher pay. Thus, it is important to clarify that 
this welfare is referring specifically to the top management, instead of the 
managers in a company as a whole. 
The discussion so far has been based on the organisational level, which focuses 
on why a company engages in M&A activity. One point to note is that whether 
M&A activity concerns value maximising or managerial personal motive, 
management's aim to increase the size and growth of the company through M&A 
activities requires strategic decision-making in the presence of environmental 
opportunities and constraints. Since M&A activity is also an investment decision 
(Halpern, 1983; Hannah, 1983), the understanding of these macro environmental 
factors should provide some insight into the motives for M&A activities as a 
mechanism for expansion. Moreover, according to Andrade et al. (2001, pp. 108), 
'the industry shock explanation for mergers has added substantially to the 
understanding of mergers, not so much how mergers create value, but rather why 
and when they occur'. Therefore, the following section will study the industry 
shocks concept based on the context of the macro environment to complement the 
understanding of the occurrences of M&A activities. 
3.4. Industry shocks concept 
Industry shocks are industry level factors that cause huge concern to companies 
and provide a catalyst for them to change their strategy and structure and lead to a 
change in industry structure (Andrade et aL, 2001; Harford, 2005; Mitchell and 
Mulherin, 1996; Mulhedn and Boone, 2001). 
Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) investigated the sources of merger waves by linking 
M&A activity and industry shocks in the 1980s. According to the authors, a shock 
leads to a change in industry structure and their argument is that M&A and 
restructuring activity accommodates such change. They predicated their research 
on two features of M&A activity: M&A activity occurs in waves and these activities 
cluster by industry within a wave. Mitchell and Mulherins (1996) argue that the 
structure of an industry, including the number and size of companies, is a function 
of factors such as technology, government policy and demand and supply 
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conditions. In other words, industry and companies are under the control of 
industry shocks, and these shocks could cause company to change strategy, and 
in turn to shift industry structure. They used proxies such as deregulation, oil price 
shocks, foreign competition, and financial innovations as the industry specific 
shocks and demographic or technological change as the general industry shocks, 
in order to test against data in the 1980s. They concluded that deregulation and 
low technological innovation accounted for a significant proportion of the M&A 
activities in the 1980s. Therefore, merger waves and industry clusters happened 
as a response to industry shocks and these shocks in turn transformed the 
industry structure (Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996). 
Similarly, Mulherin and Boone (2001) studied the relationship between corporate 
restructuring and its response to economic shocks - technology, input prices and 
deregulation in the 1990s. They used the synergistic theory (acquisition and 
divestment) and non-synergistic theory (management entrenchment, empire 
building and managerial hubris) to find out if restructuring activities were efficient 
responses to economic shocks or managerial reactions to enhance personal 
benefits. Their results show that companies responded to economic change and 
industry shocks - deregulation - through restructuring activity, which on average 
benefited the shareholders, as opposed to the non-synergistic theory, namely 
management entrenchment, empire building and managerial hubris. The findings 
are consistent with the notion that economic change is a source of the observed 
restructuring activity. They found that M&A activity was greater in industries 
undergoing deregulation, and specific industries affected by deregulation differed 
between the 1980s and 1990s. Thus, this resulted in significant industry 
clustering. 
In the same vein, Andrade et al. (2001) agreed that a significant portion of M&A 
activity was due to industry-level shocks because each wave occurred with 
differences in terms of industry cluster. In addition, they posited that the 1990s 
was the 'decade of deregulation' (Andrade et aL, 2001, pp. 104). Their findings 
support the work of Mulherin and Boone (2000) in two ways. Firstly, they also 
found that deregulated industries adapted to the pressures of market and 
competition by M&A and divestment activities. Secondly, M&A activity clustered 
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by industry in the 1990s. According to Andrade et al. (2001), deregulation had 
been a prominent industry shock in the period prior to the 1980s and it became a 
dominant factor in M&A activity and continued to account for nearly half of the 
M&A activity since then. 
In contrast to Andrade et al. (2001), Powell and Yawson (2005) found no 
significant support for deregulation as an industry shock in M&A activity. Instead, 
they found three specific industry shocks, namely low growth, the threat of foreign 
competition and better industry stock market performance to be prevalent in M&A 
activity. Powell and Yawson (2005) built upon Mitchell and Mulherin's (1996) and 
Mulherin and Boone's (2000) studies, using UK company data over the period 
1986-2000 to explain the clustering of industry by using proxies for broad and 
specific industry shocks, such as growth, free cash flow, concentration, 
deregulation, foreign competition, technology, and stock market performance. 
Powell and Yawson (2005) argued that M&A activity cannot be determined solely 
by misvaluation arising from periods of high stock prices because if that were the 
case, then there would have been a high volume of M&A activities across all 
industries. Thus, they argued that several factors led to significant industry 
clustering and the latter occurred in merger waves. 
According to Powell and Yawson (2005), a low growth industry might encounter a 
high volume of M&A activities because of consolidation due to excess capacity. 
The findings about low growth in relation to M&A activities concur with Mitchell and 
Mulherin's (1996), who concluded that acquisitions in the 1980s were more 
concentrated in industries with low growth. On the other hand, the findings are in 
contrast to Mulherin and Boone's (2000, pp. 135) conclusion that 'acquisitions in 
the 1990s are not restricted to industries with low growth options'. This difference 
could be due to the period being researched, that is, 1980 - 2000 in Powell and 
Yawson's (2005)ýstudy, the 1980s for Mitchell and Mulherin's (1996) research and 
the 1990s for Mulherin and Boone's (2000) investigation. As evidenced by 
Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), the excess capacity in metals, mining and food 
processing industries in the US led to greater restructuring activities, which in turn 
led to industry consolidation in the 1980s. Similarly, Andrade et al. (2001) posited 
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that technological innovations which created excess capacity led to the need for 
industry consolidation. 
The absence of deregulation as an industry shock in Powell and Yawson's (2005) 
study could be explained through the sample -used, as they excluded industries 
classified as property and investment institutions (for example, asset managers, 
insurance brokers) due to a lack of requisite data. Coincidentally, the property 
industry was highly affected by the deregulation of the UK financial sector in the 
1980s (Scoff, 1996). Moreover, deregulation of the financial sector during the 
1980s also saw a high volume of M&A activities among the different types of 
financial institutions (Ennew et al., 1990). The absence of deregulation as an 
industry shock can also be linked to the difference between regulations in different 
countries because Andrade et al. (2001) were researching in the US while Powell 
and Yawson (2005) were studying the UK. In addition, Powell and Yawson (2005) 
also admitted that other factors omitted from their models may play a role in 
explaining M&A and divestment activities. In view of their conclusion, if their study 
had focused on a specific industry or included more industries, some significance 
of deregulation might have been found, in terms either of a direct or an indirect 
relationship between deregulation and takeover activities. 
Harford's (2005) findings also support the explanation of merger waves as a result 
of a response to specific industry shocks that required large scale reallocation of 
assets, and therefore created a cluster of M&A activities in a particular industry. 
His findings support Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) in terms of economic, regulatory 
and technological shocks which drove industry merger waves. However, he also 
argued that the above shocks are insufficient to drive merger waves because, as 
long as there is capital available for investment, merger waves will eventually take 
place even if the above industry shocks were absent. In other words, Harford 
(2005) argues for capital availability as a major industry shock in M&A activities. 
Gugler et aL's (2005, pp. 33) study of the determinants of merger wave considered 
merger waves to be generated by one shock - market optimism. They argued that 
a few industry waves took place simultaneously, due to managerial optimism 
about the economic climate, which generated merger waves across industries at 
the same time. In this sense, their argument is similar to Harford's (2005) capital 
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availability, in terms of managerial optimism about the economic climate has made 
fund available for M&A activities. 
In a different approach, Blair and Schary (1993) investigated restructuring activity, 
and based their analysis on both company-level and industry-level data. They 
studied the relationship between corporate performance and financial market 
behaviour through transactions such as private buyouts, junk bond issues and 
leveraged restructurings used in restructuring activity. The authors characterised 
the companies according to their asset size and debt-to-assets ratios and linked 
these data to the restructuring activity and their industries. Their sample consisted 
of 357 events which involved 350 publicly traded companies from 1979 through 
1989. They found that free cash flow and tax changes on the industry-level had 
some influence on restructuring activities, while debt capacity has no significantly 
influence on these activities between 1979 and 1985. In addition, they concluded 
that their model failed to explain the restructuring activities between 1986 and 
1989. They attributed that to 'a great many firm-specific, highly idiosyncratic 
factors [being] at work in addition to the industry-level and macroeconomic 
pressures we have identified' (Blair and Schary 1993, pp. 184). Although their 
study contributed to the robustness of M&A research through two level of analysis 
- company and industry - the aggregate data and multi-industries studied also 
complicated the process of identifying and more specifically understanding the 
interactions between the two levels. 
Toxvaerd (2004) utilises a similar approach, by integrating the organisational and 
industry level, to explain why mergers happen in waves. The author adopted a 
strategic management approach rather than a financial perspective as Blair and 
Schary's (1993) had done. He categorised merger wave theories into strategic 
and non-strategic theories. The former explicitly account for the strategic 
interaction through the relationship between product markets. The latter concern 
the responses of companies to the exogenous factors such as deregulation, 
globalisation or new technologies when making decisions. Toxvaerd (2004) 
concluded that merger waves occur because of strategic interaction between 
exogenous economic conditions and the company. More importantly, he pointed 
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out that each company was influenced differently, thus supporting the findings of 
Blair and Schary (1993) that there are company specific factors involved. 
In summary, the industry shocks concept discussed shows that companies 
responded to industry shocks through M&A activities, which led to restructuring, 
and in turn resulted in vast reorganisation of resources within the economy, both 
within and across industries, which changed the industry structure (Andrade, et aL, 
2001; Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996; Mulherin and Boone, 2001). In Mitchell and 
Mulherin's (1996, pp. 196) study, the authors regard M&A activities as 
5 messengers of the underlying economic changes taking place in the industry' 
rather than the actual source of performance change. Although it may be 
considered legitimate for them to claim the above, it is also worth noting that their 
analysis focused on the industry shocks that caused organisational change, rather 
than the intent behind M&A activities which led to organisational change. Thus, 
their study is unable to provide a full understanding of the reasons behind M&A 
activity. In this view, the literature concerning the relationship between industry 
shocks in relation to aggregate M&A activities has provided only a partial 
understanding of M&A activity as an expansion mechanism, despite a wide range 
of industries and proxies being used, as well as longitudinal approaches being 
adopted. 
Andrade et al. (2001) have pointed out that most of the motives proposed have 
been found to explain some of the M&A activity over the last century, and some of 
these reasons for M&A activities are more relevant to certain time period. 
Although some studies have been carried out to integrate the two levels - 
organisation and industry, it has also been acknowledged that there were 
company-specific factors involved in restructuring activities. Blair a-nd Schary 
(1993, pp. 184) in their failure to explain restructuring activities with their proposed 
model, posited that 'this activity took on a life of its own, going forward 
indiscriminately in industry without regards to the underlying forces that may have 
made it rational in the early years'. Therefore, it is evident that the economic 
forces which drive restructuring activities are dynamic, and this also reinforces the 
complexities of interactions between events on an organisational- and industry- 
level. 
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3.5. Summary 
The evaluation of M&A literature so far found the studies of M&A activities to 
concentrate either on an organisational level or industry level. Therefore, an 
integrated study of the motives for M&A activities on an organisational level and of 
the industry shocks concept should provide a more rounded understanding of 
M&A activities and their effect on strategy and structural changes in companies 
and industry. Moreover, the few integrated studies have also pointed out their 
limitation in providing an explanation to these surges of restructuring activity, 
attributed to the complication caused by investigation of an aggregated data and 
multi-industries. This, in turn, highlights the heterogeneous characters among 
companies and between companies within the same industry; and understanding 
of why and how companies expand is only facilitated if M&A activities are closely 
scrutinised on an in-depth case by case basis. 
From the preceding review, a number of conclusions can also be drawn from this 
review. 
On the one hand, the motives for M&A activities have been widely studied, but the 
explanations have remained partial. Researchers predicated their studies on one 
perspective, which is the organisations' point of view and derived their conclusions 
from there. This is considered inward-looking as events in the macro environment 
have been ignored. 
On the other hand, those who have researched industry shocks have contributed 
some useful understanding to this area, from an outward-perspective. These 
studies have also provided partial insights because they have not given much 
attention to the impacts that these shocks would have had upon the internal 
motives, and their influence on the company's decision to adopt the M&A activity. 
Some researchers attempt to study the interactions of factors from the 
organisational- and industry-levels to understand restructuring activities and their 
results. These studies no doubt contribute to M&A knowledge through attempts to 
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integrate two influential factors in these activities. However, this area of study has 
mainly concentrated on aggregated data in a multi-industry setting. 
This review illuminates the interdependent relationship between M&A activities 
and the macro environment. It also identified the gap in which there is a lack in 
the literature in which M&A activities are understood through the integration of two 
different perspectives, organisational- and industry and general-level. Given that 
M&A activities stand out as an important agent of change with respect to 
companies and their industries, ascertaining the motives for M&A activity should 
provide insights as to 'how' and 'why' companies expand whilst the understanding 
of industry shock could provide explanations for 'why' and 'how M&A happens 
(Andrade et aL, 2001). Therefore, analysis of the connection between the motives 
for M&A activities on an organisational level and the industry shocks concept will 
enhance this understanding. 
Table 3.1 is constructed to categorise the major motives and catalysts pertinent to 
facilitating the understanding of hotel companies' expansion through M&A 
activities in this thesis. The impetus for growth can be generally seen on two 
different levels, namely organisational and macro environmental levels. 
Organisational motive is further discussed according to two schools of thought: 
value maximising and non-value maximising motives. Value maximising motives 
are underpinned by efficiency theory, whilst non-value maximising motives are 
linked to managerial theory. The underpinning assumptions are in turn further 
explored as they are found to be linked to several variables including economies of 
scale and scope, market power, speed, strategic fit, growth (in terms of company 
sales and size) and managerial welfare. 
Macro environment motives are associated with the drivers of merger waves, and 
this is referred to as 'industry shocks' in the generic literature. Under the heading 
of industry shocks variables include growth (in terms of growth or decline), 
deregulation, technology change, and foreign competition. 
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The review of M&A literature has provided the framework for seeking answers to 
the research question. However, this framework will be further confirmed in the 
next chapter, by reviewing the general development of the UK hotel industry from 
the early 1970s. 
Table 3.1: Summary of variables driving M&A activities (developed for this study) 
Concepts Organisational motives Macro environment 
Value maximisation Non-Value Merger Waves 
maximisation 
Underpinning Efficiency theory Managerial theory Industry shocks 
assumption 
Variables -Economies of scale and - Company growth Deregulation 
affecting the scope (Marris, 1964; Baumol, (Mitchell and Mulherin, 
achievement (Baldock, 2000; Gaughan, 1967; Halpern, 1983; 1996; Mulherin and 
of Value and 2007; Ingram et aL, 1992; Jensen, 1986) Boone, 2001; Andrade 
Non-value Jensen and Ruback, 1983; et al., 2001; Harford, 
maximising Lee and Alexander, 1998; -Managerial Welfare 2005) 
motives, and Lubatkin, 1983; Salter and (Jensen and Meckling, 
Merger Weinhold, 1979; Singh and 1976; Halpern, 1983; Technology 
waves Montgomery, 1987; Teece, Weidenbaum and Vogt, (Andrade et aL, 2001; 
1980; Willig, 1979) 1987; Yagil, 1996; Gort, 1969; Mitchell 
Berkovitch and and Mulherin, 1996; 
-Market power Narayanan, 1993; Cosh Toxvaerd, 2004) 
(Gaughan, 2007; Hitt et aL, and Hughes, 2001; 
1998; Ingram et ah, 1992; Wright et al., 2002; Foreign competition 
Singh and Montgomery, Schoenberg, 2003) (Powell and Yawson, 
1987; Vermeulen and 2001; Toxvaerd, 2004) 
Barkema, 2001) 
Growth (high I low 
-Strategic Fit growth industry) 
(Kusewift, 1985; Jemison (Mitchell and Mulherin, 
and Sitkin, 1986; Dutz, 1996; Mulherin and 
1989; Ingram et aL, 1992; Boone, 2001; Powell 
Kim and Singal, 1993; and Yawson, 2001) 
Lubatkin, 1983; Lubatkin 
and Lane, 1996; Hitt et al., 
1998; Smalter and Lancey, 
1966; Schoenberg, 2003; 
Ulenbruck and De Castro, 
1998; Vermeulen and 
Barkema, 2001; Hdkkinen et 
al., 2004) 
-Speed 
(Ingram et al., 1992; 
Schoenberg, 2003; Weston 
and Weaver, 2001) 
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Chapter 4: 
The UK hotel industry 
The discussion in this thesis so far has identified M&A activity as the mechanism 
widely used for companies' expansion strategy, and posited that M&A activities 
are the result of interactions between organisational strategies and macro 
environmental influences. A theoretical framework was devised in the previous 
chapter for the facilitation of data collection and synthesis. This chapter is a follow 
up to this framework, to strengthen it in general, and to present the development of 
the UK hotel industry in particular. The first part of this chapter narrates the 
historical development of the UK hotel industry. The second part discusses 
development and changes in this industry and its macro environment. The final 
part summarises this chapter. 
4.1. Evolution of the UK hotel industry 
The development of hotel companies has been tied closely to the history of 
transport (Borer, 1972; Medlik and Airey, 1978; Pope, 2000; Simmons 1984; 
Taylor and Bush, 1974). Developments in transport enhanced convenience and 
thus stimulated travel and an increasing demand for accommodation. At the close 
of the Middle Ages, the boom in the English raw wool trade saw the emergence of 
new merchants, and their corresponding need to travel led to an increase in the 
number of inns (Medlik and Airey, 1978). By the middle of the 1 9th century, the 
development of the railways became the impetus for the growth of hotels and 
seaside resorts (Simmons and Biddle, 1997). The development of railways also 
influenced the size and character of resorts and the locations of hotels and other 
facilities (Medlik and Airey, 1978; Simmons, 1994). For instance, railways were 
built on the outskirts of city centres and there was initially no provision of 
accommodation and meals for passengers (Simmons, 1994). Thus, just as the 
inns had provided for stagecoach passengers, hotels began to appear close to 
stations. 
According to Simmons and Biddle (1997), the first hotel for rail travellers was built 
alongside Crewe station and opened in 1837. The first large hotel was built by 
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London & Birmingham Railway, a railway company at Euston station. 
Subsequently, other rail companies also provided hotels at their terminals, namely 
the Great Northern Railway at King's Cross, the Great Western Railway at 
Paddington and the South Eastern Railway at Charing Cross and Cannon Street 
(Borer, 1972; Simmons, 1994; Simmons and Biddle, 1997). By the early 1860s, 
the functions of large hotels had evolved into other purposes. For example, the 
Westminster Palace Hotel was built for and catered mainly to Members of 
Parliament during the sessions, the Langham Hotel, located in the diplomatic 
quarter of London, provided mainly for diplomats, and the Grand Hotels in Brighton 
and in Scarborough were built by the sea coast, mainly for the purpose of leisure 
(Simmons, 1994). Simmons (1994) also noted that hotels built for leisure 
purposes were at a disadvantage as their businesses were more cyclical 
compared to the railway hotels, which commanded a regular demand for rooms. 
The development of hotels stalled for a few years after 1866 when the British 
economy encountered a financial crisis, with the collapse of the discount house of 
Overend and Gurney (Simmons, 1994). However, from the 1880s, large hotels 
began to establish in London, namely The Grand, The Savoy, The Cecil and The 
Carlton; their main customers were wealthy Americans. 
In the early 1900s, the structure of the hotel industry changed, provoked by a 
demographic change which resulted in increased purchasing power among the 
middle-income group, and thus the emergence of less wealthy visitors asking for 
better accommodation (Simmons, 1994). J. Lyons & Co. which was originally a 
chain of teashop operators built and operated an expensive, but less luxurious, 
type of hotels to cater to market demand. In 1919, the fourth Earl Grey formed 
Trust House Ltd. and established trusts in different counties to purchase and 
refurbish old inns, mainly for the needs of people with limited incomes, particularly 
cyclists and walkers (Simmons, 1994). From the 1920s, as the proliferation of 
private cars became the major driver for the building of roadside accommodations, 
Trust House Ltd's hotels also became a major provider of decent facilities, 
particularly to middle-income motorists (Borer, 1972; Johnson and Harrison, 
1984). 
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In 1948, the railways were nationalised to form the British Transport Commission 
under the Transport Act 1947 (Gourvish, 1986; Simmons, 1994). It was believed 
that resources would be directed more efficiently under a unified railway system 
(Bagwell and Lyth, 2002). The British Transport Hotels was formed as a result of 
the re-organisation of the railways. Five areas were formed: Railway, Docks and 
Inland Waterways, Road Transport, and London Transport and Hotels (Gourvish, 
1986). By the 1960s, a new form of transportation - airplanes - drove demand for 
hotels, through the increasing number of foreign visitors arriving by air (Borer, 
1972; Johnson and Harrison, 1984). In contrast to railways and motorways, hotels 
were not initially established close to UK airports, but rather in the cities (Taylor, 
2003). Moreover, the UK's airport hotels were established by hotel companies 
and not linked to transportation companies, as opposed to cases in the US and 
France where airlines were building hotels to accommodate passengers who had 
nowhere to stay (Taylor, 2003). For example, Air France (France) produced Le 
Meridien Hotels and Aer Lingus (Ireland) formed Copthorne Hotels. With the 
growth of hotels via airline companies, there was an increasing presence of large 
international hotel companies, which established their hotels close to the major 
international airports (Litteljohn, 1997). 
The development of UK hotels took off in the late 1960s for several reasons. First 
of all, there was a severe shortage of rooms in the hotel industry. The demand 
had exceeded supply because of rising standards of living, real incomes and 
longer paid holidays among the British (Borer, 1972; Medlik and Alrey, 1978; 
Taylor and Bush, 1974). Secondly, the value of the US dollar rose vis-6-vis the 
sterling and this led to an increase in the number of American visitors to the UK 
(Hotel Companies in the UK, 1987). Thirdly, the convenience brought by the ease 
of travel, such as the extraordinary rise in the number of cars on the roads, also 
contributed to the rising demand for rooms (Borer, 1972). Finally, cheaper air 
travel and 'package' tours added to the pull of foreign tourists to the UK (Oliver, 
1971). Although the shortage of hotels had been highlighted to the government by 
the press and travel agents, this was initially ignored (Stewart, 1991; Taylor and 
Bush, 1974). The shortage of accommodation had not been given attention until 
the problem became more severe in the late 1960s, in conjunction with the 
government's realisation that tourism is a valuable intangible export. This led to 
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encouragement for building more hotel rooms through the HDIS (Stewart, 1991; 
Taylor and Bush, 1974). 
According to the English Tourist Board Investment Report, hotel investment 
boomed due to the HDIS in the 1970s was evident by the record of 80 new hotels 
built, 75 major building extensions and 48 major refurbishments in England (Hotel 
Companies in the UK, 1989). Two major organisations in the hotel industry - 
Grand Metropolitan Hotels and Trust Houses Forte - expanded rapidly during this 
period by utilising the HIDIS. Both organisations became conglomerates by 
absorbing industrial and popular catering and other leisure related services (Borer, 
1972). 
The development of the hotel industry stalled after 1973. In the 1970s, the UK 
encountered economic turbulence such as the first oil crisis (1973 -1975), the 
second oil crisis (1979-1981), the miners' strike, electricity shortages, the three- 
day week' and a large fall in the foreign exchange rate (Caterer and Hotelkeeper, 
1979; Dow, 1998). These events had negative impact on the general economy, 
and in turn, on the hotel industry. They highlighted the vulnerable nature of the 
hotel industry, which is highly dependent on the general economic cycle, meaning 
that its growth and decline in demand are positively related to trade volumes in 
business and tourism. 
In the period between 1973 and 1975, demand for UK hotels decreased and the 
profits of hotel companies were further decreased by high interest rates and 
excess capacity in the industry (Hardman, 1979). The declining demand for hotel 
rooms was caused by the combination of the government's interest rate increase 
to tackle high inflation rates and a high balance of deficit in the UK. The excess 
capacity emerged due to the high volume of hotel development between 1969 and 
1973 (Caterer and Hotelkeeper, 1986a). Many hotel companies and developers 
went into receivership during this decade because they were over-leveraged 
during development through the HDIS (Borer, 1972; Hardman, 1979; Stewart, 
1991; Taylor and Bush, 1974). The second. oil crisis started in 1979, and, in 
Three-day week: 'The coal strike reduced coal supplies to the power stations, and industry had to 
be restricted to a three-day working week'(Dow, 1998, pp. 247). 
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conjunction with exceptionally bad weather conditions and industrial disputes in 
the UK, continued to affect travel (Financial Times, 1980). This again adversely 
affected the demand for hotel rooms and caused a slump in the hotel industry. 
The demand did not pick up until 1983, when there was an improvement in 
occupancy demand generated by increasing numbers of visitors to the UK 
(Caterer and Hotelkeeper, 1984a). 
4.2. UK hotel industry changes, early 1980s - early 2000s 
The 1980s 
In 1983, the UK hotel industry encountered a boom and some major changes in 
industry structure. This boom was mainly driven by the rise in American visitors to 
the UK, and the growth in multi-site national or international companies in the UK. 
Demand for hotel rooms was particularly high in London, among both business 
and leisure visitors (Caterer and Hotelkeeper, 1984a). However, hotel companies 
were faced with a shortage of suitable land and locations to build hotels, in 
addition to difficulties in obtaining planning permission (Caterer and Hotelkeeper, 
1986b; Hotel Companies in the UK, 1987). The combination of a high demand 
and low supply situation faced by hotel companies in the UK attracted both 
domestic and foreign hotel companies to expand their hotel interest there (Hotel 
Companies in the UK, 1987). Therefore, M&A activities became the chief vehicle 
of growth. As a result of the high demand for hotels in the UK, the price of hotels 
increased drastically by nearly 11% in 1985 (Caterer and Hotelkeeper, 1986b). 
Christie & Co., a property agents recorded the price increase in 1985 was twice as 
much as in 1984 and doubled the inflation rate that year (see Appendix E). This 
cause was attributed to there being more buyers than sellers - higher demand 
than supply (Caterer and Hotelkeeper, 1986b). 
According to Slattery and Johnson (1990, pp. 18), 'the eighties was the decade of 
hotel acquisition' for the UK hotel industry because 90% of its expansion had been 
achieved via M&A activities. The price per bedroom paid by UK Hotels plc 
continued to rise from E19,000 to E126,000 between 1985 and the end of 1989 
(Slattery and Johnson, 1990). This recorded rise of 560% was attributed to a 
continuous rise in demand for rooms at this time, to intensifying competition by 
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domestic and overseas investors (Slattery and Johnson, 1990). This high volume 
of M&A activities in the UK hotel industry coincided with the fourth merger wave 
during the period between 1983 and 1989. In the 1980s, deregulation in the UK 
financial sector resulted in a structural change in this financial sector from 1983 
and created a bigger pool of funds available for M&A activities. 
Like other industries, the hotel industry made use of bank loans as a means of 
financing its M&A activities (Clive, 1997). Bigger companies took the opportunity 
to acquire hotel assets in prime locations from independent operators and hotels 
that had been inefficiently and expensively 'managed (Slattery and Johnson, 
1990). In addition to domestic companies competing among themselves to 
acquire in the UK, there was also an increasing competition from foreign investors, 
such as the Japanese who were experiencing a period of major economic growth 
that resulted in a stronger yen and bigger purchasing power (Clive, 1997; Pring, 
1986c). In addition, the Japanese government was aware of its balance of 
payment surplus and in order to address and re-balance this trade surplus, it 
communicated to the British Tourist Authority (BTA) its intention to double the 
number of tourists travelling to the UK (Caterer and Hotelkeeper, 1986e). 
In 1986, the UK hotel industry experienced a period of adverse economic 
circumstances, between the boom period of 1983 and 1989. That year, the growth 
of the UK tourism and hotel industry slowed down, mainly due to world events 
such as the Chernobyl disaster, terrorist bombing, and the Libyan crisis (Slattery 
and Johnson, 1990; Ward, 1997). This led to a major reduction of hotel demand 
for leisure and business travellers. During this period, companies began costs 
cutting, leading to demand for cheaper hotels. This in turn brought about a new 
demand for budget hotels. 
This demand for budget hotels, in conjunction with the shortage of supply provided 
new opportunities for hoteliers. The roadside caterers became pioneers in the 
building of budget hotels, due to the land they owned next to their roadside 
restaurants (Harmer, 1995). For these roadside caterers, accommodation was 
added to existing food and beverage outlets. According to Roper and Carmouche 
(1989), this enables the caterer to derive economies of scale through bulk 
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purchase, by integrating existing food and beverage outlets and the provision of 
accommodation. Forte Group plc was one of the first to build budget 
accommodation next to their roadside diners - Little Chef and their motorway 
service areas (Caterer and Hotelkeeper, 1985d; 1986d). Subsequently, Granada 
Group p1c, Welcome Break and Rank Organisation followed suit by building their 
budget hotels next to their motorway service areas (Caterer and Hotelkeeper, 
1985d). 
However, the demand for cheaper hotels also presented new obstacles to hotel 
companies. During the same period, London in particular was facing a lack of low 
cost hotel room supply (Caterer and Hotelkeeper, 1986f). One of the reasons was 
the lack of low cost buildings, as a number of two-star hotels had been upgraded 
to three- or four-stars by hotel investors (Caterer and Hotelkeeper, 1986f). Hotel 
investors had previously identified the business potential in London, and had found 
it more economical to upgrade a two-star hotel to a higher graded hotel. For 
instance, a two-star hotel bought at E1.7 million in 1985 worth approximately E3.5 
million a year later, after a few thousand pounds had been spent on refurbishment. 
It was noted that a 15% increase in investment could bring a 50% increase in 
return (Caterer and Hotelkeeper, 1986f). 
The other reason was the competition created by home providers for the 
homeless, as more and more homeless were placed in central London hotels due 
to an insufficient stock of council homes (Sherrell, 1987a). There were an 
estimated 18,000 homeless families whose business was considered to be more 
profitable than tourists' because there was no Value Added Tax (VAT) and no 
meal provision to lodgers; in addition, there was a guarantee of 100% occupancy. 
Thus, hoteliers and tourists had to compete for rooms in central London with the 
homeless home providers (Trollope, 1986a). The issue was subsequently brought 
to the attention of the government after hoteliers and residents living close to these 
hotels filed complaints regarding possible breaches of planning regulations in their 
area. The residents were particularly concerned with the tarnished reputation and 
overcrowding of their local areas due to the high number of homeless families 
being located there (Sherrell, 1987a). The problem was resolved following a 
government investigation, and within Westminster borough itself, 40 out of 137 
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hotels were ordered to evict their homeless families, having been found to be in 
breach of regulations by housing long-term homeless people (Sherrell, 1987a). 
In the 1980s, the conference business was the other driver of the hotel industry 
growth. The number of business delegates recorded attending conferences rose 
by 44% between 1982 and 1984, and there was a 12% increase in the conference 
market and a 23% increase in the exhibition market between 1983 and 1984 
(Caterer and Hotelkeeper, 1986b). During this period, there was a growing 
emphasis on training in many industries and hotel rooms became more 
economical to hire for training purposes, compared to holding them in the 
company premises (Taylor, 2003). Hotel rooms also replaced regional offices as 
venues for area meetings, as part of companies' strategy and structural changes 
as they expanded (Caterer and Hotelkeeper, 1986b; Slattery and Johnson, 1990). 
Moreover, executives needed to stay away from home as part of their jobs, hence 
the increase in demand. Therefore, the rise in demand for conference and 
meeting rooms led to hotel companies refurbishing their hotels to create more 
conference rooms. According to Slattery and Johnson (1990), UK business 
traveller demand increased by 146% to 14 million room nights in the 1980s. 
Overall business traveller demand grew by 10.2 million room nights to account for 
65% of total room nights used. 
The lucrative conference business of the hotel industry had attracted competition 
from universities. Tho conferencing business in the UK hotel industry was 
challenged by universities who competed with three-star hotels for customers by 
offering their residences and meeting rooms to customers (Caterer and 
Hotelkeeper, 1985e). However, the adverse situation for hotels specialising in 
conference business was salvaged when they were exempted from VAT when 
only meeting rooms and not bedrooms had been hired, which made hotel 
conference rates more competitive (Caterer and Hotelkeeper, 1985e). 
One major change, which was adverse to the UK hotel industry in the 1980s was 
the habit of British travellers. As a result of the strong sterling, overseas trips cost 
less and British people travelled out of the country to places such as the 
Mediterranean for summer holidays, rather than staying in UK seaside resorts 
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(Slattery and Johnson, 1990). The demand for UK hotels declined further when a 
price war broke out among tour operators and further reduced the cost of overseas 
travel. The number of domestic travellers who went abroad increased by 20% and 
this exacerbated the decline in demand for the UK beach resorts (Caterer and 
Hotelkeeper, 1985c). This shift of travelling habits from domestic to international 
travel in turn created new strategies amongst hotel companies. 
According to Slattery and Johnson (1990), hotel rooms created for conferences 
during week-days became vacant during the weekends and this led to the 
development of a short-break market. By the end of 1989, short-break holidays in 
the UK made up 90% of the domestic travel market (Slattery and Johnson, 1990). 
The latter was first created as a discounted market to attract weekend users, but 
had since developed into a market providing breaks and a variety of programmes 
and packages. Moreover, the development of sophisticated reservation systems 
also improved the operation and management of hotels in response to the cyclical 
demand in this industry (Slattery and Johnson, 1990). 
However, the boom ended as the hotel industry experienced a crash in the late 
1980s. The hotel industry is closely linked to the property market (see section 
2.2.8), and like the latter, it was affected adversely by the economic slump. Many 
hotel companies went into receivership, due to severe financial difficulties caused 
by rising unemployment, inflation and interest'rates (Walsh and Goymour, 1989). 
It was noted that hotel properties were undervalued then, because it was difficult 
to put a value to a hotel company due to the size of hotel properties (Walsh and 
Goymour, 1989). Moreover, hotel units were generally spread across several 
countries and this led to structural problem in the hotel industry because 
companies usually owned multiple brands and both the hotel companies and the 
hotel units they ran were considered small (Hotel Report, 1999c). 
The 1990s 
The early 1990s in the UK hotel industry started with a recession brought forward 
from the late 1980s. In addition to the high inflation and interest rate crises, the 
UK hotel industry also experienced a low demand for hotel rooms due to the 
outbreak of the first Gulf War in the spring of 1991 and an unfavourable exchange 
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rate between sterling and the US dollar (London Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry, 1992; Slattery and Johnson, 1993). The decreasing demand for hotel 
rooms and increasing costs in the building industry, in conjunction with a 
consistent severe lack of space (Ward, 1997), further increased costs for hotel 
companies, particularly those which held large numbers of properties. 
Leisure industries which had no hotel related business or had no ownership of 
hotel assets were not as badly affected, as the value of real estate was also 
experiencing a drastic fall in the UK (Slattery and Johnson, 1993). During the 
period of financial deregulation in the 1980s, banks which had engaged in a large 
amount of lending experienced great loss of money in property market crash and 
the economic recession between 1989 and 1992/3 (Hotel Report, 1999c). 
According to John Wilson, chief executive of Millennium & Copthorne Hotels, the 
adverse situation that developed when banks lent more than 100% of the value of 
hotels and then interest rates started to increase at the time of the first Gulf War, 
led to new financial discipline (Sangster, 2003, pp. 26). Thus drove a tightening of 
banks' lending requirements and led to a lack of bank loans for company 
investment in the early 1990s. 
The availability of funds for hotel development from the mid 1990s is a 
consequence of financial deregulation that had brought more financial institutions, 
both local and foreign, into the UK. At the same time, there was also another 
group of investors from foreign hotel companies, in such countries as America, 
South-East Asia and Japan, who started to invest in London (BDO Stoy Hayward 
LLP, 1996; Borner, 1996). This increasing international presence was also 
attributed to the stability of the UK economy as compared to other high-cost and 
less productive economies in other Western European countries. Moreover, the 
weakness of sterling relative to some currencies in the main demand-generating 
economies made the UK hotel market in London more attractive to overseas 
investors (BDO Stoy Hayward LLP, 1996). 
This increasing availability of funds and willingness of financial institutions, evident 
among some insurance groups, to invest in properties and hotels also led a shift in 
the UK hotel ownership structure (Cohen, 1999; Hotel Report, 1999a). During the 
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late 1990s, financial institutions such as insurance groups became major investors 
in the hotel industry. For example, Norwich Union, the UK's largest insurance 
company, engaged in sale-and-leaseback deals with Choice Hotel Europe 
(formerly Friendly Hotels Group) in 1997, the Jarvis Hotel Group in 1999, and 
Ladbroke Group plc (Hilton International) in 2001 (Sangster, 2001; Whittaker, 
2006). According to Evans and Vickery (1998), institutional investment in the hotel 
sector was driven by the availability of stock in hotel companies and not by interest 
in acquiring hotel assets. This was evident from over E700 million of capital raised 
by private hotel companies in the London Stock Exchange in 1996. The 
investment in quoted equity was more desirable because it provided liquidity and 
risk management through geographic, management and market-level spread 
(Evans and Vickery, 1998). 
In addition to the ownership structural change, from owner management to 
separation between ownership and management in the 1990s, budget hotels also 
continued to change and developed into a new market segment that attracted 
families on leisure trips (Automobile Association, 1999). Budget hotels that 
emerged during the recession years of the mid 1980s, due to corporate clients 
looking for value for money accommodation also became more prevalent in 
London by the late 1990s. In 1998, the supply of hotels, particularly in the budget 
and three-star market sectors, continued to increase to a total of 2,688 rooms in 
London (Automobile Association, 1999). According to Deloitte & Touche, an 
international professional service company, which also specialises in Tourism, 
Hospitality and Leisure, the expansion of the budget sector in the period between 
1992 and 1997 took advantage of the collapse of commercial sites in city centres 
to develop quickly (Hotel Report, 1999a). Similarly, the Automobile Association 
(1999) also claimed that the 130% increase in budget hotels between 1992 and 
1996 was largely attributable to the recession. 
To this extent, there are similarities with the creation of the conference market in 
the 1980s. Both provisions were initiated by purpose-built rooms for business 
travellers, but evolved into a wider market appeal. The conference market created 
the short-break market in the 1980s while the budget hotels had created a family 
market in the 1990s. 
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The late 1990s to the early 2000s 
The boom enjoyed by the UK hotel industry from the mid 1990s ended from the 
late 1990s, as the overall economy and demand for tourism and hotel industry was 
affected by the slow down of the world economy. The demand in the UK was 
worsened -by the foot-and-mouth outbreak in 2001, particularly affecting smaller 
establishments based in the British countryside (Euromonitor, 2005). This 
economic slowdown was compounded by the terrorist attack in New York in 2001, 
the Afghanistan war in 2002, the spreading of SARS in Asia and Canada in 2003, 
and the Iraq war which started in 2003 (Deloitte & Touche LLP, 2003; Lanzkron 
and Kett, 2003). These threats lowered the number of travellers and demand for 
hotels in the UK, particularly in terms of US visitors to the UK during the early 
period of 2001 - 2002. This economic slowdown led to more portfolio 
rationalisation activity among corporate hotel companies: disposing of or closing 
down loss-making assets, in order to focus on cost reduction (Sangster, 2001). 
The rationalisation activities were partly a strategic move among hotel companies 
to reduce cost, and partly to enhance their share value. During this period, the 
City downgraded share prices of most publicly quoted hotel companies, to one 
lower than the book values of the business (Parkinson, 2006). As a result, some 
companies reverted to private ownership and others considered sale-and- 
leaseback to reduce asset holding. As a consequent to this, hotel operators gain a 
considerable sum of capital to be used towards refurbishment and to fund more 
M&A and development activities (Bock and Forster, 2002). Similarly, Whittaker 
(2006) suggest that this method removes debt and assets from the balance sheet 
and enables hotel operators to produce a clearer view of returns from operation 
and property investments. Moreover, increasing operator fees also added an 
incentive to several hotel operators for exiting their real estate interests to pursue 
management opportunities (Sangster, 2001). - 
This rationalisation of assets also has its implications for the UK hotel industry 
from the early 2000s. First, there appeared to be an increasing split between 
ownership and management control. This rationalisation of assets and adoption of 
franchising and management contracting which started in the 1990s, had 
accelerated in the early 2000s. This could mean the industry is getting more 
-82- 
confident in using this kind of expansion mode, which was almost non-existent in 
the 1970s (Medlik and Airey, 1978). It also shows the change in UK hotel industry, 
moving from an owner management convention to a separate ownership and 
management mode in recognition of returns from operation and property 
investments. Moreover, it reflects that the industry is maturing, in terms of the 
need to expand quickly through the acquisition of hotel, management contracts 
and franchising rights. The second implication is the increasing interest and 
confidence among financial investors with the hotel industry. This rationalisation 
activity would be difficult to realise if there were no willing buyers. 
The willingness of banks and financial institutions to invest in the hotel industry 
was partly due to their realisation of the value of hotel buildings (Sangster, 2001). 
According to Bozec (2001), the bursting of the late 1990s dotcom bubble also 
brought back many investors to the hotel business upon realising its more tangible 
quality. Similarly, David Gammage, Managing' Director of Insignia Hotel Partners 
posited that investors were attracted by the structure of hotel buildings as opposed 
to office blocks because of the nature of the hotel business being dependent on its 
room sales. Thus, the hotel buildings are constantly maintained in good condition 
in order to attract customers and increase its sales (Sangster, 2000a). Parkinson 
(2006) also points out the commercial property markets in the UK and many other 
areas in Europe at that time, offered lesser financial returns, as compared to hotel 
investment. These new investors, particularly financial institutions, saw the 
potential benefits of hotel ownership enhanced by strong annual returns. 
However, they had little or no experience in hotel business management, leading 
to the need for hotel asset management companies. Nilsson et al. (2001) also 
posit that hotels have a unique characteristic in terms of having a structure that 
has little or no alternative use, and thus requires specific management expertise to 
maximise its value and generate future net income, although there are similarities 
between hotels and other commercial properties in terms of land and buildings. 
Therefore, it could be said that the changing ownership structure was made 
possible by the pull from more profitable hotel investment and the push from hotel 
operators looking to decrease asset holdings led to growth in using sale-and- 
leaseback as an expansion avenue in the early 2000s. 
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Moreover, the hotel sector looked favourable during that same period because of 
low interest rates, a low inflation environment and moderate supply growth (Bock 
and Forster, 2003). During the period between 2001 and 2004, although the 
majority of the big UK hotel companies were engaging in rationalising and selling 
hotel properties, there were still a number of M&A activities in the market. 
However, these activities involved single asset transactions more than portfolio 
acquisition (see Table 4.1). This could be an indication of maturity in the 
consolidation of hotels amongst these big hotel companies. It could also be a sign 
of a more strategic approach towards expansion for these hotel companies. The 
continuous acquisitions of single assets on the premise of criteria such as strategic 
fit in the asset's location is evident by the continuous high demand for hotels 
located in London (see Table 4.1). Although portfolio rationalisation activity 
resulted in a decline in the number of units affiliated to corporate hotel companies, 
the percentage of sales generated by these companies continued to grow. For 
example, corporate hotel companies accounted for less than one-fifth of all hotel 
units in 2004, but generated E7,155 million of sales (80% of total sales) compared 
to E1,789 million by Independent hotel companies (Euromonitor, 2005). 
Table 4.1: Single asset transactions in the UK, 2001 - 2004 
Year London: London Province Province Total % of 
'000 Euro Ave price '000 Euro Ave price 1000 European 
(No. of per room (No. of per room Euro Transactions 
assets) '000 Euro assets) '000 Euro of Single 
asset 
2001 496,056 211,444 431,484 131,667 927,540 n. a. 
(9 assets) (21 assets) 
2002 325,174 368,600 52,220 60,000 377,394 40% 
(5 assets) (5 assets) 
2003 448,000 353,000 335,000 193,000 783,000 25% 
(12 (115 assets) 
assets) 
2004 618,000 237,000 360,000 123,000 978,000 24% 
(16 (17 assets) 
assets) 
Source: Adapted from Bock and Forster (2002; 2004) and Forster and Bock (2005) 
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The downturn of the worldwide economy has had a positive impact on the UK 
hotel industry, particularly on the increasingly efficient use of IT. Room occupancy 
in the hotel industry in particular benefited from internet bookings via the websites 
of intermediaries (hereafter known as online travel agents) (Weier and Kontzer, 
2004). The business of the online travel industry evolved and boomed during the 
three-year downturn, leading to a new kind of business where online travel agents 
make use of technology to sell rooms for hotel companies. Some hotel companies 
signed deals with online travel agents such as Expedia. com, Travelocity. com and 
Hotel. corn in order to boost their room sales (Henderson, 2004). 
As the economy recovered, branded hotel operators such as Hilton Hotels, 
InterContinental Hotels and Marriott Hotels realised that it was cheaper to sell their 
own rooms on their own websites directly. They estimated online travel agents to 
have gained between 25% and 40% per transaction of room sales compared to 
the estimated 10% paid to travel agents, which was a very high cost (Foss, 2004). 
This discrepancy has been identified as being led by hotel franchisees who sold 
their rooms via popular online travel agents at a very low rate. During the 
economic slow down in 1999, the franchisees who were mostly independent hotel 
owners encountered more difficulties in filling up their rooms. During that period, 
branded hotel companies such as Hilton Hotels, InterContinental Hotels and 
Marriott Hotels had not developed their own sophisticated marketing and sales 
websites on the Internet. This led them to depend heavily on online travel agents 
who had the capabilities to promote and help them to maximise value for their 
hotel businesses (Foss, 2004). 
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Figure 4.1: Travel accommodation: per cent change in year on year growth in value 
of internet sales by direct suppliers and intermediaries, 2000 - 2005 
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When the economy recovered, branded hotel companies realised their financial 
loss and also worried that their brand name would lose credibility as rooms offered 
in the online travel agents' websites were cheaper than those offered on their 
corporate sites (Tedeschi, 2004). Therefore, they started to concentrate more on 
designing and establishing online and off-line marketing and advertising through 
their own Web sites, rather than depending too much on online travel agents as 
they had done during the economic downturn (Henderson, 2004; Tedeschi, 2004). 
This shift in channels of sales is reflected in the faster growth rate in direct sales of 
77%, compared with 4% for online travel agents, between 2003 and 2005 (see 
Figure 4.11). However, it was also recognised by many hotel companies that online 
travel agents, which are considered to be popular websites, can perform the sales 
of rooms efficiently (Euromonitor, 2006). Thus, several hotel companies continued 
to use online travel agents as one of their distribution channels. 
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Thus, the major change in the hotel industry in the early 2000s was its becoming 
more technology related in response to more sophisticated customer demand 
brought about by technological advancements in communications. Hotel 
companies have not only needed to change their marketing and selling strategies 
via information technology - Internet -, but have also been involved in a wave of 
electronic installations such as high speed internet in guest rooms, and later 
shifted to wireless connections on the hotel premises. In addition, striving to 
provide speed for hotel checking-in and out has led to the installation of self- 
service check-in kiosks in hotel lobbies (Woodyard, 2004). 
In summary, this discussion provides a general, but dynamic, view of the hotel 
industry, and in turn reflects the changes in companies' strategy and structure in 
response to the external environment. Particularly dynamic was the use of M&A 
activities as a vehicle for growth in a business that needs high capital investment 
and is vulnerable to the unpredictable macro environment. The consolidations 
have also increasingly confined the number of hotel groups into a few big major 
international players, originating from the United States, France and latterly the UK 
(see Appendix F). Since each individual company is different it is logical to 
consider that not all companies will have the same reasons for using M&A 
activities for expansion. The interactions between these two environments - micro 
and macro -and their interdependencies would shed light on why and how these 
organisations expanded by using M&A activities. 
4.3. Summary 
This chapter provides an overview of the development of the UK hotel industry, in 
the context of macro environment changes in particular. The first part of this 
chapter highlights the relationship between -the UK transportation and hotel 
evolution. Although the historical context might be different in terms of time and 
space, this part of the review shows some interesting repetition of business 
strategies. For business strategy in relation to the kind of products and services 
provided in the hotel industry, the provisions have not deviated far from the coach 
inn period. For instance, the provision of basic needs (bed and meals) in a 
luxurious or basic setting is still the same at present as it was in the coaching inn 
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period. Moreover, several roadside catering companies, from the mid-1980s, 
transformed their roadside eateries into budget hotels by adding accommodation 
extensions to meet the rise in demand for this type of accommodation. This 
strategy to a certain extent is a return to the coaching inn period and the motor car 
boom of the early 1900s. In addition, the upgrading of rooms and hotel facilities in 
the past, such as the provision of electricity and lifts in the 19 th century, is mirrored 
in technology development and the improvements carried out in rooms and hotels 
in terms of telecommunications from the late 20th century. 
The fact that location is an important success factor in the hotel business is 
reinforced by the review of the relationship between transportation and the hotel 
industry. For instance, coaching inns were first established to meet the needs of 
coach travellers on the road, and the arrival of railways diverted travellers to stay 
close to train stations and led to the demise of coaching inns. However, the latter 
were revived upon the arrival of bicycles and motor cars in the early 1900s, which 
in turn slowed down the railway hotel business. The increasing use of air 
transportation since the 1960s brought about an increasing demand for hotels in 
the cities. The above has not only highlighted the importance of location, which 
remains a major driver for economic growth in the hotel businesses, but has also 
emphasised the vulnerability of this industry due to its dependence on a constantly 
changing world, and its need to respond to ever changing market demand. 
The expansion of hotel units in the UK was slowed down by the chronic lack of 
land for building and construction, particularly in London. Adding to this limitation, 
it is also time consuming to build a hotel from scratch. Moreover, the huge amount 
of capital required to build a hotel unit complicates the development. From the 
1980s, new problems arose - foreign competitors started investing in the UK hotel 
industry increasing costs and pressure on UK hotel companies. Thus, this 
industry had to race against time to bridge the difference between market demand 
and supply under a constantly changing macro environment. It also needed to 
ensure that its market share was not eroded with the entry of foreign players. 
Therefore, the use of M&A activities as a quick method of growth was pertinent in 
the case of the UK. 
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On the other hand, the need for more capital to expand hotel companies, in 
conjunction with the willingness of the financial sector to invest in the hotel 
industry, has seen more and more non-hotel operators owning hotel shares since 
the late 1990s. The deregulation in the UK financial sector had a spill-over effect 
on the hotel industry, particularly benefiting this industry, through the increased 
amount of funds made available for investment by local and international financial 
institutions. 
It is apparent that political instability, such as terror threats and wars, threatened 
hotel demand. Moreover, fluctuating economic indicators, such as interest rate, 
inflation rate and exchange rate, have critical effects on hotel demand, companies' 
decisions to expand, and the way the company chooses to expand. For example, 
companies might choose to finance hotel operation through debts and / or internal 
funding, or adopt other financing methods, such as sale-and-leaseback, which 
lead to lesser management control due to a separation of ownership and 
management. A growth market attracts investment, as is evident from the 
competition that arose between conference hotels and universities. Changes in 
market demand also drive company strategy changes, as displayed by the 
development of budget hotel from the 1980s. 
In the early 1990s, higher interest rates led to higher costs for property companies 
and hotel companies, which also held a high volume of assets and debts. The 
hotel business was worst off when there was also a low demand for hotel rooms, 
attributable to the First Gulf War and the world recession. A structural change in 
hotel companies took place in terms of ownership, as more hotel companies sold 
their hotel assets to willing buyers - financial institutions - to reduce debt, leading 
to a shift from ownership to becoming management companies. 
The examination of the development of the UK hotel industry, in association with 
various macro environmental factors, provides an overview of the hotel industry in 
general. At the same time, this chapter provides the context which supports the 
theoretical framework devised in the previous chapter. For example it explores the 
pertinence of industry related shocks such as the property market, and general 
shocks such as the financial sector, IT, foreign competition and world events. The 
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next chapter explains and discusses the research 
design used to carry out this 
study. 
-90- 
Chapter 5: 
Research design and methods 
The aim of exploring the development of big business in the UK hotel industry in 
the years 1979 - 2004 is connected to the use of M&A activity as an expansion 
tool. The understanding of this development is facilitated through the analysis of 
the motives for M&A activity of four hotel companies on an organisational and the 
external environmental levels. This study is carried out based on a critical realist 
perspective. By taking this perspective, this study recognises the 'interplay 
between structure and agency at various levels of analytical abstraction as it 
shapes the organisational forms through which social reproduction and 
transformation are realised' (Reed, 1997, pp. 37). In other words, there is a 
concern for the relationship between human agency and social structure, and 
critical realism considers both social science's interpretive and natural science's 
objectivist views. The former recognises social phenomena as products of social 
actors, and the latter posits social phenomena as emerging without intervention 
from social actors. This perspective also takes the view that there are different 
levels of reality in which social phenomena occur due to structure and agency 
interaction (see 5.1). In the same vein, Dobson (2002) argues that critical realism 
is an approach that concentrates on multiple levels of investigation. He proposes 
the examination of each level in turn, and of the interactions between each 
structure identified at the different levels, as a process in the investigation of a 
social situation. In this sense, this approach supports this research in terms of the 
study of four companies' development at different levels (organisational, industry 
and general level), and integrating the different levels to understand the 
development of big business in the UK hotel industry. 
This chapter explains the research philosophy underpinning the research design, 
such as research strategy, methods used and time horizons, including the 
limitations of the method. The first section accounts for the research design and 
the second section clarifies the multiple-case studies adopted for this thesis. The 
third section justifies sample selection while the fourth section gives details of data 
collection (secondary data and semi-structured interviews) and the data analysis 
Process. The fifth section considers validity, reliability and generalisability issues. 
-91- 
The sixth section discusses research limitations and the final section provides a 
summary of this chapter. 
5.1. Research design 
This research design is based on the examination of the motives of four UK hotel 
companies for M&A activities on an organisational level, in the context of macro 
environmental changes. The objectives are to find out 'how' and 'why these 
companies expanded and the hotel industry became big business between the 
years 1979 - 2004. Therefore, this study of the growth of hotel companies over a 
period of 26 years requires a holistic approach to understand circumstances both 
within and outside the companies. According to Patton (2002, pp. 59), 'a holistic 
approach assumes that the whole is understood as a complex system that is 
greater than the sum of its parts'. This approach emphasises the analysis of the 
interactions of variables in a non-linear way to understand the cause-effect 
relationship of a phenomenon, which is similar to historical explanation as posited 
by Leff (1969, pp. 98): 
"[Historical explanation] explains the whole through explaining the parts. 
It is a feature of history that the historian already knows what he has to 
explain before he knows why and how it is what it is". 
This also coincides with Munslow's definition (2000, pp. 131): 
"[H]istorical explanation tends to ask three questions about the events, 
processes and people of the past ... These are what 
happened, how did it 
happen and why did it happen in the way the evidence suggests it did" . 
Therefore, historical explanation is able to provide a foothold for investigating 'how' 
and 'why' M&A took place in the hotel industry, and the industry's emergence as a 
big business in the context of the knowledge that there were a number of variables 
interacting. These variables involved the interplay of management decision, 
company strategy changes and past changes in macro environmental factors to 
provide this result. 
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In this sense, critical realism is applicable to the research question in three ways: 
firstly, organisational motives for M&A activities (such as economies of scale) 
concern management decision-making and consequent action, leading to hotel 
company expansion. This is a form of 'social science' comprising 'perception and 
consequent actions of social actors' (Saunders et aL, 2007, pp. 108). Secondly, 
the 'natural science' in this study constitutes the external environment, namely 
industry and general shocks (such as deregulation of financial sector and world 
events) which 'exist in reality, external to social actors' (Saunders et aL, 2007, pp. 
108). In other words, this is not within the control of managers who make 
decisions. Thirdly, the combination of both sciences enables understanding of the 
social phenomenon of the hotel industry becoming big business via M&A activity. 
The theoretical framework of M&A activities is also linked to critical realism in 
terms of different levels - organisational and macro environmental - being used 
for interpreting and explaining this phenomenon. This is synonymous with the 
different levels in the nature of reality: the empirical, the actual and the real 
(13hasker, 1978). These different levels comprise knowledge as seen with the 
naked eye (expansion of hotel companies), the actual events that took place (M&A 
activities used as an expansion tool) and a reality where a complex causal 
relationship (between management decisions to use M&A activities based on 
macro environmental conditions) took place, requiring in-depth interpretation to 
explain the social phenomenon. Therefore, the strength of critical realism as an 
underpinning epistemology in this thesis, in terms of its proposition of multi-level 
study in the business context and recognition of the co-existence of natural and 
social science provides the foundation for this research design. 
From the organisational context, Harvey (1999) and Kieser (1994) posit that 
events and people of the past played a vital role in shaping the present conditions 
of an organisation. Kieser (1994) argues that existing organisational structures 
are a result of decisions made by individuals and groups over many years, in 
response to problems and / or opportunities at the time, and have been 
conditioned by historical context. Similarly, Munslow (2000) agrees that the past is 
presumed to be contingent and while the intention of rational agents is of central 
importance in historical explanation, actions and events are not primarily 
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determined by human logic or any other single cause. This no doubt points to the 
importance of knowing the macro environment in context, and linking 
organisational responses to complex external conditions. 
This discussion of historical explanation and critical realism thus points to 
comparative historical analysis as a suitable method to answer the aim and 
objectives of this thesis. Comparative historical analysis is defined by a concern 
with causal analysis, an emphasis on processes over time, and the use of 
systematic and contextualised comparison (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003), 
and its relevance to this thesis can be explained in four ways. 
Firstly, the main feature of a comparative historical inquiry is predicated on the 
concern to identify causal configurations, and is useful for this study since it aims 
to seek historical explanations in this research for the development of hotel 
companies. In this thesis, the understanding of the development of hotel 
companies is achieved through the use of M&A activities, particularly through the 
interaction between organisational- and macro environmental-levels, which is 
similar to historical comparative research that integrates the micro (small-scale, 
face-to-face interaction) and macro (large-scale social structures) levels (Neuman, 
2004, p. 301). 
Secondly, comparative historical analysis stresses processes over time. The 
understanding of how and why companies grow is better understood via the 
longitudinal approach as it is useful for studying changes and the causes of 
changes over a period of time (Remenyi et aL, . 1998; Saunders et aL, 2007). This 
longitudinal aspect enables a longer history of context to be established and 
provides an uninterrupted picture of what happened over the period 1979 - 2004, 
and in turn is able to facilitate a more accurate synthesis. This was also a period 
when the UK economy encountered some booms and slumps in the context of 
world events as well as seeing a high volume. of M&A activities took place in the 
hotel industry (see 1.1 and Chapter 2). 
Thirdly, comparative historical inquiry emphasises a systematic and contextualised 
comparison between a small number of cases within delimited historical contexts 
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(Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003). This emphasis is highly relevant to this 
research because a small number of four cases will be used to achieve the aim of 
this study. Moreover, the same period of study has been set to provide the 
historical context for facilitating a systematic and comparative study of the 
development of the four case companies. Although quantitative data, such as 
studying all UK hotel companies, may be valid to provide certain general insights, 
in this case it is not about quantity but the nature of the data. The large quantity of 
data might not be so relevant because it is unable to facilitate in-depth 
understanding of the complexity of interactions between company-specific and 
general environmental factors and the changes that emerge from the interactions. 
Moreover, there is a time constraint for this particular piece of research. In 
addition, the examination of a few cases in this research is not intended to achieve 
some kind of replicable controlled comparison, in the ways that are usually 
applicable to quantitative studies, but to extract meanings in relation to M&A 
motives and the growth of companies. Therefore, qualitative study via four case 
studies is suitable as an interpretative method of collecting and analysing data to 
explore and explain a phenomenon (Walsh, 2003). 
Fourthly, a comparative historical analysis is closely linked to explanatory 
approach which posits that an explanatory study enables the study to uncover 
reasons for things, showing why and how they are what they are' (Punch, 2000, 
pp. 38). This concurs with the comparative historical analysis's study of causal 
relationship between events. Moreover, the author suggests that an explanatory 
approach is more related to studies where much has been researched and 
concepts may be further developed. This approach is thus applicable to this thesis 
because M&A activity and its theory have been widely studied, but have not been 
considered in the specific context of the historical development of UK hotel 
companies. Thus, this study endeavours to further develop this theory, based on 
the strength of the explanatory approach and the adoption of qualitative and 
longitudinal techniques to answer the 'how' and 'why' questions and enhance this 
study. 
In summary, the philosophical underpinnings of critical realism and comparative 
historical analysis have been identified as similar in terms of their beliefs in the co- 
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existence of natural and social science approaches. They also believe in the 
existence of different levels of reality, leading to multi-level examination and 
analysis, and agree on the importance of knowing the process of change, as well 
as embrace qualitative methods and longitudinal technique. This thesis therefore 
utilises a few case studies and a theoretical framework (M&A theory) to conduct a 
longitudinal study (covering a period of 26 years) and elicit answers to 'how' and 
I why' hotel companies expanded, leading to the emergence of big business in this 
industry. 
5.2. Multiple-case study 
According to Yin (2003a), both case studies and histories are generally used to 
answer questions which deal with operational links needing to be traced over time. 
The case study approach is used particularly due to the need to cover contextual 
conditions, because these conditions are considered to be highly pertinent to the 
subject of study. In addition, case study strategy 'has a distinctive advantage for 
certain research questions and arises out of complex social phenomena' (Yin, 
2003a, pp. 9). Therefore, the same 'distinctive advantage' is applicable to the 
study of a complex social phenomenon -'how' and 'why companies expanded by 
using the M&A mechanism. It would also lead to a comprehensive picture of the 
development of the hotel industry in the context of its environmental changes. In 
the same way, Numagami (1998, pp. 12) posits that the case study method 
enables a researcher to reveal the 'temporal interdependence among diverse 
actions' in the tracking of historical process. This concurs with Hutchinson and 
Nicolas (1987, pp. 46), who pointed out that 'part of the underlying motivation for 
writing and reading business history of individual firms has been the promise to 
gain understanding of general factors in the growth of the industry or the whole 
economy'. 
According to Stake (2000), an instrumental case study is about examining a 
particular case to provide insight and to support and facilitate the understandings 
of other phenomena, and the multiple-case study makes use of several single 
cases to learn more about that phenomenon. Moreover, Hakim (2000) argues that 
multiple-case study involves conducting the. same study two or more times 
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simultaneously, based on the same contexts or in a selected context with a 
relevant set of interrelated factors. This is highly relevant to this thesis in terms of 
understanding the growth of four hotel companies within the same historical 
timeline and against a similar contextual background. From a different angle, 
Saunders et al. (2007) support the strength of multiple case studies as being 
instrumental in exploring existing theory and / or providing a source of new 
research questions via a series of findings generated from well-constructed 
multiple case studies. In this respect, the exploration of existing theory is similar to 
Yin's (2003b) advocacy of a rich theoretical framework as a starting point for 
collecting and analysing qualitative data. According to Yin (2003b), a theoretical 
framework is devised by identifying the main variables in the study and the 
presumed relationships between them. 
Therefore, the theoretical framework of this study is constructed from variables 
developed from M&A literature review, based on the knowledge that the interaction 
between organisational motives and macro environmental factors will elicit 
answer(s) to the research question. These variables function as parts to explain 
the whole - hotel companies' expansion and the hotel industry developing into big 
business. Moreover, Yin (2003a) regards multiple cases as more robust because 
analysis from each case study will provide insights into the phenomenon studied, 
while a comparison of results across different'cases increases the accuracy and 
reliability of the study. The samples for this multiple-case study are introduced in 
the next section and their relevance to the research questions is also explained. 
5.3. Sample Selection 
These hotel companies were selected in view of the aim to understand the 
development of the hotel industry into big business, and these cases are 
particularly relevant to this study because they had developed over the years to 
become the largest hotel companies in the UK, by the number of rooms operated, 
as well as ascending in rank worldwide (see Appendices B and F). The four 
companies are Forte Group plc (hereafter known as THF), InterContinental Hotels 
Group (hereafter known as Bass), Hilton International (hereafter known as 
Ladbroke) and Whitbread Group plc (hereafter known as Whitbread). 
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THF's original business was operating milk bars, and it became the largest hotel 
company in the UK between the period 1970. and 1996. The Group used M&A 
activities widely for expansion, and these activities attracted attention from the 
MMC in the UK and foreign government, as well as intervention from the EU (see 
Chapter 6). It was the only UK hotel company also to have been ranked in the top 
ten worldwide since the 1980s (see Appendix F). Its position was lost only after 
1995, when the Group had to sell its budget hotel companies in the US in order to 
raise funds for its defence against the Granada Group pic's hostile bid. 
Subsequently, THF was acquired by the latter in 1996, and its hotels were broken 
up and sold off between 1996 and 2003. 
Ladbroke had developed its original business in the gaming industry in 1886. In 
1987, Ladbroke acquired the international hotel company, Hilton International 
which changed the UK hotel industry structure, in terms of adding an 
internationally well-known hotel name to UK ownership. This major purchase also 
changed Ladbroke's ranking in the UK, in terms of the number of hotel rooms it 
operated, as well as international exposure for business (see Appendix F). 
Although Ladbroke's size in terms of the ranking of number of rooms did not reach 
the top ten worldwide, after the Hilton International purchase, Ladbroke also rose 
through the ranks over the next few years through the use of several M&A 
activities (see Chapter 7). 
The biggest leap in ranking achieved by a UK hotel company was that of Bass. 
Bass was originally a brewing company (since 1777) that ventured into the hotel 
industry in the mid-1960s, and exited its brewing business in 2000, in order to 
focus on its hotel business (see Chapter 8). The Group held ranks in the 40s and 
50s worldwide before 1989 (see Appendix F). After its purchase of the 
international hotel company - Holiday Inn hotels - and other subsequent 
acquisitions, it ranked as the second largest hotel company worldwide and 
emerged as the largest in 2003. 
In contrast, unlike the other three companies, Whitbread has never reached the 
top ten ranking worldwide in the hotel business, due to its concentration in the UK 
hotel market. Whitbread was also originally a brewing company, since 1742; it 
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expanded into the hotel industry in the early 1970s, and sold the brewing business 
it had held for more than 200 years in 2000 in view of the decline in the brewing 
business (see Chapter 9). However, Whitbread's hotel ranking worldwide 
ascended from 199 in 1984, and then experienced a gradual rise from 1993, 
because of its restructuring and concentration on building up its hotel division via 
M&A activities (see Appendix F). Its major increase in number of rooms was 
ascribed to the budget hotel sector, which made it the largest UK budget hotel 
company in 2000. 
These four companies are thus considered as purposeful samples because the 
study of their development is able to draw out rich information and in-depth 
understanding and insight to illuminate the questions under study (Patton, 2002). 
As pointed out by Yin (2003b), selection of cases should presuppose prior 
knowledge of the result: in this study, the four case companies are the main units 
of data collection because each had expanded by the use of M&A activities, and 
each would have substantive implications in terms of answering the research 
question about the growth of hotel companies and their impact on the industry. 
These are also four companies which are different in the nature of their original 
businesses, which concurs with Yin's (2003b) proposition that each case in 
multiple-case study research should provide a specific function within the overall 
scope of inquiry. A holistic design in a single unit of analysis is suitable for 
examining the global nature of an organisation (Yin, 2003b). Each company in this 
study is a unit of analysis, enabling literal (or direct) replications of their expansion 
through the same theoretical framework within the same historical context, which 
concurs with Yin's (2003b) category of multiple holistic cases. Moreover, the 
strategy of using these cases and concentrating on one location - the UK - 
permits in-depth comparative analysis and increases the rigour of this research. 
The following section explains the process for data collection and analysis 
5.4. Data collection and analysis 
According to Saunders et aL, (2007), data collected and subsequent methods of 
analysis have a close relationship. In this thesis, the theoretical framework is 
predicated on two concepts (organisation and macro environment) and their 
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underpinning assumptions are efficiency theory, managerial theory and industry 
shocks, found in the general M&A literature (see Chapter 3). Data collection is 
based on two sets of variables under each concept. Variables developed under 
the heading of organisational motives include economies of scale and scope, 
market power, speed, strategic fit, growth (in terms of company sales and size) 
and managerial welfare. Under the heading of industry shocks, variables include 
growth (in terms of industry growth or decline), deregulation, technology change, 
and foreign competition (see Table 3.1). Data analysis is built on studying the 
interactions between variables categorised under these two concepts. The next 
two sub-sections explain in detail these two processes: data collection and data 
analysis. 
5.4.1. Secondary data collection 
The methods for data collection are considered in conjunction with other 
approaches in the research design discussed previously, for instance, the multiple- 
case approach and longitudinal studies. According to Yin (2003b), case studies 
and historical study can overlap, due to their ability to make use of a variety of 
evidence, such as documents, artefacts, interviews and observations, for their 
investigations. Saunders et aL (2007) argue that historical research and 
longitudinal studies generally depend on archival research: documents recording 
the organisations' day-to-day activities are generally the principal source of data 
The operationalisation of this study started with attempts to retrieve archival 
documents by contacting companies. Letters were sent out to three Corporate 
Services departments, of Bass, Ladbroke and Whitbread, and followed up by 
telephone communications to enquire about company documents, such as 
company reports and meeting minutes. However, upon calling up and speaking 
with the secretaries to the heads of Corporate Services, the common comments 
were that they did not have specific storage of their previous documents, or that 
they did not know where they were, or that they did not think these were 
accessible for outsiders. 
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The next attempt was to try and contact executives of hotel companies through the 
recommendations of visiting fellows in Oxford Brookes University's Department of 
Hospitality, Leisure and Tourism Management. However, the communications 
went through their secretaries and the same kind of response was received during 
the telephone communications. The initial plan to contact the owner of the fourth 
company, THF (THF was taken over in 1996, but the owner is currently operating 
a new private hotel company), regarding previous documents was stalled because 
it was not possible to gain any access to the other three companies. Thus, in 
order to obtain more compatible data, the research method shifted to concentrate 
on alternative secondary data collection and analysis. Although the data in the 
companies' archive would have been useful for this study with regard to M&A 
activities, the main difficulty in accessing these documents was also attributed to 
these companies having gone through several M&A and restructuring activities. 
This change in research design has not compromised the quality of this study; 
rather, it has reinforced the dynamic nature of these companies and their 
relevance as samples for this study on the development and changes of 
companies and industry through M&A activity itself. 
Table 5.1: Types of secondary data 
Documentary Multiple Source Survey 
" Written Materials 0 Area based (MAB: 0 Censuses (SC: Survey 
(DW: Documentary Multiple Source Censuses) 
Written materials) area based) 0 Continuous and regular 
" Non-Wriften 0 Times Series based surveys (SCS: Survey 
materials (DNW: (MTS: Multiple Continuous and regular 
Documentary Non- source Time Series) Survey) 
Written materials) 0 Ad hoc Surveys (SAH: 
Survey Ad Hoc surveys) 
Source: Adapted from Saunders et al., 2007, pp. 249 
Litteljohn and Roper (1999) suggested researching organisations from the outside 
through annual reports, corporate brochures, Web sites, press releases and any 
other published documents, in order to eliminate access restrictions and to save 
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time. According to Saunders et al. (2007), the use of secondary data in a multiple- 
source data set makes it possible to undertake longitudinal studies under time 
constraints and these data are particularly useful in the case of historical research, 
whether used on their own or in conjunction with other secondary data such as 
multiple sources and surveys (see Table 5.1). 
Saunders et aL (2007) categorised secondary data into documentary, multiple 
source and survey. Documentary secondary data include written documents such 
as organisations' records (communications and websites), journals, magazines, 
articles and newspapers. The authors considered these as a 'storage medium for 
compiled data' (pp. 248). Documentary secondary data also include non-written 
documents such as video recordings, film and television programmes. Under the 
multiple source type, area based may include newspapers such as those, in the 
financial area (The Financial Times) or a location (country specific reports, such as 
the UK). In the category of time series based data, data might be retrieved from 
industry statistics or government publications, (Office of National Statistics and 
Bank of England). Data from surveys, for example, numbers of people employed 
in various sectors of the service industry is useful for comparing research findings 
and / or setting a context for research findings. 
In this study, the secondary data used consists, of the following: 
1. Documentary (annual reports, company news, company announcements, 
television programme, oral history, newspaper, trade journals) 
2. Multiple source (newspapers, industry statistics, academic books and 
journals) 
3. Survey (number of employees in each industry sector, hotel and property 
prices in the UK). 
A wide range of publications about hotel companies in particular and the hotel 
industry and macro environmental issues in general was reviewed through a 
number of databases such as Business Source Premier, Emerald, Euromonitor, 
Hospitality and Tourism Database, Key Notes and Mintel. Secondary data were 
retrieved from the Internet and through hardcopies. Data and relevant articles 
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were also retrieved from the Bodleian Library, City Business Library, Colindale 
Newspaper (The British Library), Companies House, New York Public Library, 
Oxford Brookes' Library and The British Library. Several websites such as Bank 
of England, British Hospitality Association, Compass Group p1c, Competition 
Commission, Department of Trade and Industry, European Union, Gamblinq 
Commission, Hilton Group pic, InterContinental Hotels Group, National Statistics, 
VisitBritain. com, Whitbread Group plc and so on were used. 
The terms in Table 5.1 are used in Table 5.2 to provide a comprehensive record of 
the data sources as part of the transparency and reliability element of the research 
design. Table 5.2 shows the types of secondary data collected and used in this 
thesis and where they were retrieved from. Some of these data - British 
newspapers, trade journals and academic journals - are available in both hard 
copies and electronic format in Oxford Brookes University Library. The US news 
was retrieved from New York Public Library directly and from The British Library 
(Colindale Newspapers) through Interlibrary Loan. 
In this study, the multiple sources available made it possible to collect data from a 
variety of sources regarding the same phenomenon - development of four hotel 
companies - at the same time validating one source of information against 
another. For example, data retrieved from company annual reports, newspapers 
and trade journals can help in scrutinising explanations of motives for a particular 
deal from the company's perspective. Simultaneously, the comments made 
regarding the same deal by industry-specific analysts in newspapers and trade 
journals can confirm, refute or provide more insight into comments the company 
made regarding that deal. More importantly, comments retrieved from different 
sources pertaining to that particular period are able to put that particular deal into 
context. 
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Table 5.2: Types of secondary data collection and sources 
Secondary Detail Type of Source of data 
data secondary data 
Company Trust House Forte/ Forte Group DW: Company House (1978 
Annual p1c, Ladbroke p1c, Bass p1c, Six Company and 1997) and individual 
Reports Continents, Intercontinental Financial company website (1998 - 
Group pic, Whitbread plc Reports present) 
Newspapers The Financial Times; Wall Street MAB: Financial British Library; Oxford 
Journal Newspapers Brookes University Library; 
New York Public Library 
Newspapers The Times, The Guardian; The DW: British Library; Oxford 
Independent, The Washington General Brookes University library; 
Post; New York Times, Los Newspapers New York Public Library 
Anqeles Times 
Trade Hotel Reports; Catering and DW: Hotel and Catering 
journals HotelKeepers Hospitality International Management 
Trade journals Association; Oxford 
Brookes University library 
Academic Business History, Business DW: Oxford Brookes University 
Journals History Review; Cornell Hotel Academic library; Bodleian Library; 
and Restaurant Administration special area The British Library 
Quarterly; International Journal journals 
of contemporary Hospitality 
Management; Journal Of 
Hospitality & Tourism Research 
Video BBC's Money Programme'Blood DNW, TV Oxford Brookes University 
on the carpet' programme Resource Centre 
Oral history Interview with Rocco Forte DW: Hospitality Archive, 
Interview Houston, USA 
Transcript 
Hospitality Sales prices: Hotel, Properties. SAH / MTS: Christie & Co.; 
Statistics Industry survey Euromonitor International; 
HVS International 
Economic Census: Employment SC / MTS: Office of National Statistics 
Statistics Economic (Internet) 
Census 
Economic Gross Domestic Product indices; MAB / MTS: Bank of England (Internet) 
Statistics Inflation rate; Interest Rate Statistics 
Reports Monopoly Mergers and MAB: MMC/ Competition Commissions 
Commission OFT 
- 
(Internet) 
Books General and specific theories DW: Academic British Library; Oxford 
I I books Brookes University Library 
For Abbreviations, please see Table 5.1 orAbbreviations 
The actual data location and collection was an on-going process, from December 
2003 to July 2007. Data for four hotel companies were mainly retrieved from 
companies' annual reports, news from companies' websites, newspapers, and 
trade journals. Information on macro environmental factors during the 1970s and 
the early 2000s, were collected mainly from academic and trade journals, 
government websites and newspapers. 
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(1) Data collection process 
Information was first sourced from the national UK Newspapers: The Financial 
Times, The Guardian, The Independent and The Times from Oxford Brookes 
University Library. These newspapers are creditable because they were chosen in 
accordance with the criteria of continuity as well as similarity. Each newspaper 
has been published continuously over the period of time analysed. They provide 
news coverage and have a more mature readership as compared to the popular 
market such as the Daily Mirror, The Sun and The Sunday Mail which attract 
younger readers (under 25 years old). Moreover, the newspapers used in this 
research are mainly from the 'Quality' range as classified by ABC, an independent 
company that regulates printed publications in the UK (Mintel, 2005c). In addition, 
the Financial Times is a specialised financial paper and is circulated on an 
international basis (Mintel, 2005c). 
The first stage of collection from newspaper data started with going through the 
indexes of each UK major newspaper from 1978 to 2004 (extended to 2006 
subsequently) searching for the four companies: Bass, THF, Ladbroke and 
Whitbread. However, these four companies had changed over the years, in terms 
of corporate names. Therefore, the key word search was extended to company 
names relating to these four companies, namely, Compass, Forte, Granada, 
Hilton, InterContinental, Six Continents and Trust House Forte. Pages containing 
these key words in the indexes were photocopied and each copy was scrutinised 
to identify news that covered any M&A activities, either directly or indirectly related 
to these companies. The relevant news items on the indexes were highlighted 
and copies of these news articles were made from microfilms in the Oxford 
Brookes University Library. Some news articles were retrieved from electronic 
sources such as Proquest. However, information presented in electronic form is 
only available from the early 1990s. For instance, the earliest available electronic 
archived news is The Guardian, which starts from 1992 and for The Financial 
Times, news is available from May 1996. 
Copies from microfilms and printouts from Proquest were made for each piece of 
news and were next sorted and categorised under each company name. Under 
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each company, copies were arranged by year and each company was assigned its 
own coloured post-it (Green: THF; Pink: Ladbroke; Orange: Bass and Blue: 
Whitbread; Purple: Industry and general information). The purpose of this 
coloured post-it was to facilitate a faster and easier way to identify companies' 
data in paper form throughout the research process. Moreover, some articles 
contain information about more than one of these case companies; thus the 
different colours attached to each article provide an indicator and reminder of its 
information for the researcher. 
Table 5.3: Search terms used in relation to M&A deals 
Specific words Alternative terms 
Merger; Acquire; amalgamation; buy; get; merge; obtain; procure; purchase; 
Acquisition; Take secure 
over 
Economies of Boost; cost cutting; cost saving; cross sell; cut back; decline; 
scale and scope decrease; drop; enhance; enlarge; fall; improve; increase size; 
lessen; raise; reduce head counts. 
Speed Fast; immediate; instant; quick; rapid; Speedy; sudden. 
Market power Biggest; control; dominant; influence; largest; leader; maintain; 
market power; market share. 
Strategic fit Complement; match; suit; supplement; increase geographical 
presence. 
Growth Advancing; declining; developing; expanding; growing; progressing. 
Technology Computer; computer system; distribution system; Global Distribution 
System; Internet; marketing tool; room reservation system; 
telecommunication; Wi-Fi. 
Deregulation Legislation changes: brewing; financial; gaming; transportations 
Foreign Foreign investors; globalisation; internationalisation. 
competition 
Information extraction started with one company, THF, by reading the news on a 
year by year basis to extract general information pertaining to each M&A deal. 
Terms such as 'buy' and 'purchase' are sought, in conjunction with words such as 
'merger, 'acquisition' and 'takeover'. Alternative words sought including 'cost 
saving' and 'cost cutting', indicating motives to achieve economies of scale (See 
Table 5.3 for more search terms used in relation to M&A deals). Other information 
such as why the company was buying and why the seller was selling; who the 
competitors were, what were the reasons for them competing to buy and how 
much was the deal was also identified. Each piece of news was identified, 
highlighted and typed into the computer word file. The information was arranged 
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in chronological order for each company according to each major deal closed by 
the company. Folders in the computer word file were created under the name of 
each company and / or industry. This same process was repeated for the other 
three companies. 
The second stage of data collection from newspaper data involved going through 
the indexes of each UK major newspaper from 1978 to 2004, searching for key 
words relating to the hotels and / or hotel companies bought by the four case 
companies: Anchor Hotels, Bristol Hotels & Resorts, Candlewood Suites, Centre 
Hotels, Clingendael Group, Comfort Hotels, Hanson Trust, Holiday Inn World, 
Holiday Corporation, Grand Metropolitan, Kennedy Brookes, Marriott, Myddleton 
Hotels, Premier Lodge, Rodeway Inns, Saison Seibu, Scandic, Scott's Hospitality, 
Southern Pacific Hotels Corporation, Stakis, Swallow, United Airlines, The Savoy. 
Copies were made from pages of indexes containing these key words. Each copy 
was searched to identify news that covered specific M&A deals, for example, THIF 
buying Hanson Trust, and so on. The specific news in each index was highlighted 
and the next step was to retrieve these particular pieces of news articles from 
microfilms and electronic source (Proquest) in the Oxford Brookes University 
Library. The same analysis and recording process used for the first stage of 
newspaper data collection was applied to this second stage. 
In the third stage of data collection, key words under category and / or industry - 
Hotel, Hospitality, Gaming, Beer, Brewing, Catering and Restaurants - between 
the period 1978 and 2004 were searched for in the indexes of each UK major 
newspaper. Similarly to the previous two stages, pages of indexes containing 
these key words were copied and their contents were inspected. Specific news 
referring, for example, to M&A activities in the industry and / or pertaining to one of 
those M&A deals under study, change of legislation, and so on were highlighted. 
This was followed by the retrieval of news articles from microfilms and Proquest in 
the Oxford Brookes University Library, and an identical analysis and recording 
process to that described in the previous two stages of data collection and 
recording. 
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The other main source for this thesis was trade journals. Major journals such as 
Caterer and Hotelkeeper (formerly the Caterer and Refreshment Contractor's 
Gazette), and Hotels (formerly known as the Service World International and 
Hotels & Restaurants International) are useful for this study because of their 
comprehensive reports, particularly for the UK hospitality industry and the 
international hotel scenes. The former is a weekly trade journal established in 
1878 and the'latter a monthly trade magazine published since 1967. These 
journals have been published continuously - weekly and monthly respectively - 
over the period of time analysed. The process of identifying and locating 
information in trade journals was more challenging, as there was no index 
available to provide guidance; thus, the initial stage was to browse through each 
journal page by page from 1978 to 2001 (electronic copies of Caterer and 
Hotelkeeper are available from the year 2002) whilst electronic copies of Hotels 
are available from 1993. The same categorising process used in previous 
newspaper data collection was applied in the case of searching for data in trade 
journals. For example, any page found to contain news linking to any of these 
companies and / or the hotel industry was copied and categorised under each 
company and / or industry. These copies were arranged in chronological order 
and pages containing news of two or more different companies and / or relevant 
industry were allocated more than one coloured post-it for identification purposes. 
This was followed by utilising the same analysis and recording process as that 
used for newspapers, to extract, categorise and input information into the 
computer word file and folders. 
The other important source used in this thesis was company annual reports. 
Company annual reports for each case study company between the period of 
1978 and 1997 (1978 - 1996 for THF) were purchased from Companies House, 
which is the official UK government register of UK companies. As mentioned 
previously, there was no access available to the companies, and annual reports 
were also unavailable as the contacts claimed that these could be obtained from 
Companies House. Annual reports from 1998 were available from each 
company's website and these were retrieved and printed. Company annual 
reports were used because it is found that individual investors and financial 
institutions alike considered company annual reports as a main medium through 
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which to receive company information and make investment decisions, as external 
users (Firth, 1978; Epstein and Pava, 1993; Lee and Tweedie, 1975). These 
studies span countries such as Australia (Anderson, 1981; Anderson and Epstein, 
1995), USA (Epstein and Pava, 1993) and the UK (Lee and Tweedie, 1975). Most 
of these studies also revealed that profit and loss accounts in the annual reports 
were ranked as the most important information provider. Lee and Tweedie's 
(1975) study found that individual investors in the UK considered chairmen's 
reports and profit and loss accounts to be the most widely read because the 
former provides a future prospect of the company while the latter is an important 
basis for investment decision. 
Reports made by Chairmen and Chief Executive Officers in company annual 
reports were reviewed to gain a general understanding of companies' 
development: corporate strategy changes, major M&A activities in the hotel 
division and other business divisions; future planning, and so on. Sales and profits 
for each business sector in each company's financial reports were tabulated to 
understand changes in corporate strategy, by comparing differences between 
business sectors within each company and between company and macro 
environmental factors (see Appendices L; M; N; 0). This information also 
provided insights into the motives behind each hotel deal closed, as well as 
shedding light on the external environment which might have affected the 
company's financial performance and strategic decisions. 
Other sources such as time-series statistics or specific area-based (UK) data were 
contextual information retrieved from Office for National Statistics and Bank of 
England. These data sources provide statistics such as Gross Domestic Product, 
inflation rate, interest rate, exchange rate and international visitors' spending and 
so forth, which are important for building up the picture of the economic 
environment in the UK during this period of study. For instance, the Bank of 
England website provides historical data of interest rates which function as a 
support for the argument regarding changes in market demand and UK economic 
situation. 
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Academic books and monographs provided introductory sources to general or 
specific theories, subjects and topics. Academic journals, particularly peer 
reviewed articles published in refereed academic journals, such as Business 
History and Business History Review (formerly the Bulletin of the Business 
Historical Society), provide a starting point to find out what has been written and 
what might be topical areas for further research. Other quality journals such as 
Journal of Management Studies, Academy of Management Review and Strategic 
Management Journal are used predominantly for researching M&A theories. For 
the hotel industry, journals such as Cornell Hotel & Restaurant Administration 
Quarterly and International Journal of Contemporary Hospitality Management 
provide up-to-date business management research on the hospitality industry. 
Other sources such as non-wriften materials were sought in Oxford Brookes 
University Resource Centre and a recorded TV programme recounting the hostile 
take over of THF by Granada Group pIc in 1996 (created and telecast by the 
British Broadcasting Corporation) was found useful as part of the examination of 
the THF case. Similarly, the visit to Hospitality Industry Archives, USA found an 
interview transcript with Rocco Forte (Chief Executive of THF) to be relevant to 
this thesis. 
After collecting and categorising data according to company and industry in a 
chronological order, the next step was to categorise these data, based on the 
theoretical framework, and to write an historical account of four cases. The next 
section explains these processes and how analysis was carried out. 
(ii) Presenting the historical account of four cases 
The theoretical framework established for data collection was used as a point of 
reference for writing up the four cases. The chronologically recorded information 
for each deal by each company (see the three stages in (i) data collection process) 
was re-read to discuss the motives, based on the variables (economies of scale 
and scope, speed, market power, strategic fit, managerial motive, industry growth, 
technology, deregulation and foreign competition) within the theoretical framework 
(see Table 3.1). 
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Analysis of data was carried out by identifying words that are identical or closely 
related to the expression, such as economies of scale and scope. Terms including 
I cost cuffing', 'cross-selling', 'increase size', and so forth, used in sentences were 
sought, as a means of informing readers about the motives for the particular M&A 
deal. The following provides an example taken from Ladbroke to represent how 
the analysis was carried out. 
'Economies of scale could be attained by combining the marketing skills 
of both companies and utilising Hilton International's sophisticated central 
reservation system, based in the USA, to boost bookings in Europe'. 
Source: Feltham (1987a, p. 1) 
Within this sentence, several inferences were made in terms of the variables in the 
framework. Firstly, the words which link directly with one of the variables in the 
framework are 'economies of scale'. Secondly, although strategic fit, another 
variable, might not has been spelled out in this example, it can be inferred through 
the complementary characters of the assets (central reservation system) and 
operations (marketing skills) of the combined companies. For example, 
'combining the marketing skills of both companies' suggests strategic fit for 
marketing resources. Similarly, the 'sophisticated central reservation system' 
indicates the use of technology, something highlighted by the literature as a 
general industry shock factor, and consequently categorised as "general industry 
shock". Thus, the analysis was carried out by identifying direct and indirect 
inferences to the variables in the framework. This particular example cited reveals 
the interaction between organisational motives (economies of scale and strategic 
fit) and the environmental factor (technology) in this M&A activity. 
The task described above, of identifying the motives through variables developed 
in the theoretical framework and writing up the four cases, has already explained 
the first step in the analysis process. According to Saunders, et aL (2007), 
generating and categorising data is a process of analysis in itself. In the writing up 
of the findings about the motives for the four cases, each M&A deal for each case 
company is presented as a sub-section of its own, and all the deals are in turn 
presented in a chronological and narrative manner (see 6.3; 7.2; 8.2; 9.2). Yin 
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(2003b) also points out that explanatory case studies presume causal sequences 
to occur in a linear manner over time. In this study, the examination of the growth 
of four hotel companies is presented in a chronological order. Dealing with each 
M&A activity individually serves the purpose of tracing causal events, not only 
about the deal involved, but also in terms of a link between M&A deals, as well as 
between deals and the general and industry-specific events occurring concurrently 
in the macro environment, over a period of time ( see 6.5; 7.4; 8.4; 9.4). 
Upon completing the initial analysis of the four cases, it was realised that most of 
these deals had strong links with US hotel companies. Therefore, it was 
considered that newspapers from the US might provide either views that support 
the existing data, or information that provides different insights into these deals. 
Major newspapers from the US - Wall Street Journal, The New York Times and 
The Washington Post, which have been ranked as that nation's top tier 
newspapers (Journalism Organization, 2006) - were sought in The British Library 
(Colindale Newspapers). A trip to New York Public Library was made to find out 
what kind of information exists in the US that could complement the constructed 
four cases and illuminate the development of the UK hotel industry. In view of the 
time limitation in New York, only indexes were searched, identified and copied. 
These copies were scrutinised and news from Proquest in the New York Public 
Library was also retrieved (Newspapers from Proquest for Wall Street Journals are 
available from 1980). Articles that were not available from Proquest were 
requested through Inter-Library Loan from Oxford Brookes University Library. The 
same process of categorising, analysing and writing up was carried out with the 
news extracted from the US newspapers, and information was added into the four 
written up cases (see 5.4.1. (1)). After gaining insights into the development of four 
hotel companies and the UK hotel industry, the next step was to carry out the 
semi-structured interviews, for data triangulation purpose. 
5.4.2. Semi-structured Interviews 
The semi-structured interview technique was selected as a complementary 
method to the secondary data collection approach for this study. As pointed out 
by Saunders et aL (2007), the combination of data collection techniques employed 
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to triangulate multiple sources of data ensures that the data collected are relevant 
to producing the answer to the research question. Semi-structured interviews are 
instrumental in this explanatory study, in terms of their ability to draw out causal 
relationships between variables through the opportunities of prompting and 
inducing answers from interviewees to enhance understanding of the subject 
(Saunders et aL, 2007). Moreover, the scope of the information provided in these 
interviews was expected to be substantial, broad, considerably different and 
complex. Therefore, this semi-structured technique also facilitated a more 
systematic way to analyse information provided across informants. 
Two general areas were approached, which were: 
1. General views on the motives for M&A activities in the UK hotel industry, 
1979 -2004. 
2. Specific insight into the deals closed amongst the four hotel companies 
between 1979 and 2004. 
These areas provide additional insights about the development of the four 
companies, constructed from secondary data. Alternatively, these data might 
refute the constructed development of the four hotel companies, and further 
enhance the stories in terms of eliciting information that has not been mentioned in 
public sources (see Appendix G for interview questions which provide supporting 
reasons to using these two general areas). 
The criteria for selecting interviewees were predicated on the basis of their ability 
to contribute to understanding of the motives for M&A activities in four UK hotel 
companies between 1979 and 2004. Respondents needed to have general 
knowledge of the UK hotel industry and its macro environment, as well as specific 
knowledge of M&A activities in the hotel industry during this period in study. They 
also needed to have direct and / or indirect working experience in the hotel 
industry, at the executive level and have contributed to investment decisions for 
their companies. Consequently, the non-probability sample selected was 
purposive, and these are critical cases being selected on their ability to provide 
clear insights into the M&A activities. The criteria ensures the robustness of this 
study by adding insights to the understanding of how and why hotel companies 
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expanded by using M&A as a growth mechanism. In the situation of considering 
compatible data, industry analysts were selected as interviewees because they 
were seen as complementary sources to add insights and enrich the secondary 
data collected. 
Six respondents were approached on their relevance as a critical sample for this 
study. According to Patton (2002, pp. 244), 'there is no rule for sample size in 
qualitative inquiry'. In the case of a critical sample, the number of samples is not 
as important as the selection of credible samples that provide rich information that 
fits in with the purpose of research within the available time frame and financial 
resources (Patton, 2002). Moreover, all six respondents had backgrounds in hotel 
operations, worked as analysts in the hotel industry, had been directly or indirectly 
involved in some of the M&A deals examined in this research, and all had market 
research background and affiliation in an academy setting (see Table 5.4). 
Therefore, they are considered credible respondents who can provide 'a great deal 
[of information] about matters of importance and therefore worthy of in-depth 
study' (Patton, 2002, pp. 242). 
Table 5.4: Background of respondents 
Respon- Respondent's Previous and current industry experience 
dents current 
position 
Respondent Academic Financial Controller in international hotel companies, Academic 
1 in the UK university. 
Respondent Managing Managing Director of consultancy company, Hotel Anaiysts, 
2 Director / Investment Banker, Academic in UK university. 
Consultant 
Respondent Managing Managing Director of an international hotel company, top 
3 Director / executives of two international hotel companies, Visiting fellow 
Consultant in UK university, Consultant for hotel technology. 
Respondent Investment Middle management in international hotel companies, 
4 Banker Investment Banker in Corporate Finance (Leisure), Research 
position in UK university. 
Respondent Managing Managing Director of a consultant company, Visiting fellow in 
5 Director / UK university, Financial management positions in international 
I 
Consultant hotel companies. 
Respondent Managing Managing Director of a consultancy company, Hotel Analyst, 
6 Director / Visiting fellow of UK university, hotel executives of international 
Consultant I hotel companies. 
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Access to the interviewees was obtained through four different channels. One 
was through introduction from a member of staff in Oxford Brookes University, the 
second was through electronic communications, the third was through 
snowballing, and the final means of access was direct contact, as access to one of 
the respondents was obtained during a book launch by a Professor at Oxford 
Brookes University's Department of Hospitality, Leisure and Tourism 
Management. 
In view of ethical issues, all the respondents were sent a copy of a letter to request 
for an appointment and a participant information sheet via electronic mail (see 
Appendices H and I for a sample of the letter and participant information sheet 
respectively). Fortunately for the researcher, all the respondents were very 
prompt in their response and were flexible with their dates for interviews. 
Subsequent confirmation of meeting dates, time and venues were carried out by 
emails. On the day of the interview, the respondents were asked to confirm their 
consent to the interview including voice recording by signing a form before the 
interview started (see Appendix J). 
According to Remenyi et al. (1998), it is important to test out any interview 
schedules before the fieldwork, so as to ensure reliability. This was carried out in 
three phases for this study. The first phase involved the supervising team who are 
familiar with the researcher's research question, and were thus able to help to 
navigate the interview questions towards achieving the aim and objectives of this 
study. The second phase involved the University Research Ethics Committee, 
who scrutinised these questions to ensure their relevance and quality pertaining to 
this study. The final phase was a practical session, where a pilot interview was 
conducted. The aim of the pilot interview was to test the interview content, 
structure and to evaluate if the questions were phased in a concise and 
understandable way. 
During the actual interview process, two questions were asked (see Appendix G). 
Conversations were also recorded, in addition to note taking and subsequently 
transcribed. The transcripts are useful 'to analyse the results of interviews in a 
more methodological and complete manner than is possible with notes' (Veal, 
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1997, pp. 135). At the same time, note taking also plays the role as a backup for 
any loss of data in the case of technical malfunction in the recording process. 
Table 5.5 reports the dates, time, venues and duration of interviews conducted. 
More importantly, it displays relevant incidents that took place during the interview 
process. These incidents might have affected the interview process, and have 
thus been highlighted. For example, although the interview with Respondent 3 
was conducted at his office, the recording was not as clear because of the noise 
generated by the heater in the background. However, the problem with the 
background noise was rectified with assistance from the audio-visual team in the 
university who were able to make use of their editing equipment to eliminate the 
background noise in the recording, and to increase the volume of the respondents' 
voices. 
Table 5.5: Interview and incidence 
Respondent Date and Time Duration Venue Incident 
minutes 
Respondent 1 February 6 n, -45 Respondent's Nil. 
Pilot 2006 office 
(1000-1100 
Respondent2 February 8'n, 90 Respondent's Interrupted by a phone 
2006 office call once. 
(1030 -1200) 
Respondent3 February 1 Om , 60 Respondent's Room change: meeting 2006 office room (double bookings) 
(1030 - 1130) to respondent's office. 
Respondent4 March TO, 2006 60 Respondent's Nil. 
(1100 - 1200) office 
Respondent5 March 28'n, 2006 90 Coffee Lounge, Background was noisy. 
(830-1000) Hotql Lobby 
Respondent6 April 6n, 2006 75 Meeting Room 1 Nil. 
1 (845- 1000) 1 1 
There were also some interruptions during the interviews, such as telephone calls 
and room changes. The respondents were very professional and it was observed 
that their tone and manner were unchanged, and they were still very engaged with 
the topic before the interruptions. As for Respondent 5, despite the surrounding 
noise and the clanking of cups and saucers, as the venue was a hotel coffee 
lounge, he was able to engage in the conversation and provide a wealth of 
knowledge to this study. 
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After the interviews, a note of appreciation was sent by electronic mail to each 
respondent on the same day. The voice recordings were also transcribed and 
organised with the notes taken during the interviews immediately. Each recording 
was digitally recorded and it took approximately 8 to 12 hours to transcribe each 
interview; the transcriptions were later sent to respondents for verification. 
However, there was no change requested by the respondents. 
The next stage was to analyse these transcripts which made use of the same 
variables from the theoretical framework. The same identification process utilised 
in the secondary data analysis is repeated. The findings were then compared and 
contrasted with secondary data (see Tables 6.3; 7.2; 8.2 and 9.2) to consolidate 
the findings (see Tables 6.5; 7.4; 8.4; 9.4). The next section explains how analysis 
was conducted for each case and for cross-case study. 
5.4.3. Data analysis 
The analysis of this thesis was predicated on four steps (Saunders et al., 2007, pp. 
479): 
Categorising; 
'Unitising' data; 
Recognising relationships and developing the categories to facilitate this; 
Developing and testing theories to reach conclusions 
The first step of categorising was completed before the data collection stage, 
namely, building the theoretical framework from M&A literature. The framework is 
categorised into two different concepts - organisational and macro environmental, 
and further classified into three underpinning assumptions of value maximising 
and non-value maximising motives on an organisational level, and industry shocks 
concepts on the macro environmental level. This categorising stage also included 
grouping of variables under each assumption. In this study, the word motives or 
variables are used, interchangeably, synonymous with the word 'categories' used 
in Saunders et aL's (2007) third step of analysis. 
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The second step of unitising data involved the identifying of variables in secondary 
data and this was carried out during the write up to present four cases, which 
involved classifying relevant data according to the motives stated in the framework 
(see 5.4.1 (ii)). Data units are sentences and variables are attached to data units 
(see Table 5.6). 
Table 5.6: Newspapers article extract with variables attached (Example: Bass 
bought Holiday Inns) 
Variables Newspapers article extract 
Strategic fit: Bass, Britain's biggest brewer is paying E297 million for a chain 
corporate strategy. of 178 Holiday Inns as part of a big expansion of its hotel 
interest. 
Strategic fit: similar The deal gives Bass control of the Holiday Inns operation 
product, re- worldwide outside the United States, Canada and Mexico. Bass 
branding. already owns 117 hotels in Britain and Europe - some of which 
Increase in size will be changed over to Holiday Inns - and now becomes a 
and market share large force in the business. 
Non-managerial But Mr [an Prosser, the managing direct of Bass insisted the 
motive. acquisition was not intended to compensate for the failure to 
buy the Hilton hotel chain which was sold to Ladbroke for F-645 
million two weeks ago. 
"This deal is quite different and is a continuation of an 
arrangement we reached earlier this year with Holiday 
Corporation - the master company - when we acquired a group 
of eight Holiday Inns in Europe" he said. 
Speed,; increase in The latest agreement, which will be completed in the first 
size. quarter of next year, involves the purchase of 13 hotels in the 
southern states of the US and the right to run 165 hotels around 
the world. 
Z: iource: Article adapted trom Feltham (1 987b) 
The third step of recognising relationships and developing categories is conducted 
via the analysis of the four cases on a case-by-case basis. According to Yin 
(2003a), the better case studies are the ones that repeat the same analysing 
process and built up the explanations by looking for consistent and inconsistent 
theoretical propositions. In this study, the relationship between theory and data is 
first recognised by comparing motive(s) retrieved from secondary and interview 
data, and analysing them against the motives for M&A activities of one hotel 
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company. For example, Whitbread bought Swallow hotels in 1999, which sped up 
its growth in terms of increasing its number of rooms and geographical locations 
(see 9.3). This purchase of Swallow by Whitbread was highlighted by Respondent 
4 as 'quicker to buy [compared to buildingf. This purchase was also linked to 
strategic fit which revealed a supplementary character between hotel locations for 
Whitbread and Swallow, as well as complementary features in physical products 
which enabled Whitbread to re-brand Swallow hotels into Marriott hotels quickly. 
This way of analysing each deal against theory was repeated for every single deal 
closed in the other three case companies (see 6.4; 7.3 and 8.3). 
The next step was to integrate the context, in the form of industry and general 
shocks such as changes in the political and economic environment, takeover 
policies, industry specific legislations and technology, as well as deregulation of 
the financial sector and increased foreign competition (see 6.5; 7.4; 8.4 and 9.4). 
By using the same example (Whitbread - Swallow), it is observed that Whitbread 
bought Swallow based on environmental factors, external to the company, such as 
a lack of land for hotel development at good locations. Moreover, the hotel 
industry was a growing industry during the period of the purchase. Therefore, by 
repeating the same analysis process with the other M&A deals in each company, it 
was possible to scrutinise and identify the relationship between current literature 
and its variables or to identify and develop new variable(s). This constant 
comparison between theory and data, and the iterating process, also helped to 
improve accuracy and reliability in analysis and conclusions. 
The final step of developing and testing theories to reach conclusions in this 
analysis is conducted by seeking patterns of similarities or differences across the 
four cases, in terms of current variables in the theoretical framework, as well as 
variable(s) newly discovered during the previous step of identifying the 
relationships between existing theory and data. In this thesis, a cross-case 
comparison dissects the four cases through the discussion of variable(s) that 
supported or did not support the literature. Variable(s) that disconfirm parts of the 
framework will be evaluated to provide alternative explanations. This step 
enhances the probability that the 'investigators will capture the novel findings 
which may exist in the data' (Eisenhardt, 1989, pp. 541). 
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5.5. Validity, Reliability and General isabil ity 
According to Remenyi et aL (1998), the issues of validity, reliability and 
generalisability are the most important criteria used to evaluate research. 
To reinforce the validity of this research, the researcher compared information 
drawn from secondary data to the interview transcripts, which had been sent back 
to respondents for verification to ensure accuracy. In addition, to avoid any invalid 
information, and to increase the reliability of this research, the same historical 
period had been delimited as the context for each case, to create a systematic 
comparative history inquiry. Moreover, macro environmental factors that were 
influential on companies' growth or decline are addressed. 
The need for reliability means transparency is needed for this study, so as to 
withstand any scrutiny 'should doubts regarding the research ever be raised' 
(Remenyi et al, 1998, pp. 116). Therefore, the research design, methods and 
implementation have been set out clearly in steps in this chapter, to provide the 
justification for this design, and enable others to investigate it. 
The debate about generalisability in the case study approach lies in the limited 
scope of its design to provide for scientific generalisation (Yin, 2003a). In this 
thesis, the fact that scientific generalisation is not possible does not reduce the 
credibility of this research; rather it illuminates the relevance of the historical study 
of the development of these companies and the hotel industry. As mentioned 
previously, 'historical propositions are always contextual' (Leff, 1969, pp. 78) and 
'the transferred application to situations that are less comparable, either in place or 
time' (Thomson, 1969, pp. 75) could actually discredit the reliability and validity of 
this research. 
By the same token, Yin (2003a, pp. 32) proposes that multiple-case studies are 
able to generalise theory or 'analytical generalisation'. The author also argued 
that a strong theory is imperative to interpret and differentiate the differences in the 
development between companies. In the same way, Remeny! et al. (1998) argued 
that generalisation can occur when the context of the research phenomenon in 
different cases is similar, such as the mix of social, political, cultural or economic 
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circumstances. They also posited that similar studies may be undertaken and if 
these studies produce consistent findings which support an emerging theory, it 
may be granted some degree of general validity. In this study, the possibility of 
analytical generalisation will be enabled by identifying the theoretical framework, 
then comparing the variables in this framework across four companies, predicated 
on a similar historical context within the same period of investigation. 
5.6. Research limitations I 
This section evaluates the limitations of the -research and explains how these 
limitations are minimised in view of bias found in these sources. 
(1) One of the limitations lies in a lack of archival documents. The initial plan was 
to use archival documents as the main data source, since this method has been 
rarely used in the study of the historical development of the UK hotel companies. 
The researcher visited the hospitality archives - Conrad N. Hilton Library & 
Archives - in Houston, USA in December 2004 to find out what kind of information 
is available for this particular study. The archive was established by a grant from 
the Hilton Foundation; thus the largest archival collection was documents of Hilton 
Hotels Corporation (HHC), the original owner of Hilton International. The 
hospitality archive holds a comprehensive collection of documents for the HHC 
and some information for other international hotel companies. However, there are 
not many archival documents to be found regarding Hilton International (HI) 
because the latter was spun off and operated as an independent public company 
in 1964, and was sold off to Trans World Airlines in 1967. Later, it was found that 
the four companies under study have no available archive material for analysis as 
a result of the active M&A activities within each company in the period of study. 
However, there is a huge amount of secondary data from public sources, such as 
company annual reports, newspapers and trade journals, which were available for 
use as alternative sources. 
(ii) The other limitations were the availability of and access to companies' pioneers 
and executives, and timing. It was decided that the collection of oral histories from 
pioneers and executives who were directly involved with the M&A deals would add 
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insight and enrich the findings and analysis of this research. However, the 
relevant pioneers were either not traceable, or they had left these companies on 
bad terms, which made it impossible to contact them through current executives. 
The other impediment was timing because three of the companies studied were 
going through a massive restructuring, and the executives were unavailable for 
interviews within the time frame set for this study. To avoid the collection of 
incompatible data, such as interviews with some relevant executives from one 
company and not the other, the decision was made to concentrate on the large 
amount of secondary data that are available and have hardly been used for 
extensive study. Moreover, criteria were set to identify respondents who would be 
able to provide insights into the general UK hotel industry and its macro 
environment, as well as specific knowledge of M&A activities in the hotel industry 
during the period, under study, which serves as a strong support to validate the 
data collected. In addition, the discussion is supported by the analysis of 
companies' growth whilst subject to the same macro environmental influences. 
(iii) The other data limitation linked to published reports is the belief that 
information produced in company annual reports does not reflect the actual 
situation of the company. For instance, the limitations of the balance sheets and 
profit and loss statements were designed only for shareholders and not for 
historians, but have been refined to inform shareholders and the public of what the 
management want to disseminate (Marriner, 1980; Mason, 1982; Parker, 1991). 
Although Singh (1971) suggested that accounting data retrieved from companies' 
annual reports are derived from different methods used by different companies to 
valuate assets, he also argued that accounting data are commonly used and 
discussed in the financial press and in the financial community in general, and 
thus provide a good indication of a company's current and past performance. 
In the context of this study, it is argued that these limitations are of much less 
significance because the comparative studies were conducted between groups of 
companies in the same industry. Therefore, accounting conventions within the 
same industry for publicly quoted companies on the stock market are similar to 
some extent, and this should reduce differences when using their accounting data. 
Moreover, with more legislation imposed on the way companies reveal their 
-122- 
financial status, data are becoming more reliable and comparable. For instance, 
the possibility of concealing profits and losses by manipulating the statements of 
subsidiary companies was eliminated by the Companies Act of 1948 (Parker, 
1991). The first definitive standards for financial reporting were also developed in 
the UK by the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales' 
Accounting Standards Steering Committee in 1970 (institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and Wales, 2007). Moreover, creative accounting, which 
had been common in the UK in the 1980s, has also been largely restricted by the 
Companies Act of 1989 (Parker, 1991). Since, this study is based in the period 
1979 to 2004, financial statements have been more controlled and standardised; 
thus the accuracy and comparability of these data is increased. Therefore, it 
makes sense to use these reports as an investigation tool with regards to a 
company's development. 
(iv) One other data limitation rests in the use of published financial reports. It is 
acknowledged that there are limitations in these figures (Appendices L; M; N and 
0) as they are affected by restatement of financial data each year, attributable to 
adjustment for exchange rates, financial accounting presentation, change of 
business mix in a company, change in financial accounting period, and changes in 
the accounting legal system worldwide. For example, THF and Bass changed 
their financial reporting year end from September to December to align with most 
European and international companies' financial reporting period. Moreover, 
companies involving international businesses also adjusted their figures in 
subsequent years to reflect exchange rate changes. Thus, figures such as sales 
and profits generatedfrom each division might not match the absolute total sales 
and profits. Despite these limitations, it is imperative to note that these tables 
(Appendices L; M; N and 0) set out to provide a support to discussion of 
development of the case companies' -hotel enterprises in general, and this 
limitation poses no threat to the understanding of this purpose. 
For example, in the case of Whitbread, there were no breakdowns of sales and 
profit figures for the different business divisions available before 1983. 
Subsequently, hotels were categorised under the same business division as 
Retailing in 1983, Managed Retail Estate in 1990, and Restaurants and Leisure in 
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1992. However, the cases in question are Marriott, Swallow and Premier Lodge, 
which were acquired from 1996 onwards. The hotel division was established as 
an individual division in 1997, after the purchase of Marriott's brand rights. 
Similarly, the establishment of an individual hotel division for Ladbroke from 1983 
and Bass from 1990 reflected shifts in corporate strategy, to emphasise on 
developing hotel divisions. It might be argued that these shifts appear late 
compared to the period of their hotel development, which had started from the 
1970s and 1960s respectively. However, it should also be noted that this delay 
has in fact illuminated the dynamics of the business environment as well as 
organisational capabilities in these companies in adjusting their business portfolio 
in response to opportunities and threats. For example, Ladbroke had started to 
balance four business portfolios from 1984, including its hotel division, thus the 
establishment of hotels as an individual division in 1984 still captures the basic 
purpose of providing a general view of hotel development in the company. In a 
similar vein, Bass shifted the hotel sector from its leisure division in 1987 and set 
up a Hotel and Restaurant division. Finally, Bass established hotel as a division of 
its own in 1990, which illuminated the intent of Bass' strategy in expanding its hotel 
division. 
(v) The limitation of using newspaper data lies mainly in the selection bias arising 
from newspaper editors' biases as to what to report, and description bias because 
of errors in information reported (Earl et al., 2004). Although these are bias 
problems for social studies, they could be argued as relevant to the general use of 
newspapers as a data source for research. However, in this thesis, these biases 
are minimised because of the nature of the study. For example, companies under 
study are publicly quoted and their M&A activities are generally reported 
extensively for major cases, or mentioned briefly, in quality newspapers. These 
reports target general readers, and particularly, shareholders and other interested 
parties. Thus, - selective bias is minimised. Similarly, descriptive bias became 
insignificant in this study, because information extracted is straightforward, 
consisting of amount paid, names of buyers and sellers, and reasons for the 
transactions. Although reasons for the transactions could be considered to be 
differently cited in different newspapers, these differences and data were validated 
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via triangulation of data against industry analysts' interviews and macro 
environmental factors. Complications in these deals might arise because of 
hostility in bidding processes, when several companies competed for the same 
bid, and / or monitoring bodies such as MMC, EU and the Takeover Panel were 
involved. However, these competitions generally increase the validity of 
information retrieved, as more information regarding such deals has to be revealed 
to the public. In addition, newspaper reports regarding companies' M&A activities 
are limited in their bias because facts such as company financial performance and 
share prices cannot be made up, but are being monitored constantly by 
shareholders, financial institutions and the City analysts. 
5.7. Summary 
In this study, the research question requires the investigation of the causal 
relations between companies' growth strategies and macro environmental factors 
to understand how the hotel industry emerged as big business in the UK via the 
study of M&A activity. The research philosophy for this thesis, which is based on 
critical realism, acknowledges the co-existence of natural and social science in 
social phenomena. The strength of the explanatory approach lies in its ability to 
develop M&A theory as an area that has been widely studied, but not in the 
specific context of the historical development of UK hotel companies. 
Comparative historical analysis which emphasises the importance of multi-level 
study in a business context, in conjunction with the qualitative and longitudinal 
approaches, is considered useful in understanding the development of four hotel 
companies, through looking at a few samples in depth and adding breath via a 
longer time frame being set for the study. The multiple-case study is used as it is 
able to cover complex social phenomena and contextual conditions; thus thi .s 
research design is appropriate for achieving the aim of this study. 
Data collection and analysis were predicated on a theoretical framework 
established by two concepts - Organisational motives and macro environmental 
factors. 
. Under the former, the underpinning assumptions 
included value 
maximising motives (economies of scale and scope, market power, speed, 
strategic fit) and non-value maximising motives (growth of sales and profits and 
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managerial welfare). The latter is linked to industry shocks concept, relating to 
economic and political issues, deregulations, the UK takeover policies, foreign 
competition and technological advancement. The four companies - THF, Bass, 
Ladbroke and Whitbread - selected are regarded as purposeful sample and are 
pertinent to this study in terms of their historical growth which will provide insights 
and answers to the research question. Secondary data, which has not been used 
extensively in previous research related to the historical development of hotel 
companies, were adopted to construct the development of the four hotel 
companies. In addition, semi-structured interviews were used to complement the 
research method. The triangulation of different sources is used for checking the 
validity and reliability of these data, and the generalisability of data is discussed. 
Finally, research limitations in terms of research method and secondary data were 
addressed. 
The next four chapters are made up of four individual case studies: THF, 
Ladbroke, Bass and Whitbread. The findings of each case are presented and 
analysed to identify and build up explanations for the development of each 
company, prior to explaining the emergence of big business in the UK hotel 
companies. 
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Chapter 6:. 
Forte Group plc (THF) 
This chapter explores the development of Forte Group p1c. The first part provides 
a brief overview of how this company was conceived. The term 'THF' is used 
throughout this discussion, including the period after its name change from Trust 
House Forte plc to Forte Group plc in 1991. The second part narrates the major 
M&A activities that THF undertook between the 1980s and 1996. Table 6.1 
presents the major deals that THF closed between 1981 and 1994. 
Table 6.1: Major merger and acquisition activities, 1981-1994 
THF/ Forte 
_1981 
Savoy 
_1 
986 Anchor Hotels 
_1 
988 Kennedy Brookes 
1990 Crest Hotels 
1994 Le Meridien 
Source: THF annual reports, various newspapers and trade journals 
The third part reviews the hostile takeover of THF by Granada Group p1c. The 
fourth part compares and contrasts the motives for each deal by using data 
collected from both secondary and primary sources. The final part discusses the 
general development of THF's hotel division in the context of corporate strategy 
changes and the macro environment. 
6.1. The beginning of Forte Group plc 
Trust House Forte was formed in 1970 by the merger of Trust Houses Group and 
Forte Holdings Ltd. Trust Houses Group was founded in 1903 by the Hertfordshire 
Public House Trust Company Ltd and became Trust House Ltd. in 1919, formed 
by the fourth Earl Grey (Ashworth, 1991; Monopolies and Mergers Commission, 
1987). The new company grew through the merger of Hertfordshire, Essex and 
Middlesex Trusts and continued to develop its accommodation in the one- and 
three-star market levels (Simmons, 1994). By 1970 it owned and operated almost 
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200 hotels throughout the UK and overseas (Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission 1987). 
Forte Holdings Ltd was founded by Lord Charles Forte (Forte Sr. ) in 1935. The 
business started as a milk bar in London's West End, through Strand Milk Bar Ltd; 
the concept developed into a range of popular and high quality restaurants and 
banqueting facilities (Monopolies and Mergers Commission, 1987). Forte Sr. 
acquired the Cafe Royal in 1954 and in the next year, he won catering contracts at 
several UK airports, including Heathrow, Gatwick, Manchester, Glasgow and 
Birmingham (Monopolies and Mergers Commission, 1987; The Times, 1996). In 
1960, Forte Sr. opened Britain's first motorway service station on the newly built 
M1 at Newport Pagnell, and floated the company on the London Stock Exchange 
(The Times, 1996). The City of London catering company, Ring and Brymer, was 
acquired in 1962 and in 1969 Forte Sr. bought the Criterion site in Piccadilly 
Circus. The latter acquisition saw Forte Sr. diversifying into retail (Lillywhites) and 
theatre (Criterion) (Monopolies and Mergers Commission, 1987). 
In the hotel business sector, Forte Sr. purchased his first hotel, London's Waldorf, 
in 1958. In 1969, the Post House hotel group was established at a three-star 
market level targeting travelling salesmen (Clark, 2001b). Subsequently, the 
company began a string of international hotel acquisitions. These purchases 
included the three five-star hotels in Paris, namely the George V, the Plaza 
Afthenee and the Tremoille (Stewart, 1996). By 1970, THF owned and ran 28 
hotels in the United Kingdom and Ireland plus-another 15 overseas (Monopolies 
and Mergers Commission, 1987). 
After the merger with Trust Houses Group Ltd in 1970, THF expanded its hotel 
division mainly through the acquisition of existing hotels and remained the leading 
hotel group in the UK. Major M&A activities included Travelodge International Inc. 
which operated an estimated 450 motels and hotels throughout America in 1973 
(Caterer and Hotelkeeper, 1978b; Monopolies and Mergers Commission, 1987), 
and 35 hotels from J. Lyons & Co Ltd in 1977 (Caterer and Hotelkeeper, 1978b). 
The latter deal cost THF E27 million in cash, but included several major London 
hotels such as the Cumberland and Strand Palace. In 1978, within a period of 
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seven years since the merger with Trust Houses, THIF owned 885 hotels 
worldwide (Caterer and Hotelkeeper, 1978b; The Times, 1996). 
6.2. Hotel expansion - major M&A activities 
THF expanded its hotel business between 1979 and 1996 via several methods. 
The most notable was the use of M&A, which helped the Group to increase its 
size. The hostile bid to gain control of the most prestigious hotel group in the UK - 
The Savoy (6.2.1) - spanned more than a decade. The Hanson Trust (6.2.2) deal 
strengthened THFs three-star market hotel business, as well as its motorway and 
catering services. This deal also brought THF into the limelight because of an 
investigation into potential monopoly by the OFT and the MIVIC. The subsequent 
acquisition of Kennedy Brookes (6.2.3) continued to increase THF's hotel stock 
and allowed it to acquire a new product - Heritage Hotels. The purchase of Crest 
Hotels (6.2.4) increased THF's market share in the three-star market segment and 
extended its geographical presence. The bid for the Le Meridien Hotel group 
(6-2.5) increased its range of five-star products, but also attracted the attention of 
the French government and the European Commission. The last major M&A deal 
was a reversal of this role, whereby THF was taken over by the Granada Group. It 
was considered the deal of the decade in the hospitality industry, in terms of size 
(number of hotel units acquired) and the value of the deal (the amount offered in 
the bid). Each of these major deals will be discussed in the following sub-sections. 
6.2.1. The Savoy 
The Savoy Group (The Savoy) comprised The Savoy, Claridges, The Connaught 
and The Berkeley hotels (Skapinker, 1994b; Stewart, 1991). The Group had a 
reputation and tradition in "preserving intact a great British institution of 
international fame, a bastion of style and excellence" (Hyam, 1989, pp. 36). Thus, 
there was a significant degree of prestige in possessing and operating the hotels 
in The Savoy. In the past, well-known entrepreneurs such as Harold Samuel, 
Nigel Broackes, Jacob Rothschild, Conrad Hilton and Max Joseph had also 
attempted to buy The Savoy but failed (Fallon, 1992; Hyarn, 1989). 
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The Savoy was able to maintain its independence through its two-tier share 
structure created in 1953. With the help of stockbrokers Cazenove & Co, the two- 
tier share consisted of "B" shares, which had 10 votes per share, while holders of 
the equity, "A" shares, had only one vote each (Faith, 1994). The other reason for 
The Savoy to remain independent was the staunch support for independence from 
the chairman, Sir Hugh Wontner (Wontner) and the managing director, Sir Giles 
Shepard (Shepard). Wontner created the two-tier share structure in defence 
against an attempt by two property tycoons, Harold Samuel and Charles Clore, to 
take over The Savoy (Faith, 1994). Shepard was known for fighting off THF's 
hostile bid between 1980 and 1994. 
In March 1981, Forte Sr. launched the bid for The Savoy after the profitability of 
the latter was severely diminished due to the recession of 1979 - 1981 (Vaughan, 
1981 a). The Savoy rejected THF's E54 million bid and deemed the offer as'wholly 
unwelcome and totally unacceptable' (Vaughan, 1981 a, pp. 1c). The directors of 
The Savoy sent letters to its shareholders to state their stand and indicated that 
THF was trying to buy up the "A" shares as a way to transfer the control of The 
Savoy to THF at a low price (Caterer and Hotelkeeper, 1981b; Financial Times, 
1981b). During that period, the directors and associates of The Savoy were 
controlling up- to 45% of the votes through a large holding of the "B" shares 
(Financial Times, 1981 b). 
Despite the initial rejection of its offer, THF continued to work with its City 
merchant bankers S. G. Warburg & Co Ltd to try and buy as many "A" shares as 
possible in order to increase its voting rights (Caterer and Hotelkeeper, 1981b; 
Fisher, 1981). THF was hoping to gain control of The Savoy through its "A" 
shares, which had lower voting power, but still controlled 51.5% of the votes of the 
whole group. THF's attempt included an application to the court to obtain approval 
for an arrangement under the Companies Act, Section 206, to call for separate 
meetings of the "A" and "B" shareholders of The Savoy to vote on the bid (Caterer 
and Hotelkeeper, 1981c; 1981d; Fisher, 1981). However, after four days of legal 
argument in private, the court ruled in favour of The Savoy, stating that 'the court 
has no legal power to sanction an arrangement without the consent of the 
company [The Savoy Groupf (Vaughan, 1981 a, pp. 1c). 
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THF's threat of takeover became a wake-up call for The Savoy management. The 
Savoy re-organised its financial position by selling parts of the buildings - 
consisting of the apartments - connected to The Savoy hotel for approximately E8 
million to reduce its debt (Caterer and Hotelkeeper, 1981e; Financial Times, 
1981a). However this plan in turn drove THF to launch a second bid of E67.2 
million (Caterer and Hotelkeeper, 1981 e; Vaughan, 1981 b). 
THF took the opportunity created by the building sale to highlight the 
incompetence of The Savoy's management. Lord G. H. Thorneycroft 
(Thorneycroft), THF's chairman, urged The Savoy's shareholders to accept THF's 
offer, as he claimed that this sale indicated the incompetence of The Savoy's 
management and stood as a threat to its long-term business opportunities (Caterer 
and Hotelkeeper, 1981f). However, THF faced strong resistance from The Savoy 
management and shareholders again, and, in anticipation of a second defeat, THF 
applied for a week's extension under the Takeover Code at the beginning of June 
1981 (Caterer and Hotelkeeper, 1981g). Under the Takeover Code rules, THF 
was not allowed to bid for The Savoy for the next 12 months if the offer was 
rejected. In addition to that regulation, THF was also permitted to buy only two 
more percent of The Savoy shares during the next 12 months (Caterer and 
Hotelkeeper, 1981h; Moir, 1981). During that one-week extension, THF took the 
opportunity to acquire as many shares as possible, intending to build up its base 
before the next bid (Moir, 1981). These shares included a 34% stake from Kuwait 
Investment Office (KIO) for E19 million (Caterer and Hotelkeeper, 1981 a; 1981h; 
Wilson-Smith, 1981) and a further 420,000 "Am shares in the market (Moir, 1981). 
According to The Savoy, THF bought 38.92% of "A" shares and 8.85% of "B" 
shares during that week and accumulated a total of 63.11 % of the "A" votes and 
12.55% of the "B" votes (Financial Times, 1981c). At the end of the bid in 1981, 
THF owned 65% of The Savoy equity, which represented 42% of the total votes 
(AR / THF, 1981). In the year 1981, THF spent an aggregate of E37.7 million in 
acquiring The Savoy shares. 
Forte Sr. did not give up his quest for The Savoy's shares despite the second 
defeat. He continued to pursue control of The Savoy through two resolutions 
proposed to The Savoy's shareholders. The first was to increase the number of 
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directors on The Savoy's board, from 11 to 12 and the second was for Eric 
Hartwell, THF's chief executive, to be elected to The Savoy board as a non- 
executive director (Moore, 1982; Leonard, 1989). However, both the resolutions 
were rejected after the majority of The Savoy's shareholders voted against the 
motions during the annual meeting (Moore, 1982). In 1983, THF spent a further 
E3 million to purchase 1,137,500 more shares and increased its holding of non- 
voting "A". shares in The Savoy from 65% to 69% and the voting rights to 42.3% 
(AR / THF, 1983; Caterer and Hotelkeeper, 1983c; Fleet, 1983). In June 1987, 
with the support of KIO, a number of private individuals and institutions, THF 
managed to buy over more shares and to increase its control to 72% of The Savoy 
equity, but still only 42.3% of the votes (AR / THF, 1988; David, 1989 ). 
THF's struggles to acquire The Savoy were deemed to be 'more about vanity and 
establishment acceptance' (Brummer, 1994, p. NOPGCIT). In 1989, the fees paid 
for the legal baffle proved too much for both companies, and a peace agreement 
was signed (Stewart, 1991). The agreement specified that THF would not 
increase its stake for the next five years and would give one year's notice before 
launching any takeover bid (Leonard, 1989; Skapinker, 1994b). In exchange for 
an agreement, Forte Sr. 's son, Sir Rocco Forte (Forte Jr. ) and THF's Finance 
Director, Donald Main, were given seats on The Savoy board (Faith, 1994). That 
was considered to be another step for THF towards gaining some control of The 
Savoy. 
In 1992, THF missed an opportunity to purchase more of The Savoy shares when 
Wontner, the staunchest defender of The Savoy's independence, passed away 
(Fallon, 1992). He had been the longest serving president of The Savoy and was 
well known for defending its independence over the years. The Savoy shares 
leapt as the market predicted some intense competition for the acquisitions by 
companies including THF. However, THF could not move in on the shares 
because of the five-year abstinence agreement. Moreover, the economy and 
industry were hit by recession at that time, which curtailed THF's ambitions and 
plans to expand further as a branded international hotel group (Fallon, 1992). 
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In early 1993, THF missed out on another opportunity to purchase some of The 
Savoy's shares. A 4.3% stake in The Savoy's share went on sale when the 
property company St Anselm Development went into receivership under the 
control of Cork Pully management (Springett, 1993; The Times, 1993). Forte Jr., 
who had taken over Forte Sr. 's chief executive position in 1993, commented that 
THF would not buy it as they were still in a standstill agreement with The Savoy 
(Springett, 1993). However, THF's major opportunity to gain control of The Savoy 
group arrived in 1994 because of the combination of The Savoy's deteriorating 
profits and a law change in Switzerland. 
Firstly, The Savoy's declining share prices threatened the job stability of Shepard 
because the group's financial result in 1992 showed a loss of E1.4 million and only 
gained E725,000 from sales of E83.3 million in 1993. Moreover, the dividend was 
halved in the same year (Faith, 1994; Stevenson, 1994). In addition, Shepard was 
involved in an argument with the rest of The Savoy board after he produced an 
anti-Forte dossier and then accused Sir Michael Richardson (Richardson), a non- 
executive director, of leaking confidential corporate information to the press. He 
also authorised a press release condemning the leak but had to retract the 
statement after the board rallied round Richardson. Following the dispute, he was 
asked to resign from The Savoy (Shepherd, 1994a; Stevenson, 1994). 
Secondly, a new Swiss law required corporate trustees to maximise income and 
financial returns of assets for beneficiaries (Cusick, 1994). Forte Jr. argued that 
The Savoy's poor financial performance, including a 50% cut in the dividend in 
1993, should force the trustees to look at ways of improving its profitability 
(Bennett, 1994). The bad financial performance provided John Sinclair, who 
presided over three Savoy trusts and controlled more than 30% of the votes, the 
opportunity to argue for steps to be taken to maximise income (Faith, 1994; 
Shepherd, 1994a). Although the departure of Shepard opened up the opportunity 
to acquire The Savoy, THF could not afford to pay for the acquisition because their 
businesses were badly affected by the recession during that period. On the other 
hand, following the law change, THF was able to gain some control of The Savoy 
without having to pay for more shares (Cusick, 1994; Skapinker, 1994b). During 
the re-structuring of The Savoy board of directors in 1994, Forte Jr. was selected 
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as one of the three important people in the Chairman's Committee, newly formed 
to work closely with The Savoy's new managing director (Shepherd, 1994a). After 
more than a decade of battle for the control of The Savoy, THF finally achieved 
another step closer to more control, this time without any financial commitment. 
6.2.2. Hanson Trust I 
One of the major deals for THF in 1986 was the acquisition of Hanson Hotel and 
Catering from the Hanson Trust, which cost THF E190 million. The deal 
comprised five Welcome Break motor service areas, 30 Anchor hotels, 64 Happy 
Eater roadside restaurants and 69 restaurants known as Imperial Inns (Pring, 
1986b). It was considered by the City as Forte Jr. 's first triumph after taking over 
the chief executive position in March 1983 (Pring, 1986b). The Anchor Hotels 
were relatively small and were mainly located in the centre of towns or villages 
rather than on the outskirts (Voss, 1979). They were fairly well distributed 
between the north and south of England (Slattery and Roper, 1986/87), therefore 
the Anchor group of hotels provided THF with strategic geographical extension in 
the UK. 
The deal also increased the size of THF's market share in the motorway service 
and roadside catering businesses. In October 1985, THF had opened its first 
roadside catering business - Little Chef Lodge - which was. a new concept in 
overnight accommodation that offered low-cost accommodation, and was 
categorised between the budget and two-star range (AR / THF, 1985; McDermid, 
1985). The new market that THF was targeting was people who had never used 
hotels before and those who were trading up from rooms situated above pubs 
(McDermid, 1985). The concept was initiated by customers requesting 
accommodation at roadside restaurants. THF took up the opportunity and 
capitalised on its Group's existing resources - existing car parking space and hotel 
management capabilities - to construct low-cost accommodation (Trollope, 1985a). 
In addition, THF had started establishing its budget brand - Travelodge - mainly 
on major 'A' road and trunk roads all around the UK, and Happy Eater restaurant 
chain, owned by Hanson Trust, were located beside these roads (Trollope, 
1986e). 
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Before settling into THF's hands, the Hanson Trust deal had changed hands three 
times within a short span of six months. In April 1986, Hanson Trust won the bid 
to purchase Imperial Inns (Caterer and Hotelkeeper, 1986c). After the acquisition, 
Hanson Trust decided to re-organise its assets and formed Hanson Hotel and 
Catering, which comprised Happy Eater, Welcome Break, Anchor Hotels and 
Imperial Inns (Caterer and Hotelkeeper, 1986g). The news of the sale of Hanson 
Hotel and Catering attracted a number of speculative bidders such as THF, 
Scottish & Newcastle (S&N), Ladbroke and Elders IXL (Pring, 1986b). It was 
commented by industry analysts that THF emerged as the winner because it was 
already a big client of Imperial products (food and catering) and the Imperial 
subsidiaries within Hanson Trust might suffer if the deal were to go to a rival 
brewing or foods group (Jay, 1986). 
It was anticipated that the Hanson Hotels and Catering deal might be referred to 
the MMC for approval because the former was already the largest motorway 
service operator (Harris, 1986), but the roadside catering businesses were 
referred instead (AR / THF, 1986; Bell, 1986; Tait, 1986). During that period, the 
combination of THF's 10 motorway service stations and Hanson Trust's five would 
have made up more than 37% of the market share in the UK, because there was a 
total of 40 in the UK (Caterer and Hotelkeeper, 1986k; Jay, 1986). However, the 
roadside catering business was referred instead, because the 220 Little Chef 
outlets that THF owned were already dominating the market (Trollope, 1986e), 
and the addition of 76 Happy Eaters, included in the deal, caused concern to Paul 
Channon, the Trade Minister (AR / THF, 1986; Bell, 1986; Trollope, 1986c). The 
OFT was also worried about fair competition, and wanted an investigation to study 
the effects of competition in the road side-resta u rant market - especially on trunk 
roads between towns (Trollope, 1986e). Fortunately for THF, it received the go- 
ahead as the MMC did not believe that the merger of Little Chef and Happy Eater 
would pose a threat to the public interest (Caterer and Hotelkeeper, 1987b). 
Moreover, they believed that THF would still face competition since the catering 
market was one of the cheapest and easiest to enter (Caterer and Hotelkeeper, 
1987b; Fallon, 1986). 
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6.2.3. Kennedy Brookes 
In 1988, Kennedy Brookes (KB) became the next major target of acquisition for 
THE It cost THF El 74 million, including a El million debt (Feltham, 1988; Waller, 
1989). The KB deal included 27 hotels (1,800 rooms) and 80 restaurants 
(Feltham, 1988; Hotel Companies in the UK, 1991; Trollope, 1988). Similar to The 
Savoy acquisition, this deal also met some resistance from the target company, 
although this was not as strong as that experienced in the case of The Savoy. 
The founder and chairman of KB, Michael Golder, initially refused THF's offer 
because he wanted the company to remain independent (Feltham, 1988). 
However, THF managed to rally around KBs major shareholders and won the bid 
through the support of the Barclay brothers, who owned a 12% stake, and the rest 
of the K13 board (Feltham, 1988). 
KB's hotels (Heritage Hotels) were originally established in 1985 by the 
Goldsmiths Group (Goldsmith) -a Leicester-ba sed company, which operated a 
chain of 97 retail jewellers and 44 insurance offices. Goldsmith started its hotel 
business by acquiring six Heritage Hotels from Saga Holidays - an international 
tour operator - in August 1985 for E3.9 million (Caterer and Hotelkeeper, 1987d). 
A year later, Goldsmith was attracted to the locations of seven Prince of Wales 
Hotels and paid E12.75 million to expand its Heritage Hotels group (Caterer and 
Hotelkeeper, 1986h; 1987d). However, in early 1987, Goldsmith was taken over 
by Oriflame - an international jewellery and cosmetic group - and was instructed to 
sell the 11-strong Heritage Hotels group (Caterer and Hotelkeeper, 1987a). The 
Heritage Hotels were sold to KB for E35 million and were upgraded and re- 
branded under the KB brand (Cambell, 1987). 
KB's Heritage Hotels was a collection of three- and four-star standard, including 
unique properties set in historic cities, and they were absorbed into THF's hotel 
division to increase its geographical presence in the UK and diversify its hotel 
portfolio (Caterer and Hotelkeeper, 1987a; Compass, 2001a; Trollope, 1988). In 
this deal, THF also strengthened its catering business via the gain of a brand 
name for its catering business, since the Brookes brand was deemed to possess a 
strong name in the catering sector. In addition, KB's Privilege Charge card and 
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KB's central restaurant reservations system were integrated into THF's business 
to enhance its operation system (Trollope, 1988). 
6.2.4. Crest Hotels 
In May 1990, THF acquired 43 Crest Hotels from Bass Hotels and Resorts (Bass) 
for E300 million funded through a sale and leaseback arrangement (AR / THF, 
1991; Churchchill, 1990; Harris, 1990). Crest Hotels in the UK were located in key 
towns from the South-West to the North-East and there was little overlap with the 
Post House group whilst the Continental Crest Hotels were located in major cities 
(Harris, 1990). 
These hotels targeted business travellers who were using three-star hotels and 
they therefore complemented THF's existing 39-strong Post House group, which 
operated in the same target market (Churchill, 1990; Harris, 1990; Slattery and 
Johnson, 1990). According to Forte Jr., the properties under Crest Hotels were in 
good condition and were well-managed (Harris, 1990). With the acquisition of 
Crest Hotels, THF added another 4,753 rooms to its portfolio. This was an 
increase of approximately 6% in its share of the three-stpr market segment and 
further consolidated its position as the largest operator in the UK market (Harris, 
1990; Hotel Companies in the UK, 1991). This deal also helped THF to increase 
its number of roadside restaurants and budget hotels (Seargeant, 1990). The 
sites of 17 Kelly's Kitchen and several greenfield sites included in the purchase 
had enough space for THF to expand its budget hotel group - Travelodge 
(Seargeant, 1990). 
6.2.5. Le Meridien Hotels 
The Meridien Hotels Group (Le Meridien) was established in 1972 by Air France, 
the national carrier of France and had expanded to run and operate 45 hotels 
worldwide by 1982 (Caterer and Hotelkeeper, 1983b; Christie, 1994b). In 1992, 
Air France faced a financial crisis whereby the Group was incurring a loss of FFr 
3.27 billion and, in 1993, a further loss of FFr 8.48 billion (Ell billion), because of 
steep competition and a strike that cost FFr1.3 billion in lost revenue (Milner, 
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1994). Air France tried to secure a FFr 20 billion (E2.4 billion) recapitalisation 
package from the French government in 1994. However, this would only be 
approved by the EC on the condition that Air France sell off its 57.3% stake in Le 
Meridien to the highest bidder (Christie, 1994b). 
In 1994, Le Meridien had already established 58 hotel units worldwide, which was 
attractive to many potential buyers (Caterer and Hotelkeeper, 1987g). According 
to analysts, Le Meridien Hotels would give any American hotel company a foothold 
in Europe. For hotel groups from Asia, for example Mandarin Oriental, Le 
Meridien would increase the Group's exposure in major cities - such as London, 
Paris and New York (Caterer and Hotelkeeper, 1987g). THF, Accor SA (French 
hotel group; hereafter known as Accor) and Kempinkski (German hotel group) bid 
for a 40% controlling stake in Le Meridian while Air France would retain a 
percentage to promote client crossover (Christie, 1994a). At the end of the first 
bid, Kempinski AG was eliminated by the board on the basis of bidding price 
(Ridding and Skapinker, 1994a). 
The decision as to which group - THF or Accor - would emerge as the buyer of Le 
Meridien was first expected on April 28 1994. However, the decision was delayed 
after Accor lobbied the French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur to intervene 
(Ridding and Skapinker, 1994c). The rival bids between Accor of France and THF 
were referred to France's Privatisation Commission, which advised the French 
government on privatisation issues (Ridding, 1994a; Ridding and Skapinker, 
1994b). Although the political pressure on Air France from the French government 
posed a challenge to THF's take-over bid of Le Meridien, THF also had an 
unexpected ally, the EC. Since the EC was in favour of Air France granting the 
sale of Le Meridien to the highest bidder, it kept a close watch to ensure that Air 
France did not close the deal with Accor for political reasons (Bruce, 1994). The 
EC had also stepped in to warn the French government against any political 
influences on the sale (Skapinker, 1994a). 
In late July 1994, Accor and THF were given new financial information about Le 
Meridien in order to re-submit their bids by August 23d because of th 
*e 
delay 
mentioned above (Brasier, 1994; Christie and Milner, 1994). In addition to the 
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expiration of the first bidding deadline, there was news of a net loss of FFr29.7 
million (E3.502 million) in Le Meridien for 1993, compared with a profit of FFrl 12 
million for 1992 (Ridding, 1994b). Despite the disappointing financial 
performance, the bidders were not discouraged as evidenced by an increase of 
FFr1OO million in both their new offer prices (Ridding and Skapinker, 1994c). The 
initial bid was FFr 1.8 billion from THIF and FFr 1.6 billion from Accor. The final 
bids were FFr1.9 billion from the former and FFrI. 7 billion from the latter (Ridding 
and Skapinker, 1994c). 
The final result saw THF emerging as the winner and it acquired Le Meridien for a 
cash payment of FFr 1.9 billion (E230 million) (Christie, 1994c). According to 
Christian Blanc, chairman of Air France, THF's offer was accepted because of 
financial considerations. THF had also committed itself to maintaining the 
standard of the hotels in Le Meridien, to assuring its development and to keeping 
its headquarters in Paris (Ridding and Skapinker, 1994d). Forte Jr. commented 
that the deal was a crucial step for the company to embark upon being a major 
player in the international luxury hotel market. According to him, Le Meridien 
hotel group comprised mainly management contracts; thus the deal also allowed 
THF to move upmarket without investing heavily in bricks and mortar and reduced 
THF's exposure to the volatile property climate (Ridding and Skapinker, 1994d). 
The addition of the 54-strong Le Meridien increased THF's number of international 
five-star hotels to more than 100 establishments (Skapinker, 1994c; Tate, 1994). 
Moreover, Le Meridien took THF into the Far East and South America for the first 
time, and strengthened THF's presence in the US and the Middle East (Marckus, 
1994; Shepherd, 1994b; Tate, 1994). 
6.3. The end of Forte Empire - the reverse takeover 
Granada Group plc (Granada), the TV and leisure group, bid for THF in November 
1995 and took over the Group in January 1996. According to Granada's 
chairman, Gerry Robinson (Robinson), he first mentally targeted THF in 1987 
because he doubted possibilities of success for the group, with the transition from 
the founding generation of THF's empire to the next (From Forte Sr. to Forte Jr. ) 
(Daneshkhu and Snoddy, 1995). However, in their interviews with the British 
-139- 
Broadcasting Corporation in 1999, Robinson and Charles Allen (Allen), Granada's 
chief executive commented that they first spoke about acquiring THF "casually' in 
1992 (British Broadcasting Corporation, 1999). The conversation about acquiring 
THF happened after they received no reply from THIF regarding the Gardner 
Merchant sale, which they had expressed interest in. According to Robinson 'We, 
the most likely buyer had been excluded'. This casual conversation led to a secret 
operation, which involved investigating the performance and management of THE 
In addition to despatching their 'men' to THF's establishments, Robinson also 
visited at least two-dozen Little Chef outlets personally (British Broadcasting 
Corporation, 1999). On 22 November 1995, they announced their intention to take 
over THF (British Broadcasting Corporation, - 1999; Daneshkhu, 1995b). 
As part of its defence, THF raised funds through its sale of assets, which included 
the catering supplier Puritan Maid for E7.5 million; Lillywhites for E28.5 million and 
the US Travelodge chain for El 14 million (Daneshkhu, 1995c; 1995d; King, 
1996a). THF also raised its full year profits forecast by another E5 million and 
published the revaluation of the hotels portfolio at E3.35 billion, an extra E355 
million (King, 1996a; The Guardian, 1995), although they had reduced its property 
value by almost E500 million in the last valuation, in January 1994 (Daneshkhu, 
1995a). At the same time, THF also switched its revaluing policy from three years 
to a five-year rolling basis, with one-fifth of the properties re-valued each year 
(Daneshkhu, 1995a). THF decided to commission the revaluation because this 
was the crucial part of its defence argument to back up its claim that Granada's bid 
had undervalued its assets and prospects (Daneshkhu, 1995a). 
In its defence, THF also appealed to the Takeover Panel for Granada to provide a 
detailed breakdown of the cost savings of E100 million, a figure that Granada 
claimed was achievable for the first full year after acquisition (Daneshkhu, 1995d; 
Financial Times, 1995a). However, this appeal was turned down by the Takeover 
Panel who commented that Granada had acted within its rules in stating it could 
improve THF's profits by El 00 million (Daneshkhu, 1995d). 
In its other defensive attempt, THF claimed to be able to deliver 'greater 
shareholder value' and urged its shareholders to reject the bid because 'Granada 
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was trying to buy the company on the cheap' (Daneshkhu, 1995b, pp. 5). THF 
argued that its company had concentrated on re-structuring and focusing on Its 
hotel and restaurant businesses, and had raised E950 million from disposing of 
non-core assets in the past two years (Daneshkhu, 1995b). They also pointed out 
that the hotel industry had entered a strong profit growth period and the industry 
was expected to continue to grow for the next few years, according to a report 
made by the hotel consultant Pannell Kerr Forster (PKF). On the other hand, 
Granada also claimed to be able to improve shareholder value by highlighting 
THF's poor returns, which the former could improve by cost-cuffing, exploiting 
brand potential and implementing more skilful purchasing. Both groups also had 
different views in terms of THF's future development. Granada wanted to keep 
THF's motorway hotels and mid-market hotel group whilst THF wanted to sell off 
its budget hotels and restaurants to concentrate on its upmarket (five-star and 
above) hotels (Donovan, 1996). 
Meanwhile, THF continued to attack Granada by claiming that the Granada group 
was an unfocused collection of unrelated businesses and that Granada's bid would 
leave the company with E3.6 billion in debt (The Guardian, 1995). In addition, the 
deal would expose its 'unrelated' businesses- to unacceptable risk at a time of 
declining market share and increasing competition. Granada retaliated with the 
claim that its strong cash flow would be sufficient to cover interest repayments four 
times better than THF had managed in recent years despite the high debts 
associated with this takeover (The Guardian, 1995, pp. 2). Simultaneously, 
Granada cleared a further obstacle by securing an agreement to buy the trust 
shares of the Council of Forte for Ell 50 million. This Council was a group of 
trustees charged with safeguarding the company, owning less than 1% of THF's 
shares but controlling 50% of the voting rights, which was enough to block a 
hostile bid (New York Times, 1996a). 
In the final defence document, THF confirmed its proposal to sell its restaurants 
business and the Travelodge group of budget hotels to Whitbread for more than 
El billion if the hostile bid failed (Financial Times, 1995b). The proceeds was 
meant to reduce the high gearing and constraints on expenditure for refurbishment 
and expansion. in addition, THF announced a new estimated valuation of its 
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hotels at about EV billion, excluding THF's 68% stake in the Savoy group and an 
increase in its dividend, which was cut from 9.91 p to 7.5p for the year to January 
31't 1993; it was last raised in 1989 (Daneshkhu and Price, 1995). Forte Jr. 
promised shareholders a 20% rise in dividend per year over the next three years 
and an unexpected E800 million share buy-back plan (Donovan, 1996; Forte, 
1996; King, 1996a). He pledged to distribute its 68% Savoy Hotel stake to 
shareholders, and committed the company to 'aggressive' expansion of its Le 
Meridien and Post House group of hotels (Forte, 1996, pp. 38; King, 1996a). 
However, Robinson was sceptical about Forte Jr. 's defence argument (King, 
1996a). He commented that THF's aim to make dividends grow while achieving a 
practical level of dividend cover required profits to double in three years. Forte Jr. 
finally announced that he could split his job of chairman and chief executive. He 
commented that the decision was 'appropriate and timely' given his company's 
plans to focus on its hotel business in the wake of Granada's E3.8 billion hostile 
bid (King, 1996b). 
After the final defence were presented, it appeared that Granada had more 
supporters. According to one dealer: 'hundreds' of private shareholdings had sold 
in the market, typically in parcels of between 1,000 and 3,000 shares at a time 
(King, 1996c, pp. 15). Several institutions had also traded in large volumes. 
Among those selling THF's shares was Capital Corporation - which at the outset of 
the bid was THF's second biggest institutional shareholder. Capital Corporation 
sold almost all its stake, constituting a substantial parcel, to Granada's merchant 
bank advisers (Buckingham and King 1996). The proposal was also considered a 
'tall order because THIF management had not been able to deliver profits, 
earnings and dividends in the past (King, 1996a, pp. 14). 
After a bitter baffle, Granada won the bid and took over THF for E3.9 billion (King, 
1996d). Granada claimed that its bid had been accepted by THF's shareholders, 
representing 60.89% or about 591 million shares (New York Times, 1996b). 
These shares included one of THF's biggest shareholders, Mercury A: sset 
Management (MAM), which had decided to support Granada by committing its 
14.4% stake in THF to Granada (King, 1996c). Some fund managers who had 
witnessed Forte Jr. 's final presentation commented that they were unconvinced by 
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THF although the Group had done a lot to improve its image in the City during the 
defensive battle (Buckingham and King, 1996). They accepted Granada's offer 
because they were sceptical of THF management's ability to generate sufficient 
profits even after weighing the proposals laid out by THF (New York Times, 
1996b). 'We supported Granada', said Graham Wood, a fund manager at the 
British insurer Standard Life. 'I found that Granada's management could produce 
better returns on the assets than Forte's could' (New York Times, 1996b, pp. D1 8). 
Other analysts argued that Forte Jr. and family were late in seeking to release 
shareholder value, leading to Granada's management gaining more credibility 
from the City than Forte Jr. (Buckingham and King, 1996). The separation of Forte 
Jr. 's dual roles as chairman and chief executive was also considered a late move 
to gain shareholders' confident (Brummer, 1996). 
Aftermath: Break up of THF assets 
In the first meeting with Granada after THF lost to the former, Forte Jr. offered 
Granada P-970 million to buy back most of Le Meridien and part of the Exclusive 
hotel chains (Marckus and Murray, 1996; Murray, 1996). However, Allen insisted 
that Granada was not pressured to sell any of the former THF's assets. He 
claimed that these assets had been under-exploited and they had decided to keep 
Le Meridien for the time being, in consideration of the value the chain could 
generate for their shareholders (The Times, 1996). Granada also thought that 
THF was offering a price that was 50% below the total value of those assets on 
sale (King, 1996e; Murray, 1996). After Granada had announced to sell London's 
Grosvenor House and other luxury hotels, Forte Jr. decided to withdraw his bid 
because his major interest was in Le Meridien and not this package (King, 1996e; 
Price, 1996). Not long after, Forte Jr. decided to build up his own luxury hotel 
company - RF Hotels (Doran, 2000). Appendix K provides a summary of the 
disposal of THF's various assets between 1996 and 2003. 
6.4. Comparison of motives for M&A deals 
The main purpose of this section is to discuss each deal by comparing the motives 
for major M&A activities as documented in secondary (Table 6.3) and primary 
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sources (Table 6.4), as well as in relation to the MýA literature discussed in 
Chapter 3 (see Table 3.1). Table 6.5 consolidates the motives retrieved from both 
sources to provide an overview of THF's motives for M&A activity in 1981 to 1994. ' 
The Savoy 
The motives for The Savoy deal reflected a strong personal managerial motive 
and to a lesser extent one of economies of scale. This is evident from comments 
made by Wontner who discounted any business sense in Forte Sr. 's hostile bid for 
The Savoy, as it was then incurring a loss of E1.6 million. Several other actions 
also suggested that motives for the 14-year baffle to control the Savoy were 
predicated on personal reasons. One of them was the fact that Savoy was where 
Charles had proposed to his wife and where they had spent part of their 
honeymoon (Skapinker, 1994b; Stewart, 1991). The personal reason aspect may 
also be supported by two other incidents in which Forte Sr. seemed to have a 'soft 
spot' for the past. One of them was the purchase of his first milk bar - Meadow 
Milk Bar - in 1984 (Caterer and Hotelkeeper, 1984b). Forte Sr. 's sentiments for his 
past were revealed again in his joint venture with AGIP Petroli, part of Italy's state- 
owned oil company, to operate its hotels in Italy. The joint venture, called AGIP 
Forte International (AFI), operated 18 hotels in Italy, which were located near 
highway junctions and were three- and four-star properties (Hotel, 1992). Charles 
saw the deal as 'a return to his roots in Italy' (Sullivan, 1998, pp. 22). Therefore, 
there appeared to be a fair amount of personal satisfaction in gaining The Savoy; 
Respondent 6 commented that there was 'no financial motive' for the takeover and 
this is further confirmed by most of the respondents, particularly Respondent 2 
who pointed out that: 
'[s]trategy was whatever Charles was thinking about in any day and he got it 
into his mind that he wants to own, so he started to buy the share of the 
Savoy... this was a Charles Forte decision [to buy Savoy]. This wasn't done 
as a result of any detailed systematic analysis... it was idiosyncratic. ' 
Although five of the respondents agreed that there was an 'ego' issue involved, 
some of them were of the opinion that The Savoy bid possessed some efficiency 
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in terms of economies of scale. This is because THF also had a group of luxury 
products, and the integration of THF's and The Savoy group of hotels could 
reduce cost and enhance value through procurement, particularly for The Savoy. 
According to Respondent 1 and Respondent 3 this deal was not a totally non- 
strategic one since The Savoy was in reality, 'badly run', which means there was 
potential tp derive operative synergies - such as marketing and procurement - 
from the deal and to cut costs. This opinion was supported by Respondent 2 who 
found it to be a 'buy investment'. Moreover, The Savoy had been recognised as a 
brand of its own and an institution of quality and service in the industry. It had also 
been sought after previously by a few established businessmen in the UK and the 
US. Thus, it can be argued that there is some amount of value maximising motive 
in this case, in view of The Savoy's prestigious brand name and its inefficient 
operations which could have added value to THF's hotel business overall. 
Hanson Trust (Anchor Hotels) 
The strategic fit motive for buying Anchor Hotels was dominant in terms of the 
presence of supplementary and complementary resources. This deal 
supplemented THF by providing the latter with hotels that were located in areas 
where THF did not have a prevailing presence and thus facilitated its geographical 
expansion in the UK. Anchor Hotels also complemented THF's existing hotels 
because both hotel groups operated in the three-star market sector, and thus 
increased THF's size in this sector. On the other hand, Respondent 6 argued that 
Anchor Hotels was not the main attraction in this deal as it was part of the Hanson 
sales package, which also included catering divisions: 64 Happy Eater roadside 
restaurants and Imperial Inns (69 restaurants). 
Respondent 2 held a similar opinion regarding The Savoy case, in that he 
considered this deal to be a display of the 'idiosyncratic entrepreneurialism of 
Forte Sr. and not the result of systematic analysis'. In this sense, Respondent 2's 
comments can be linked to the managerial motive for growth - that is, to increase 
the size of the company without much consideration for shareholder value or the 
strategic growth of the group. Despite the non-value maximising motive of Forte 
Sr. suggested by Respondent 2, there is no doubt that value maximisation was 
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achieved through economies of scale, as the size of the hotel division increased in 
terms of the number of rooms and locations within the UK. Moreover, there was 
an existing operational relationship between THF and Hanson Trust. Since THF 
was already a big client of imperial products (a subsidiary of Hanson Trust), THF's 
management was no doubt already familiar with the latter's products and 
operations. Therefore, operational and managerial synergies could be attained, 
and this is considered a value enhancing deal. 
Kennedy Brookes (Heritage Hotels) 
In the case of Kennedy Brookes (KB), strategic fit is dominant because THF 
gained a supplementary product in terms of a collection of Heritage hotels which 
expanded its hotel portfolio. Its value was enhanced by being able to cross-sell its 
extended range of products to existing and new customers. Moreover, THF 
increased its geographical presence in the UK with the addition of new locations in 
historic cities. K13 was also considered to be part of a bigger sales package, as 
commented by Respondent 6, who posits that KB's catering business, and not its 
hotels, was the main attraction for THE THF's catering business was 
complemented by the addition of KBs brand name, which was strong in the 
catering business. Moreover, the catering deal also included KB's Privilege 
Charge card and KB's central restaurant reservations system, which enabled THIF 
to derive economies of scale when they were integrated into THF's business. 
In a different view, Respondent 2 considered this deal as an unsystematic way of 
analysing and buying businesses and also attributed it to Forte Sr. 's 'idiosyncratic 
entrepreneurialism'. According to him, the position of a Director of Strategy was 
created in THF in 1986, but the Director had not provided sound advice for its 
M&A activities, such as this deal, because he possessed insufficient knowledge of 
the hotel business. However, his comment can also be read as an issue of 
family's or Forte Sr. 's dominating position in- the company, which reduced the 
power of salaried management in making decisions. On the other hand, this deal 
should not be considered as totally non-value maximising because the products 
did fit in with THF's business divisions and increased its market share in both hotel 
and catering divisions. Value maximisation was achieved through economies of 
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scale and scope as THIF obtained a new hotel product (Heritage Hotels) and 
extended its geographical presence in the UK. In addition, it also increased its 
size in its other business division, catering. 
Crest Hotels 
Strategic fit and speed were the major motives for acquiring Crest Hotels, to 
increase THF's number of rooms and overall industry presence. The strategic fit 
appeared in the form of a complementary product of Crest Hotels and THF's 
existing hotels. Both Crest and Post Houses shared the same three-star market 
business traveller and both products were similar, which sped up the integration of 
the two hotel companies. The purchase of the same kind of product thus enabled 
THIF to gain a critical mass, which concurs with Respondent I's, Respondent 4's 
and Respondent 6's comments that Crest Hotels were bought to increase the size 
of Post House. 
There was also a supplementary fit in terms of locations between THF's Post 
House and Crest. The former was located in key towns in the UK, while the latter 
was sited in secondary locations. In this way, Crest increased THF's geographical 
presence in the UK, as well as its international exposure since the Continental 
Crest Hotels were located in major European cities. Similarly, Respondent 1's and 
Respondent 6's comments regarding attaining coverage for Post House were also 
referring to strategic fit in terms of expansion via increasing the geographical 
distributions of hotel units. 
Speed was a dominant motive in this deal as it secured THF's position as the 
largest three-star market operator in the UK rapidly. Speed was also present in 
the form of the addition of 17 Kelly's Kitchen to THF's roadside restaurants and 
budget hotels. These sites obtained enabled THF to build their budget hotels 
beside the restaurants and expedited THF's budget hotel expansion. On the other 
hand, Respondent 6 also argued that this was an opportunistic deal because Bass 
happened to be rationalising its portfolio. The opportunistic reason was also valid 
as many hotel companies were rationalising their assets during the early 1990s. 
-147- 
The ability of Bass to seize the opportunity to expand quickly made this deal 
extremely value enhancing for the company. 
Le Merldien Hotels 
The Le Meriden deal displayed strong support for the internationalisation motive. 
From Table 6.3, it is observed that the Le Meridien purchase displayed THF's 
ambition to expand overseas, in comparison to all the other deals closed. 
According to Respondent 2 and Respondent 3, globalisation and international 
competition had driven THF to increase its international exposure. In a sense this 
is similar to Respondent 6's suggestion that it was an opportunistic purchase, 
which is not totally incorrect since there was a need to compete internationally. 
Moreover, Le Meridien Hotels happened to be put up for sale by its owner - Air 
France, which was facing a financial crisis. 
Strategic fit was also present in this purchase in terms of complementary and 
supplementary roles. TH F gained a four-star product which complemented its 
exclusive range of products. At the same time, these products supplemented THF 
in terms of international presence because Le Meridien hotels had a worldwide 
distribution, with hotels in each major city. Thus, this deal provided THF with a 
presence in the Far East, South America and a stronger presence in the US and 
the Middle East. 
This deal also created a critical mass for THF as its total number of hotels 
increased and economies of scale was attained with the integration of Le Meridien 
hotels into THF's hotel portfolio. Economies of scope were also gained as 
members of Le Meridien's loyalty programme were integrated into THF's system 
and cross-selling of a range of different products was made possible. 
The other motive to acquire Le Meriden was for its brand name. This was 
supported by Respondent 1 and Respondent'4 who posit that 'people want to buy 
the Le Meridien brand' and 'to get an international brand' respectively. Moreover, 
the increasingly competitive hotel business environment at that time led hotel 
operators to operate their businesses through alternative means, and franchising 
-148- 
and management contracts which required lower capital investment became 
important. Expansion via franchising and management contracting rely a lot on a 
strong brand name; thus the Le Meddien Hotels comprised mainly management 
contracts and an international brand name was a strategic fit for THF. This 
highlighted the increasing importance of a brand name as an acquisitive motive, 
and also revealed the cost reducing and value enhancing potential of this 
purchase. 
In summary, the consolidation of motives for M&A in THF's case shows a mixture 
of motives for M&A in each deal, rather than one single reason, which concurs 
with the general M&A literature. The dominant motive was to increase size and 
this was achieved through all the acquisitions (Anchor, KB, Crest and Le 
Meridien). Other reasons such as strategic fit in terms of geography as well as 
product fit are evidenced by all these deals. THF's strategy to internationalise its 
hotel division started in the 1970s when it bought Travelodge in the US, and 
continued with subsequent purchases such as Crest Hotels and Le Meridien. The 
managerial motive is also present, particularly displayed by the hostile bid for The 
Savoy, deemed to be a deal motivated by Forte Sr. 's personal sentimental 
reasons and personal aspiration to acquire prestige. 
The deals discussed also support the efficiency argument made in the M&A 
literature for cost reduction and value enhancement in light of complementary or 
supplementary resources. The motives for the Anchor hotel and KB deals were 
linked to strategic fit as both deals added value to THF, not only in its hotel sector, 
but also in other related business operations, because these deals comprised of 
accommodation and food businesses. The former complemented its hotel division 
while the latter complemented its catering division. Simultaneously, these gains 
supplemented its business mix and fit in with its corporate strategy of growth. 
Motives concurring with the M&A literature also include operational relatedness as 
seen in the THF-Hanson deal, as they had a previous business relationship which 
prompted the M&A activity, as it was deemed value enhancing for THF. 
I 
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Table 6.2: THF's motives for M&A activity, 1981-1994 
Savoy Anchor KB Crest Le 
Merldien 
1981 1986 1988 1990 1994 
Economies of scale and scope 
Economies of scale and scope: Cut 
cost 
Economies of scale: Re-branded 
product 
Economies of scope: Loyalty 
programme 
To increase the number of hotels in the 
UK 
Market Power 
To increase market share: in other 
businesses 
Increase size/ market share: No. of 
hotels and rooms, critical mass 
Market power: brand rights 
Speed 
Increase size quickly 
Strategic fit 
Strategic fit: Complementary product 
Strategic fit: Supplementary product 
Geographical fit and value 
enhancement through location 
Product portfolio: own, franchise, 
manage, etc 
New product & new platform 
New market, new customers 
Value enhancement: quality of product 
To acquire new portfolio/ products 
Market penetration: same product/ 
customers 
increase presence in the UK Ve 
Managerial motive 
Managerial motives: Personal V, 
Foreign competition 
Internationalisation: new locations 
Internationalisation: product 
Others 
To acquire with minimum assets 
(pertinent to the nature of hotel, high 
investment cost and location) 
Brand name, prestipous 
Source: THF annual reports 1979 - 1996, various newspapers and trade journals 
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Table 6.3: Comparing analysts' comments on THF's motives for M&A activity, 
1981- 1994 (R = Respondent) 
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 
TH F -Savoy (1981 -) 
Founder wanted to own shares in the Savoy 0 
Savoy was badly managed, therefore a 'buy 
investment' 
0 
Badly managed, thus, for cost and revenue 
enhancement 
0 0 
Managerial motive: Ego 0. 0 0 0 
THF - Anchor (1986) 
Managerial motive: idiosyncratic 
entrepreneurial of Charles Forte, not 
systematic I 
0 
Stronger motive to acquire Hanson's 
restaurant chain, as Anchor hotels made up 
a smaller deal in the whole package 
THF - Kennedy Brookes (1988) 
Managerial motive: idiosyncratic 
entrepreneurialism in Charles Forte, not 
systematic 
0 
Stronger motive to acquire KB's catering, as 
KB hotels made up a smaller deal in the 
whole package 
0 
THF - Crest (1990) 
To become big and increase number of 
hotels and profits of hotel etc, because 
market level and location (Market 
penetration) 
0 
I 
To increase the number of hotels in the UK 0 
Coverage for Post House 0 0 
Quick way to expand 0 
Opportunity 0 
THF - Le Meridien (1994) 
To boost non-UK presence in the up market 
sector and as a platform for international 
market (enter new territory, geographical 
expansion, market development) 
0 
Internationalisation and Globalisation 0 0 
To acquire brand 0 0 
Opportunity 
Management Contracts I 
Coverage for portfolio: up-market 10 1 1 1 
Source: Semi-structured interviews 
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Table 6.4: Comparing THFIs motives for M&A activity, 1981- 1994 
Savoy Anchor K13 Crest Le 
Meridien 
1981 1986 1988 1990 1994 
Economies of scale and scope 
Economies of scale and scope: Cut 
cost 
Economies of scale: Re-branded 
product 
Economies of scope: Loyalty 
programme 
Savoy was badly managed, therefore a 
'buy investment' 
Badly managed, thus, for cost and 
revenue enhancement 
Market Power 
To increase market share: in other 
businesses 
Increase size/ markei share: No. of 
hotels and rooms, critical mass 
Market power: brand rights 
Speed 
Increase size quickly 
Quick way to expand 
Strategic fit 
Complementary product 
SupplementaEy product 
Geographical fit and value 
enhancement through location 
Product portfolio: own, franchise, 
manage, etc. 
New product 
New market, new customers 
Value enhancement: quality of product 
To acquire new portfolio/ products 
Market penetration: same product/ 
customers 
Increase presence in the UK 
Motive to acquire Hanson's restaurant 
chain; Anchor hotels made up a 
smaller deal in the whole package 
Stronger motive to acquire KBs 
catering division; KB hotels made up a 
smaller deal in the whole package 
To become big and increase number of 
hotels and profits of hotel etc, because 
market level and location 
Coverage for Post House 
Coverage for portfolio: up-market 
product 
Managerial motive 
Managerial motives: Personal 
Founder wanted to own shares in the 
Savoy 
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Savoy Anchor KB Crest Le 
Meridien 
1981 1986 1988 1990 1994 
Managerial motive: Ego 
Managerial motive: idiosyncratic 
entrepreneurial of Charles Forte 
Foreign competition 
Internationalisation: new locations 
Internationalisation: product 
To boost non-UK presence in the up 
market sector and as a platform for 
international market (enter new 
territory, geographical expansion, 
market development) 
Internationalisation and globalisation 
Others 
To acquire with minimum assets 
(pertinent to the nature of hotel, high 
investment cost and location) 
Brand name, prestigious 
Opportunity 
Management Contracts 
5ource: T HF annual reports 1979 - 1996, various newspapers, trade journals and interviews 
Words in italics are motives mentioned by analysts during interviews 
6.5. General development of THF 
This section provides an overview of the development of THF's hotel division 
between 1979 and 1996, and particular attention is paid to its M&A activities and 
the macro environment. M&A activities accelerated the pace of THF's growth and 
helped the group to further consolidate its market leadership in terms of size - 
number of rooms - in the UK hotel industry during that period. 
THF evolved from a business focused on the hospitality industry in 1970 to 
become a conglomerate in the 1980s. After the merger with Trust Houses Group 
Ltd. in 1970, THIF continued to expand its hotel sector through M&A activities in 
the UK and overseas and by 1978, it owned 885 hotels worldwide. In addition to 
expansion in its hotel business, THF also acquired unrelated business - such as 
an oil business, a publishing company and a theatre, and related businesses such 
as catering and roadside restaurants. 
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The expansion of THF in the hotel sector in the first half of the 1980s was 
dominated by the hostile bid for The Savoy. The recession in the late 1970s had 
affected The Savoy's financial performance badly and it was not operating 
efficiently then. Thus, it was considered that there was huge opportunity for value 
maximisation in this deal. However, that was part of the reason that prompted 
Forte Sr. to bid for the Group. The other major motive was Forte Sr. 's personal 
and sentimental reasons for wanting to own and control The Savoy (see 6.4 - The 
Savoy). The battle to take over The Savoy lasted between 1981 and 1989, and in 
1989, an agreement was made between The Savoy and THF to admit Forte. Jr. 
and THF's Finance Director into The Savoy board as directors. This decision was 
taken because both companies had incurred high legal fees over the past eight 
years. Moreover, THF had become a major shareholder, holding 72% of The 
Savoy equity, although it only held 42.3% of the voting rights. In between the bids 
for The Savoy, THF also closed two deals: Hanson Trust (including Anchor 
Hotels) and KB group (including Heritage Hotels) in 1986 and 1988 respectively. 
These purchases included a hotel group, catering and restaurant businesses 
which fifted into THF's 1985 strategic plan to focus on three areas for future 
growth: hotels, airline catering and industrial or commercial catering (Feiler, 1985). 
In the late 1980s, THF's strategy for hotel development changed to add an 
emphasis on developing and maintaining a brand-led portfolio. According to 
Paddy Mitchell, the Managing Director of THF, the hotels would be grouped under 
'three brands and two collections' in 1989 (Goymour, 1989b, pp. 29). The three 
brands were Forte Hotels, Post House and Travelodge, which referred to all the 
modern, custom - built hotels in the four-star, three-star and lodge category 
respectively. However, the re-branding exercise in 1989 was delayed due to the 
acquisition of Crest from Bass in 1990. During the early 1990s, the UK and the 
world were facing a recession and as economic slow down, coupled with lower 
demand for hotel rooms due to fewer business and leisure travellers, the 
increased interest and inflation rates had reduced earnings and increased costs 
for many hotel companies. As a result, many hotel companies rationalised and 
sold their hotel properties to reduce interest rate costs. THF took the opportunity 
to buy Crest Hotels, which was considered a strategic fit for its hotel expansion 
because of the complementary products and supplementary locations. 
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The initial intention of absorbing Crest into the existing Post House brand was 
discarded after market research revealed that the Crest brand was much stronger 
than first perceived by THF. Therefore, THF changed its strategy to re-shuffle its 
portfolio and rename its higher grade Post Houses as Crest and re-brand some 
Crest Hotels into Forte Post House (Goymour, 1991b). The result was the 
determination of five brands: Exclusive Hotels, Heritage Hotels, Crest Hotels, Post 
House Hotels and Travelodge (Slattery and Johnson, 1991). The purchase of 
Crest in 1990 was mainly financed through sale-and-leaseback because it was 
considered cheaper than bank loans during that period, as interest rates were 
raised to more than 14% (see Appendix C). 
THF's financial performance was also badly affected by the fall in the number of 
international travellers because of the First Gulf War, the persistent recession in 
the UK and developing recessionary conditions in Europe. According to Slattery 
and Johnson (1992), THF's hotels were concentrated in London, UK primary 
provincial cities and continental European gateway cities worsened its 
performance. Moreover, its hotel business in North America was also affected by 
recession, oversupply of rooms, low room rates and slow growth in its US 
Travelodge chain (Slattery and Johnson, 1992). In 1993, THF's strategy changed 
due to Forte Jr. 's concerns over the effectiveness of delivering the company's 
business when he took over the chairmanship from his retiring father. According 
to him, (Forte, 1997, pp. 7), each of THF's businesses - industrial catering, in-flight 
catering, restaurant business and hotel business - had evolved into 'a big business 
in its own right with the capability of expanding quite aggressively in good markets, 
but demanding huge capital to do so'. THF's hotel division derived a consistent 
high profit margin, as a percentage of total profit, compared to other business 
sectors such as its catering business from the 1980s onwards (see Appendix L). 
However, improved results for catering were present, particularly after 1986 
(purchase of Hanson deal, including Anchor Hotels). Thus, THF's strategy 
returned to focusing on the hotel business and maximising the profits of existing 
profitable assets. At the same time, it aimed to reduce debt and, in 1993, dispose 
of its catering arm, Merchant Gardner, which was once considered as a core 
business in the Group (AR / THF, 1993). THF also tackled its cost base by 
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reducing the number of corporate employees in the head office from 3,000 to 
1,000 (Rawstone, 1993). 
In 1994, the Le Meridien hotels were acquired and gave THF a worldwide 
exposure in the hotel industry. In addition, Le Meridien increased the number of 
THF's four-star products, as well as providing the Group with the entrance to and 
platform for management contracting. Le Meridien was an asset-light hotel chain 
which fitted in with THF's plan to reduce its gearing and improved its financial 
performance. However, THF was taken over by Granada in a hostile bid in 1996, 
before it was able to restructure its company, as the hotel industry was still 
recovering from the early 1990s recession. Although Forte Jr. gave a good 
defence and made proposals for improving the company's financial performance, 
many analysts and investors had already lost confidence in THF's management 
capabilities and thus lost to Granada, which had a stronger management team 
with proven track record. 
The mechanism of M&A activities as a method of growth, as discussed, has 
shown that motives in the case of THF's hotel division supported M&A literature in 
general. These M&A activities and development of the THIF hotel division provide 
a general view of how THIF responded to market conditions and changed its 
strategy over time. This in turn reflected the interdependence between 
organisational strategy and the macro environment. The next chapter reviews the 
second case, Ladbroke Group p1c, and the cross examinations of four cases and 
the development of the hotel industry will be conducted in Chapter 10. 
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Chapter 7: 
Ladbroke Group plc (Ladbroke) 
This chapter explores the development of Ladbroke Group plc (Ladbroke). The 
first part provides a brief history of how Ladbroke started its businesses. This is 
followed by a discussion of several major merger and acquisition activities (M&A) 
that Ladbroke undertook between 1979 and 2001. Table 7.1 presents the major 
deals that Ladbroke closed between 1979 and 2001. 
Table 7.1: Major merger and acquisition activities, 1979-2001 
Ladbroke/ Hilton 
1979 Myddleton Hotels 
1984 Comfort Hotels 
1985 Rodeway (USA) 
1987 Hilton Hotels 
1999 Stakis Hotels 
2001 Scand c 
(North Europe) 
Source: Ladbroke annual reports, various newspapers and trade journals 
The third part compares and contrasts the motives for each deal by using both 
secondary and interview data. The final part discusses the general development 
of Ladbroke hotel division in the light of corporate strategy changes and the macro 
environment. The term 'Ladbroke' is used throughout the discussion, including the 
period after its name had been changed to the Hilton Group in 1999. 
7.1. The beginning of Ladbroke Group plc 
Ladbroke was founded in 1886 in a Warwickshire village named Ladbroke and its 
business then was in horse race betting (AR / Ladbroke, 1989). The effective start 
of the bookmaking operations was in 1902 when Arthur Bendir joined the company 
(Munting, 1989). According to Munting (1989), Ladbroke started with a focus on 
securing rich and well-known clients, and providing betting services both on and 
off course; the stakes were mostly based on large amounts and on credit terms. 
The company also employed well-educated staff, often recruited from public 
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schools and / or ex-army officers. However, Ladbroke's revenue declined in the 
1950s, as horse betting developed into a mass-market business and its focus on 
exclusive clients could not keep up with the changing needs of the market. During 
that time, Ladbroke remained a small private company operating from one office in 
the West End of London and served a few, mainly aristocratic, clients in credit 
betting (AR / Ladbroke, 1993). 
In 1956, Max Parker bought the company and his nephew Cyril Stein (Stein) 
became the manager (Munting, 1989). In 1961, legislation changed and off-track 
betting became a legalised leisure activity for the first time since 1853, under the 
Betting and Gaming Act 1960 (Dixey, 1987; Saunders and Turner, 1987). 
According to Channon (1978), Stein took the opportunity created by legislation 
change and developed a nationwide chain of licensed bookmakers. From a small 
base as a cash betting operation, Ladbroke became a listed company on the 
London Stock Exchange (LSE) in 1967 (Channon, 1978; Stock Exchange Official 
Yearbook, 1970). Between the period 1968 - 1974, Ladbroke's turnover rose from 
E39 million in 1968 to E255 million in 1974, and the Group also diversified into 
other industries, which included casinos, property development, hotels and holiday 
centres (Channon, 1978). According to May and Tomkinson (1979), Ladbroke's 
casino business started with the opening of the first London casino - Ladbroke 
Club - in 1971. The casino business grew quickly as more and'more wealthy 
customers arrived from the Gulf - such as the Crown Prince Fahad Ben Abdulaziz, 
brother of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia - because the price of Middle East oil 
quadrupled and the value of the pound declined (May and Tomkinson, 1979). 
Subsequently, Ladbroke further diversified its gaming business into the areas of 
fixed-odds football, ante-post betting and evening greyhound racing (Munting, 
1989; Sunday Times, 1978). In 1972, Ladbroke started its property business 
through the acquisition of London and Leeds Development Corporation, which 
provided the Group with an entrance into the real estate market in the Eastern 
USA, Paris, Amsterdam and Brussels (Grant and Pederson, 1998). 
In 1973, Ladbroke started its first lodging business when it opened three 
moderately priced hotels (Caterer and Hotelkeeper, 1979b; Grant and Pederson, 
1998). In 1978, Ladbroke expanded its hotel business through the acquisition of 
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Leisure & General Holdings (L&G) (Felstead, 1978). The result of this acquisition 
gave Ladbroke control of over 50% of L&G's assets (Felstead, 1978), which 
included the 14 Mercury Motor Inns (Caterer and Hotelkeeper, 1979b; Financial 
Times, 1985). Subsequently, Ladbroke augmented its hotel stock through single 
asset acquisitions such as: Fairlane Motor Inn at Hornchurch; Seven Hills, 
Cobham; Bridge House, Reigate; and Beehive, Watford. It then proceeded to re- 
brand these assets into the Mercury Hotels (Caterer and Hotelkeeper, 1979b). In 
a further move to expand its hotel business, and to maintain a policy'to purchase 
prime modern hotels with good trading records', Ladbroke acquired a number of 
major hotels to complement its expanding chain (AR / Ladbroke, 1979, pp. 4). 
These single assets included the Pennine President Hotel at Huddersfield, the 
Gateway Hotel at Newport, the Westmoreland Hotel in London and the Twelve 
Knights Hotel in Port Talbot, South Wales (AR / Ladbroke, 1979; Daily Telegraph, 
1979a; 1979b; Kinloch, 1979). By 1979, Ladbroke's hotel division had grown into 
30 properties with nearly 3,000 bedrooms (Caterer and Hotelkeeper, 1979b).. 
7.2 Hotel expansion- major M&A activities 
The following sub-sections discuss the development of Ladbroke's hotel business 
between 1979 and 2004 through its various M&A activities. The acquisition of 
Myddleton Hotels (7.2.1) increased Ladbroke's hotel stock rapidly in the UK. 
Comfort Hotels (7.2.2) provided Ladbroke with a strong foothold in London and 
access to major European cities. The purchase of Rodeway Inn (7.2.3) enabled 
Ladbroke to start its hotel business in the US rapidly and to broaden its hotel 
expansion scope through franchising. The purchase of Hilton International (7.2.4) 
established its international presence, as well as strengthening its UK hotel stocks, 
as it became the second largest hotel company in the UK. Stakis Hotels (7.2.5) 
further strengthened Ladbroke's hotel and leisure business in the UK. The 
acquisition of Scandic Hotels (7.2.6) increased Ladbroke's presence in the 
Scandinavian region and almost doubled the number of Hilton hotels in 
Continental Europe. Each of these major deals will be discussed in the following 
sections. 
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7.2.1. Myddleton Hotels 
Ladbroke acquired the Myddleton Hotel group (Myddleton) for E4.6 million in late 
1978 (The Times, 1978). Myddleton had seven hotels in English tourist centres, 
including five-star hotels in cities such as Bath, York, Bournemouth, Oxford and 
Eastbourne (Caterer and Hotelkeeper, 1979b; The Times, 1978). Myddleton's 
fixed assets stood at E3.83 million and an additional 50 rooms were under 
construction at the time of the sale (The Times, 1978). According to Stein, the 
Myddleton acquisition increased the total number of Ladbroke hotels and motor 
inns from 18 to 25. The purchase enabled Ladbroke to expand its hotel division, 
which included the Dragonara and Mercury hotels in major tourist centres (The 
Times, 1978). 
7.2.2. Comfort Hotels 
In late 1984, Ladbroke bought Comfort Hotels (Comfort) for E77 million from the 
Comfort Hotels International group, formerly known as Adda International, for an 
unconditional offer (Caterer and Hotelkeeper, 1979b; Nicoll, 1985). The deal 
comprised 1,700 bedrooms in London, 1,000 in the rest of the UK and just under 
1,000 in Europe, graded in the three-star range (Maughan, 1984a; Warner, 1984). 
Comfort was built up by Henry Edwards, chairman of Comfort Hotels, and a 
renowned hotelier in the UK industry. He was also known for building up Centre 
Hotels before selling them to Coral Leisure and used the proceeds to buy the 
Adda International group and developed Comfort (Maughan, 1984a) (Centre 
Hotels was bought by Bass in 1980, see 8.2.2). The initial offer by Ladbroke was 
F-67.7 million on December 11 1984 (Maughan, 1984b; Warner, 1984). However, 
there was competition between Ladbroke and Intasun Group (Intasun), Britain's 
second largest tour operator, to buy Comfort, which led to the final bid of E77 
million. Before Ladbroke's bidding, Intasun had offered to buy Comfort for E44.5 
million (Eadie, 1984; Maughan, 1984b). Intasun wanted Comfort because the 
locations of its hotels were in central cities, such as London and major European 
cities, which coincided with its plan to diversify into London and the overseas hotel 
market. However, Intasun's bid was complicated by Comfort's bid, worth E16.6 
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million, for Prince of Wales hotels, a few minutes after its own announced bid for 
Comfort (Eadie, 1984). 
Comfort was interested in Prince of Wales because the latter's hotels were spread 
out in the UK and in major European countries (Maughan, 1984a). Moreover, 
Quality Inns, which was a US hotel company and one of the world's largest hotel 
organisations, held 11 % of Prince of Wales shares and could provide Comfort with 
exposure in the US. In addition, this acquisition could provide Comfort with 
conference hotels predominantly situated close to seaside locations (Maughan, 
1984a). On the other hand, neither Intasun nor Ladbroke was interested in Prince 
of Wales and both wanted to purchase Comfort with the condition that Comfort 
abandoned the bid for Prince of Wales (Warner, 1984). 
Intasun did not want Prince of Wales because its eight hotels were either in the 
provinces or in an inconvenient part of London. Moreover, Intasun believed that 
Comfort was paying too much for Prince of Wales (Eadie, 1984). As for Ladbroke, 
the group's motive for buying Comfort was to expand its existing market (London) 
and to penetrate new ones (Europe). Their target market in the UK was 
predominantly the commercial market in cities, and Prince of Wales's locations 
and market were different (Goymour, 1985a). Subsequently, Harry Goodman, 
Chairman of Intasun formally conceded defeat and commented that Ladbroke had 
offered a 'full and fair offer for the company [Comfort Hotel]'. He also offered to 
Ladbroke his 14.9% share in Comfort (Maughan, 1984a, pp. 18). According to 
Stein, the purchase of Intasun's' Comfort share for E9.34 million increased 
Ladbroke's equity share of Comfort and would fend off any potential competitor 
(Financial Times, 1984). 
The acquisition of Comfort made Ladbroke the second largest hotel group in 
Britain in room numbers after THF (Warner, 1984). Ladbroke doubled in size 
overnight with the Comfort acquisition and accelerated its existing development 
plans (Caterer and Hotelkeeper, 1985a). The addition of Comfort's three-star 
hotels around the country improved Ladbroke's standing from sixth to second 
position, with an estimated 6,247 rooms (Maughan, 1984c; Mughal, 1984). 
Moreover, Ladbroke and Comfort complemented each other geographically. 
-161 - 
Comfort had nine out of 22 hotels located in London while Ladbroke only had one 
hotel (the Westmoreland Hotel) out of its 35 in the capital (Maughan, 1984b). 
Ladbroke also saw the Comfort purchase as an opportunity to operate 
internationally with the addition of Comfort hotels sited in important continental 
European capitals such as Copenhagen, Paris and Amsterdam (AR / Ladbroke, 
1984; Warner, 1984). In addition, economies of scale could be derived from this 
deal by integrating the operational and sales and marketing departments of the 
two companies (AR / Ladbroke, 1984, pp. 7). Ladbroke also planned to spend U 
million to improve the quality of Comfort Hotels in order to achieve a higher room 
rate at the higher end of the three-star range (Nicoll, 1985; Warner, 1984). 
7.2.3. Rodeway Inns 
Ladbroke expanded its hotel division overseas in July 1985 through the acquisition 
of Rodeway Inns International (Rodeway) for $13 million (E10 million) in cash 
(Financial Times, 1985; New York Times, 1985). Rodeway was a franchise 
organisation based in Dallas (Financial Times, 1985); it operated in the middle 
range and tourism markets and was the 15 th largest hotel company in the US, 
located predominantly in the southwest of US (The Times, 1985b; Wall Street 
Journal, 1987b). The hotels were popular amongst families and middle executives 
and competed with hotel brands such as Holiday Inn and Howard Johnson. 
Rodeway's properties were similar in style to Ladbroke's Comfort properties and it 
ran 138 hotels (17,500 bedrooms) through franchising and management contracts 
in the US, Mexico and Canada (AR / Ladbroke, 1985; Financial Times, 1985; The 
Times, 1985a). The combined total of Ladbroke's 60 hotels in the UK and Europe 
and Rodeway placed Ladbroke among the 20 biggest hotel companies in the 
world (Financial Times, 1985). Rodeway enabled Ladbroke to establish its 
presence in the US, which was internationally known as 'the world's largest hotel 
market' because the US had approximately 24% of the world's lodging market 
share (AR / Ladbroke, 1985, pp. 3; The Times, 1985a). Moreover, Rodeway's 
reservation system would also provide Ladbroke's European hotels with a direct 
sales link to the US business and tourism market (Caterer and Hotelkeeper, 
1985b). 
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'Rodeway is a strategic purchase taking us at low cost and little risk into the US' 
commented John Jarvis (Jarvis) Ladbroke's, hotel chairman (Financial Times, 
1985, pp. 18). He further commented that Ladbroke planned to expand the 
franchise network rapidly and also to increase, its number of management 
contracts (Caterer and Hotelkeeper, 1985b; New York Times, 1985). However, 
Ladbroke sold Rodeway Inns in 1987 to Ramada Inc. for E12.3 million (Caterer 
and Hotelkeeper, 1987e; Wall Street Journal, 1987b). Ladbroke commented that 
Rodeway Inns failed to make Ladbroke a market leader within a set time scale. At 
the same time, Michael Hirst (Hirst), Managing Director of Ladbroke also 
commented that Rodeway Inns provided the Group 'with invaluable US experience 
... the hotels [Rodeway Inns] operated throughout the length and breadth of the 
country and provided unique information [business operations in the US] ... it was 
a practical way of doing some market research' (Caterer and Hotelkeeper, 1987e, 
pp. 24). 
7.2.4. Hilton International 
Ladbroke completed its acquisition of Hilton International (HI) on October 15,1987 
for $1.07 billion (AR / Ladbroke, 1987; Los Angeles Times, 1987b; Wall Street 
Journal, 1987c). It was considered by the directors as a reasonable price and a 
$once in a life-time' corporate opportunity to achieve their strategic goal (AR / 
Ladbroke, 1987, pp. 2). The package comprised 91 hotels worldwide, of which 44 
were full ownership, 14 were partly owned and the remaining 33 had management p 
contracts. There were more than 35,000 bedrooms in 44 countries, including the 
Vista International Hotel in Washington (Feltham, 1987a; Harris, 1987c). The deal 
also included 27 hotels in Europe, 26 in North and South America, and 38 in the 
Far East, Australia and other parts of the world, as well as 14 hotels under 
construction (Feltham, 1987a; Trollope, 1987b). 
HI was originally established by Hilton Hotel Corporation (HHC) in the US in 1949 
as a subsidiary. In 1964 it was spun off as an independent public company and 
given the exclusive right to use the Hilton name outside the US (Harris, 1987b). 
This was a means of raising finance at that time for the parent company, HHC. 
Although HHC and HI remained financially independent of each other, they 
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continued to share a joint'reservation system reputed to be one of the best in the 
world (Churchill, 1987; Hards, 1987b). In 1967, HHC sold HI to Trans World 
Airlines (TWA), later known as Transworld Corporation. After operating HI for 20 
years, TWA sold HI to Allegis Corporation (United Airlines' new name, hereafter 
known as Allegis), a Chicago-based corporation, for $982.5 million, because it was 
closing down the company (Harris, 1987b; Kilman and Valente, 1987). Allegis was 
already the owner of United Airlines, Westin Hotels and Hertz (rental car company) 
and the Group bought HI in an attempt to become a full-service travel-services 
conglomerate (Hamilton, 1987; Hiltzik, 1987; Potts, 1987). However, the 
diversification strategy proved more troublesome and less profitable than the 
chairman, Richard J. Ferris (Ferris) had hoped for. In June 1987, less than three 
months after Allegis had acquired the HI group of hotels, Allegis board members 
declared that they had lost faith in Ferris' strategy when the company's 
performance made it a takeover target by its own employees (Hamilton, 1987; 
Hiltzik, 1987). The pilots' union of United Airlines outlined a plan to break up 
Allegis in such a way that employees would end up with control of the airline 
(Kilman and Valente, 1987). Consequently, Ferris and about 20 other senior 
officers resigned and the HI deal was the first in a series of divestitures for Allegis, 
which was liquidating its non-airline operations (Dallos, 1987; Kilman and Valente, 
1987). 
This purchase of HI was not Ladbroke's first attempt. Ladbroke had tried to 
acquire HI from Transworld Corporation (TWA) in December 1986 but lost the bid 
to KLM Royal Dutch Airlines (KLM) and Allegis (Harris, 1987a; Harris, 1987b). 
The Group's offer of $850 million for HI was considered to be running in third or 
fourth place in terms of the amount offered in the bidding process (Harris, 1987b; 
Kilman and Valente, 1987). KLM won the bid by offering $975 million (Harris, 
1987b). However, KLM's purchase was blocked by KLM's own supervisory board 
and it had to abort the purchase. The deal was then taken over by Allegis who 
offered to pay $980 million (Harris, 1987b; Financial Times, 1987). Two months 
after completing its acquisition, Allegis had to put Hilton up for sale for the reasons 
mentioned previously (Feltham, 1987a; Harris, 1987b; 1987c). When Allegis put 
HI up for auction, contenders for the deal included Lufthansa (the West Germany 
national airline), Japan Airlines, Swissair, Scandinavian Airlines System, Accor, 
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Marriot Corporation (the American hotel group), David and Frederick Barclay of 
London (Barclay Bank) and KLM, who had aborted the deal previously (Financial 
Times, 1987; Hamilton, 1987; Kilman and Valente, 1987; The Washington Post, 
1987a). 
According to analysts, HI was attractive to many buyers because it had many 
prime sites in major cities of the world. Terry Barlow, Marriott's regional vice 
president for operations in the UK and Europe, pointed out that HI had established 
itself in the international market since the 1960s and had strong global presence in 
countries where the markets were growing (Churchill, 1987). 
Ladbroke believed its offer succeeded because it was able to tie up a deal more 
quickly and because it did not require the regulatory permission needed by some 
airlines (Feltham, 1987a). Moreover, Ladbroke also offered the assurance of 
closing the deal with Allegis, and not repeating the KLM incident, which had seen 
the deal being stopped by KLM's supervisory board (Harris, 1987b; Financial 
Times, 1987). 
According to Stein, 'To have secured Hilton International at a reasonable price is a 
great coup for Ladbroke' (DeLuca, 1987, pp. 1). He further commented that the 
hotel division of Ladbroke was strengthened by the strong presence of Hilton in 
North Artierica while Ladbroke was already strong in the Northern European 
market. He believed that this purchase would increase Ladbroke's share of the 
US travelling public since 'Hilton International's overseas marketing strategy had 
been focusing primarily on catering to Americans' (DeLuca, 1987). Under this 
deal, Ladbroke acquired all of Allegis' interest in the ownership and operation of all 
hotels under HI. These included several Vista International Hotels within 
continental US, which would give Ladbroke a foothold in the USA's upscale market 
where HI was not permitted to use the Hilton name (Hiltzik, 1987; Kilman and 
Valente, 1987). The US hotels included the Drake in Chicago, where the most 
expensive room then cost $1,200 a night. 
The HI deal also closed up the gap in the number of rooms between Ladbroke and 
the top hotel company - THIF - in the UK (Feltham, 1987a). In addition, this deal 
provided Ladbroke with a broader international conference and business market 
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(Trollope, 1987b), which was a growing segment in the hotel industry from the mid 
1980s. The acquisition of HI would also transform the look of Ladbroke from a 
humble betting shop chain (Feltham, 1987a) into a conglomerate with an 
international hotel group. 
Another attractive feature of HI was pointed out as the name 'Hilton' itself. Geoff 
Parkinson of Horwath & Horwath, a hotel consultant company, commented that 
'Hilton' is 'second to none as a trading name for a hotel' (Churchill, 1987, pp. 18). 
The deal brought Ladbroke the right to use the brand name across the world, 
except in the US where HHC has its exclusive rights (Trollope, 1987a). Jarvis 
from Ladbroke also commented that 'In the hotel business you need a strong 
brand name and they don't come any better than Hilton' (Feltham, 1987a, pp. 1). 
Jarvis and Hirst had been looking for some time for an international brand name 
'with life', one which could internationalise Ladbroke's hotel division, maximise 
underlying assets and sustain the group's profits record, as they found Ladbroke 
brand was unable to rely upon for international expansion (Hannan, 1988b, pp. 
41). 
The acquisition also gained Ladbroke a joint share in the Hilton Service 
Corporation, giving it access to Hilton's sophisticated central reservation system 
(Trollope, 1987a). Economies of scale could be attained by combining the 
marketing skills of both companies and utilising Hi's reservation system to boost 
bookings in Europe (Feltham, 1987a). In addition, as commented by Hirst, 'It is 
not just the number of people it [the central reservations system] will give 
Ladbroke hotels access to, but the quality of the people' (Trollope, 1987a, pp. 7). 
7.2.5. Stakis Hotels 
Ladbroke completed its takeover of Stakis pic (Stakis) on March 26 th , 1999 for an 
offer of E1,342.7 million (AR / Ladbroke, 1999). According to analysts, talks of the 
deal were first disclosed after a rise in both Ladbroke's and Stakis's share prices 
(Walsh, 1999a). Stakis was forced by the Takeover Panel to issue a statement 
after a sharp rise in its share price by 11 % since the newspapers had revealed two 
weeks previously that Ladbroke and Stakis had held - exploratory talks (Walsh, 
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1999a). Ladbroke had approached Stakis in November after a strategic review of 
its hotel business in the summer of 1998 (Robinson, 1999c). According to David 
Michels (Michels), the then Stakis Chief Executive, one of the attractions of Stakis 
was its room rateý levels. Stakis had a network of mainly regional four-star hotels, 
and was enjoying some of the best occupancy and yield rates in the sector 
(Financial Times, 1999a). Stakis had an estimated occupancy rate of 78% and it 
was believed that 'people will pay a premium for this brand name [Hilton after the 
conversion from Stakis]' (Robinson, 1999d, pp. 28). 
Although there was speculation of counter bidding for Stakis from Whitbread, 
Ladbroke managed to close the deal without much competition. Whitbread, the 
UK brewer, was deemed to have 'a large war chest' and would have been a strong 
contender (Brice and John, 1999, pp. 44). However, Whitbread did not feel 
threatened by the possibility of Ladbroke becoming a close rival in the four-star 
hotel sector because the former felt that its Marriott hotel brand was still in 'a 
strong competitive position' should Ladbroke's bid succeed (Robinson, 1999b, pp. 
19). On the other hand, other analysts commented that a counter-bid for Stakis 
was unlikely because the value of Ladbroke's offer had risen due to share prices. 
The mix of shares and cash offer had lifted Ladbroke's offer price to about 160p, 
against 109 1/4p before the confirmation of the talks (Walsh, 1999b). 
Ladbroke encountered a minor internal objection from Stakis's shareholders 
despite the absence of external competition. The takeover by the English and the 
move of the Scottish Headquarters to England had provoked some unhappiness 
among the Scots (Buxton, 1999). Although the-founder of Stakis was not originally 
Scottish, Scotland was seen as the starting point of this company. Stakis was 
founded by Sir Reo Stakis (Reo Stakis), a native Cypriot who arrived in Britain in 
1928 at the age of 15. Reo Stakis started his business running steakhouses in the 
1940s, a hotel business in the 1950s and casinos in the 1960s (Scott, 1999). He 
floated his company on the stock market in. the 1970s and was considered a 
legend in the hospitality industry for having 'single-handedly changed Scotland's 
eating habits' (Willcock, 1999, pp. 14). In the leisure trade, he opened Glasgow's 
first nightclub and Scotland's first casino; and in the hotel trade, Stakis had been 
the first to provide breakfast-included rates, tea and coffee facilities in each room, 
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and the concept of weekend breaks (Scoff, 1999; Willcock, 1999). Despite the 
objections from shareholders, Ladbroke managed to move its headquarters to 
England, but maintain a presence north of the border: for example, it kept 
accounting for all UK hotels, casinos and health clubs, which was centralised in an 
in-house shared service centre, in Glasgow (AR / Ladbroke, 1999; Cope, 1999). 
Robert Smith (Smith) Chairman of Stakis pointed out to the shareholders that he 
had 'a fiduciary duty to recommend Ladbroke's "fair and reasonable" offer which 
valued its shares at 160p each compared with about 110p before the offer 
(Buxton, 1999, pp. 19). Smith also emphasised to Stakis's shareholders that the 
English people in Ladbroke's hotel business would be facing the same fear as the 
Scots regarding job losses (Cope, 1999; Walsh, 1999b). 
Some analysts commented that Stakis's management and strong operations were 
one of the major attractions to bidders (Robinson, 1999a). Its management were 
widely admired and the chief executive of Stakis, Michels, was highly regarded by 
industry specialists as the best of the UK hotel group managers. 'He is the real 
star of the Stakis group, ' commented one broker (Financial Times, 1999a, pp. 24; 
Thompson, 1999). It was claimed that Stakis-was falling apart after Reo Stakis, 
the founder handled his empire over to his son Andros in 1988. Andros expanded 
the business into commercial property, pubs, discos and nursing homes in the late 
1980s, but was met with the property market crash in 1990 (Willcock, 1999). In 
March 1991, Reo Stakis relinquished his chairmanship position to Sir Lewis 
Robertson (Robertson) and the latter brought in Michels to replace Andros 
(Willcock, 1999). Robertson and Michels salvaged the company by selling off the 
1980s acquisitions and acquiring and rebuilding underperforming hotel and casino 
assets (Scott, 1999; Willcock, 1999). Under their leadership, Stakis recovered and 
grew from a value of E70 million in 1992 to E1.2 billion in 1999 (Willcock, 1999). 
On the other hand, Peter George (George), Ladbroke's chief executive, admitted 
that the Stakis deal was in part prompted by unsuccessful merger talks between 
HHC and Ladbroke in 1998 (Robinson, 1999c). Moreover, in that same year, 
Ladbroke missed out on two acquisitions. In the first deal, Ladbroke lost its bid for 
the Intercontinental hotel group to Bass. Ladbroke lost in not being able to move 
in quickly because of LSE rules, which required Ladbroke'to hold a shareholders' 
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meeting seeking consent. This requirement did not fit in with the seller, Seibu 
Saison, which had wanted to sell its stock and reduce debt quickly (Wall Street 
Journal, 1998; Guerrera and Cope, 1999; Robinson, 1999a). However, Bass, 
which won the bid for the Intercontinental Hotel group, was not affected by the rule 
because it was listed as a brewing and leisure company at the time, and its hotel 
division represented a far smaller proportion of the corn pany's business (Wall 
Street Journal, 1998) (see 8.2.4. ). The second deal that Ladbroke missed in 1999 
was the Coral betting shop chain (Coral bookmaker). Ladbroke won the bid to buy 
Coral bookmaker, but was forced to sell it by the competition regulatory authorities 
later. After the sale of Coral bookmaker to Morgan Grenfell Private Equity, the 
venture capital arm of Deutsche Bank, for E390 million, Ladbroke became cash 
rich after deriving a profit of E27.3 million (Robinson, 1999a; Wheatcroft, 2001). 
The Stakis deal resulted in Ladbroke becoming the second largest hotelier after 
Granada, the second largest casino operator after Rank Organisation and the 
largest health club company in the UK (Financial Times, 1999a; Robinson, 1999e). 
The addition of Stakis's four London hotels and 51 provincial hotels to Ladbroke's 
several top London hotels and 22 mid-market hotels outside London (Guerrera 
and Cope, 1999; Robinson, 1999a) would increase Ladbroke's market share in 
both areas. Ladbroke planned to re-brand Stakis' 54 hotels as Hilton (Robinson, 
1999c) because Stakis was only well-known in its home base of Scotland, but was 
less well known in England (Robinson, 1999b). Ladbroke also expected to derive 
around two-thirds of its profits from hotels after the deal with the doubling of the 
number of rooms under the Hilton brand (Robinson, 1999c; 1999d). 
The deal was estimated t'o save Ladbroke El 6 million in -costs by combining its 
administration and marketing departments with those of Stakis (Robinson, 1999b; 
1999d). According to analysts, economies of scale could be derived through cost 
cutting and revenues enhancement by integrating Stakis Hotels into Ladbroke's 
marketing and reservation systems (Financial Times, 1999a). The deal had given 
Ladbroke a combined database of three million members from its loyalty 
programme (Robinson, 1999d). Moreover, there was no geographical overlapping 
in its hotels, casino and health clubs businesses (Robinson, 1999c). 
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The acquisition of Stakis also led to Ladbroke restructuring its gaming operations 
as the latter integrated Stakis's 22 regional casinos into its five Ladbroke London 
casinos (Guerrera and Cope, 1999; Robinson, 1999c). In the same way, 
Ladbroke's health club business division expanded with the addition of Stakis's 67 
LivingWell Health and Fitness clubs, which was also a market leader in UK health 
clubs sector (Financial Times, 1999a). Moreover, several of these clubs were 
already operating in 22 Hilton Hotels (Guerrera and Cope, 1999), which was why 
George commented "it is rare to find a business that represents such a perfect 
operational mix and complementary geographic fit, " (Cope, 1999, pp. 13). 
7.2.6. Scandic Hotels 
Ladbroke completed the acquisition of Scandic Hotels AB (Scandic), the 
Scandinavian hotel company, operated by the Swedish hotel operator on June 11, 
2001 for E620.2 million (AR / Ladbroke, 2001). The deal included 154 Scandic 
hotels, of which 133 were in the Nordic region. The Group acquired 95.4% of 
Scandic in total and took control of the latter's hotels, which were located all over 
northern Europe (Financial Times, 2001). 
Scandic was first established as Esso Motor Hotel in 1963 in LaA, central 
Sweden by Esso, the Standard Oil of New Jersey diversified into the motel 
business (Caterer and Hotelkeeper, 1978a; Stewart, 1996). Esso wanted to 
develop its service stations on the new motorways being planned in Sweden at the 
time. In the early 1970s, Esso Motor Hotel expanded overseas to Denmark and 
Norway and became the biggest hotel group in Scandinavia by 1973. In 1983, the 
hotel group was sold to a Swedish consortium with Ratos AB as part owner and 
renamed Scandic Hotels (Scandic Hotels, 2007). Esso Hotels were built next to 
Esso Europe petrol filling stations in Continental Europe in 1963, when Standard 
Oil of New Jersey diversified into the motel business (Caterer and Hotelkeeper, 
1978a; Stewart, 1996). Ratos AB became the sole owner in 1985 and was listed 
on the Stockholm Stock Exchange in 1996. It became the first pure hotel business 
in Sweden to be quoted on the stock market. In the same year, Scandic started to 
expand via M&A activities. For example, the hotel group purchased 14 hotels from 
Swedish Reso in 1996 and bought the third largest hotel group in Finland - Finnish 
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Arctia - in 1998, becoming the first Nordic-wide chain. The hotel group also 
reached a franchising agreement with Bass for the latter to operate their hotels 
under Holiday Inn brand name in Germany (AR / Bass - supplementary, 1996). In 
1999, Scandic entered a co-operation with SAS Eurobonus (Scandinavian Airlines 
frequent flyer programme) and Finnair to expand its scope and also acquired 17 
hotels that year and thus increased its capacity by 10% or 2,055 rooms. In 2000, 
Scandic acquired Swedish Provobis hotels located in 16 cities in Sweden (Scandic 
Hotels, 2007). 
Ladbroke commented that it would achieve cost savings of El 7 million per year by 
2003 from re-branding Scandic hotels into the Hilton brand and the sharing of the 
central reservation system (Daneshkhu, 2001b). This purchase enlarged 
Ladbroke's hotel division to 378 hotels with 91,590 rooms (Walsh, 2001). The 
addition of Scandic hotels - mainly in the Nordic region - would almost double the 
number of Hilton Hotels in continental Europe, where the Group already operated 
65 hotels (Daneshkhu, 2001 b). This purchase was brought to the attention of EC, 
but was cleared because they found no evidence of any possible creation of 
dominant position or cause of threat to competition in the European hotel business 
(Europa, 2001). This clearance also supported comments made by Anthony 
Harris, Managing Director of Hilton International, who claimed that Ladbroke would 
be the only global player on the Scandinavian market after that acquisition 
(Financial Times, 2001). 
7.3. Comparison of motives for M&A deals 
This section compares the motives for M&A deals closed by Ladbroke in the 
period 1979 and 2001. Table 7.2 provides an outline of Ladbroke's motives for 
M&A activity retrieved from various secondary sources. Table 7.3 compares the 
motives cited by analysts during their interviews. Table 7.4 combines the motives 
retrieved from both sources to provide an overview of Ladbroke's motives for M&A 
activity in 1996 - 2004. 
-171- 
Myddleton Hotels 
The dominant motive for buying Myddleton was to expand Ladbroke's hotel 
division, as pointed out by Stein. The purchase increased the total number of 
Ladbroke hotels and motor inns from 18 to 25. Although this was not considered a 
large number as compared to Ladbroke's purchases later, these hotels provided a 
strategic fit, being located in major UK tourist cities. The motive to penetrate into 
major tourist centres and capture the growing market imply a strong value 
maximising intent with this purchase. 
Comfort Hotels 
The strategic fit motive is prominent in terms of product and geographical fit 
between Ladbroke and Comfort. As Respondent 6 pointed out, both hotel groups 
had the 'same style', meaning they were offering the same products in the three- 
star market sector. This deal increased Ladbroke's hotel business capacity in 
terms of an increase in room numbers, and also made Ladbroke the second 
largest hotel group in Britain after THF. The geographical fit increased Ladbroke's 
presence in the UK, particularly in London. For instance, Comfort had nine 
London three-star hotels which covered locations where Ladbroke did not have a 
presence during that period. Moreover, there was a shortage of three-star hotels 
in London at the same time (see 4.2, The 1980s); thus, the M&A activity was a 
suitable and quick method to respond to the market demand. 
Ladbroke's motive to expand internationally was also achieved through this 
purchase as Comfort had sites in important continental European capitals such as 
Copenhagen, Paris and Amsterdam. Following the increase in the number of 
hotel rooms, economies of scale were derived through the integration of the 
operational, sales and marketing departments of the two companies. According to 
Respondent 2, one of the reasons for Ladbroke to complete this deal was - 
because 'Ladbroke had the capital to buy', attributed to its strong financial base 
created from its original core businesses (gaming and real estate). Therefore, 
value maximisation was achieved through economies of scale. There was also an 
expansion in scope in terms of an increase in the number of three-star products 
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spread over a wider geographical area. This ultimately provided the company 
greater reach to existing and new customers. 
Rodeway Inns 
One of the reasons for Rodeway acquisition was Ladbroke's foray into the 
international market in the 1980s: Rodeway provided low cost and low risk benefits 
and 'a practical way of doing some market research in the US', as commented by 
Jarvis. Moreover Rodeway was predominantly a franchising and management 
contracting company and this benefited Ladbroke in terms of franchising and 
management contracting knowledge. The geographical spread in the US also 
enabled Ladbroke to learn the differences in business operations among states in 
the country. This concurs with Respondent 2 who commented that Rodeway was 
a deal 'to test the market in the US' and for Ladbroke to learn about franchising, 
which Ladbroke was not involved in at that period. 
Rodeway operated at the three-star market level and in the tourism sector, and 
thus was a strategic fit for Ladbroke because both companies were targeting the 
same kind of customers. Market leadership was another motive for this acquisition 
as Rodeway was the 15 th largest hotel company in the US and the addition of 
Rodeway hotels gave Ladbroke a total of 60 hotels, which placed it among the top 
20 hotel companies in the world quickly. This was supported by the Group's 
comment during its sale of Rodeway Inns in 1987, that this purchase was a quick 
way to achieve market leadership. However, they had to sell the group because 
Rodeway did not achieve the objective of becoming a market leader in the US. 
This comment implicitly supported the motive of speed to enter a new market, so 
as to increase its overall market share and attain market leadership. On. the other 
hand, it can be argued that these deals are not considered total failures, in the 
context of the timing of their purchases. For instance, Rodeway Inns was 
considered a cheaper way to enter the US market in 1985. The process of 
acquiring Rodeway also served as a learning platform in franchising for Ladbroke, 
enabling it to learn the requirements of American visitors travelling within and 
outside the country, as well as the business operations in the US. Therefore, 
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value maximising motive was considered as more dominant than non-value 
maximising in this case. 
Hilton International 
The predominant motive was strategic fit in terms of location and a brand name for 
Ladbroke to expand its hotel business. HI was one of the earliest hotel companies 
to establish itself in the international market and thus had a strong global 
presence. This complemented the geographical presence of Ladbroke's hotels, 
which was predominantly in the UK. The motive to acquire a good brand name is 
particularly highlighted by Jarvis who posited that a hotel business needs a 
recognised brand name, and also advocating this was Parkinson who commented 
that the Hilton brand was a top trading name. This deal also included several 
Vista International Hotels within the continental US; therefore, it provided Ladbroke 
with a renewed foothold in the US, taking into consideration that the Group had 
already sold Rodeway Inns. 
There was also the strategic fit in terms of its target market, as Ladbroke was 
targeting US travellers and this deal expanded its share of this market since Hilton 
International's predominant users were Americans. Moreover, the increase in size 
enabled Ladbroke to gain economies of scale and scope through operational 
synergies derived by combining the marketing skills of both companies and 
utilisirig Hl's sophisticated central reservation system to boost bookings and sales 
in Europe and the US. The benefits in this deal also included speed in reducing 
the difference in number of rooms operated, by Ladbroke and THF, the UK's 
largest hotel company then. 
Analysts had similar opinions of the deal: Respondent 4 commented that this deal 
was to build up a 'global empire' which concurs with three other analysts who 
suggested that globalisation was one of the causes of the need for Ladbroke to 
engage in international hotels. Other comments include the fact that Ladbroke 
had the 'cash availability' access (mentioned by Respondent 5) and that this could 
be linked to a good business mix in the company structure, with the core gaming 
division generating cash to supplement the growth of other business divisions. 
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Therefore, value maximisation was achieved predominantly through a strategic fit 
in the company's business. The acquisition fit the company's corporate intent to 
internationalise its. hotel division and provide complementary products to its 
widening customer base. The expansion enabled Ladbroke to re-brand its 
products and increase its size and geographical presence quickly. 
Stakis Hotels 
The main motive for the acquisition of Stakis hotel was the achievement of 
strategic fit, in terms of geographical fit. It is apparent that there was no overlap in 
the locations of Stakis hotels with Ladbroke's then portfolio. The addition of 
Stakis's four hotels in London and 51 provincial hotels increased Ladbroke's 
market share both in London and outside it. There was also a physical fit in their 
product specifications as it was possible to convert Stakis hotels into the Hilton 
brand. In this sense, it also reflected complementary quality between the two hotel 
companies. Moreover, this sped up Ladbroke's expansion plan, as commented by 
Respondent 3, in that Ladbroke gained a quick entrance in major UK cities such 
as Birmingham, Newcastle, Glasgow and so forth, because 'organic growth will 
take forever and be more expensive than acquisition'. This deal also enabled, 
Ladbroke to derive economies of scale as its number of rooms increased, in turn 
leading to per unit cost reduction and value enhancement with an expanded pool 
of customers when the two loyalty programmes were combined. 
There was also the complementary fit in terms of related businesses as this deal 
included casinos and health clubs, which complemented Ladbroke's existing 
casinos via geographic fit. Moreover, some of Stakis' health clubs were already 
operating in Ladbroke's hotels. According to Respondent 3, part of the reason for 
acquiring Stakis was its casinos, which fit in with Ladbroke's gaming division. In 
addition, there was the anticipation of less stringent regulation for casino operation 
in the UK during that period. Respondent 6 also supports the fact that there were 
a number of product fits, in terms of hotels, casinos and health clubs. However, 
he also thought that there were quite a lot of personal contacts involved in that 
deal, as he did not find any contest by other companies. Respondent 6's 
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comments further supported Respondent 2's recollection of his direct involvement 
with this deal. 
According to Respondent 2, Ladbroke changed Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
twice between 1994 and 1999, and he ascribed Ladbroke's poor financial 
performance to their choice of CEOs because the latter had no hotel operating 
background. On the other hand, Michels had been highly regarded by the hotel 
industry, particularly for his achievement in managing and turning Stakis around, 
and so became a major motive for this purchase. Although Respondent 6 does 
not think the purchase of a staff or a management team is the major reason, the 
fact that Michels became the Managing Director for Ladbroke's hotel division and 
CEO in 2004 seems to confirm the managerial synergy motive. This value 
maximising motive is prominent in terms of the acquisition of knowledge and 
management skills and other business assets in this deal. 
This deal could also be considered non-value maximising, if one considers the fact 
that Ladbroke had failed in closing a couple of deals (InterContinental Hotels 
group and Coral bookmaker), leading to the fall of Ladbroke's share price. This 
increased the pressure on the Ladbroke management to turn around the situation 
by M&A activities. Moreover, George from Ladbroke had also admitted to the 
failure to merge with HHC in 1998, as one reason that prompted the Stakis 
purchase. Thus, the closure of the Stakis deal became vital for the management. 
On the one hand, it can be said that management reputation was at stake; thus 
there was an aspect of personal motivation among management to'excel and M&A 
activity was a platform to achieve this. On the other hand, taking into 
consideration several strategic fit existing between Ladbroke and Stakis, the value 
maximising motive is more prominent. 
Scandic Hotels 
The dominant motive for the Scandic purchase lies in geographical fit because 
Ladbroke's and Scandic's hotels were located in different parts of the world. As 
commented by Respondent 1, Respondent 4 and Respondent 6, there was a need 
to be in Scandinavia where there were not many international hotel companies, 
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and this purchase put Hilton there ahead of other international companies. 
Moreover, this purchase doubled Ladbroke's hotel number in continental Europe 
instantly, supporting the speed motive for this acquisition. Respondent 3 also 
supports the idea that increasing Ladbroke's number of hotels was a reason for 
purchasing Scandic, which enabled it to achieve economies of scale. Respondent 
5 considered the Scandic purchase as a recognition of a gap in product offered to 
customers; thus one of the reasons for purchasing Scandic was to supplement 
Hilton's five-star product with the three-star market sector operated by Scandic. 
On the other hand, Respondent 2 regarded the purchase of Scandic as an 
opportunistic one because the latter happened to be on the market for sale. 
Respondent 2 was part of a team representing Scandic for this sale. According to 
him, Scandic realised that its hotel growth in the Nordic region was slowing off in 
2001, and anticipated that its share price would fall. Thus, Respondent 2's team, 
as the representative of Scandic, approached a couple of companies and 
Ladbroke was the quickest to respond, and the deal was closed within 10 days. 
Despite the reason of seizing opportunities as given by Respondent 2, this is still 
considered a value maximising deal. The addition of Scandic Hotels had 
expanded Ladbroke's hotel division, and increased its presence in a region which 
has not been penetrated by other international hotel companies. 
In summary, the consolidation of motives for M&A in Ladbroke's case shows a 
mixture of motives for M&A in each deal, rather than one single reason, which 
concurs with the general M&A literature. The dominant motive was to increase 
size and this was achieved through all the acquisitions (Myddleton, Comfort, 
Rodeway, Hilton, Stakis and Scandic). Ladbroke's plan to internationalise its hotel 
division had been taking place since the early 1980s when it bought Comfort, 
which included hotels in European major cities, and Rodeway Inns in the US. The 
major break into the international market was the purchase of Hilton International. 
Other reasons, such as strategic fit in terms of extending into geographic locations 
where Ladbroke's hotels were absent, are evidenced in deals such as Comfort, 
Rodeway, Hilton and Scandic. Product fit is evidenced particularly in the Stakis 
purchase, as the similar product allowed Ladbroke to re-brand these hotels into 
the Hilton brand, which increased Ladbroke's market share in the four-star markeý 
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sector instantly. Thus, the speed motive is supported in addition to product fit that 
allows re-branding to attain critical mass. 
This increase in size (number of rooms) in its hotel division enabled Ladbroke to 
achieve greater market power in terms of bulk procurement. Moreover, advanced 
information technology used for management of a bigger pool of rooms for 
bookings also gave Ladbroke economies of scale via reduction in per-unit cost. In 
the same way, integration of members registered under two loyalty programmes 
enabled Ladbroke to derive economies of scope by providing a range of products 
for its existing and newly registered customers in the database. Other value 
maximising motives include knowledge acquisition, as evidenced by Rodeway 
Inns and Hilton International, which gave Ladbroke new means of expansion 
through franchising and management contracting. Although there was some trace 
of managerial motive in the case of Stakis, as Ladbroke management was 
pressured to engage in M&A activities in order to prove their managerial 
capabilities to the City, the value-maximising motive was more prominent in all 
these deals. 
The deals discussed support the efficiency argument in the M&A literature for cost 
reduction and value enhancement in the light of complementary or supplementary 
resources. The motive for the Stakis deal was linked to strategic fit as it 
' 
added 
value to Ladbroke not only in its hotel sector, but also in other related business 
operations such as casino and health club centres. Motives concurring with the 
M&A literature also include operational relatedness. as evident in health club 
centres which were already operated in some of Ladbroke's hotels. This 
complemented its hotel division in terms of value added facilities for the hotel 
customers. Simultaneously, the casinos supplemented Ladbroke's existing casino 
business with extended locations, particularly in London. 
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Table 7.2: Ladbroke's motives for M&A activity, 1979 - 2001 
Myd- 
dleton 
Com- 
fort 
Rode 
-way 
Hilton Stakis Scandic 
1979 1984 1985 1987 1999 2001 
Economies of scale and scope 
Economies of scale and scope: Cut 
cost 
Economies of scale: Re-brand 
product 
ve 
Economies of scope: Loyalty 
programmes 
Market power 
To increase market share: in other 
businesses 
Increase size/ market share: No. of 
hotels and rooms, critical mass 
Increase size/ market share: Became 
market leader 
Market power: brand rights 
Speed 
Speed: Buy market leader ve 
Speed: Increase size 
Strategic fit 
Strategic fit: Complementary product 
Strategic fit: Geographical fit 
Product portfolio: own, franchise, 
manage, etc. 
Vol 
New market, new customers 
Value enhancement: occupancy and 
yield rate 
Value enhancement: through 
location 
V, 
To acquire new portfolio/ products 
To acquire with minimum assets I 
Market penetration: same product/ 
customers 
V/ 
Increase presence in the UK ve ve 
Managerial motive 
Managerial synergies: synergies 
Managerial motives: Personal V, 
Foreign competition 
Internationalisation: new locations 
International isation: product 
Others 
Difficult to win hotel management 
contract 
Risk advers : franchisor 
Brand name, prestigious 
bource: Ladbroke annual reports 1979 - 2004, various newspapers and trade journals. 
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Table 7.3: Comparing analysts' comments on Ladbroke's motives for M&A activity, 
1979- 2001 (R = Respondent) 
RI R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 
Ladbroke - Myddleton (1979) and Comfort 
(1984) 
To 'entice' presence in the UK, to increase 
presence in the UK 
0 
Ladbroke had the capital then to buy 0 
Ladbroke - Comfort (1985) 
To increase presence in the UK 0 
Strategic fit: in terms of geography and style 
Rodeway Inn (USA) (1985) 
To test market in the US 0 
To understand/ learn about franchising 0 
Ladbroke - Hilton International (1987) 
Global empire building and corporate 
strategy 
0 
Globalization issue 0 0 
Cash availability/ access (gaming and hotel) 
Ladbroke - Stakis (1999) 
To acquire David Michels 0 
To acquire Stakis' management 0 
Coverage: Locations 0 
Complementary product; portfolio Fit: Casino 
and health club 
0 
Strategic move because understand gaming 0 0 
Strategic move, good fit, giving geographical 
spread and location and critical mass 
0 
Quick entrance in major cities 0 
Organic growth is slow and expensive 
Speed 
0 
Ladbroke - Scandic (2001) 
Opportunity: Scandic was up for sale and 
Hilton need to expand into north Europe 'or 
the Scandinavia region 
0 0 0 
Need 'to be in the Scandinavia' 0 0 0 
To gain volume and dominance 0 
Cover mid-market, new market and increase 
customer base/ portfolio 
0 
Source: Semi-structured interviews 
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Table 7.4: Comparing Ladbroke's motives for M&A activity, 1979 - 2001 
Myd- 
dleton 
Com- 
fort 
Rode 
-way 
Hilton Stakis Scandic 
1979 1984 1985 1987 1999 2001 
Economies of scale and scope 
Economies of scale and scope: Cut 
cost 
Economies of scale: Re-brand 
product 
Economies of scope: Loyalty 
programmes 
V, 
Market power 
To increase market share: in other 
businesses 
Increase size/ market share: No. of 
hotels and rooms, critical mass 
Increase size/ market share: Became 
market leader 
Market power: brand rights 
To gain volume and dominance 
Speed 
Buy market I ader 
Increase size quickly 
Organic growth is slow and 
expensive 
Strategic fit 
Strategic fit: Complementary product 
Geographical fit and value 
enhancement through location 
Product portfolio: own, franchise, 
manage, etc. 
New market, new customers 
Value enhancement: occupancy and 
yield rate 
To acquire new portfolio/ products 
To acquire with minimum assets 
Market penetration: same product/ 
customers 
Increase presence in the UK 
To increase presence in the UK 
Coverage for Hilton 
Complementary product Casino, 
good fit and casino's location were 
good fit 
Strategic fit, giving geographical 
spread and critical mass 
Portfolio fit. Cover mid-market, new 
market and increase customer basel 
_portfolio 
Managerial motive 
Managerial synergies: synergies 
Managerial motives: Personal 
I To acquire David Michels 
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Myd- 
dieton 
Com- 
fort 
Rode 
-way 
Hilton Stakis Scandic 
1979 1984' 1985 1987 1999 2001 
To acquire Stakis'management 
Growth 
Need 'to be in the Scandinavia' 
Health club business was growing 
and LivinglNell was doing well 
Foreign competition 
Internationalisation: new locations 
Internationalisation: product 
Global empire building and corporate 
strategy 
Globalisation issue 
Others 
Difficult to win hotel management 
contract 
Risk adverse: franchisor 
Brand name, prestigious 
Ladbroke had the capital then to buy 
To test market in the US 
To understand/ learn about 
franchising 
Cash available from other business 
sector., gaming 
Opportunity: Scandic was up for sale 
and Hilton need to expand 
Source: Ladbroke annual reports 1979 - 2004, various newspapers, trade journals and Interviews 
* Words in italics are motives mentioned by analysts during interviews 
7.4. General development of Ladbroke_ 
The development of Ladbroke's hotel division is studied through the examination 
of various M&A activities and the macro environment between 1979 and 2001. 
Ladbroke increased its size from owning three hotels in 1973 to operating 403 
hotels across the world in 2004. This rapid and extensive growth is attributed to 
the use of the M&A mechanism, together with several strategic changes within the 
company, facilitating its emergence as one of the market leaders in the hotel 
industry 
Ladbroke began its hotel business with the opening of three moderately priced 
hotels in 1973. The earlier growth was achieved through the acquisition of a 
leisure company which included 14 motor inns, and other subsequent single-asset 
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acquisitions. In 1980, the purchase of Myddleton further increased its number of 
hotels and locations in major UK city centres. Ladbroke's growth in the hotel 
industry was also attributed to related diversifications undertaken during the same 
period. In 1982, the Group acquired the BPF Travel Inc., a US-based travel 
company that arranged hotel reservations for large corporate clients. This 
acquisition established Ladbroke's presence in the US and generated additional 
business for Ladbroke's UK hotels (AR / Ladbroke, 1982). In 1985, Ladbroke took 
over Arthur Bell and Sons, a Scotch whisky company, in view of its related 
business with its hotel sector (Wood, 1985). According to Jarvis, Ladbroke was 
the second largest hotel operator in the UK and was interested in other companies 
that had important hotel businesses because of trading opportunities (Wood, 
1985). Moreover, the Arthur Bell and Sons deal also included four hotels, which 
the company had acquired from the Gleneagles Hotel group in 1984. In 1985, 
Ladbroke also aimed to expand its hotel division internationally through the 
acquisitions of Rodeway Inns and Comfort deals. The former provided Ladbroke 
with its first international expansion, and knowledge in franchising and hotel 
operation experience in the US; and the latter established Ladbroke hotels in 
major European cities. 
Ladbroke was operating as a conglomerate in'the early 1980s (see Appendix M). 
This was partly due to Ladbroke's management emphasis on 'growth with security' 
by balancing their fast cash flow businesses (such as gaming) with those that were 
asset-based (property and hotels) (AR / Ladbroke, 1982, pp. 2). Cash was 
generated by unrelated businesses such as gaming, which was core to Ladbroke, 
and Central Independent television, the largest UK commercial network station, a 
Satellite Television company which provided the Group with licence fees (AR / 
Ladbroke, 1981). In 1985, Ladbroke acquired Home Charm Group pIc, a DIY 
retailer, to meet one of Ladbroke's key corporate strategic objectives of 
establishing a fourth core business. The Group saw DIY retail as an area in which 
it could take advantage of the growing level of consumer expenditure on leisure 
time activities (AR / Ladbroke, 1985). In 1986, Ladbroke's strategic moves 
changed to focus on four core businesses, which were gaming, hotels, property 
and DIY retailing. It started to exit from its non-core interests, for example, the 
sale of Laksys, an audio and video chain, to Granada for E30 million, and the 
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bingo clubs and amusement centres to Rank Organisation for E67.5 million in the 
same year (AR / Ladbroke, 1986; Batchelor, 1986; Churchill, 1986). 
In 1987, Rodeway Inns was sold as this purchase did not realise Ladbroke's aim 
to gain market leadership in the US within a set time line (Harris, 1987c; Hotel & 
Motel Management, 1987). In the same year, ' Ladbroke acquired Hilton 
International, which was considered its big break into the international hotel 
industry, as well as gaining an internationally well-known brand name. This 
purchase also provided Ladbroke with new knowledge in hotel operation through 
the management contracting method. In the following few years, Ladbroke re- 
structured its hotel division into an individual profit generating division by 
capitalising on its brand name 'Hilton'. It used manageme nt contracting to expand 
its hotel division and minimised purchasing hotel assets as it used to do (AR / 
Ladbroke, 1987; 1991). In retrospect, it is obvious that branding has been playing 
a major role in Ladbroke's rapid growth in its hotel division. For instance, 
Ladbroke changed the names of Mercury Hotels and Comfort Hotels into Ladbroke 
in 1979 and 1985 respectively. In 1987, Ladbroke created the name 'Hilton 
National' and changed its UK Ladbroke hotels into Hilton National. The plan to 
develop a group of budget hotels was then considered unimportant and was put 
aside (Sherrell, 1987d) as Ladbroke concentrated on expanding Hilton hotels, 
which are positioned in the four- and five-star markets (AR / Ladbroke, 1987; 
1991). 
The first Gulf War which started in 1991, the three years of economic recession in 
the UK (1989 - 1992) and abroad, as well as the property market crash, markedly 
reduced the group's profits because international travel decreased substantially. 
In 1994, Ladbroke changed its strategy to concentrate on developing its hotel and 
gaming businesses to enhance shareholder value, leading to decisions to reduce 
debt and interest costs by selling its commercial property portfolio, and not to 
make new investments in commercial properties (AR / Ladbroke, 1993). The sale 
of its property division clearly shows how the strategy of Ladbroke had changed 
from the belief in the 1980s that 'high quality property development provides the 
finest assets backing and is a reliable hedge against inflation' (AR / Ladbroke, 
1980, pp. 2) to the belief in holding minimum assets to protect its bottom line 
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against unpredictable negative economic change. Ladbroke's hotel industry 
growth in 1996 came through a strategic alliance with HHC. Ladbroke and HHC 
signed a formal agreement to reunite the Hilton hotel brand by marketing the 
brand together on a worldwide basis (AR/ Ladbroke, 1996). Both HHC and HI 
increased their presence in an instant with the unifying of brands and the 
consolidation of loyal customers in the database. The number of hotels for HI 
increased from 160 to 400 instantly. This move reinforced the strength of branding 
in the hotel industry. 
In 1999, Ladbroke acquired the Stakis hotel group in recognition of the strategic fit 
in terms of products and geographical location. These strategic fits enabled 
Ladbroke to convert Stakis hotels into the Hilton brand, as a quick way to increase 
its number of hotel rooms and locations. Ladbroke changed its corporate name - 
Ladbroke - to the Hilton Group in 1999, upon gaining size through this purchase. 
However, the Scandic hotel group acquired in 2001 did not go though an extensive 
re-branding to the Hilton name. Although Hilton is well-known world wide, the 
name 'Scandic' was more widely recognised in Scandinavia and thus remained 
intact, as pointed out by one of its executives. This further fortified the power of 
brand name in the hotel industry. In 2002, the Hilton brand extended its product 
range into the three-star all-inclusive market sector through an agreement with the 
Dominican Republic hotel group to re-brand the latter's Caribbean hotels 'Coral by 
Hilton' (AR / Ladbroke, 2002). 
Ladbroke's hotel business was adversely affected by the aftermath of the 9/11 
terrorist attack in 2001, in conjunction with other world events and economic slow 
down worldwide (Baker, 2001). These events led to fewer business travellers and 
lower demand for hotel rooms. Since Ladbroke's hotel business was 
concentrating on the four- and five-star markets, this was compounded by 
business travellers downgrading their accommodation because many companies 
were cutting costs. This in turn affected the Group's overall financial performance 
and main revenue generating business shifted from the hotel division to gaming 
business. 
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The changes in sales and profit percentages generated between hotel and gaming 
divisions in the Group's total sale and profit were particularly obvious from 2002 
(see Appendix M). In 2002, the gaming division was increasingly generating 
between 60% and more than 100% profits whilst the hotel division contributed a 
decreasing percentage from 85% to 44%. The better financial performance was 
partly due to the abolition of the 9% consumer tax on betting which was replaced 
by a 15% Gross Profit Tax on gaming operators' gross profits. The other reason 
was the emergence of online betting stimulated by the availability of cheap, fast 
Internet access (Mintel, 2005a; 2006). Gradual relaxation of gaming rules from 
1996 (see 2.2.6), also contributed to better financial performance in Ladbroke's 
gaming division. The potential growth in the gaming industry in anticipation of 
continuous regulation changes, and Ladbroke's experience with the hotel business 
itself could have accelerated the drastic change of strategy, with Ladbroke 
returning to its original gaming business in 2006. 
After 2004 
In 2005, Ladbroke sold Hilton hotel group to HHC in the US. According to 
Ladbroke, the offer price from HHC was attractive for Ladbroke and the latter 
expected a number of benefits upon disposing of the hotel company (Hilton Group 
pIc, 2005). Moreover, the Group saw the significant growth in UK and international 
betting markets as an opportunity to take advantage of, given the strength of the 
Ladbroke (gaming) brand and its experienced management team in gaming. In 
addition, Ladbroke expected, as a stand-alone betting and gaming business, to 
benefit from: (a) being valued independently on the stock market as a pure betting 
and gaming business; (b) the ability to develop a capital structure and dividend 
policy appropriate to a pure betting and gaming business; and (c) being able to 
retain, motivate and recruit key personnel more effectively (Hilton Group pIc, 
2005). Ladbroke officially changed its 'Hilton Group pIc' name back to 'Ladbroke' 
on February 23,2006 (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2006). The change 
marked the end of Ladbroke's 33 years of hotel ventures. 
The above discussion of M&A activities in the case of Ladbroke's hotel division 
revealed a mixture of motives for each deal and supported the general M&A 
literature, in terms of value and non-value maximising motives. The changes in 
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strategy also shed light on the UK economy and provided a better understanding 
of 'why' and 'how' a hotel company expanded. The next chapter will examine the 
development of Bass Group pic. 
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Chapter 8:. 
Bass Group pic (Bass) 
This chapter explores the development of the InterContinental Hotels Group 
through the development of Bass Group plc (Bass). The term 'Bass' is used 
throughout the discussion, including the period after its name had been changed 
to Six Continents in 2001 and InterContinental Hotels Group in 2003. 
Table 8.1: Major merger and acquisition activities, 1979 - 2003 
Bass/ lHG 
1979 ClingendaelGroup 
1980 Centre Hotels 
1987 Holiday Inn 
1988 Holiday Inn 
1989 Holiday Inn 
1998 InterContinental Hotels 
2000 Southern Pacific Hotels 
Corporation SPHC 
(Australia) 
Bristol Hotels & Resorts 
2001 Post House - 
2003 Candlewood Suites (USA) 
Source: Bass annual reports, various newspapers and trade journals 
The first section describes the beginning of Bass's businesses in brief. The 
second section examines several major M&A activities that Bass undertook 
between the period 1979 and 2003 (see Table 8.1). The third section compares 
and contrasts the motives for each deal by using both the secondary and interview 
data. The final part discusses the general development of Bass's hotel division in 
the context of corporate strategy changes and the macro environment. 
8.1. The beginning of Bass Group plc 
William Bass established the Bass brewery business in 1777 and it was the first 
registered trademark in the UK (InterContinental Hotels Group, 2004). It 
expanded its brewery-related business in the second half of the 20th century via 
several mergers. Bass acquired Tennents Caledonian in Scotland, Mitchells & 
Butlers in the Midlands, and merged with Charringtons in London in 1967 
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(InterContinental Hotels Group, 2004). In 1979, the company name was changed 
from Bass Charrington Limited to Bass Limited. The following year, as a result of 
the passing of the new Companies Act 1980, Bass re-registered under the Act as 
a public company and changed its name to Bass Public Limited from Bass Limited 
(AR / Bass, 1981). Bass' hotel division was established in 1967 following the 
merger with Charrington in London. It then decided to establish a separate 
management structure for the hotel division and to rename all the hotels Crest 
Hotels which were positioned at the three-star market sector (Stewart, 1996). In 
1973, Bass expanded its Hotel division through the acquisition of 27 Esso Motor 
Hotels in the UK and continental Europe (Goymour, 1986; Owen, 1992). 
Subsequently, Bass's hotel expanded through several more M&A activities which 
will be examined in detail in the next subsections. 
8.2. Hotel expansion- major M&A activities 
Bass expanded its hotel business between 1979 and 2003 via several methods. 
The most widely used method of expansion for Bass was the M&A mode. Bass 
bought ten hotels from Clingendael Group in 1979 (8.2.1) to increase its presence 
in the Netherlands, and, in turn, expand its hotel division overseas. Centre Hotels 
(8.2.2) were acquired in 1980, which increased Bass's hotel stock rapidly in the 
UK. The purchase of Holiday Inn hotels (8.2.3) and later the rights to the brand 
name and trademarks provided Bass with a strong presence in London and the 
world. Bass further gained an international presence and a five-star product 
market through the InterContinental Hotels (ICH) deal (8.2.4). The acquisition of 
Southern Pacific Hotels Corporation (SPHC) in 2000 (8.2.5) made Bass the 
biggest hotel operator in Asia Pacific region. Bristol Hotels & Resorts Inc., (Bristol) 
a US based Hotel Management Company, (8.2.6) presented Bass with the 
opportunity to expand rapidly via management contracts and to reduce its hotel 
ownership. The Post House deal in 2001 (8-. 2.7) increased Bass' share in the 
four-star UK market. Candlewood Suites (8.2.8) extended its range of leisure and 
business products on offer worldwide. Each of these major deals will be 
discussed in the following sections. 
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8.2.1. Clingendael Group 
In 1979, Bass expanded its hotel sector through the acquisition of hotels from the 
Clingendael Group in Holland for El 6 million, in recognition of the potential growth 
of the hotel business (The Times, 1979). According to Bass, the Clingendael 
group of hotels in the Netherlands comprised 10 three- and four-star category 
hotels (AR / Bass, 1979). These hotels were located across Holland, in areas of 
potential growth for the hotel business (The Times, 1979). Moreover, the hotels 
consisted of a range of different types, for instance the. modern hotels at 
Rotterdam and Scheven, the city centre hotel at Amsterdam and the prestigious 
and well-known hotel, Hotel des Indes, at the Hague (AR / Bass, 1979). This 
purchase made Bass one of the largest hotel companies in Holland, operating 13 
hotels and having the largest number of hotel rooms in the country (AR / Bass, 
1979; The Times, 1979). During the same period, Bass was operating 54 Crest 
Hotels in the UK, 12 in West Germany, two in Belgium and two in Italy (The Times, 
1979). 
8.2.2. Centre Hotels 
Bass bought Coral Leisure Group Limited (Coral Leisure) in December 1980 for 
F-87 million (AR / Bass, 1980; Goymour, 1984b; Stewart, 1996). The deal included 
Coral Leisure's core businesses - off-course bookmaking (60 licensed betting 
offices), casino operations, holiday camps run under the brand of Pontin's, diverse 
entertainment complexes and a hotel group - Centre Hotels (Caterer and 
Hotelkeeper, 1980c; Stewart, 1996). Bass had been planning to expand its 
existing hotel division and the Centre Hotels was considered a good fit for the 
Group because Crest Hotels had been located in provincial areas and the Centre 
Hotels offered exposure in the London market, major London airports and 
important provincial city centres in England and Wales (AR / Bass, 1981; 1982). 
Moreover, during that period, Centre Hotels was the fourth largest hotel group in 
the country with 22 hotel units and was also the leading three-star hotel operator 
(Hardman, 1979). Other analysts in the City took the view that Bass was 
interested in the Pontin's business, in addition to Centre Hotels, because Pontin's 
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was operating 24 holiday camps and was named 'one of the biggest pubs in the 
world' (Caterer and Hotelkeeper, 1980c, pp. 7). 
The origin of Centre Hotels went back to 1900, when it was created as Cranston 
(London) Hotels, and the company was Scottis h-owned and dominated by teetotal 
investors (Hardman, 1979). In its first 60 years of operation, Centre ran three 
temperance hotels in London - the Waverley, the Ivanhoe, and the Kenilworth - 
and the name Cranston (London) Hotels was changed to Centre Hotels (Cranston) 
in 1965, and later to Centre Hotels by Henry Edwards (Hardman, 1979). The 
economic crisis from 1973 to 1975 had a spill-over effect on the UK hotel industry, 
leading to a property market crash because of massive construction programmes 
and high gearing incurred by companies during the concessions offered by HDIS 
in the late 1960s (Goymour, 1986; Hardman, 1979). Centre was one of those 
hotel companies that were badly affected and was sold to Coral Leisure in 1977 
for E16.7 million (Stewart, 1996). In 1980, Bass in turn bought Coral Leisure 
because the latter was facing a financial crisis due to high interest rates, in 
conjunction with the high unemployment rate in the UK, which reduced the 
spending power of many of its customers. In addition, although Coral bookmaker 
had good performance, the Group's casino division, which had been generating 
high profits, was unsuccessful in its licence renewal for three West End casinos 
. 
(Caterer and Hotelkeeper, 1980a; 1980b). 
After closing the deal, Bass integrated Coral Leisure's businesses, except its 
casinos, into the Bass management structure. Centre Hotels were integrated into 
Crest Hotels after refurbishing and're-naming (Poymour, 1984b). Pontin's holiday 
camps and Coral racing were managed as separate companies and Coral 
bookmaker was absorbed into Bass Leisure (AR / Bass, 1981). According to 
Bass, the casino operations did not form part of Bass' development plans and 
therefore were sold shortly after the acquisition (AR / Bass, 1980). 
8.2.3. Holiday Inns Hotels 
Bass's acquisition of Holiday Inn brands spanned over a number of years in four 
batches: 
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(1) The first acquisition was considerably smaller than their subsequent buys, 
consisting of the purchase of eight Holiday Inn hotels in the UK and Europe. 
(2) The second was the purchase of Holiday Inn Inc., Holiday Corporation's (HC) 
subsidiary and its 153 international hotels, outside North America, Canada and 
Mexico, and 13 hotels inside the US. 
(3) The third consisted of the takeover of 38 Holiday Inn hotels in Canada. 
(4) The final purchase included all the Holiday Inn Hotels in the US and worldwide, 
the brand rights, trademarks, reservation systems and the training university. 
The first Holiday Inn was built in 1952, in Memphis, and the idea of Holiday Inn 
Hotels was conceived by Kemmon Wilson (Wilson), to provide comfortable rooms, 
at an affordable price for families, after his own personal bad experience with 
motels in 1951 (Wilson, 1972). Moreover, he saw the potential in providing this 
kind of facilities, taking the view that the hotel-motel industry was 'the greatest 
untouched industry in the world' (Wilson, 1972, pp. 13). In 1954, Wilson teamed 
up Wallace E. Johnson, a well-known home-builder to start Holiday Inns of 
America, Inc. (Wilson, 1972). This was followed by the development of a group of 
Holiday Inn Hotels, through franchising within the US. Other subsidiaries were set 
up to support the hotel-motel business, namely: Inn Keepers Supply Company 
(1957) to supply equipments, etc.; Holiday Press (1958) to support printing and 
office supplies and Holiday Irinkeeping School (1959)(known as Holiday Inn 
University currently) to provide training. In 1963, Holiday Inns of America, Inc. 
closed a deal with Gulf Oil Corporation to promote a strategic alliance between the 
two companies through the former's Holiday Inn System (a system which was 
similar to the loyalty programmes of the present day). The company was listed on 
New York Stock Exchange in 1963, and three other US stock exchange centres in 
1965. In 1965, the company also started to develop its computerised reservation 
system - Holidex. Within a period of 16 years, Holiday Inn opened 1000 Holiday 
Inns in the US, expanded into other countries - Canada in 1960 - and extended to 
other continents such as Puerto Rico in South America in 1963 and Holland in 
Europe in 1968 (Wilson, 1972). 
-192- 
In 1969, the corporate name was changed from Holiday Inns of America, Inc. to 
Holiday Inns, Inc. because of its international 'exposure, and the previous slogan 
'The Nation's Innkeeper' was replaced by'The World's Innkeeper' (Wilson, 1972). 
In May 1985, the corporate name was changed again from Holiday Inns, Inc. to 
Holiday Corporation (HC). According to the then chairman and chief executive, 
Michael D. Rose, 'Holiday Inns' is only one of their brands, and the new name 
would reflect better the hospitality nature of the business' (Wall Street Journal, 
1985a; 1985b, pp-1). 
In the mid-1980s, HC decided to reduce debt by selling some of the Holiday Inns 
(Morris, 1986; William and Cohen, 1986). . The company's poor 
financial 
performance was partly affected by the oversupply of hotel rooms in the US hotel 
industry in the mid-1980s (White, 1989). To complicate the situation, many of its 
older properties had been operating in some less developed countries, which were 
relatively prone to political instability (Cohen, 1986; Pace, 1981). In order to cut 
cost in operations and strengthen its profits, HC began expanding in more 
developed areas and selling properties in less desirable locations in the early 
1980s (Pace, 1981; William and Cohen, 1986). The poor performance was also 
driven by an anti-takeover plan to halt a possible acquisition in the early 1980s 
(Goymour, 1988b; Wall Street -Journal, 1985a). When the Group found that a 
potential predator had built up a stake in HC's shares, threatening the group with a 
take-over, HC purchased thousands of its company shares on borrowed money to 
make its balance sheet look bad (Wall Street Journal, 1985a). In addition, this 
anti-takeover plan included a $65 per share dividend to be distributed to 
shareholders by any successful buyer (Bean, 1986; William and Cohen, 1986). 
Although, HC managed to prevent a take-over, it raised its debt level 
simultaneously, and this led to the need to reduce it, by putting up its hotels for 
sale (Feltham, 1987b; Goymour, 1988b). 
(1) The acquisition of eight Holiday Inns 
In June 1987, Bass completed its acquisition of four Holiday Inn Hotels in England 
from HC for the price of E58 million ($97 million (Quest, 1987; Wall Street Journal, 
1987a). In the same year, Bass acquired four hotels in Europe from HC for 
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E34.204 million ($55 million). They were located in Paris, Belgium, Brussels 
Airport and Eindhoven, (Caterer and Hotelkeeper, 1987f; Feltham, 1987b; Wall 
Street Journal, 1987a). Bass continued to operate all the eight hotels under a 
franchising arrangement with HC, as Holiday Inns brand (The Times, 1987; Wall 
Street Journal, 1987a). 
According to Bryan Langton (Langton), chairman of Crest Hotels, the hotel division 
of Bass, the Holiday Inn purchase took place mainly out of the need to grow 
international in order to increase turnover in its hotel division (Goymour, 1988b). 
According to him, he was under pressure by the target set by Bass's chairman Sir 
Derek Palmer for each business division to achieve a turnover of 25%, and his 
division - hotel, holidays and other leisure business - was accounting for less than 
20%. Thus, in view of Crest being a brand that was confined to the European 
market, rather than an international market, he decided to go international in the 
hotel division in order to grow. The opportunity came when HC got into financial 
crisis and started to sell their hotel assets. Thus, Bass had taken its first step 
towards acquiring an international brand name. These deals also brought Crest 
hotels into the Holiday Inns international reservations system (Caterer and 
Hotelkeeper, 1987c). At the closing of the eight deals, Langton asked for further 
deals and this led to the purchase of the Holiday Inns International outside the US 
(Goymour, 1988b). 
(2) The purchase of Holiday Inn Inc. 
In September 1987, Bass and HC closed the deal on the sale of Tennessee-based 
Holiday Inn International (HII) for about $475 million, including 175 international 
hotels, 43 of which were under development, 13 US hotels and the trademarks 
and businesses of HC outside the USA, Canada and Mexico (AR / Bass, 1988; 
Feltham, 1987b; Wall Street Journal, 1988). The US hotels were located in three 
southern states: seven hotels in Florida, two in South Carolina and four in 
Tennessee, and cost Bass $175 million (Goymour, 1988b; The Washington Post, 
1987b). Langton considered the 13 hotels in the US as amounting to a small 
presence in the US, but a major step towards internationalisation, as having a 
presence in the US was considered to be an achievement of real international 
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status (Goymour, 1988b). In addition, Langton commented that 'the big change 
for Bass now is a move away from purely a Crest operation, in which we controlled 
nearly all the assets, into joint-venture, management contracts and partially owned 
investments' (Goymour, 1988b, pp. 36). Langton also found a cultural fit between 
the two companies, commenting that, 'The way Bass and Holiday Inn run each, 
company is similar. The greatest thing is the commitment, synergy and philosophy 
of the two companies' (Quest, 1987, pp. 18). HC and Bass also completed the 
formation of a joint venture to develop the Holiday Inn brand in their respective 
markets (AR / Bass, 1988; Wall Street Joumal, 1988). 
Bass gained three major benefits from this deal. First, an opportunity was created 
for future growth in the international hotel business with the world's leading hotel 
brand name (AR / Bass, 1987). Second, Bass gained control of the largest three- 
star hotel brand outside of the US, Mexico and Canada (Feltham, 1987b; Hannan, 
1987). Third, HC's reservation systems had been updated to Holidex 2000, 
allowing the creation of a database of each guest's information, which provided 
Bass with important marketing and reservation back-up (Feltham, 1987b; Hannan, 
1987). 
(3) Acquiring Holiday Inn hotels in Canada 
In 1989, Bass acquired Commonwealth Hospitality Limited (CHIC) - from Scott's 
Hospitality, a Canadian-owned company, based in Toronto, for El billion (Fox and 
Jay, 1995; Wall Street Journal, 1989b). CHIC was the largest franchisee of HC in 
Canada and was Canada's largest hotel management company (Wall Street 
Journal, 1989b). According to the deputy chairman and chief executive officer of 
Scotts, Benson Orenstein, one-third of the hotels were owned by CHIC and the 
rest were leased (Wall Street Journal, 1989b). The acquisition provided Bass with 
38 hotels and over 8,700 rooms, primarily operating as Holiday Inns (AR / Bass, 
1989; Harris, 1981). Amongst the 38 hotels, 32 were operated under franchise 
from HC, two operated as Briarwood Hotels Inc. and four operated under license 
from the Radisson Corporation. The deal gave Bass the rights to operate Holiday 
Inn Hotels in Canada and Mexico, both of which were growth areas during that 
period (Graham, 1989). Bass also increased its own franchising licences and as a 
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result operated 291 hotels in 54 countries with more than 53,800 bedrooms (AR / 
Bass, 1989). 
By the late 1980s, Holiday Inns accounted for 10% of all hotel rooms in the US 
and more than 25% in the three-star market sector (McCarthy, 1989). During that 
period, the three-star market sector in the US had a more difficult time due to an 
oversupply of rooms (White, 1989). Although Holiday Inn had encountered a four 
point drop in its occupancy rate, the rate of 67% (in 1989) was still four points 
higher than the average for all hotels in the three-star market sector (White, 1989). 
According to James Murren (an analyst at the New York investment company of 
C. J. Lawrence, Morgan Grenfell), this favourable occupancy rate of Holiday Inns 
attracted Bass to bid for Holiday Inns (White, 1989). 
(4) Acquiring Holiday Inn Hotels in the US 
Bass completed its purchase of the remainder of the Holiday Inn hotels in North 
America in February 1990 (Harris, 1989; The Times, 1990a). Bass paid HC E1.25 
billion ($1.98 billion) for the final acquisition, which consisted of 1,389 hotels plus 
HC's computer reservation system, the biggest hotel system in the world with 
nearly 1,600 different hotels and 310,000 rooms in 53 countries (Bennett, 1989; 
Graham, 1989). Bass also benefited from the access to the Holiday University, 
founded in 1959 and was situated near the Holiday Inn's headquarters in 
Memphis, Tennessee (Bennett, 1989; Hannan, 1987; Wilson, 1972). As part of 
the deal, HC would retain its hotel groups (Embassy Suites, Hampton Inns and 
Homewood Suites), a US casino operation, and reorganise under a different name 
- Promus - as well as receiving a 2% stake in Bass (Graham, 1989). 
Some analysts doubted Bass's strategy of buying hotels in the US since the US 
market was suffering from over capacity and an economic slow down in the late 
1980s (Carey, 1990). However, Bass executives saw this purchase as beneficial 
because of the decreasing property price, which made hotel development easier, 
and also as a reduction in risk in hard times because the Holiday Inn group was 
primarily a franchisor (Carey, 1990). This final acquisition made Bass the owner of 
the Holiday Inn brand throughout the world as well as a major player in the 
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international hotel market (AR / Bass, 1990). In total, Bass paid out E1,689 million 
for the acquisitions of Holiday Inn Hotels over a few years (AR / Bass, 1990; The 
Times, 1990a). 
8.2.4. InterContinental Hotels 
Bass's next big deal was the acquisition of the InterContinental Hotel group (ICH) 
from Seibu Saison in March 1998 (Daneshkhu, 1999a). Bass acquired ICH for 
E1.78 billion (US$2.9 billion). The deal included 187 hotels with 65,000 rooms in 
69 countries (Goymour, 1984a). 22 of these hotels were owned or held on long 
lease, which provided the major part of ICH's profit (AR / Bass, 1998). Out of the 
187 hotels, 117 (44,000 rooms) were under the ICH brand and 20 (8,000 rooms) 
were under the three-star Forum brand (Willman, 1998b). Forum hotels were 
based in London, targeting business travellers on a tighter budget (Goymour, 
1984a). There were another 50 hotels, which were operating together with the 
ICH and Forum hotels under a joint venture marketing agreement with Global 
Partners (AR / Bass, 1998). Bass also agreed to issue a license to Seibu Sais, on 
Group to have the exclusive right to operate the ICH and Forum brands in Japan 
where Bass had no operating arm (McDowell, 1998; Willman, 1998b). 
The origin of ICH goes back to 1945, when United States president Franklin 
Roosevelt and the US State Department wanted to help countries in Latin America 
to strengthen their economies. It was found that the lack of adequate hotels was 
discouraging busi ness and tourist travel in that region. Juan Trippe (Trippe), the 
President of Pan America World Airways (Pan-Am) was then asked to survey the 
situation (Caterer and Hotelkeeper, 19811). With the help of some hoteliers, the 
survey confirmed that there was a shortage of hotels, but Trippe could not find any 
US company to participate in establishing hotels in Latin America. Finally, Trippe 
decided, -in 1946, to form a wholly-owned subsidiary, InterContinental Hotels 
Corporation, to handle the problem (Caterer and Hotelkeeper, 19811). The number 
of ICH grew to 14 by 1956, and in 1961, the company established its first hotel 
outside the Latin America continent, in Beirut, in the Middle East (Pace, 1981). In 
the 1970s, ICH expanded together with Pan Am's airline business and in 1972, 
Forum Hotels were created to provide relatively inexpensive accommodation 
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(Pace, 1981). However, Pan Am faced several challenges from new competition 
brought about by airline deregulation in the late 1970s; oil price crisis; increasing 
labour costs and over extended air routes, leading to a lost of $217.6 million in the. 
first half of 1981. Therefore, Pan Am started to sell assets to reduce its lost, 
including the sale of ICH (New York Times, 1981 a). 
Grand Metropolitan (GM) bought ICH from Pan Am for E246 million ($500 million) 
in August 1981 (Cole, 1988; Goymour, 'l 984a; New York Times, 1981 b). When 
GM bought over ICH, the Group had already expanded and established 97 hotels 
and new hotel projects in 46 countries (Caterer and Hotelkeeper, 19811). In 
December 1988, Seibu Saison Group, a Japanese conglomerate, acquired ICH 
from GM when the latter decided to sell its hotel business in order to focus on its 
drink, food and retailing businesses (Lipman, 1988; Lowenstein and Marcom Jr, 
1988). In 1998, Seibu Saison Group also experienced a financial crisis and ICH 
was put on a six-week auction, whereby Bass competed with rivals such as 
Marriott International, Patriot American Hospitality Inc. and Ladbroke (Willman, 
1998b). Marriott and Bass were the highest bidders, and Bass emphasised that it 
was able to beat the US group - Marriott International - by promising to deliver 
cash quickly to the troubled Japanese, company, which had been selling several 
assets to cover its subsidiaries' bad debts (Willman, 1998b). Some industry 
analysts commented that this deal made sense for Bass because it was already 
dominating the three-star market by operating or franchising 2,400 facilities 
(McDowell, 1998). Moreover, it was noted that the upper end of the hotel market 
had long been the choice of business executives and had been the most 
consistently profitable 'in the 1990s as the economy strengthened (McDowell, 
1998). 
8.2.5. Southern Pacific Hotels Corporation 
In January 2000, Bass's affiliate companies, Bass Overseas Holdings Limited 
bought Southern Pacific Hotels Corporation (SPHC) from Hale International 
Limited (Hale) for A$315 million (El 25 million) (Herald, 2000). This deal included 
24 hotels in Australia (only 6 were owned or leased), 13 in New Zealand, eight in 
the Southern Pacific Islands, three in Papua New Guinea and 11 in the rest of Asia 
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(Kermode, 2000; Herald, 2000; Daneshkhu, 1999d; Oyama, 2000). Hale created 
SPHC in 1958 and the latter became the second largest hotel management 
company in Australia in the early 2000s, owning, leasing, managing and 
franchising hotels throughout the Asia Pacific region (InterContinental Hotels 
Group, 2000a; Oyama, 2000; Herald, 2000). Its main brands were the three- and 
four-star Parkroyal, four-star Centra, and three-Star Travelodge hotels 
(Daneshkhu, 1999d; 2000a). Hale, in turn, was owned by the Pritzer family, which 
also owned the Chicago-based Hyatt hotel group. The Pritzker family had decided 
to sell SPHC in order to concentrate on the Asia-Pacific region and expand its five- 
star Hyatt hotels and three-star Travelodge hotels (Daneshkhu, 2000a). 
Commenting on the deal, Bass saw the buy as 'an excellent opportunity for Bass 
to strengthen our number one position in the Asia Pacific market' (Herald, 2000, 
pp. 20). Moreover, Bass saw marketing and operational synergies in the SPHC 
acquisition because these newly acquired properties could be re-branded as 
InterContinental, Crowne Plaza and Holiday Inn and incorporated into Bass's 
global reservations system. In addition, Bass's customers would benefit through 
the linking of Bass's customer loyalty programme, 'Priority Club' with SPHC's 
'Pacific Privilege' (InterContinental Hotels Group, 2000a). 
The purchase brought Bass from 10th position to become the second largest 
hotelier in Australia and the largest hotel group in the Asia Pacific Region, with 170 
hotels and over 40,000 rooms under its management (Condon, 2000; Daneshkhu, 
1999d; InterContinental Hotels Group, 2000a). According to Tom Oliver, 
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Bass Hotels &. Resorts, SPHC hotels 
were well managed and their Parkroyal and Centra brands had established a good 
reputation in the regional markets: "There was clear opportunity to build upon this 
strength by introducing Bass Hotels & Resorts world-class global brands to the 
properties" (InterContinental Hotels Group, 2000a). During this same period, Bass 
was already operating a 102-strong hotel portfolio in the Asia Pacific region under 
the Inter-Continental, Crowne Plaza and Holiday Inn brands. According to Tony 
South, Bass's chief operating officer in Australia, New Zealand and the South 
Pacific, 'Globally, the game is to gain market share. If you are a global 
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organisation, you can't afford not to be in this part of the world' (Condon, 2000, pp. 
50). 
Analysts viewed the SPHC purchase as an expensive one because although it has 
many operating contracts, it owned little real estate. However, these same 
analysts also agreed that there was growth potential in the Asian market where 
SPHC already has significant market share (Binkley, 2000). During that period, 
higher hotel-occupancy and room rates were recorded in Asia and this 
improvement was attributed to the increase in the number of foreign executives 
from the US and Europe travelling to Asia for business (Binkley, 2000). Industry 
executives such as Ted Teng, president of Asian operations for Starwood Hotels & 
Resorts Worldwide Inc., commented that Asia was considered a tantalising frontier 
for Western hotel investors and operators because the region held 55% of the 
world's population and 30% of its GDP, but only 17% of its hotel rooms (Binkley, 
2000). Therefore, the purchase of SPHC could be considered 'entirely consistent 
with Bass's strategy of expanding its hotel brand portfolio and moves it into a part 
of the world with good growth prospects, ' as pointed out by analyst Philip Morrisey 
at Warburg Dillon Read (Herald, 2000, pp. 20). 
8.2.6. Bristol Hotels and Resorts Inc. 
Bristol Hotels & Resorts, Inc. (Bristol), a US-based hotel management company 
and Bass jointly announced on February 28,2000 that Bass would acquire 90% of 
Bristol for $157 million (E98.7 million) in cash (Daneshkhu, 2000b; New York 
Times, 2000). Bass and Bristol had been doing business since the late 1990s. 
Bristol was the largest franchisee of Bass's Holiday Inn hotels in the US and Bass 
already owned the other 10% of Bristol's share (Bauman, 2000; InterContinental 
Hotels Group, 2000c; New York Times, 2000). Moreover, Bass had also'sold its 
ownership of 60 Holiday Inn branded hotels in the US to Bristol in 1997 for $391 
million in cash, together with a 32% stake in the equity of Bristol. The. sale was 
part of Bass's plan to reduce its involvement in ownership in the three-star market 
sector. According to Bass, this deal enabled the Group to maintain a strategic 
interest in, a major franchisee of their brand (AR / Bass, 1997). Bristol agreed to 
continue to use Holiday Inn brand name and put over $150 million into re- 
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developing the hotels to meet the brand's quality standards. In addition, Bristol 
converted 10 of its existing hotels into Holiday Inn brand, thus increasing Bass's 
distribution (AR / Bass, 1997). 
After the purchase of Holiday Inns in 1997, Bristol merged with FelCor Lodging 
Trust Inc. (Fe[Cor), a Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) in the US. Bristol 
became a pure hotel management company after transferring its assets into 
FelCor (InterContinental Hotels Group, 2000b). In this deal between Bass and 
Bristol in 2000, Bass gained a total of 112 hotels, including 12 on management 
contract and 100 on lease agreement from FelCor (AR / Bass, 2000; Daneshkhu, 
2000b). Within the 112 hotels, about 75% of them held Bass's brands in the US 
and Canada, and 83 hotels were already in Bass's computer system. Among the 
83 hotels, 59 were Holiday Inns, 18 were Crowne Plazas and six were Holiday Inn 
Express hotels (Baker, 2000). In this deal, Bass also expected to derive benefits 
from economies of scale and profit enhancement from the combined 
administration and operations. Bristol enhanced Bass's already considerable 
expertise in the field of hotel operations and management in North America since 
Bristol was a pure hotel management company with significant track record and 
experience in this area (AR / Bass, 2000; Baker, 2000; InterContinental Hotels 
Group, 2000c). 
8.2.7. Post House 
In April 2001, Bass paid Compass E81 0 million in cash for Post House hotels (Post 
House) and planned to re-brand them as Holiday Inns (Daneshkhu, 2001a). 
Compass, which had decided to move out of the hotel business in order to 
concentrate on its catering sector, had put up Post House for a three-month 
auction (Clark, 2001a). The deal consisted of 79 three-star hotels with 12,300 
rooms, of which 77 hotels were owned and / or held under long lease whilst 78 
hotel units were located in the UK and one in the Republic of Ireland (Hotel 
Report, 2001). 
According to Tim Clarke (Clarke), the chief executive of Bass, Post House had 
been well-maintained, with E200 million of capital expenditure invested over the 
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past four years (Clark, 2001 a). Bass intended to invest E75 million over the next 
three years to revamp and re-brand Post House into Holiday Inns, in order to drive 
its hotel business towards a stronger mix of international customers in the UK 
(Clark, 2001 a). Bass also intended to sell 15 Post Houses whose locations were 
too close to the other Holiday Inns or unsuitable for upgrading (Daneshkhu, 
2001 a). Clarke further commented that Bass benefited from Post Houses' 
strategic locations because many of them were located close to important 
motorway intersections and airports in the UK and Ireland (Caterer and 
Hotelkeeper, 2003; Clark, 2001a). Moreover, the Post House acquisition also 
increased Bass's market share by trebling its number of hotel units to 9.6. Clarke 
commented that Bass believed the three-star market Post House had a strong 
future under its expanding Holiday Inn brand (Clark, 2001 a). 
8.2.8. Candlewood Suites 
On December 31 2003, Bass completed an acquisition of the three-star extended 
stay Candlewood Suites brand from Candiewood Hotel Corporation in the US, for 
$15 million in cash (E9 million) (Verjee and Bolger, 2003). The transaction actually 
involved three parties - Bass, Candlewood Hotel Corporation and Hospitality 
Properties Trust (HPT) (Chittum, 2003; InterContinental Hotels Group, 2003). 
Candlewood Hotel Corporation was closing its business and sold the franchising 
rights of the Candlewood Suites brand and future franchise agreements to Bass 
(InterContinental Hotels Group, 2003). At the same time, HPT in the US bought 
12 hotels from Candlewood for $90 million, bringing its Candlewood Suites 
portfolio to 76 hotels (InterContinental Hotels Group, 2003). Finally, Bass entered 
into an agreement with HPT to manage their 76 Candlewood Suites hotels and the 
management agreements would be for 25 years with options to extend 
(InterContinental Hotels Group, 2003). In addition, all the guests of Candlewood 
Suites hotels would be tied into the Bass's loyalty programme and its central 
reservation office (Chittum, 2003). This purchase expanded Bass's management 
portfolio by about 40% in North America, to nearly 12,500 rooms (AR / Bass, 2003; 
Chiftum, 2003; Verjee and Bolger, 2003). 
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According to Steve Porter (Porter), President for the Americas sector of Bass 
(InterContinental Hotels Group, 2003): 
"This acquisition is consistent with our long term strategy to prove and deliver 
winning brand concepts, while reducing our capital exposure in real estate 
assets and growing our revenue stream from management and franchise 
fees. Our growing relationship with HPT gives us the best of both worlds, " 
Porter continued that: 
"The Candlewood Suites acquisition expands our industry supply share in a 
segment where we have experience and dominance - the mid-price market - 
with good quality assets that significantly grow our room and hotel supply 
share virtually overnight. The brand is a perfect fit within our current portfolio 
of brands and will benefit tremendously from our global enterprise values 
such as Priority Club Rewards, global sales and our worldwide reservation 
system. " 
The Candlewood Suites brand would become the sixth in Bass's portfolio. Since 
Candlewood Suites was positioned in the three-star extended stay segment, this 
purchase supplemented Bass's five-star extended stay Staybridge brand. This 
acquisition thus positioned Bass 1n two tiers of the growing extended-stay hotel 
market (Chittum, 2003). 
8.3. Comparison of motives for M&A deals . 
This section studies each deal closed by Bass by comparing it to the M&A 
literature. The motives identified in the secondary sources are listed in Table 8.2, 
and those extracted from the semi-structured interviews are presented in Table 
8.3. Table 8.4 tabulates information from both sources for further comparison 
work. 
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ClingendaelGroup 
The Clingendael Group purchase was predominantly to expand Bass's hotel 
division in recognition of the potential growth of the hotel business. Bass also 
gained a number of benefits from this deal, including an increase in market share 
and market leadership in Holland, as well as acquiring a few strategically located 
hotels. 
Centre Hotels 
Centre Hotels was considered part of a bigger sales package offered by Coral 
Leisure. The predominant motive for this deal was to expand Bass's hotel division 
and this was made possible since Centre was already the fourth largest hotel 
group in the country and the leading hotel operator in the three-star market sector. 
This purchase provided Bass with an increase in market share in the three-star 
market sector and a gain in strategic fit in its geographical location. Centre was 
the fifth largest hotel group in London and offered Bass exposure in the London 
market, as well as major London airports and important provincial city centres in 
England and Wales where Crest was not previously represented (AR / Bass, 1981; 
1982). The other motive was the strategic fit in terms of operations and value 
enhancement for the company as a whole. As commented by some dealers 
Coral's Pontin's could be an attraction for Bass since it also operated 
entertainment centres, and the pubs could complement Bass's brewing retail 
outlets. Thus, the Centre deal not only increased the size of Bass's hotel division, 
but its other divisions such as brewing. Moreover, the Group also gained new 
gaming businesses - betting, bingo and casino. 
HolidayInns 
The major motivation to buy the Holiday Inn group was to expand in the 
international hotel industry and to become a big player in that industry. As pointed 
out by Langton, Bass's hotel division needed an international brand name to grow 
and the Crest brand was not strong enough to achieve that task. The timing for 
the sale of the Holiday Inn group happened to coincide with Bass's new strategy 
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and thus acquiring an established brand name became an important motive. 
Respondent 1, Respondent 2 and Respondent 3 agreed that internationalisation 
and globalisation were part of the causes for hotel M&A activities during the 
1980s. 
The other motive was that Bass could learn a new way of operating hotels, 
particularly in franchising, as the hotels operated under the Holiday Inn name were 
not all owned, but nearly all in joint venture, management contracts and partially 
owned. As pointed out by Langton that this way of operating hotels was different 
from Bass's conventional way of owning and operating their Crest Hotels. This is 
supported by Altinay (2001), who found that Bass wanted to gain knowledge and 
expertise in the international hotel business, particularly in franchising. Moreover, 
there was a compatible business culture and national culture due to their Anglo- 
Saxon background. From a different angle, Respondent 5 considered the ability of 
franchise business to generate cash as a major motive. Holiday Inn was 
predominantly a franchising business; thus this enabled Bass to re-invest cash 
generated for expansion, in addition to cash generated by its brewing business. 
There was also the speed element, since Holiday Inn was already the biggest 
three-star market hotel chain in the world, and Bass became the biggest hotel 
company worldwide within a short period of time. Respondent 1 and Respondent 
6 also pointed out that its major motive was to gain volume and dominance in this 
industry. Bass gained critical mass worldwide and economies of scale were 
derived particularly through the room reservation system. The Holiday Inn hotel 
chain was the first in the hotel industry to develop and possess a computer system 
dealing with room reservation management. Bass benefited from this innovation, 
which helped the Group to cut operational and distribution costs as well as to 
enhance sales values. Other attractions of this deal included a healthy occupancy 
rate compared to other hotel companies at the same market level, during the 
economic slow down in the late 1980s. Moreover, there was also the cultural fit 
between Bass and Holiday Inns, in terms of their operating philosophy. Therefore, 
this was considered a value maximising deal, particularly through the brand name 
and its potential to generate more profit. 
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InterContinental Hotels 
The dominant motive for buying ICH was to expand Bass's international hotel 
division by purchasing another well-known international name. ICH is one of the 
first five-star hotel groups to establish its presence worldwide; thus Bass gained 
extended locations in major cities worldwide. Moreover, during that period, 
demand in the industry for this market sector was growing among business 
executives despite the slow-down of the world economy. According to 
Respondent 1, Respondent 2 and Respondent 4, this purchase supplemented 
Bass's existing portfolio of one-star to four-star market sectors with a new luxury 
product, as well as increasing its number of. hotel rooms worldwide. Similarly, 
Respondent 4 considered this purchase as 'global empire building'. Although 
Respondent 3 commented that this was an opportunistic buy because the owner 
happened to be selling it, this was not totally non-strategic in terms of the benefits 
discussed above. Moreover, part of Bass's corporate strategy was to expand its 
hotel division, due to a continuing decline in its brewing business. This motive is 
supported by Respondent 1, Respondent 2 and Respondent 3 who agreed that 
the hotel industry was a growing industry while demand for beer was decreasing 
and leading to a declining brewing industry. In addition, Bass's brewing division's 
growth through the merger with Carlsberg -Tetley in 1997 was stopped Board of 
Trade on competition grounds (AR/ Bass, 1997). 
Southern Pacific Hotels Corporation 
The dominant motive was strategic fit as can be seen in several ways. Firstly, 
Bass planned to continue its hotel expansion internationally and since its presence 
was considerably weaker in the Asia Pacific region as compared to its other 
locations such as the US, Europe and the Middle Eastern, SPHC served as a 
platform to penetrate this region. As highlighted by one of Bass's executives, 
Bass needed to move into the Asia Pacific region in the early 2000s because this 
was the growth area for hotel expansion. Respondent 3 also pointed out that the 
asset light structure of SPHC fitted in with Bass's aim to expand its hotel sector 
with minimum capital investment cost. 
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Secondly, Bass wanted to be a market leader and SPHC was already the second 
largest hotel management company in Australia. This purchase made Bass the 
largest hotel company in Asia Pacific region quickly. It could also imply that this 
deal enabled Bass to attain speed in expansion and a market leading position. 
Thirdly, SPHC products complemented Bass's products because these newly 
acquired properties could be re-branded as InterContinental, Crowne Plaza and 
Holiday Inn. This is supported by Respondent 1 who commented that this 
purchase was one that complemented its existing portfolio. Moreover, demand for 
five-star hotels was increasing after the decline due to the 1997 Asia Crisis, 
because of expatriates visiting the Asia Pacific region, as evidenced by the higher 
hotel-occupancy and room rates. From another perspective, it can also be said 
that the SPHC purchase coincided with Bass's aim to grow its company, and with 
the decline of its core brewing business the growing hotel industry became a 
complementary strategy to counteract that decline. 
This purchase increased Bass's market share in all the different market levels, and 
this further enabled the Group to enjoy economies of scale and scope. For 
instance, Bass's global reservations system was able to handle more hotel units in 
its database, meaning there was a lower per unit cost for the Group. At the same 
time, by combining Bass's customer loyalty programme, 'Priority Club', with 
SPHC's 'Pacific Privilege', the number of customers in its data base expanded, 
and Bass benefited from a bigger pool of customers, in which cross-selling could 
provide it with economies of scope in terms of a wider range of products being 
available to existing customers of Bass and SPHC. 
Bristol Hotels and Resorts Inc. 
The strategic fit motive is most prominent for this deal as Bass continued to 
expand the size of its hotel division. Strategic fit in terms of an existing operational 
relationship was found between Bass and Bristol. Bristol, as a pure management 
hotel company, was operating 75% of its hotels under Bass's brands. Although 
this deal did not exactly add a large number of hotels to its existing stocks, since 
75% of these hotels already held by Bass's brands in the US and Canada, and 83 
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hotels existed in Bass's computer system, it was still a value enhancing deal. As 
highlighted by Respondent 3, there was no asset involved (the deal included 100 
hotels on lease and 12 management contracts), which was consistent with Bass' 
strategic plan to reduce its capital investment. Moreover, this deal consolidated 
Bass market leadership in terms of maintaining a major franchisee of its own 
brand. This deal was also value enhancing because Bass gained an added 10 
Bristol hotels to be converted to the Holiday Inn brand. 
Post House 
The major reason for the acquisition of Post House was to increase Bass's 
presence in the UK, particularly in increasing the company's size rapidly. This is 
according to Respondent 2, who had participated as one of the team members 
advising Compass (owner of the THF after its merger with Granada in 2000) in the 
sale of Crest, and thus knew that the best way 'they [Bass] could get Holiday Inn 
brand to have the dominant three-star market position within the UK was to 
acquire the Post House'. Similarly, Respondent 3 and Respondent 6 agreed that 
there was strategic fit between products as Post House and Bass were both in the 
three-star market sector and this made it easier for Bass to re-brand these hotels. 
Thus, this deal also enabled Bass to. achieve its plan to attract more international 
customers through its international brands when re-branding Post Houses into 
Holiday Inns. There was also the geographic fit in terms of locations of Post 
House and Crest supplementing each other. This is supported by Respondent 4, 
who posited that globalisation was part of the reason for this purchase because 
'Holiday Inns did not have much foothold in the UK, only five or six hotels. 
However, it got 40,50 hotels in the UK suddenly'. In an implicit way, the motive of 
speed is reflected here in terms of the trebling in the number of Bass's hotel units 
to 96. This purchase also solidified Bass's market leadership in the three-star 
market sector and economies of scope were also achieved by integrating two 
different loyalty programmes, which enabled customers to utilise a wider range of 
products provided by Bass, as well as increasing its customer base. It also fits in 
with Bass's intention to expand its hotel division since it sold its brewing division in 
2000. 
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Candlewood Suites 
The dominant motive for the purchase of Candlewood Suites was to extend its 
range of products in its continuous hotel expansion strategy. In this deal, 
Candlewood Suites is an extended long-stay product in the three-star market 
sector and this supplemented Bass's upscale extended long-stay product - 
Staybridge. This is supported by Respondent 1 and Respondent 6 who 
commented that it was a purchase to supplement its existing portfolio. On the 
other hand, since Candlewood Suites is also a three-star product, it can be argued 
that this extended long-stay three-star product became a complementary product 
for Bass's existing three-star Holiday Inn hotels. The motive is one of value 
maximising and enabled Bass to achieve economies of scope because this 
purchase increase its range of products offered to customers. Moreover, 
economies of scale and scope are also achieved by integrating its database of 
members under different loyalty programmes. In addition, Candlewood Suites was 
a brand ownership purchase, thus was a strategic fit with Bass's plan to expand 
with minimum capital investment. This is particularly pertinent for the 
management since the Group had been facing pressure from its shareholders to 
sell off fixed hotel assets and to return more dividend. 
In summary, the discussion of motives for M&A in Bass's case supports the 
general M&A literature. There is a mixture of motives in each deal, rather than 
one single reason. Moreover, these deals also support the efficiency argument in 
terms of cost reduction and value enhancement. The dominant motive was to 
increase size and this was achieved through all the acquisitions (Dutch 
Clingendael Group, Centre, Holiday Inns, ICH, SPHC, Bristol, Post House and 
Candlewood Suites). Following these acquisitions, the increase in size and 
market share led to greater market power in terms advanced information 
technology used for management of a bigger pool of rooms for bookings, thus 
achieving economies of scale with a reduction in per-unit cost. 
In the same way, integration of members registered under two loyalty programmes 
enabled Bass to derive economies of scope in terms of providing a range of 
products for existing and newly registered customers in the database. 
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Correspondingly, speed as a motive is dominant, particularly in the case of Post 
House which sped up Bass's expansion in size in the UK three-star market sector. 
SPHC positioned Bass quickly as a leading hotel operator in the Asia Pacific 
region. The essence of speed is achieved partly due to strategic fit between 
products, which enabled similar products to be re-branded quickly and attain 
critical mass. Geographical fit is also dominant for all the acquisitions, 
domestically (Centre and Post House purchases) and internationally (Holiday Inns, 
InterContinental and SPHC). Strategic fit is also present in terms of 
complementary and supplementary resources: for instance, Candlewood suites 
supplemented Bass's five-star extended-stay portfolio with a three-star extended- 
stay product. At the same time, this purchase complemented its mid-market 
Holiday Inn hotels. In a similar vein, the ICH deal supplemented its range of one- 
to four-star market sectors with a five star product. Managerial motive in terms of 
non-value maximising and personal ego was absent in this discussion. Bass's 
strategy to internationalise its hotel division was most obvious in all acquisitions, 
except Post House, which was to gain critical mass within the UK. 
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Table 8.2: Bass's motives for M&A activity, 1979 - 2003 
Clingen- 
dael 
Centre Holiday 
Inn 
ICH SPHC Bristol Post 
House 
Candle- 
wood 
Suite 
1979 1980 1988 1998 2000 2000 2001 2003 
Economies of scale 
and scope 
Economies of scale V 
and scope: Cut cost 
Economies of scale: Vol 
Re-brand product 
Economies of scope: 
Loyalty programmes 
Market power 
To increase market 
share: in other 
businesses 
Increase size/ market 
share: No. of hotels 
and rooms, critical 
mass 
Increase size/ market 
share: Became market 
leader 
Market power: brand 
rights 
Market power: size 
Speed 
Buy market leader V, 
Increase size quickly 
Strategic fit 
Strategic fit: ve 
Complementary 
product 
Strategic fit: 
Geographical fit 
Product portfolio: own, 
franchise, manaqe, etc. 
New product & new 
platform 
New market, new 
customers 
Value enhancement: 
quality of product 
Value enhancement: 
occupancy and yield 
rate 
Value enhancement: 
through location 
To acquire new 
portfolio/ products 
To acquire with 
minimum assets 
Market penetration: 
same product/ 
customers 
Increase presence in 
the UK 
Other core businesTeT 
decline 
F 
-211- 
Clingen- 
dael 
Centre Holiday 
Inn 
ICH SPHC Bristol Post 
House 
Candle- 
wood 
Suite 
1979 1980 1988 1998 2000 2000 2001 2003 
Growth market 
Growth market V, 
Managerial motive 
Managerial synergies: 
synergies 
Pressure from the City 
Foreign competition 
Internationalisation: 
new locations 
Intemationalisation: 
product 
Others 
Difficult to win hotel 
management contract 
Culture: corporate 
culture is similar 
Risk adverse: 
franchisor 
To acquire with 
minimum assets 
To learn about 
franchising and 
management contracts 
Brand name, 
prestigious 
Source: Bass annual reports 1979 - 2004, various newspapers and trade journals. 
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Table 8.3: Comparing analysts' comments on Bass's motive Is for M&A activity, 
1979 - 2003 (R=Respondent) 
RI R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 
Bass - Holiday Inn (1987-1990) 
Holiday Inn: to become global player, platform 
to grow the company 
0 0 0 0 
To gain volume and dominance 0 
Cash generative business - franchising 
Bass - InterContinental (1998) 
Opportunity - ICH on market for sale 0 
Strategic decision because sales of brewing 
(core business) was declining and unable to 
expand due to regulations 
0 
Growth area - hotel industry 0 0 
Global empire building 0 
Supplementary products: to enter up-market 0 0 
Bass - SPHC (2000) 
To gain more franchising and management 
contract and reduce asset holding 
0 
To supplement portfolio 0 
Bass - Bristol (2000) 
To gain more franchising and management 
contract and reduce asset holding 
0 
Bass - Post House (2001) 
To expand in the UK, to expand Holiday Inn, 
the mid-market position in the UK 
0 0 
To gain volume and dominance 0 
To increase the number of hotels in the UK 
(to increase market share) 
0 0 
Good fit with Holiday Inn 0 0 
Opportunity 0 
Bass - Candlewood Suites 
Cover mid-market, new market and increase 
custo er base/ portfolio iI - 
0 
I 
0 
To supp lement portfolio 1 0. 
oource: -)emi-structured interviews 
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Table 8.4: Comparing Bass's motives for M&A activity, 1979 - 2003 
Clingen- 
dael 
Centre Holiday 
Inn 
I ICH SPHC Bristol I Post 
House 
Candle 
wood 
Suite 
1979 1980 1988 1998 2000 2000 2001 2003 
Economies of scale 
and scope 
Economies of scale 
and scope: Cut cost 
Economies of scale: 
Re-brand product 
Economies of scope: 
Loyalty programmes 
Market power 
To increase market 
share: in other 
businesses 
Increase size/ market 
share: No. of hotels 
and rooms, critical 
mass 
Increase size/ market 
share: Became market 
leader 
Market power: brand V 
riqhts 
Market power size 
To gain volume and 
dominance 
To increase the 
number of hotels in the 
UK and to increase 
market share 
Speed 
Buy market leader 
Increase size 
Strategic fit 
Strategic fit: V 
Complementary 
product 
Geographical fit and 
value enhancement 
through location 
Product portfolio: own, 
franchise, manage, etc. 
New product & new 
platform 
New market, new 
customers 
Value enhancement: 
quality of product 
Value enhancement: 
occupancy and yield 
rate 
To acquire new 
portfolio/ products 
To acquire with V 
minimum assets 
Market penetration: 
same product/ 
customers 
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Clinden- Centre Holiday ICH SPHC Bristol Post Candle- 
gael Inn House wood 
Suite 
1979 1980 1988 1998 2000 2000 2001 2003 
Increase presence in V., 
the UK 
Other core businesses V, 
decline 
Cash generative 
business, Franchising 
Strategic decision V, 
because sales of 
brewing (core 
business) was 
declining and unable to 
expand due to industry 
regulations 
InterContinental. - to 
enter up-market 
Strategic move 
because Bass wanted 
to move from more 
franchise to more 
management type of 
organization structure 
change, reorganization 
or restructur/Rq 
Good fit with Holiday 
Inn: to expand in the 
UK, to increase market 
share in mid-market 
position in the UK 
Cover mid-market, new 
market 
Managerial motive 
Managerial synergies: 
synergies 
Pressure from the City 
Growth 
Hotel market is 
growing 
Growth area 
(expanded into growth 
area since growth in 
the other business 
sector in the company 
had been thwarted) 
Foreign competition 
Intemationalisation: V %/ %/ V V/ 
new locations 
Intemationalisation: 
product 
Holiday Inn: to become Ve 
global player, plafform 
to qrow the company 
Global empire building 
Others 
Difficult to win hotel Ve 
management contract 
Corporate culture is V, 
similar 
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Clinden- Centre Holiday ICH SPHC Bristol Post Candle- 
gael Inn House wood 
Suite 
1979 1980 1988 1998 2000 2000 2001 2003 
Risk adverse: 
franchisor 
To acquire with 
minimum assets 
To learn about 
franchising and 
management contracts 
Brand name, 
prestigious 
Chancel opportunityl 
Serendipity (ICH on 
market for sale) 
Opportunity 
bource: bass annual reports 1979 - 2004, various newspapers, trade journals and interviews 
* Words in italics are motives mentioned by analysts during interviews 
8.4. General development of Bass 
In this section, Bass's hotel development is examined through its M&A activities 
between 1979 and 2003 and its general development in the context of macro 
environment changes over time. Bass established its hotel division in the 1960s, 
continued to expand it through M&A activities in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
(Esso Motor Hotels, Clingendael Group and Centre Hotels). In 1980, Bass bought 
I Coral Leisure, comprised Centre hotels, which were integrated into its Crest hotel 
group. Bass also diversified into leisure business by integrating the Coral racing 
into its business operation (see Appendix N). Subsequently, the Group extended 
its leisure business into bingo and social clubs, snooker clubs and a video theatre 
in 1983. Bass also branched out into businesses such as Satellite Information 
Services Limited, formed between Bass and the Racecourse Association, as well 
as producing and supplying amusement machines in 1986 (AR/ Bass, 1983; 
1986). 
In the 1980s, Bass went through three major strategy changes and re-structuring 
programmes. First, the Group extended its business into budget hotel sector by 
creating Toby Restaurants in 1984, as part of a response to increasing market 
demand for this sector. It took over the operations of 238 public houses from its 
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beer operating companies, created Toby Restaurants and built budget hotels 
alongside these restaurants (Trollope, 1985c). 
Second, a declining demand for beer and limited growth in the brewing business, 
in conjunction with the benchmark set by Chairman Palmer for e ach business 
division to achieve a 25% turnover became part of the motivations to acquire 
Holiday Inn in 1987 and expand Bass's hotel division through this particular deal, 
and as a corporate solution in general. Moreover, Bass had identified the need to 
own an international brand name as the way to internationalise its hotel division. A 
new division was created to manage all of Bass's hotels and restaurant operations 
after the purchase of Holiday Inns in 1988, and this division was split again in 
1990, as hotels were established as an individual division after Bass bought out 
Holiday Inns and its brand rights worldwide. Bass also went through a 
rationalisation of assets that resulted in the sale of 23 Crest hotels in Europe, 
properties that no longer fitted into its long-term strategy. Bass decided to 
concentrate on building the Holiday Inn brand name (AR / Bass, 1988). Moreover, 
Bass had agreed not to use the Crest brand name to compete with Holiday Inn 
franchisees outside the UK from November 1994, as an agreement in the Holiday 
Inn deal (Caterer and Hotelkeeper, 1988). This led to the brand 'Crest' being sold 
to THF in 1990. 
In its re-organisation of its hotel division, Bass closed down Holiday Inn's 
manufacturing division, and Holiday Clubs (the specialist direct selling 
organisation) resulting in a loss of 600 corporate staff (The Times, 1990b). Like its 
previous owner, HC, Bass used franchising as a main vehicle for expansion, to 
draw on the advantage of less capital investment with this mode of expansion. 
Bass sold its many assets, established separately run franchised operations, and 
appointed Mike Levin as the President of Franchising in order to improve its 
relationship with franchisees and attract new franchisees (The Times, 1990b). 
The third major change of structure lie in Bass dismantling its historical integrated 
structure of Brewing and Pub business in 1989, and replacing it with two divisions: 
Bass Brewing and Bass Retailing (see Appendix N). This was attributed to the 
Beer Order enacted in 1989 (see 2.2.7) leading to the sale of more than 5,000 
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pubs by Bass's brewing business, hence the decision to re-organise its business 
structure. 
In the early 1990s, this rationalisation of assets and franchising through brand 
name helped to reduce negative impact from the economic downturn and the First 
Gulf War between 1989 and 1992. Bass attributed its profitable position to the 
strength of its brand name which maintained a premium pricing and outperformed 
its direct competitors (AR / Bass, 1991; 1992). Thus, Bass maintained this 
strategy of focussing on franchising as a means to expand its hotel division, in 
conjunction with the continuous programme of disposing hotel assets and non- 
core businesses to reduce capital investment as well as increase cash flow (AR / 
Bass, 1993; 1995). This resulted in Bass's continuous re-structuring programmes. 
There were two major re-organisations in the company in the 1990s. 
First, the Group continued its disposal of assets, including the sales of ownership 
of 60 Holiday Inn branded hotels in the US in 1997. In October 1997, as part of its 
strategy to cater to a range of brands serving different segments of the 
international hotel market, Bass added a fourth'hotel brand - Staybridge Suites - to 
meet the demands of longer'stay guests (AR / Bass, 1997). With the addition of a 
new product, Bass re-organised to create new presidents for each brand in order 
to focus on guests' preferences. Each brand became a profit centre and pursued 
its own strategic plan (AR / Bass, 1997; 2000). 
However, this structure based on brand was re-structured in 1998 according to the 
type of services each hotel brand provided (AR / Bass, 19 98). This change took 
place mainly due to the acquisition of ICH in 1998, one of the world's oldest hotel 
brands. Moreover, ICH operated mainly through management contracts and this 
kind of operation added to Bass's knowledge. of hotel operations, in addition to 
reducing capital investment costs. For instance, there were separate units for 
four-and five star (ICH and Crowne Plaza), three-star (Holiday Inn), one-star 
(Holiday Inn Express) and five-star extended stay (Staybridge) operations. 
The third change was the disposal of Bass's leisure division. Bass disposed of its 
leisure businesses - the Gala chain of bingo clubs, Coral bookmaker, Barcrest 
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(amusement machines manufacturer), BLMS (amusement machines operators), 
the 1,400 tenanted pub estates and over 321 lower-performing managed pubs - to 
concentrate on its hotel and brewing businesses (AR / Bass, 1998). The 
performance of Bass's leisure division was considered good, except for its bingo 
business, which, like other companies involved in t, he gaming business, had been 
adversely affected by the National Lottery, started in 1994 (Financial Times, 
1997b). In late 1997, despite the deregulation of the bingo industry, in terms of 
relaxation of advertising restrictions, Gala's overall performance was still affected 
by competition from other modes of gambling, namely the National Lottery and 
bookmakers (King, 1997; Doward, 1997). Moreover, the taxation, compared to 
other gambling sectors, remained high at 10% per one pound stake, whilst it had 
been halved in some other sectors (Doward, 1997). According to Daneshkhu 
(1 997b, pp. 29), Bass ascribed the poor performance of its Gala clubs to increased 
supply, failing demand and 'intense competition'. Moreover, Gala was performing 
badly due to it's the poor location of many of its sites (King, 1997). Following this 
strategic change, Bass also changed its corporate name from Holiday Hospitality 
to Bass Hotels & Resorts, to stress its strengthened hotel division (AR / Bass, 
1998). 
In the late 1990s, Bass went through a fourth major re-organisation by selling its 
two century-old brewing business and its Bass brand rights. The reasons given for 
this sale was that Bass's share in the British beer market had been shrinking since 
1996, while its hotel division was contributing more in terms of group sales and 
operating profit (Daneshkhu, 1999d). Moreover, the opportunity to grow its 
brewing business was restricted when its merger with Carlsberg -Tetley in 1997 
was halted by the Board of Trade on the grounds of anti-competition rules in the 
brewing industry. Bass's group share price was also decreasing as a result of 
being graded as a brewing company, and its hotel division's financial performance 
was ignored. Bass executives claimed that they would not be tied down by 
Isentimental nostalgia' for brewing because the main concern was shareholder 
value (Willman, 1999c, pp. 12). 
Bass's corporate strategy to focus on the growth sector, in this case the hotel 
business, saw the Group expanding through the acquisitions of two hotel 
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management companies, Bristol in the US, and SPHC in Australia. Both 
purchases created critical mass for Bass Jn US and Asia Pacific region 
respectively, and quickened its international hotel expansion without high capital 
investment cost. These purchases further revealed Bass's strategy of hotel 
expansion as one that is based on the power of branding to attract customers and 
investors in order to expand. In 2001, Bass continued its hotel expansion through 
the purchase of Post House (financed by the sale of its brewing business). The 
Group also changed its name to Six Continental to reflect better the global spread 
of the group's business after the sale of brewery (Daneshkhu, 2001 c). According 
to one of Bass executives, 'We definitely didn't want a made-up name, ' and 
moreover the company was reluctant to favour one of its hotel brands over another 
(Daneshkhu, 2001c, pp. 24). 
In the early 2000s, Bass's financial performance was adversely affected by the US 
9/11 terrorist attack and subsequent global uncertainty, which discouraged 
international travellers (AR / Bass, 2001). This indirectly led to the accelerated 
sale of Bass hotel assets as Bass faced increasing pressure from shareholders to 
sell assets and return dividends. The most prominent incident occurred in 2002, 
when one of Bass's shareholders, David Pitt-Watson, a managing director of 
Hermes Investment Management Limited (a fund management company) 
demanded excess capital the Group was holding (derived from the sale of its 
brewing interests in 2001), to be returned to shareholders; and objected to the 
possible purchase of either Wyndhams or Starwood, two other hotel groups that 
had been put up for sale (Dickson, 2002). 
In 2003, Bass re-structured its company by de-merging its hotel and pub division, 
and assuming the corporate name of InterContinental Hotels Group, whilst its pub 
divisiog adopted the equally well-known name, Mitchells & Butlers (Mesure, 2003). 
However, Bass also faced a take-over challenge in 2003 when it announced its 
de-merger plan. Hugh Osmond's (Osmond) investment company, Capital 
Management, offered to buy up Bass for E5.6 billion (Milner, 2003). The offer was 
turned down by Bass, and this led to a hostile bid in which Osmond attacked Bass 
for not delivering adequate profits and trading its property assets under net asset 
value (Evening News, 2003). The management team was also criticised for their 
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deal-making skills as Bass was deemed to have paid too much for ICH and Post 
House, and sold for too little its Gala bingo and Coral bookmakers (Garrahan and 
Saigol, 2003). Although the hostile bid was unsuccessful as Osmond did not get 
the shareholders' approval, the outcome was the quickening of Bass's cost cutting 
programmes. For instance, the group moved its headquarters in the heart of 
London's West End to Windsor earlier than planned and sold the Mayfair 
InterContinental. The Group also identified several hotels in the US for disposal 
and started a redundancy programme in the US, as well as negotiating with labour 
unions in the UK and across Europe to cut jobs (Garrahan and Jones, 2003). 
Bass also continued to reduce its asset ownership via the sale of 16 Staybridge 
Suites properties to HPT, and bought the franchise rights to the brand name 
'Candlewood Suites'. These moves fitted in with Bass's plan to expand by 
maintaining its brand presence and creating value for Bass's shareholders (AR 
Bass, 2004). 
Bass shifted from emphasising the use of cash flow to re-invest and expand its 
company before the 1980s, to branding and using a brand name to expand its 
hotel division. The importance of brand is illuminated through the branding of 
Crest in the 1970s, followed by the motive to buy the Holiday Inn brand, the re- 
branding of hotels (Crest and Post House into Holiday Inns), as well several 
changes of corporate names, entailing adopting well-known brand names such as 
'Holiday' Hospitality; 'Bass' Hotels & Resorts; and 'InterContinental' Hotels. 
Although Bass did mention the Group was not willing to adopt one of its hotel 
brand names as a corporate name, the more prestigious InterContinental' name 
was selected in 2003. This in turn reflected Bass's focus on using brand as an 
expansion tool in particular, and brand as a widely used marketing tool in general. 
This chapter compared and contrasted motives for M&A activities to provide better 
understanding of 'why' and 'how' a hotel company expanded. The motives for 
M&A activities, in the case of Bass's hotel division, supported the value and non- 
value maximisation literature. These deals provide some in-depth understanding 
of company-specific motives, such as increasing shareholder value, becoming a 
global market leader, expanding into growth areas and acquisitions of international 
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brand names. Moreover, these activities also revealed the changing business 
environment in the UK. The next chapter reviews the final case - Whitbread p1c. 
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Chapter 9: 
Whitbread Group pic (Whitbread) 
This chapter explores the development of Whitbread Group pic (Whitbread). The 
first part provides a brief history of how Whitbread started its business. The 
second part examines several major merger and acquisition activities (M&A) that 
Whitbread undertook between the 1990s and 2004 (see Table 9.1) 
Table 9.1: Major merger and acquisition activities, 1995-2004 
Whitbread 
1 995 Marriott . _ 1999 Swallow Hotels 
2004 Premier Lodge 
Source: Whitbread annual reports, various newspapers and trade journals 
The third part compares and contrasts the motives for each deal by using both 
secondary and interview data. The final part discusses the general development 
of Whitbread's hotel division in the light of corporate strategy changes and the 
macro environment. The term 'Whitbread' is used throughout the discussion, 
including the period after the hotel group name had been changed to the Country 
Club Hotel Group in 1991. 
9.1. The beginning of Whitbread Group Pic 
Samuel Whitbread started his career in brewing at the age of 14 through an 
apprenticeship at Master of the Brewers' Company, a brewery in London 
(Whitbread, 1994). - In 1742, he formed a partnership with Godfrey and Thomas 
Shewell and founded Whitbread brewery. Whitbread became a publicly quoted 
company in 1889, as a means to raise capital for funding the purchase of free 
house leases from public house operators on the verge of bankruptcy (Pederson, 
2003). Between 1955 and 1971, Whitbread engaged in many M&A activities, 
including buying out smaller brewers and taking over 26 regional breweries 
(Pederson, 2003). Whitbread also expanded its drink business, through off-licence 
retailing, spirit and wine production and distribution and also continued to grow its 
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food and hotel businesses. The hotel and restaurant businesses started in the 
early 1970s with the purchase of Severnside Hotels from Trust Houses and the 
formation of a joint venture - Whitly Inns - with J. Lyons to operate over 100 
restaurants (Ritchie, 1992). In 1973, Whitbread signed a 50 / 50 joint-venture with 
John Pontin, Chairman of JT Construction Group, a Bristol-based building 
company, to manage Country Club Hotels (CCH) (AR / Whitbread, 1984; 
Goymour, 1986; Caterer and Hotelkeeper, 1983a). CCH was founded in 1968 by 
the JT Construction Group when it acquired the Redwood Lodge, Bristol and the 
St. Pierre Hotel Golf and Country Club, Gwent (Caterer and Hotelkeeper, 1983a). 
Whitbread invested another E2.5 million stake in CCH group and further developed 
CCH as leisure-based conference hotels, which appealed to the business 
meetings' market and to those looking for relatively active weekend breaks. 
In the mid 1980s, Whitbread identified two areas - hotels and restaurants - with 
opportunities for expansion (AR / Whitbread, 1990). Thus, between 1984 and 
1985, Whitbread developed a group of hotels consisting of pubs and rooms by 
organising its managed pub estates together nationally and re-branding them as 
Whitbread Coaching Inns (WCI) (AR / Whitbread, 1984/85; Slattery, 1988). The 
first four units were opened in 1986, and WCI expanded into 38 by 1989 (AR / 
Whitbread, 1986; 1989). According to Whitbread, WCI was designed to avoid the 
cyclical trends of the hotel business in general because of its hotel locations 
mainly in country towns and its value-for-money accommodations, providing a full 
range of services all the year round (AR / Whitbread, 1987). 
The other hotel development was to create a group of budget hotels - Travel Inn - 
as part of a strategy based on the growing budget hotel market (Pederson, 2003). 
Whitbread started the first budget hotel by building it next to its Beefeater 
restaurant. Later, Whitbread continued to open Travel Inns beside other 
restaurants, such as Roast Inns and Brewers Fayre, because Travel Inns brought 
substantial extra business to the adjacent restaurants (AR / Whitbread, 1989; 
1990). The advantage that Whitbread had over its competitors was the land it 
owned beside the restaurants, which provided the space to build the budget hotel 
group (AR / Whitbread, 1984). 
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In 1989, Whitbread decided to reposition WCI's business from'pub image'to'hotel 
image', thus, the name of WCI was changed to 'Lansbury Hotels' (AR / Whitbread, 
1989, pp. 19). By 1990, CCH had become the leader in leisure-based conference 
hotels, operating 1Q hotel units (AR / Whitbread, 1990). Whitbread's hotel 
expansion was sped up. through M&A activities later, which will be discussed 
below. 
9.2. Hotel expansion- major M&A activities 
In its hotel business, Whitbread grew mainly organically in the 1980s, but engaged 
in three major M&A activities between 1995 and 2004. Whitbread acquired 16 
Marriott Hotels in 1995 (9.2.1), which provided the Group with an international 
brand name and the right to operate it exclusively in the UK. Swallow Hotels was 
bought in 1999 (9.2.2) to increase the Group's hotel rooms rapidly in the UK. The 
Premier Lodge deal in 2004 (9.2.3) solidified, its position as the largest budget 
hotel operator in the UK. Each of these major deals will be discussed in the 
following sections. 
9.2.1 Marriott Hotels 
Whitbread bought 16 British hotels trading under the Marriott brand from Scott's 
Hospitality (Scott's), a Canadian-owned company, based in Toronto, for E180 
million ($288 million) (Cope, 1995b; Fox and Jay, 1995; New York Times, 1995). 
The sale of Scott's UK hotels was attributed to the need to enhance the Group's 
earnings, which had been affected by world recession since the late 1980s 
(Wolffe, 1995). Through this deal Whitbread became the master franchisee of 
Marriott brand and obtained the right to operate and develop Marriott's brand in 
the UK (Edgecliffe-Johnson, 1995; Holman, 1995). The deal also propelled 
Whitbread from the ninth position to become the third largest hotel operator in the 
UK (see Appendix B). Whitbread operated more than 10,000 rooms during that 
time, including both Marriott hotel rooms and those of its existing budget hotels - 
Travel Inns (Buckingham, 1995; Edgecliffe-Johnson, 1995). 
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UK Marriott Hotels were previously branded as Holiday Inn Hotels (The Times, 
1991). Scott's was the biggest UK hotel franchise holder of the Holiday Inn brand 
before 1992. The group decided to terminate its contract to franchise the Holiday 
Inn brand after failing to secure a territorial franchise that would have given it 
exclusive control of the Holiday Inn brand in'the UK (Bond, 1992; The Times, 
1991). In January 1992, Scott's reached a new master franchise agreement with 
Marriott Corporation (Marriott), the American owner of the Marriott brand. Marriott 
had granted Scott's exclusive franchises for two of its brands, the four-star Marriott 
and the three-star Courtyard by Marriott (Bond, 1992; Edgecliffe-Johnson, 1995). 
According to Jan Hubrecht, managing director of Scott's, he was 'pleased with the 
Marriott deal, because it gives us greater control over our own destiny' (Bond, 
1992, pp. 23). Ed Fuller, managing director of Marriott Lodging was also pleased 
to forge the alliance with Scott's Hotels, which he claimed shared Marriott's 
management philosophy, marketing focus and strong commitment to quality 
(Bond, 1992). The new franchise brand and the termination meant that Holiday 
Inn, or Bass which had become the owner of this brand by then, lost 13 hotels, 
comprising 40% of its UK room stock in July 1992 (The Times, 1991). 
As a result of this deal, Whitbread obtained the exclusive brand rights to operate 
and develop Marriott's brand in the region, including re-branding some of its 
existing hotels in the UK into the Marriott brand (Edgecliffe-Johnson, 1995; 
Holman, 1995). Whitbread's 14 CCH, which had golf courses and leisure centres 
attached became Marriott Resort Hotels. The Group also took over the operations 
of four three-star hotels under the Courtyard by Marriott brand (Cope, 1995b; 
Edgecliffe-Johnson, 1995). 
One of the benefits of the Marriott deal was to capitalise on the strength of the 
Marriott brand name and the Marriott worldwide reservation system to attract 
American visitors to the UK (The Times, 1995). According to analysts, 
Whitbread's CCH had lost out due to a lack of an international reservation system 
as compared to one of its major competitors; THF (THF was the first UK hotel 
group to develop its own worldwide management and reservation system). Thus 
the re-branded Whitbread hotels would overcome this weakness when their hotels 
became included in the Marriott worldwide reservation system (Cope, 1995a; 
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Edgecliffe-Johnson, 1995). In addition, Marriott's reservation system also 
provided Whitbread with access to Marriott's main customer base in the US and 
the Far East. These customers' profiles were considered in terms of their being 
potential future customers who might book their four-star holiday break at a 
Marriott resort in the UK (Buckingham, 1995; The Independent, 1995). 
According to David Thomas (Thomas), managing director of Whitbread 
Restaurants and Leisure: 'The purchase will provide us with key city centre 
locations and is a perfect geographic fit with our existing hotels. There will be 
financial and operating synergies as well as significant benefits from the leading 
international brand name in hotels. ' (Buckingham, 1995, pp. 14). Whitbread 
expected to achieve economies of scale through cost savings when they merged 
the two administration systems. Other cost benefits would be achieved when 
Whitbread sold its beers, wines and spirits to Marriott Hotels (Cope, 1995a). 
According to analysts, 'the thinking in hotels now is that size is once again the key 
factor in hotel-chain performance'; therefore the Marriott Hotels could expect to 
benefit from improved procurement through Whitbread's system (The 
Independent, 1995, pp. 16). The acquisition of Marriott brand right coincided with 
the period when the UK economy was picking up and hotel price rates and 
occupancy rates were improving; thus, the deal was considered a beneficial one 
for Whitbread (Stevenson, 1996; The Independent, 1995). 
9.2.2 Swallow Hotels 
In 1999, Whitbread bought Swallow Hotels for E730 million, including debt 
(Financial Times, 1999b; Willman, 1999b). The deal included 38 three, four- and 
five-star hotels and 199 pubs in the North-East of England (Baker, 1999; Daily 
Record, 1999; Walsh, 1999d). News of the talks between Whitbread and Swallow 
over an agreed bid for Swallow emerged only after Swallow's share price rose 
more than 10% on rumours of a bid (Baker, 1999; Willman, 1999a). Thedealwas 
finalised in less than a fortnight from start to finish (The Guardian, 1999). 
According to Whitbread, the Group made a preliminary approach to Swallow with 
the intention of making a E450 million takeover (King, 1999). Whitbread had 
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underpinned its bid for the Swallow hotels and pubs group by buying 21.3% of the 
shares to add to the 28.9% already committed by directors and two fund 
management groups - Mercury Asset Management and Phillips & Drew Fund 
Management (Armstrong, 1999b; Willman, 1999b). The two fund management 
groups had given irrevocable commitment on their shares, provided there were no 
better offer from competitors within 21 days (Willman, 1999b). However, analysts 
believed a rival was unlikely to emerge because Whitbread was offering a high 
premium of 40% above Swallow's share price (Armstrong, 1999b; Frost, 1999; 
Willman, 1999b). 
According to Thomas: 'Swallow is an excellent strategic acquisition for Whitbread 
in a segment of the UK hotel market that 
1we 
have targeted for expansion. 
Whitbread will merge Swallow Hotels with its 35-strong chain of Marriott hotels in 
the UK' (Daily Record, 1999; Frost, 1999, pp. A17). It was suggested that at least 
two thirds of Swallow's hotels could become city-centre Marriott Hotels, while 
some lesser units could be converted to its three-star Courtyard by Marriott brand 
(Walsh, 1999c). The acquisition would double Whitbread's number of four- and 
five-star hotels to 73 and 11,000 rooms, making it the second largest upmarket 
hotel group in the UK after Ladbroke's Hilton hotels (Armstrong, 1999b). 
According to Simon Johnson, a leisure analyst at Credit Suisse First Boston: 'It is 
a full price, but it is a deal that makes sense. ' (Daneshkhu, 1999b, pp. 26). 
The move was also considered an ideal geographic fit because most of Swallow's 
hotels were located in the North East of the country compared with Whitbread's 
focus on the South (Armstrong, 1999b; King, 1999). The addition of the Swallow 
hotel portfolio would increase Whitbread's distribution significantly, particularly in 
key cities - such as Edinburgh, Dundee, London, Birmingham, Manchester, 
Liverpool, York and Sheffield - where Marriott was underrepresented (Daneshkhu, 
1999b; Walsh, 1999d). Whitbread expected to reduce operation cost from this 
acquisition, through lower administration and marketing charges as well as greater 
purchasing power, by combining their administration, computer systems and 
marketing department (Armstrong, 1999b; Flanagan, 1999; Financial Times, 
1999b). The other attraction of Swallow was the disposal of Swallow's tenanted 
pubs estate. Swallow had sold its pub estates to Pubmaster for El 27.5 million and 
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closed its Sunderland and Sheffield breweries in June 1999, which Whitbread had 
no intention to acquire (Armstrong, 1999a; King, 1999). 
9.2.3 Premier Lodge 
In 2004, Whitbread bought Premier Lodge hotels from Spirit Amber (formerly 
known as Punch Retail), the Midlands-based Spirit Group for E505 million and also 
paid a sum of E31.2 million for 19 pub restaurants (Bowers, 2004; Goodman, 
2004; Osborne, 2004; Walsh, 2004c). The deal included nine sites next to these 
hotels, which were under development. Whitbread planned to invest E32 million in 
completing these nine sites and convert the pub restaurants into its Brewers Fayre 
brand (Walsh, 2004c). Both groups also agreed to maintain operations at a 
number of sites where other Spirit pub restaurants were joined to Premier Lodge 
sites. 
Premier Lodge was originally owned by De Vere, previously called Greenalls, a 
Warrington-based company (The Scotsman, 2004; Evening News, 2004). In 
1999, Greenalls decided to sell its pub and budget hotel businesses in- order to 
focus on its four- and five-star hotels (De Vere) and health clubs during a 
restructuring exercise (Cowell, 1999; Evening News, 2004). Although Premier 
Lodge had been one of the strongest performers for Greenalls, it did not have the 
required scale, which was believed to be the key issue for profitability, as 
commented by their investor relations manager, Siobhan Turner (Wilson, 1999). 
She pointed out that to attract regular room occupancy, 'a network from day one 
and developing room yields is what makes for good margins. The price of the 
room is only part of the total yield' (Wilson, 1999, pp. 17). Thus, Greenalls 
decided to sell its 769 pubs and restaurants, and the 69 Premier Lodges to 
Scottish & Newcastle (S&N), an Edinburgh-based group (Wilson, 1999). 
In 2003, S&N decided to sell its S&N Retail division, including the brands Chef & 
Brewer, T&J Bernard and Premier Lodge, to reduce debt and strengthen the 
Group's financial position (Reid, 2003). In October 2003, Spirit Amber, a newly- 
created company backed by a consortium which included US private equity group 
Texas Pacific, the Blackstone Group, CVC Capital Partners and Merrill Lynch 
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Global private equity, took over the S&N Retail division (Pain, 2003; Ringshaw, 
2004). Spirit Amber became the UK's largest managed pubs group after the 
acquisition, with a portfolio of more than 1000 outlets, employing over 17,000 staff 
(Pain, 2003; Reid, 2003). 
Shortly after the deal was completed in November 2003, Spirit Amber engaged 
Merrill Lynch to conduct a strategic review of their businesses (Ringshaw, 2004). 
After the review, Karen Jones, chief executive officer of Spirit Amber, decided to 
put Premier Lodge up for sale as the Group wanted to focus on the food, drink and 
entertainment businesses (Birmingham Post, 2004; John, 2004). In early 2004, 
the investment banks - Merrill Lynch and Bear Stearns - were appointed to sell the 
hotel business (Garrahan, 2004a; Ringshaw, 2004). 
The sale of Premier Lodge attracted many competitors. Whitbread competed 
against five other strong bidders to emerge as the winner of Premier Lodge 
(Waples, 2004). According to analysts, Premier Lodge were attractive to any 
company that was eager to enter the UK budget hotel sector as this sector was 
enjoying strong growth while more upmarket hotels had been suffering over the 
past three years. Moreover, the lack of land had made it more difficult for hotel 
operators to build budget hotel and achieve organic growth (Reece, 2004). The 
bidders in the first round included: 
PAI Management, a French private equity company; 
Collins Stewart, a stockbroker of Nomura, the Japanese investment bank; 
Apax, a private equity company; 
A joint bid by De Vere (the original owner of Premier Lodge), the 
Warrington, Cheshire-based group and Sun Capital, an investment group 
* Permira, a private equity company 
(Dennis, 2004; Garrahan, 2004c; Walsh, 2004a). 
The auction process entered its final round with Whitbread competing with Apax 
Partners (Dennis, 2004; Walsh, 2004b). Whitbread won the bid over Apax 
Partners, on the basis of its offered price, whilst the other four competing 
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companies withdrew from the competition (Dennis, 2004; Garrahan, 2004c; Walsh, 
2004a). During the bid for Premier Lodge, Whitbread lodged an "informal 
submission" with the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) notifying it of its interest in 
Premier Lodge for guidance on whether a deal could be blocked on competition 
grounds (Dennis, 2004; Garrahan, 2004b, pp. 2). According to Whitbread, "Due to 
the size of the Premier Lodge estate its potential acquisition would be subject to 
OFT scrutiny ... because Whitbread's Travel Inn brand was already the biggest 
budget hotel operator in the UK' (Garrahan, 2004b, pp. 2). Whitbread had some 
18,000 rooms across the UK; Travelodge, which is the second largest, had about 
13,000 rooms; and the second runner up, Premier Lodge, had 8,100 rooms 
(Garrahan, 2004e; Jones and Faint, 2004). Whitbread was given clearance on 
June 2,2004 by the OFT that its bid for Premier Lodge would not present 
problems (Garrahan, 2004d). 
For Whitbread, Premier Lodge was seen as a natural fit for their Travel Inn chain 
(Garrahan, 2004c). According to Alan Parker (Parker), chief executive of 
Whitbread, This acquisition offers an excellent fit with our existing Travel Inn 
businesses and strengthens our leadership in UK budget hotels (Birmingham Post, 
2004, pp-17). Premier Lodge had a greater concentration in urban locations 
compared to Whitbread's Travel Inns (Garrahan, 2004a). Moreover, the former 
consisted of newly refurbished or recently built assets, which were trading 
strongly, with sales up 20% in the first half of 2004 (Birmingham Post, 2004). The 
addition of Premier Lodge would expedite Whitbread's aim of having 25,000 rooms 
under the Travel Inn brand by 2007-2008 (Reece, 2004). Other analysts believe 
that Whitbread bought itself five to six years of organic growth as a result of the 
acquisition of Premier Lodges in 2004' (Deloitte & Touche LLP, 2004, pp. 4). 
According to Whitbread, the combined operations would be renamed as Premier 
Travel Inn to end customers' confusion between Travel Inn and its main rival, 
Travelodge (Bowers, 2004). Whitbread would become 'by far the biggest budget 
hotel business in the UK', with 29,141 rooms in 461 locations (Birmingham Post, 
2004, pp. 17). 
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9.3. Comparison of motives for M&A deals 
This section provides a comparison of motives for major M&A deals closed by 
Whitbread. Table 9.2 provides an overview of Whitbread's motives for M&A 
activity in 1995 - 2004, retrieved from various secondary sources. Table 9.3 
compares the motives cited by analysts during their interviews. Table 9.4 
combines the motives retrieved from both sources to provide an overview of 
Whitbread's motives for M&A activity in 1995 - 2004. 
Marriott Hotels 
One of the dominant motives for the Marriott deal was the acquisition of its brand 
right. According to Respondent 6, the "Whitbread - Marriott deal was a franchise 
deal rather than anything else. It wasn't really a merger or an acquisition, it was 
just taking on a franchise". Similarly, Respondent 2 commented that it was a 
purchase of a group of hotels belonging to a Canadian company that owned the 
franchising rights to operate the international Marriott brand in the UK. On the 
other hand, Respondent 3 took the view that. Whitbread realised that the Group 
needed a global brand in order for its hotel division to take off. Thus, it may be 
argued that the purchase was an acquisition of international brand name by buying 
the brand right to operate the Marriott hotel group in the UK. This move could 
have been due to pressure to gain an international market, in view of competitors 
such as Bass, Ladbroke, THF and so forth operating international brand names. 
The other motive strategic fit. There was the geographical fit as Marriott hotels 
supplemented Whitbread with key city centre locations. Whitbread was already 
operating 14 four-star hotels - CCH - and the Group recognised that CCH was 
restricted in its growth due to the huge space needed to build golf courses, and the 
lack of distribution channels. Thus, access to the use of Marriott's reservation 
system would solve the distribution problem and enable Whitbread to derive 
economies of scale. Moreover, this deal also enabled Whitbread to achieve 
economies of scope through access to Marriott's other customers in the computer 
database, as well as creating a critical mass for Whitbread in terms of a larger pool 
of customers available to possibly use its CCH. In addition, there was also the 
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strategic fit in terms of managerial capabilities, as Respondent 1 points out that 
Whitbread acquired the rights to use the Marriott brand to operate Marriott hotels 
as its master franchisee, building on its existing franchising skills in the restaurant 
business and extending these to the hotel business. The Marriott deal also 
synergised with Whitbread's strategy of supplementing its declining brewing 
business with financially value enhancing business. 
Whitbread's Marriott deal also supports the managerial motive (e. g. in terms of 
ego). Whitbread's financial performance was affected by the economic slow down 
and the First Gulf War between 1989 and 1992. As a result of this, Peter Jarvis 
(Jarvis), Whitbread's managing director commented that he was looking for 
business opportunities with strategic fit with its existing ones. His motive was to 
sustain the Group's rating and reduce its gearing to less than 2%. This implied 
that management were under pressure to perform in order to satisfy the City and 
get good ratings for the Group's share price. Moreover, Jarvis admitted that 
organic growth was perceived as dull and he was determined to prove Whitbread 
was 'no risk-averse wimp' (Bernoth, 1995, pp. 1). This again is implicitly linked to 
Jarvis's personal motive, not wanting to be linked to risk aversion, since 
investment decision making is generally decided by the executive management, 
including Jarvis himself. 
Swallow Hotels 
The main reason to acquire Swallow was to increase its size quickly. Respondent 
4 and Respondent 5 support this motive because they agreed that there was 
strategic fit between products and locations. Both products were positioned in the 
four-star market and it was possible to convert Swallow hotels to the Marriott 
brand to obtain critical mass quickly. Moreover, as Respondent 6 points out, 
Swallow's locations were not overlapping with those of Whitbread, thus extending 
the latter's geographical presence in the UK. Whitbread has been a predominantly 
UK hotel operator and Respondent 3 considered this deal as close to Whitbread's 
core territory, in terms of hotel operation and its concentrated presence in the UK. 
There was also the speed motive, in view of Respondent 4's comment that there 
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was a 'built out process', mainly referring to land limitation and the difficulty for 
hotel companies in finding good locations and building new hotels from scratch. 
Although it is evident that there are a number of value maximising motives in this 
deal, some managerial personal intent is also found, in terms of Whitbread's 
management's need to prove its managerial capabilities. During the late 1990s, 
Whitbread's overall financial performance had been adversely affected by its 
reduced market share in the beer market as the Group failed to close two deals 
(Courage and Allied Breweries). Its brewing division's financial performance was 
declining while its hotel division was performing well. Thus, Whitbread was under 
pressure from the City to improve its financial results and hotel acquisition became 
one of the solutions. This is supported by the comment by Respondent 2 who was 
directly involved with this deal: 
"The share price when they announced they were pulling out of this 
transaction [of Allied Breweries] fell and our advice to them was in the first 
instance they had to make an acquisition to illustrate to the market they 
could make an acquisition effectively and to illustrate to the market they 
[M&A activities] worked. We looked at a variety of options and the one 
that came along was Swallow hotel and we acquired Swallow hotels for 
them. And if you look at the share price graph, you will see that at that 
time that we bought Swallow hotels the share price started to move up. 
So we were successful. We paid too much for it. We paid far too much to 
acquire Swallow hotel, but at that time, it worked. " 
Thus, this could be translated into managerial ego and personal need to prove 
their management capability, which supports the non-value maximising motive for 
M&A activity. 
Premier Lodge 
The purchase of Premier Lodge was predominantly to gain critical mass. 
Whitbread was already the UK largest budgetý hotel operator and Premier Lodge 
was the third largest, thus, this deal was a strategic fit for Whitbread's hotel 
business. It sped up the Group's aim to expand this sector and also consolidated 
its UK's number one budget hotel operator position. This was supported by 
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Respondent 1 and Respondent 6, who also commented that this was a deal to 
gain market dominance in the budget hotel market sector. 
There was also the strategic fit element, taking into consideration Whitbread's 
four-star Marriott brand being badly affected in the early 2000s by the world wide 
economic downturn, US's 9/11 event and the UK's foot and mouth disease 
outbreak. Demand for four-star hotels such as Marriott declined while the budget 
sector enjoyed increasing demand. Thus, the acquisition of Premier Lodge 
supplemented the loss of revenues in Whitbread's hotel division and overall 
corporate financial performance. Strategic fit in terms of locations is also 
prom inent as Premier Lodge's urban locations supplemented Travel Inns' 
predominantly motorway accommodation. Moreover, the lack of land for building 
and the fact that it is more time consuming to build from scratch made this 
acquisition more value enhancing. Simultaneously, this could point to the speed 
motive, as some analysts also pointed out that the advantage of this deal for 
Whitbread as saving itself five to six years by using M&A activity rather than 
expansion by organic means. 
In summary, the number of motives for M&A activities is quite consistent for all 
three deals. Whitbread's motives also concur with the general M&A literature, in 
which there is a mixture of reasons in each deal, rather than one single reason. 
The dominant motive was to increase size and this was achieved through all 
acquisitions (Marriott, Swallow and Premier Lodge). These deals also support the 
M&A literature efficiency argument for cost reduction and value enhancement in 
the light of complementary or supplementary resources. For instance, the 
purchase of 14 hotels and the Marriott brand rights complýmented Whitbread's 
existing four-star hotels (CCH), and the Swallow purchase also complemented its 
Marriott Hotels, in terms of extending its geographical presence in the UK. 
Simultaneously, both purchases complemented its four-star hotel market and 
supplemented its brewing division by increasing its number of retail outlets for beer 
distribution. 
By the same token, the motive of product fit is also present, particularly noticeable 
in the Swallow and Premier Lodge p6rchases. Swallow's similarity in terms of 
-235- 
product allowed Whitbread to re-brand its hotels under the Marriott brand, which 
increased Whitbread's market share in the four-star market sector instantly. 
Similarly, Premier Lodge and Travel Inns could be re-branded and re-named 
(Premier Travel Inn) for Whitbread to gain critical mass quickly. Therefore, the 
speed motive is also present, in that re-branding allowed rapid attainment of 
critical mass, and in turn is able to achieve greater market power in terms of bulk 
procurement. Advanced information technology used for the management of 
bookings for a bigger pool of rooms had also given Whitbread economies of scale 
via reduction in per-unit cost. Likewise, integration of members registered under 
two loyalty programmes enabled Whitbread to derive economies of scope by 
providing a range of products for its existing and newly registered customers in the 
database. Although there was some trace of managerial motive in the Whitbread 
- Swallow case, as management was pressured to improved financial 
performance, thus engaged in M&A activities in order to prove managerial 
capabilities to the City, the value-maximising motive was more dominant in all 
these deals. 
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Table 9.2: Whitbread's motives for M&A activity, 1995 - 2004 
Marrioft Swallow Premier 
1995 199ýF 2004 
Economies of scale and scope 
Cut cost 
Economies of scale: Rebrand product 
Economies of scope: Loyalty programme V, 
. 
Market Power 
To increase market share: in other businesses V 
Increase size/ market share in No. of hotels 
and rooms, critical mass 
Increase size/ market share: Became market 
leader 
Brand rights V, 
Size 
Speed 
Buy market leader v/ V, V, 
Increase size quickly 
Strategic fit 
Complementary product 
Geographical fit 
To acquire new portfolio/ products 
Market penetration: same product/ customers ve 
Increase presence in the UK V, 
Growth market 
Hotel market is growing 
Managerial motive 
Pressure from the City 
Pressure from shareholders 
Managerial synergies: synergies 
Foreign competition 
Internationalisation: new locations 
Others 
Brand name, prestigious 
Culture: corporate culture is similar 
Source: Whitbread annual reports 1979 - 2004, various newspapers and trade journals. 
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Table 9.3: Comparing analysts' comments on Whitbread's motives for M&A 
activity, 1995 - 2004 (R=Respondent) 
RI R2 R3 R4 IRS R6 
Whitbread - Marrioft (1996) 
To buy international brand 0 
Whitbread - Swallow (1999) 
Opportunistic deal 01 
Chance Serendipity (on the market 
for sale) 
0 
Close to core territory (related M&A) 0 
Critical mass for Marriott brand 
'Built out process'- run out of space 0 
'quicker to buy' - Speed 0 
Strategic fit: convert Swallow to 
Marriott brand 
0 
Strategic fit: Geographical 
expansion 
0 
Whitbread - Premier Lodge (2004) 
Expand current portfolio, market 
penetration 
To gain volume and dominance 
No financial motive 
Source: Semi-structured interviews 
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Table 9.4: Comparing Whitbread's motives for M&A activity, 1995 - 2004 
Marriott Swallow Premier 
1995 1999 2004 
Economies of scale and scope 
Cut cost 
Economies of scale: Rebrand product V, -W/ 
Economies of scope: Loyalty programme V11 
Critical mass for Marriott brand 
To gain volume and dominance 
Market Power 
To increase market share: in other businesses ve 
Increase size/ market share in No. of hotels and 
rooms, critical mass 
Increase size/ market share: Became market 
leader 
ve 
Market power: brand rights 
Market power: size 
Expand current portfolio, market penetration 
Speed 
Speed: Buy market leader 
Speed: Increase size V, 
_'quicker 
to buy'- Speed 
Strategic fit 
Complementary product 
Geographical fit 
To acquire new portfolio/ products 
Market penetration: same product/ customers 
Increase presence in the UK 
Strategic fit: convert Swallow to Marriott brand 
Strategic fit: Geographical expansion 
Close to core territory (related M&A) 
Growth market 
Risk adverse: franchisor 
Managerial synergies: synergies 
Managerial motive 
Pressure from the City V/ 
Pressure from shareholders ve 
_ 
Foreign competition 
Internationalisation: new locations V, V, 
To buy intemational brand V, 
Others 
Brand name, prestigious V, 
Culture: corporate culture is similar V, VI 
Opportunistic deal 
Chance Serendipity (on the market for sale) 
No financial motive 
'Built out process'- run out of space 
Source: Whitbread annual reports 1979 - 2004, various newspapers, trade journals and Interviews 
* Words in italics are motives mentioned by analysts during interviews 
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9.4. General development of Whitbread 
The development of Whitbread's hotel division is examined through various M&A 
activities between 1995 and 2004 to provide a general view of how the Group 
developed its hotel division in response to macro environment changes over time. 
The Group started its hotel business in the early 1970s wilth the purchase of 
Severnside Hotels and a 50 / 50 joint venture to operate CCH. In the 1980s, the 
hotel division formed part of Whitbread's retailing division as the Group 
concentrated more. on its brewery and restaurant sectors because it saw 
opportunity for growth in these sectors (AR / Whitbread, 1982). 
1 
Between 1982 and 1992, Whitbread engaged in numerous M&A activities to 
consolidate these two businesses (drinks and food). For example, off-licence 
companies (Thresher), pubs (public houses), spirit distributors (European Cellars), 
restaurants (Pizza Hut, Henekeys and Denny's) were expanded in domestic and 
overseas markets. Whitbread also engaged in a few related diversifications such 
as discotheques (Aureon Entertainments) and amusement machine operations 
(JPM), as these served as retailing outlets for its drinks sales and provided 
entertainment machines for its pubs. Unrelated diversifications included 
retirement homes (Gatehouse nurseries) and television network (TV South) (AR / 
Whitbread, 1984; 1985; 1986). Whitbread's diversification strategy since the 
1980s has been ascribed to its understanding of customers' needs and 
subsequent adaptation and development of its products accordingly, in order to 
take advantage of the increasing market demand (AR / Whitbread, 1995). This 
was particularly evidenced by its change from being a focused brewing company, 
to become a conglomerate in the 1980s with its businesses extending into retailing 
(restaurants, leisure machines, soft drinks and budget hotels) (see Appendix 0). 
According to analysts, Whitbread was the first brewer to spot the changing 
demographics of Britain and anticipate the 'slow death of the traditional blue-collar 
boozer' (Bernoth, 1995, pp. 1). For example, the Group led the trend in the UK of 
the development of family-oriented pub-restaurants such as Brewers Fayre. It 
also identified increasing demand from conference and business travellers and the 
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lack of budget hotels to meet market demands; and thus started to refurbish its 
CCH and Lansbury hotels as well as create Travel Inns. 
In the 1980s, particular emphasis was placed on its internationalisation 
programmes to increase the proportion of earnings from overseas to a level of 
approximately 30% (AR / Whitbread, 1980). This was carried out by its 
acquisitions of a number of breweries, restaurants, pubs, distillers, and distributors 
in the UK, North America and Europe (AR / Whitbread, 1984; 1985; 1986; 1987). 
By 1987, Whitbread considered itself an international company producing and 
marketing all types of drinks from beers, wines and spirits to soft drinks and food 
through Threshers, Beefeater Restaurants, Roast Inns and the Pizza Hut chain 
(AR / Whitbread, 1987). However, Whitbread's corporate strategy changed to 
focus on beer, restaurants and hotels from the late 1980s (AR / Whitbread, 1993). 
This was partly due to a decline in Whitbread's market share in the drinks industry, 
which was affected by widespread consolidation worldwide (Toman, 1989). Thus, 
Jarvis decided to sell its spirit business in 1989 and consolidate the Group's 
resources and management skills in other growing and potential markets, 
particularly restaurant chains, hotels, public houses, and brewing businesses 
(Toman, 1989; Wall Street Journal, 1989d). 
Whitbread's hotel development was predominantly organic and the hotel division 
earned a more dominant position in the company's portfolio in the early 1990s 
when the Group decided to integrate three brands - Travel Inn, CCH and Lansbury 
- under the umbrella of the Country Club Hotel Group (CCHG) (The Independent, 
1995). However, this strategy did not last, as financial performance for the budget 
hotel (Travel Inn) and four'-star hotels (CCH) was growing faster than the three- 
star market sector (Lansbury). Therefore, Whitbread decided to concentrate on 
the more successful market sectors and sold Lansbury (AR / Whitbread, 1993; 
The Independent, 1995). According to Slattery and Johnson (1993), the first Gulf 
War was a big driver for this decision as Whitbread suffered in financial 
performance evident by declines in Lansbury's room rates (5% decline) and profits 
(40% decline). Moreover, the absence of leisure facilities was an obstacle to the 
growth of the Lansbury brand, as it was less attractive to wholesale and contract 
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markets. In addition, Lansbury hotels were located in secondary or tertiary 
locations and their average of 39 rooms per hotel was considered too small. 
The decision to sell Lansbury reflected not only Whitbread's responses to the 
macro environment, but also changes to Whitbread's corporate strategy. Hotel 
development became one of its core focuses and 1995 saw Whitbread's first major 
hotel acquisition via the purchase of 16 hotels from Scott's and the brand rights to 
use the name Marriott in the UK. Subsequently, Whitbread sold its non-core 
divisions and those that were growing slowly, such as Gatehouse Nursery, First 
Quench off-licence, joint venture operations and overseas restaurants. It 
continued to expand its hotel division through the purchase of Swallow Hotels in 
1999, increasing the Group's hotel market share by re-branding the former into the 
Marriott brand name and speeding up its expansion programme. 
I 
In 2000, Whitbread decided to re-focus its businesses in the growth areas of 
hotels, restaurants and health and fitness centres. This led to the sale of its two- 
century old brewery and pub businesses (Cowell, 2001; Wall Street Journal, 
2001). According to Whitbread, the exit was due to two factors (Whitbread pic, 
2000). Firstly, there was a need to focus on investment in the growth markets 
during that period, since its core brewing business was restricted in growth by the 
Beer Orders of 1989 (see 2.1.7). Secondly, Whitbread's attempt to acquire the 
Allied Domecq pub estate in 1999 was being given attention by the OFT, leading 
to Whitbread's withdrawal from the bid. Thus, the lack of growth opportunity in the 
brewing industry in conjunction with declining demand in this industry drove 
Whitbread to exit from it. Although not explicitly explained as such, the exit could 
also be ascribed to the need for Whitbread to create value for its shareholders. 
This need was apparent from the fact that Whitbread had been under pressure 
from the City and its shareholders to improve its financial performance since the 
late 1990s. The mounting pressure to generate higher returns on shareholders' 
invested capital, and gaining confidence from the City, had led to more disciplined 
growth. This is evident from the rationalisation of hotels and disposal of some 
Swallow hotels in 2003 to reduce capital commitment. In addition, the Group also 
explored new ways to develop the Marriott brand without the use of significant 
amounts of shareholder funds. This included operating Manchester's Victoria & 
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Albert Hotel through management contract under the Marriott brand for the hotel's 
owner - Royal Bank of Scotland (AR/ Whitbread, 2003). 
The Travel Inn business had been expanded through organic growth, as well as a 
joint venture with Punch Retail (later known as Spirit Amber) and a management 
agreement with RoadChef (motorway services group) in the year 2000 (AR/ 
Whitbread, 2001, pp. 5; AR/ Whitbread, 2002). Whitbread's Travel Inns had 
become the UK's largest budget hotel group and the second largest operator in 
the UK hotel market, with 336 hotels and estimated 25,000 rooms at the end of 
2000 (AR/ Whitbread, 2000). In 2004, Whitbread continued its hotel expansion via 
the acquisition of Premier Lodge to consolidate its position as the largest UK 
budget hotel operator. According to Whitbread, the purchase of Premier Lodge 
was aiming to increase scale, so as to reduce cost and increase revenue by re- 
branding the two budget hotel groups - Travel Inn and Premier Lodge - and 
marketing them under one brand in the UK (AR / Whitbread, 2004)., Whitbread 
had been developing its Travel Inn reservation system since 2001, which resulted 
in a higher proportion of reservations being directed through the Internet and 
accounted for an average of 31% of all its room reservations in 2004 (AR / 
Whitbread, 2001; 2004). The Group thus planned to improve its operational 
efficiency by capitalising on IT investment. Therefore, Whitbread also modified its 
reservation system for Travel Inn to accommodate the addition of Premier Lodge's 
bedrooms (AR / Whitbread, 2004). 
Whitbread went through another major strategic change in its hotel division in 
2004, as a result of a strategic review after the Group's financial performance was 
affected by another economic crisis, driven by world economic slow down, terror 
threats, the SARS epidemic and wars (Bain, 2006). Whitbread decided to exit its 
four-star hotel business for several reasons. First, there was a decrease in 
demand for this type of room, in conjunction with rising costs in business utilities 
and minimum wage rates (Bain, 2006). Second, the number of Americans staying 
at Marriott's properties in London declined because of a weaker exchange rate for 
the US dollar (Stenier, 2005). A third factor could have been the fact that the 
Marriott brand was not owned, but franchised by Whitbread. This means the 
Group had to pay franchise fees to Marriott International and finance the 
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operations of Marriott Hotels, as well as bearing all the risks of'non-profitable 
operation when demand was low. Respondent 2 succinctly pointed out that, as an 
analyst, he would place a lower price on Whitbread's share price because 
Whitbread did not own the Marriott brand, but only the brand rights in the UK. 
According to Parker, 
"This sale [Marriott hotels and Marriott brand right] brings the excellent 
partnership that we have enjoyed with Marriott International to a close ... We are now a more focused company, intent on delivering improvements 
in operating performance, reducing costs and driving growth in our best 
performing brands. " (Bain, 2006, pp. 31). 
Therefore, Whitbread re-focus it businesses on other branded sectors, such as its 
Travel Inns (budget hotel), health clubs (David Lloyd Leisure) and restaurant 
chains (Brewers Fayre, Beefeater, Pizza Hut). The general review of Whitbread's 
hotel development and, specifically the three M&A deals, provided some in-depth 
understanding of company-specific motives - such as becoming a market leader, 
expanding in growth businesses and increasing shareholder value. 
This chapter compared and contrasted the motives for M&A activities to provide a 
better understanding of 'why' and 'how' a hotel company expanded. The motives 
for M&A activities as discussed in this case support the M&A literature. Value 
maximisation is dominant in all three deals. To a lesser extent, a non-value 
maximising motive existed in the case of Swallow purchase. The next chapter 
provides a cross examination of these motives among four hotel companies and 
themes emerging from the study of the development of the UK hotel industry. 
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Chapter 10: 
Discussion on the development of four hotel companies 
This study sets out to develop a deeper understanding Of four UK hotel companies 
and their expansion through M&A activities over a period of 26 years, 
endeavouring to evaluate the development of the UK hotel industry into big 
business. The previous four chapters identified the motives for M&A activities 
through a theoretical framework developed through M&A literature review and 
confirmed after the UK hotel development chapter. Each of these four chapters 
provides a narration of how the company under discussion started and of various 
major deals closed, followed by an analysis of each deal, based on secondary 
data, semi-structured interviews and M&A literature. Each chapter ended with a 
general overview to outline the development of each hotel division in the light of 
the macro environment during the period of study. This - chapter sums up the 
findings across the four cases in the context of M&A literature, via the discussion 
of motives that supported or did not support the literature; and the latter are further 
evaluated. It also traces and compares strategy changes among the four 
companies, synthesising hotel company development in response to changes in 
the macro environment, in order to shed light on the changes in the industry 
structure. 
In this chapter, the first section compares and contrasts the motives for M&A 
activities across four hotel companies and the M&A literature. The second section 
highlights and explains the motive to acquire brand names and brand rights which 
emerged in these findings, but has been neglected in the general M&A literature. 
The third section evaluates the emergence of big business in the hotel industry in 
the context of brand acquisition. The fourth section compares hotel development 
generally across the four cases, particularly illuminating how conglomerates 
balanced their business portfolio in the context of macro environmental changes. 
The final section summarises the chapter. 
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10.1. Motives which support the M&A literature 
In this study, the findings are consistent with the M&A literature in general. They 
support the propositions that management decisions about M&A activities are 
based on value maximising motives, and to some extent, the non-value 
maximising reasons. It is apparent that organisational motives are overlapping 
within each M&A deal, but certain variables are more dominant than others. It is 
also confirmed that value (economies of scale and scope, market power, strategic 
fit and speed) and / or non-value (managerial motives) maximising motives 
depend on the interactions between the company's intent and variables in the 
macro environment. The following discussions under organisational motives 
(10.1.1. and 10.1.2. ) integrate one or more variables to facilitate the discussion. 
The macro environmental factors (10.1.3. ) were overlapping, but not as apparent 
as the organisational motives, thus these factors (deregulation, technology, foreign 
competition and industry growth) are discussed separately. 
10.1.1 Organisational motives: Value maximisation 
Value maximising motives are consistent amongst all four companies, in terms of 
increasing size and extending geographical presence. Market penetration in terms 
of acquiring the same product is also commonly found in all four hotel companies 
as a means for increasing size and market share. By comparing and contrasting 
common variables identified in the four companies it is apparent that there was an 
increase in the number of variables cited after the mid-1980s for Ladbroke, Bass 
and Whitbread. THF was the exceptional case, having fewer variables cited as 
compared to the other three companies, which could be ascribed to the fact that 
THF was already the market leader in the UK hotel industry and had been since 
the late 1970s. Thus, the incentive to become market leader and to increase its 
size through speed was absent. 
As compared to the other three companies, the number of variables cited in Bass's 
M&A activities stream-lined over the years. This could be due to two factors. 
Firstly, Bass had accumulated experiences in the area of M&A activities over the 
years and this provided Bass with in-depth knowledge and a clear strategy of what 
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the Group wanted in each deal. Secondly, Bass had built up a portfolio of brands 
and products at different market levels, thus, the deals they closed in the early 
2000s were more related to the expansion in the same market level and portfolio. 
This implies that variables found will be similar to previous M&A deals. 
To increase size is observed to be the most dominant motive for M&A activity in 
this study, which are linked to cost cuffing as 'per-unit cost reduced from an 
increase in the size of scale of a company's operation' (Gaughan, 2007). In the 
case of the hotel industýy, fixed costs form a large proportion of total costs, and 
economies of scale can be better achieved through bulk procurement and reduced 
administration cost when there was an increase in the number of rooms. For 
example, Bass commented that the Group saved approximately E15 million after 
the acquisition of ICH in 1998, through re-organisation of management, such as 
setting up a new team to handle worldwide asset development and management 
in Atlanta (US) head office and re-structuring its geographical management 
responsibilities (AR/ Bass, 1998). 
This study also supports economies of scale as a value maximising motive based 
on the addition of the same kind of resources - supplementary and complementary 
(Salter and Weinhold, 1979). In the case of the hotel companies, the presence of 
supplementary resources can be explained in the context of an increase total 
number of rooms, through Bass's purchase of the InterContinental Hotel group. 
The latter was a five-star brand and supplemented Bass's range of two- and three- 
star hotels. By the same token, it can be argued that strategic fit is present, in 
terms of supplementing locations can also lead to operational synergy. This 
particular motive in -the hotel industry is attributable to the nature of the hotel 
business, involving delivering goods and services directly to customers at certain 
locations. Therefore, to cover more geographical areas means to cover more 
market segments; thus providing for more customers becomes an indispensable 
requirement for the hotel industry. Strategic fit is also achieved via supplementing 
each company's existing hotel locations with newly acquired hotels to create 
critical mass, whether it is an international acquisition or a domestic one limited to 
the UK. This is evident by THF's purchases of Anchor, KB and Crest - these had 
increased the company's geographical spread in the UK. Similarly, Bass with its 
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Centre and Post House deals, as well as Ladbroke with its Comfort and Stakis 
deals all shared the same motive to expand in geographical presence. 
Strategic fit in terms of complementarity between related resources via the 
purchase of complementary products (Hill and Hoskisson, 1987; Jemison and 
Sitkin, 1986) is illustrated by the M&A deals: THF - Post House, Ladbroke - 
Stakis, Bass - Post House, and Whitbread - Swallow. These transactions 
consisted of purchasing similar types of hotels, which were positioned in the same 
market level. This contributed to the group's rapid expansion, enabling it to 
bypass the lengthy process of building hotels from scratch, resulting in significant 
value enhancement and cost reduction. For example, Whitbread's acquisition of 
Swallow and the conversion of the latter into Marriott's brand had increased the 
number of Whitbread's hotel rooms at the same four-star market level as well as in 
its hotel division as a whole. 
Value maximising was also achieved through economies of scope, which is the 
sharing or utilising of inputs by related activities to achieve a potential source of 
benefits, such as using the same input to generate a vector of products, rather 
than one product (Teece, 1980; Willig, 1979). This is supported by THF's 
purchase of KB's hotels, adding a new product - historic hotel (Heritage Hotels) to 
its range of hotel at different market levels, thus provided its existing customers 
with more choices to select from, with a range of budget (Travelodge), three-star 
(Post House) and five-star (Exclusive) hotels. Similarly, the purchase of 
Candlewood Suites, positioned in the three-star extended stay segment, had 
supplemented Bass's five-star extended stay division - the Staybridge brand. 
Thus, in both purchases, Bass had increased the total number of hotel rooms 
operated and its market size. By the same token, it can be argued that Whitbread 
and THF had achieved economies of scope by starting their budget hotel business 
beside their existing pubs and motor way eating places. The strategy of using the 
same piece of land, and building accommodation next to those drinking and eating 
places had helped both companies to maximise the use of their lands and values. 
Economies of scope has also been posited as one that is achieved through the 
sharing of specialised know-how (Teece, 1980; Willig, 1979). This is evident by 
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Whitbread using its franchising capability in its restaurant business and applying 
this skill to operating the franchised group of Marriott Hotels. Similarly, the motive 
of gaining knowledge and expertise for operating international companies and 
franchising are demonstrated by the acquisitions of Holiday Inns by Bass, and 
Rodeway Inns by Ladbroke, thus supporting this part of the literature. 
Managerial synergy is also found in some of these deals closed, particularly 
prominent in the Ladbroke - Stakis deal and supports the M&A literature. Lubatkin 
and Lane (1996) emphasise the importance of managers' capabilities in merged 
companies to recombine resources and enhance competencies which create 
value. Similarly, managerial synergies and market power are created upon 
acquisition of new knowledge and resources (Trautwein, 1990; Vermeulen and 
Barkema, 2001). In the Ladbroke - Stakis case, it has been stressed that 
acquiring Michels' business acumen and expertise was the motive for this 
particular M&A activity. Although there was argument against this motive 
(Respondent 6), it can also be argued that the motive for acquiring the 
management capabilities of one individual is possible. This was evident by 
Michels being made-the managing director of Ladbroke's hotel division after the 
integration of Hilton and Stakis in 1999. He was also made Ladbroke's chief 
executive in 2003. Michels also had previous working experience with Ladbroke, 
implying managerial synergies could be derived from his familiarity with both 
organisations' culture, in conjunction with his management skills. This supports 
the M&A theory of Hitt et al. (1998) who suggested that resource 
complementarities are important since the operational fit between Michels and 
Ladbroke's operational culture could enhance value for Ladbroke. 
Ingram et afs (1992) suggestion that M&A activity provides a much faster means 
of growth as compared with internal expansion or organic growth is supported in 
this thesis. Speed became a quick solution for expansion is evident by a number 
of deals. For example, Ladbroke doubled its number of hotel rooms through the 
purchase of Stakis; Bass's acquisition of Post House saw the Group tripled its 
number of hotels rooms; and Whitbread's purchase of Premier Lodge, the third 
largest budget hotel chain in the UK, enabled the Group to speed up its growth in 
this same sector and consolidate its leading position in the budget market sector. 
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In other words, M&A activities became the quick solution for expansion as evident 
by the instant size increase amongst all four hotel companies. 
The purpose of attaining speed in M&A activity is linked closely to the nature of the 
hotel industry. The basic need of the hotel business for land and building was an 
urgent one, but in the UK, obstacles such as lack of land and suitable buildings, as 
well as planning restrictions became major obstacles for any expansion plans. 
This has been a perennial problem for the UK hotel industry since the 1980s. 
M&A thus became a solution to create capacity and to meet demand. It is also a 
swift and strategic'way to gain a bigger slice of the market vis-A-vis competitors. 
This supports the argument that speed gives 'immediate access' to products and 
customers, and reduces competition from rival companies rather than adding more 
productive capacity (Schoenberg, 2003, pp. 98). 
M&A activity also enables a company to enter a growing market quickly and seize 
opportunities ahead of competition. For example, THF's purchase of Crest Hotels 
from Bass in 1990 (included a few sites called Kelly's Kitchen) and Whitbread's 
acquisition of Premier Lodges in 2004 demonstrated the motive of speed to 
expand into the growing budget hotel sector. Similarly, Bass acquired SPHC to 
expand into the Asia Pacific region, which was a fast growing area and it was 
essential for them to enter the market quickly in order to establish its presence and 
/ or to consolidate its presence in that region. The discussion so far confirmed that 
motives for M&A on an organisational level are value maximising in this study. 
The next section evaluates the motives of non-value maximising motives. 
10.1.2 Organisational motives: Non-value maximisation 
In this study, non-value maximising motives, in terms of achieving benefits for 
management rather than for shareholders (Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1993a; 
Cosh and Hughes, 2001; Morck et al., 1990) point to two different conclusions. 
The first conclusion supports the literature regarding managerial motive, in terms 
of managers engaging in M&A activities for the sake of growth in sales and 
company size, rather than profit (Baumol, 1967; Marris, 1964). The second 
conclusion partially supports the argument that managerial power and control grow 
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in tandem with company size and non-value maximising motives in M&A activities 
are related to managerial welfare (Jensen, 1986). 
The first conclusion in this study is supported by the notion of 'ego', commonly 
cited by respondents. Although Respondent 4 admitted that ego is not a 'scientific 
reason' [for M&A activity], he also noted that, in terms of management ambition, 'if 
I want to have a chain bigger than you've got, you can't discount that [ego] is part 
of it. ' To some extent, this general remark supports the works of Baumol (1967) 
and Marris (1964). The findings in this research support the managerial personal 
motive proposition, taking into consideration three of the deals closed by three 
different companies. In the case of the THF - Savoy, there was an obvious 
personal reason displayed by Forte Sr. who battled to buy The Savoy for over a 
decade (see 6.4). Ladbroke's purchase of Stakis could also be considered to be 
motivated by non-value maximising reasons because Ladbroke had failed to close 
a couple of deals previously (ICH and Coral bookmaker) (see 7.3). Thus, the 
closing of the Stakis deal was vital for the management to prove its capabilities to 
the City. In the same vein, Whitbread's acquisition of Swallow was linked to 
personal motive, as pointed out by Respondent 2, because of its failure to close a 
deal to acquire Allied Domecq in the summer of 1999. As a result of that failed 
deal, the Group's share price fell and there arose a need to acquire something in 
order to prove its management capabilities to the City (see 9.3). These examples 
point to managerial motive, displaying their wish to satisfy personal need and / or 
prove their competences, which could lead to engaging in M&A deals without due 
diligence, resulting in non-value maximisation for shareholders. 
The second conclusion does not support the non-value maximising motive, in 
terms of achieving benefits for management, rather than for shareholders. This 
study only supports, to a certain extent, the argument that managers sought the 
prestige of running a big company or to enjoy higher pay when the company 
became bigger (Marris, 1964; Schoenberg, 2003; Wright et aL, 2002; Yagil, 1996). 
This is explained from two points of view: firstly in terms of earnings per share 
(EPS) and dividends, and secondly, in terms of increasingly active shareholders 
who monitor management and company financial performance. 
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First, two simple indicators of shareholder value - namely EPS and dividends per 
share - did not display a drastic decline ascribable to hotel M&A activities. It is 
apparent that all four hotel companies' EPS declined between 1991 and 1992 (see 
Figure 10.1 - 10.4). Although three companies had acquired other hotel 
companies in the late 1980s (Ladbroke-Hilton International in 1987; THF-Kennedy 
in 1988; and Bass-Holiday Inns from 1987 - 1990; Whitbread has no hotel 
acquisition activities until 1995), the decline was attributed to macro environmental 
factors, rather than to these specific M&A activities. 
Figure 10.1: EPS and Dividends per share for THF, 1979 - 1995 
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Figure 10.2: EPS and Dividends per share for Ladbroke, 1979 - 2004 
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Figure 10.3: EPS and Dividends per share for Bass, 1979 - 2004 
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Figure 10.4: EPS and Dividends per share for Whitbread, 1979 - 2004 
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In the late 1980s, the UK economy was challenged by rising unemployment and 
high inflation and interest rates, leading to decreasing demand for property. 
Therefore, the property market was faced with low demand for new buildings and 
higher building costs (Scott, 1996). This adverse effect spilled over to the hotel 
industry, which, like the property market, experienced a 'double blow' because of a 
reduction in hotel demand and an increase in servicing debt interest. Ladbroke 
sold its property division; Whitbread rationalised its hotel division and sold off its 
three-star Lansbury hotel group. THF also reduced debt and maximised profit by 
disposing of the group's underperforming assets and non-core businesses. Bass 
on the other hand was not as severely affected as the other three companies 
because the former had had reduced its ownership of hotel assets and expanded 
via franchising, since buying the Holiday Inns hotels in the late 1980s. 
Although Bass experienced a minor decline in its EPS during the same period, its 
shareholders also benefited from a continuous growth in dividend distributions. 
The reduction in property value also led to Ladbroke and THF's decision to adjust 
their distributed dividends to better reflect the balance between providing an 
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adequate income for shareholders and the need to retain cash for investment in 
the group's businesses (AR / Ladbroke, 1993; AR / THF, 1993). In the same 
period, the severity of the recession had affected Whitbread's financial 
performance, particularly from its brewing business due to customers' reduced 
disposable income. The Group's concentration of two thirds of its brewing 
leasehold property and half its beer business in the south of England was the 
major cause (AR / Whitbread, 1992). Therefore, it is argued that management did 
not acquire hotels at the expense of shareholder values because the adverse 
effects on financial performance have largely been ascribed to the ups and downs 
of economic cycles and world events. 
These companies faced another difficult market conditions in the early 2000s (THF 
was taken over in 1996) as a result of the combination of worldwide recession, the 
9/11 terrorist attack in New York, SARS and the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. There 
were similarities between three companies: Ladbroke's and Whitbread's EPS 
declined from 1999 and Bass's EPS was reduced from 2001; all three hotel 
companies had acquired another hotel group in 1999 (Ladbroke - Stakis; 
Whitbread - Swallow) and 2000 (Bass - Post- House). In the case of Ladbroke, 
the general downturn in the world economy was the major cause of reduced 
demand for hotel rooms, leading to a decline in EPS, although dividends were; 
unaffected (AR / Ladbroke, 2002); this was partly due to a change in gambling 
taxation (see 2.2.6), which led to a re-balancing of income generation. As for 
Whitbread and Bass, the declines were ascribed to reduction of overall operating 
profits, contributed to by their sales of brewing divisions in 2000 (AR / Bass, 2001; 
AR / Whitbread, 2000 / 01). Bass's dividend per share was not affected because 
the Group had been re-structuring since the late 1990s, by the sale of hotel assets 
and re-organising itself into a hotel management company. However, Whitbread's 
dividend per share was affected, due to a combination of brewing sales and a 
concentration of hotel business in the UK. This discrepancy is apparent when 
compared to Bass's hotel diversity in terms of market levels and geographical 
presence worldwide. 
In other words, the above shows that management motives for these M&A 
activities were not totally based on their desire to increase sales and profits, but 
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there were also strategic elements, in terms of expanding into a growth market - 
the hotel industry - in consideration of shareholder value. Moreover, management 
had displayed organisational capabilities, by recognising opportunities (hotel 
growth) and responding to the external environment (decline in property value and 
consumer demand for beer) in order to improve company and shareholders' value. 
The decline of shareholder value may rather be attributed to the combination of 
external factors - macro environmental changes and other company-specific 
reasons. 
The second conclusion does not support the argument of the declining ability of 
shareholders to monitor management as the corporation grows larger and more 
complex (Cosh and Hughes, 2001; Jensen, 1986; Weidenbaum and Vogt, 1987; 
Wright et aL, 2002). It is found that this phenomenon is disappearing in the case 
of UK hotel companies because of pressure exerted from analysts in the City and 
major investors, particularly financial institutions in the UK. 
As financial institutions became major owners of hotel companies, they exerted 
strong influence on the corporate strategy of each company, including decision 
making regarding capital investment, even though they were not making day-to- 
day operational decisions. This is demonstrated particularly in the case of Bass's 
shareholders demanding dividend return, and intervening with management over 
potential acquisition activity. Therefore, it can be observed from this study that the 
non-value maximising motive for M&A activity is increasingly unsustainable, 
particularly in the UK hotel industry from the late 1990s. 
The growing power and importance of shareholders was confirmed via the hostile 
take-over of THIF by Granada in 1996. In this case, the main rationale posited by 
Granada during the hostile bid was that THF was not managing the company well 
and not returning justifiable profits to shareholders. The final decision for the bid 
depended on THF's main shareholder, a financial institution - MAM - which held a 
substantial amount of the company's shares. MAM's decision to sell THF shed 
light on the fact that financial institutions as major shareholders have in effect 
become the external monitors of management teams. This supports Marris 
(1964), who posited that M&A activity could be a form of control for management 
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and their non-profit maximising behaviour. THF being taken over by Granada, 
might, to a certain extent, not have proved that managers pursued their own 
welfare at the expense of shareholders, as posited by Marris (1964), but it did 
show that companies considered to be underperforming in the market would 
attract takeover bids to displace the management. The analysis of the four cases 
in this study also shows that managers cannot engage in M&A activities based 
purely on personal interests, because financial performance reflects managerial 
capabilities and their remunerations are tied to company's financial performance. 
Respondent 3 pointed out that senior management are typically rewarded via 
option and long-term incentive plans, and, in order to be rewarded, their interests 
have to be aligned with the shareholders' interest, because 'the management in 
the company will only make money when we, the shareholders of the company, 
make money'. This supports Jensen and Meckling's (1976) proposition that 
managers will act in the best interest of shareholders when there are appropriate 
incentives for them. 
The implication of the concern for increasing shareholder value reveals in another 
way how the hotel industry is being taken more seriously by the City. The hotel 
industry was increasingly becoming an important investment vehicle for financial 
institutions as evident by the bid for Premier Lodges in 2004. The final six bidders 
constituted five financial institutional investors and one hotel operator (Whitbread). 
10.1.3. Macro environment 
(1) Deregulation 
Deregulation has been suggested by Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) and Mulherin 
and Boone (2001) as a major industry shock in the UK between the 1980s and 
1990s. Harford (2005) also agreed that industry shocks - regulatory, technological 
and economic - are drivers of merger waves. However, Harford (2005) and other 
authors, Gugler et aL (2005) also argued that capital available for investment is 
crucial. These assumptions are supported in this study, particularly with regard to 
the deregulation of UK financial sector. M&A activities in the hotel industry could 
not have taken place without financial support, either from the company itself or 
other sources, because of high capital investment. Deregulation of the UK 
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financial sector in the 1980s played its role in releasing more funds for re- 
investment activities in the economy, and opened up opportunities for all industries 
to access capital at a competitive price. 
Financial deregulation is particularly crucial for the hotel industry and it can be 
broken down into two kinds of impacts, direct and indirect. Firstly, the direct 
impact was in terms of funds made available for expansion, in the form of bank 
loans with competitive interest rates and / or money generated from the share 
market and / or insurance companies and building societies. The anticipation of 
the financial deregulation itself produced an enormous number of M&A activities 
within the financial sector, which in turn created demand in the economy for 
durable and non-durable goods alike. This benefited hotel companies by allowing 
them easier access to capital, considering how capital intensive this industry is. 
Secondly, the indirect impact is the increased demand for non-durable goods. For 
instance, Godley (2002), while studying the transformation in the service industry 
found an unprecedented increase in the number of foreign retailers specialising in 
clothing in the late 1980s and early 1990s in the British retail market. He ascribes 
this phenomenon to the rise in income in the UK, with foreign retailers responding 
to the demand, leading to a shift in the domestic demand market for clothing on 
British high streets. In the same way, increased affluence among the British led to 
higher demand for leisure activities. The 1980s in the UK saw the rise in demand 
for short break holidays. This rise in the demand for hotel rooms within the UK 
itself spurred demand and growth in the hotel industry. This in turn increased the 
confidence of investors and attracted more financial capital into the industry, as 
evident with the four companies in this study. The under-supply and higher 
demand situation at that time particularly led to the need to engage in M&A 
activities in order to capture the market share quickly and meet demand 
adequately. 
In the first half of the 1990s, although banks had tightened their lending 
requirements due to the loss of a great deal of money in the recession years 
between 1989 and 1993, hotel companies were able to obtain funds by 
rationalising and selling their assets. Particularly in the late 1990s, financial 
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institutions changed their perspectives and developed a preference for tangible 
assets investment over the share market, mainly due to the technology market 
crash in the late 1990s. Hotel companies began to engage in more sale-and- 
leaseback and sale-and-manage back contracts with financial institutions. In this 
sense, deregulation of the UK financial sector, as an industry specific shock for the 
financial industry, became a general industry shock for the other industries, 
including the hotel industry, and induced merger waves during the 1980s and 
1990S. 
As with motives on an organisational level, different industry shocks did not take 
place in an exclusive manner, but were, to some degree, mutually dependent. For 
instance, deregulation of the UK financial sector was partly induced by 
globalisation, and the opening up of the UK financial sector to foreign competition 
led to the installation of new computer systems to facilitate financial exchange 
worldwide. In the same way, technology advancement worldwide has different 
impact on different companies and industries, including changes in hotel 
operations and distribution systems, which will be discussed next. 
(H) Technology 
Technology is considered a general industry shock and has an impact in inducing 
corporate restructuring (Mulherin and Boone, 2001; Toxvaerd, 2004). It is also an 
effective tool in M&A activities because economies of scale and scope are attained 
when the same amount of resources are used to produce more products or 
distribute a wider range of products (Gaughan, 2007; Singh and Montgomery, 
1987). Andrade et a/. (2001) posited that technological innovations created 
excess capacity which led to the need for industry consolidation. Although their 
studies were based on the manufacturing industry, the fact that technology created 
excess capacity is as applicable to the case of the hotel industry. For example, in 
the manufacturing industry, excess capacity is created in terms of products due to 
the advancement in technology. In the hotel industry, technology created excess 
capacity, in terms of using the same computer distribution system to handle a 
bigger pool of data such as the supply of rooms. 
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Technology advancement, particularly through information technology (IT), 
enables hotel companies to consolidate information regarding the number of 
rooms at different market levels, sell them through the same technology and 
achieve economies of scale by operating at a lower per-unit cost. The 
technological shock is particularly pertinent for the hotel industry as international 
trade barriers across borders disappeared and mobility of visitors between national 
borders increased. IT enables quick dissemination of information and so 
enhances sales and marketing, as well as the management and operation 
systems of hotel units across borders. This is supported by several M&A deals 
discussed previously, such as Whitbread - Marriott, Bass - Holiday Inn, Ladbroke - 
Hilton and THF - Le Meridien. These companies advocated the cost cutting factor 
derived from economies of scale, when rooms from two different companies were 
integrated after M&A activities into the same computer reservation system. 
Economies of scope are also achievable by cross selling a range of different 
products, such as hotel rooms, at different market levels or located in different 
geographical regions and countries. 
(III) Foreign competition 
Powell and Yawson (2005) found foreign competition in the UK to be an influential 
driver for M&A activities between the' 1980s and 1990s. Toxvaerd (2004) 
suggests that globalisation was a major factor leading to merger waves. This is 
supported by Jones (2005) who posits that the pace of globalisation intensified 
from the 1980s and attributes this to the combination of political and economic 
events. For example, drivers of the rapid development include the financial 
deregulation in the US (1975) and the UK (1986) which enabled more capital flows 
across borders; China's adoption of market oriented policies in 1979 and the 
collapse of Communism in Russia and Eastern Europe in 1989 opened up new 
markets for foreign investment. Moreover, the deregulation of air transport and 
telecommunications had also reduced transportation costs (Jones, 2005). 
During much of the 1980s, globalisation, deregulation and foreign competition led 
to more funds made available for investment in the UK, from local and foreign 
companies. In addition, interest rates and inflation rates were low, in conjunction 
with an increase in disposable income level, which had added to the change in 
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British consumer demand. The UK became the legitimate location for hotel 
companies to invest because of stable economy and a high volume of international 
visitors to the country. This growing demand for hotel rooms in the UK also 
attracted both domestic and foreign companies to expand their hotel interests 
there (Hotel Companies in the UK, 1987). UK hotel companies saw the 
opportunities to use international brand names to expand market share and attract 
international visitors, because they were also facing a shrinking demand from the 
domestic market, as the British were travelling out of the UK. Concurrently, 
particularly those with an international brand name in the US, decided to expand 
out of their country due to market maturity there. UK hotel companies became 
more prominent in the international hotel industry when Ladbroke bought the 
Hilton hotel company (1987) and Bass purchased the Holiday Inn hotel company 
(1987-1990). These were big hotel companies in terms of international presence 
and size (number of rooms) worldwide during that period. In the 1990s, the UK 
hotel companies continued to grow internationally by buying up international brand 
names (Le Meridien by THF in 1994) or brand rights (Marriott by Whitbread in 
1996). 
(iv) Growth (high or low growth industry) 
According to Powell and Yawson (2005) and Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), M&A 
activities had been concentrated more in industries with low growth in the 1980s. 
The findings in this study of the UK hotel industry have presented different views, 
in terms of a high volume of M&A activities in the growing hotel industry in the 
1980s. As discussed previously, the financial deregulation during that period had 
a spill over effect on other industries, leading to growing demand for non-durable 
goods and services. This difference in findings probably occurs because of the 
difference in sample used. The samples used by Powell and Yawson (2005) and 
Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) were based in manufacturing industries facing 
declining growth, leading to consolidation of excess capacity, in the low growth 
industries. However, this study supports the view of Powell and Yawson's (2005) 
with regard to the negative correlation between low growth industry in the 1990s 
and M&A activities. This was demonstrated by Ladbroke - Stakis, Bass - SPHC 
and Bristol, and Whitbread - Swallow engaging In M&A activities in the late 1990s 
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under an economic downturn and a decrease in demand for hotel rooms, slowing 
the growth in the hotel industry. 
This study also supports the view of Mulherin and Boone (2001, pp. 135) who 
concluded that M&A activities in the 1990s were not restricted to industries with a 
slow growth. For instance, the deals such as SPHC and Bristol closed by Bass 
were linked to the aim of expanding in a growth industry, which was the, hotel 
industry at that time. These moves were partly motivated by the aim to reduce the 
company's exposure to another declining industry - brewing. Similarly, Whitbread 
expanded its hotel division aggressively from the mid-1 990s, as part of its intention 
to balance its business portfolio, due also to the slow growth in brewing. Thus, 
corporate restructuring is not only dependent on industry and / or general shocks; 
there were also company specific motives. In this sense, this study also supports 
the view of Blair and Schary (1993), Gulger et, aL and Toxvaerd (2004) that there 
are company-specific reasons interacting with industry and general shocks. 
In summary, this sub-section presented the analysis derived from a cross-case 
comparison in the context of variables obtained from the theoretical framework to 
present how this study supported or did not support the M&A literature. As found 
in this thesis, industry and general shocks - deregulations, technology, growth or 
decline in specific industry and foreign competition - interacted with organisational 
motives which led to M&A activities. The study has explained the circumstances 
which triggered hotel expansion via M&A activities in terms of environmentally 
induced or 'push' factors and opportunities arising which 'pull'. As the 
globalisation of trade and visitors mobility continued in conjunction with IT's rapid 
development as a vehicle for real time information dissemination and sales 
purposes, the increasing competition posted by hotel companies as well as online 
agents, led to hotel operators' increasing awareness of the power of brand names. 
It is found that the motive to acquire a well-established brand name or brand right 
is common in these four case studies. However, this particular motive has not 
been extensively discussed in the M&A literature. In view of the growing 
importance of this factor amongst hotel operators, brand acquisition will be 
evaluated in detail in the next section, in the context of the M&A literature. 
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10.2. Brand and brand right acquisitions 
Strategic fit is often cited as a motive for M&A activity based on relatedness 
between resources, such as the complementary. characters of the assets and 
operations of the combined companies to produce the product and derive 
maximum value for the company (Hill and Hoskisson, 1987; Jemison and Sitkin, 
1986). In the context of the hotel industry, the acquisition of brand and brand 
rights could provide the same strategic fit. This may be achieved either by buying 
up a branded hotel group and re-branding the existing hotel company, or buying 
up a hotel company which complements existing products and re-branding its 
hotels. Evidently, either way of re-branding hotels leads to an increase in size, in 
terms of number of hotels and rooms, and creates critical mass. This concurs with 
the complementary resources, which lie in the similarities in the types of room 
operation between two hotel companies. A brand name is acquired and used to 
re-brand acquired hotels which carry the same kind of rooms, enabling the 
acquirers to save time and cost compared to organic growth. 
In addition, branding also increases market power through increase in market 
share. Generally, the M&A literature relates to achieving market power through 
increasing market share, realised by the purchase of the same p roduct in the 
market, thus increasing a company's size relative to its competitors (Gaughan, 
2007; Hitt et al., 1998; Ingram et aL, 1992; Singh and Montgomery, 1987; 
Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001). In the case of the hotel industry, the concept of 
market share in the M&A literature can be applied to the hotel company in terms of 
a rise in numbers of customers, rather than products, through M&A activities. This 
explicitly relates to enhancing value by integrating two loyalty programmes, thus 
increasing market share. This is evident from deals such as Whitbread-Marriott, 
Bass-ICH and Ladbroke-Stakis. In these deals, integration of customers under 
two loyalty programmes and cross-selling of different products or the same 
products at different locations, provided by the same hotel companies, can be 
translated into higher sales and profits. Thus, brand has become an important 
motive for M&A activity because 'A brand name is a promise to the customer of a 
certain level of product quality and service execution' (Muller, 1998, pp. 91). 
Moreover, the combination of globalisation and technology drives brand 
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recognition as some travellers prefer to use the same brand name for assurance 
when travelling away from home. 
Technology and brands are found to be interdependent and are more specific to 
the hotel industry in terms of exploiting operational synergies. It has been clearly 
pointed out by David Bland, Managing Director at Bass Hotels and Resorts 
(Europe, Middle East and Africa) that 'the strength of the Internet demanded 
strong brands and the Internet also provides an opportunity to obtain incremental 
sales through intermediaries such as Lastminute. com' (Sangster, 2000a, pp. 13). 
Melvin Gold of Pannell Kerr Forster (PKF), a business consulting company, 
including hotel consultancy, also commented that 'as the big groups get bigger, 
hotels which do not rely exclusively on their local market are going to have a look 
at branding and group reservations systems to reach a global market' (Cohen, 
1999). These views shed light on the importance of technology and brand, clearly 
influencing factors on the management decision-making process and the motive to 
increase the size of a company. 
Correspondingly, a well-established brand name acquired is value enhancing for 
the combined companies when extended to different products and to offering more 
goods and services to customers. This is evident from the creation by Holiday Inn 
of the Express by Holiday Inn brand name, and Marriott Courtyard by Marriott was 
similarly created by Marriott as a three-star product, offering amenities and 
services that are ranked between limited service and four- and five - star type of 
hotel. In the same way, Ladbroke started its hotel business in the four - and five - 
star market sectors and extended its range of products through three-Star (Hilton 
Garden Inns) and three-star all-inclusive sectors (Coral by Hilton). These 
examples provide empirical support to Singh and Montgomery's (1987) conceptual 
study that suggests scope economies occur through distribution systems and 
intangible assets like brand name when these are used for more than one product. 
Brand name can become a strategic fit with corporate and business strategies, 
thus enhanced the value for companies. For instance, Ladbroke re-branded its 
existing Ladbroke hotels as Hilton National after the acquisition of Hilton 
International in 1987. The Group also replaced its corporate name with Hilton 
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Group plc in 1999 in order to identify itself as a major player in the hotel industry. 
Similarly, Bass re-branded its Crest hotels to Holiday Inns in the late 1980s and 
adopted the more prestigious name of 'InterContinental' from its hotel division as 
its corporate name in 2003 after de-merging it ,s hotel and drinks divisions. 
This discussion so far shows that brand name and brand right acquisitions provide 
the means to increase market share via re-branding of rooms, merging members 
of loyalty programmes and product extension. This discussion also highlights the 
strategic fit between complementary products which enhance value and reduce 
cost, resulted partly from operational synergies. According to Gaughan (2007) 
and Singh and Montgomery (1987), an increase in market share also 
encompasses market power and monopolistic control and the power to set price. 
In this study, financial synergy is gained through market power and monopolistic 
control derived from the acquisition and ownership of brand names. This in turn 
leads to market power to control licensing', franchising and/ or management rights. 
Moreover, the rights to brand name also enable the brand owner to control its 
I price' in terms of franchising fees and management fees. This supports the view 
of Gaughan (2007), that the source of market control can be linked to monopoly 
power because of ability to set and maintain price above competitive levels. 
Price setting for hotel rooms might not be prevalent because of intense 
competition in the industry; however, price setting could take place in terms of 
franchising fees. For example, the consolidation of the Holiday Inn brand and the 
sole ownership of its brand name enabled Bass to set and control franchising fees. 
Bass increased its franchise fee for the Holiday Inn brand in 1991 after it acquired 
the whole chain. The power of owning a brand name and its exclusive rights is 
further 'evidenced by Bass granting a license to Seibu Saison Group (seller of 
InterContinental Hotels) to continue the operation of the InterContinental and 
Forum brands in Japan where Bass had no exposure. This monopoly power is 
best illustrated by the breakdown in a franchising deal between Scott's and Bass 
in 1991. Scott's had wanted the sole franchise rights and control of the Holiday 
Inn brand in the UK, but this was rejected. This led to Scott's terminating its 
contracts with Bass, and re-branding all its Holiday Inns hotels into the Marriott 
brand. Likewise, Whitbread, which bought Scott's chain of UK hotels, had the 
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advantage of gaining this exclusive right to operate Marriott's brand name in the 
UK. This could also be translated into monopoly power over the use of this brand 
name in the UK, simultaneously eliminating direct competitors operating in the 
same market level (four-star), without increasing capacity. 
Financial synergies are argued in the general M&A literature in terms of increased 
sizes and decreased lending rates, as well as reductions in perceived risks and 
higher debt capacity because additional funds are easier to obtain when the asset 
backing of the merged companies is larger (Halpern, 1983; Hitt et aL, 1998; 
Kitching, 1967; Lewellen, 1971; Lubatkin, 1983; Yagil, 1996). This is supported by 
Respondent 4's comment that financial synergies can be derived in the case of a 
bigger company buying over a smaller one; the latter company, increased in size, 
is able to borrow more money at lower rate on the back of the bigger company. 
This financial synergy is also supported by brand name and right acquisitions, in 
terms of enabling hotel operators to gain access to capital markets more easily 
because investors feel 'safer behind a brand name and an established company' 
(Cohen, 1999, pp. 9). In a similar vein, Respondent 4 also pointed out that there 
are financial synergies in M&A activities when the value of a brand enables these 
hotel - companies to expand through management contracts and franchising, 
cutting down debts and increasing shareholder value by returning more dividend. 
This implies a well-recognised brand name attracts investors, which enables hotel 
companies to move towards expansion without equity or minimum equity 
investment, and this no doubt reveals ownership of a brand name and rights as 
synonymous with market power. For instance, Bass retains the brand rights to the 
brand name Holiday Inn and Intercontinental; Whitbread held the right to the 
Marriott brand in the UK (1995 - 2005), and THF had the brand rights to Le 
Meridien worldwide (1994 - 1996). Therefore, the acquisition of a recognised 
brand name and not assets had provided these hotel ý operators with the 
opportunity to grow, particularly from the 1980s. 
The argument for brand acquisition in this study also highlighted the relationship 
between M&A activities and a low-concentrated industry. The general argument 
for industry concentration is attributed to sales and profits or the amount of product 
produced by a few dominating companies (Powell and Yawson, 2005). Moreover, 
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Powell and Yawson (2005) argued that low-concentrated industries have a higher 
rate of M&A activity, as companies compete to gain a greater share of the market. 
Branding has become increasingly recognised as an important asset of hotel 
companies, and it was estimated in 1999 that 80% of all the UK's hotels were 
unbranded (Buckingham, 1999). Thus, the opportunity created by the low 
concentration of branded hotels motivated hotel companies to acquire brands as a 
means of expansion, via corporate affiliation such as franchising and management 
contracting. 
Due to the difficulties in organic growth, brand acquisition as well as purchasing- 
and-re-branding exercises became common activities in the hotel industry. A lack 
of land and the difficulties in obtaining development permits severely constrained 
the building of new hotel rooms in the UK since the 1980s (Hannan, 1986; Ward, 
1997). These constraints coupled with the opportunity created by the under- 
supply of rooms in the industry, a lack of corporate affiliated hotel rooms, 
globalisation and higher customer expectation in the quality of hotels made these 
brand acquisitions and re-branding more valuable. Moreover, it was considered 
cheaper to buy asset and re-brand as Respondent 3 and Respondent 6 
mentioned. In weighing the cost-benefits between the options of new build or 
acquisition, branding strategies play a particular important influence. As 
commented by Respondent 6, 
'The increase in the number of global travellers and greater mobility in 
general make branding a much more important part of the exercise today 
than it was, it was global branding'. 
Although technology, globalisation, deregulation of the financial sector and 
industry growth are commonly examined as proxies for industry 
' 
shocks (Mitchell 
and Mulherin, 1996; Mulherin and Boone, 2000; Powell and Yawson, 2005; 
Toxvaerd, 2004), there is no specific discussion based on land limitation, planning 
restrictions and property markets. One reason is that previous M&A related 
research was conducted within a mix of industries. Moreover, there has been no 
specific study. carried out in the context of the interaction of organisational intents 
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and macro environmental factors in M&A activities, based on the UK hotel 
industry. 
The aim to understand the emergence of big business in the UK hotel industry via 
the study of M&A activities led to the revelationof brand as an important motive in 
this activity. The role of brand and brand right acquisition has also shed light on 
big business concepts and will be discussed in the next section. 
10.3. Brand acquisition and big business 
The importance of the role of brand and brand right acquisition provides several 
new dimensions to big business concepts, particularly in the context of the UK 
hotel industry. 
Firstly companies' ownership of huge capital assets is embedded in the 
description of big business (Schmitz, 1993). Although the four hotel companies 
owned large capital assets,, via several M&A activities, it has been observed from 
the 1980s that increasing emphasis on acquiring and owning brand names and 
brand rights among hotel companies has changed the meaning of owning huge 
assets in this industry. Brand name and brand rights have provided hotel 
companies with the market power to franchise out their names and / or engage in 
management contracts, as a means to expand, leading to value enhancement and 
cost reduction. For example, THF's acquisition of Le Meridien in 1994 (consisting 
of management contracts in the main) and Bass's acquisition of hotel 
management companies SPHC and Bristol (2000), show a trend towards involving 
fewer fixed capital assets, but instead purchasing co mpanies that hold the 
operating rights to a number of brand names. Thus, the hotel industry is 
increasingly becoming big business, not predicated on high fixed capital assets, 
rather on intangible ones. 
Secondly, Schmitz's (1993) concept of a big business is one that integrates the 
production and sales of a diverse number of products and / or geographic areas. 
In the hotel industry, the integration of the production and sales of a number of 
products in one or a number of locations simultaneously, is increasingly different 
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from Schmitz's description. First, there is a difference between the formers study 
of the manufacturing sector and the more service orientated nature of the hotel 
industry. Although it could be argued that the hotel room serves as a product itself 
and is produced by companies for nightly sale, the nature of the hotel business 
requires product (rooms) to be delivered in many places at the same time for 
customers' consumption. Second, as mentioned previously, in the process of 
becoming a big business, hotel companies became increasingly dependent on 
branding to expand. Similarly, integrating production and sales processes is also 
dependent on a recognised brand name, in terms of re-branding the products of 
one company into another brand name and integrating these products into the 
same marketing and distribution system to promote sales. There are many 
examples in this study, namely, the re-branding of Crest hotels into Holiday Inn 
brand; THF integrating Post Houses into the Crest brand; Ladbroke converting its 
Ladbroke Hotels into Hilton National and Whitbread's purchase of Marriott brand 
rights and changing the names of its country club hotels into the Marriott brand. 
Thirdly, there is the argument made by Cassis (1997, pp. 5) regarding big 
business, namely that it "is a wider concept ... [it] is a matter of large-scale 
operations, of money and poyver, whatever the type of activity or the forms of 
organisation". In the hotel industry, it is increasingly clear that hotel companies 
are large-scale operations, due to the need to be present at as many locations as 
possible to provide goods and services concurrently. Moreover, money is inherent 
in this industry due to its nature of high investment costs, regardless of the source 
of funds, whether originating from the company through internally generated 
resources or attracted from external investors. In addition, the ownership of a 
well-recognised brand name and brand rights has increasingly become a 
significant part of the market power of hotel companies to attract both customers 
and investors as a means of expansion and survival. Customers are attracted to a 
good brand name for the quality it guarantees, and this in turn generates the 
interest of investors to invest in hotel companies with a brand name. Each hotel 
company under study had, in its history, used its acquisition and ownership of a 
brand name or brand right to expand its hotel business and emerge as a leading 
company in this industry. For instance, THF - Le Meridien Hotels; Ladbroke - 
Hilton Hotels; Bass - Holiday Inn Hotels and InterContinental Hotels and 
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Whitbread - Marriott Hotels. These purchases enabled Bass and Ladbroke to 
become two of the leading hotel companies worldwide, by the number of hotel 
rooms operated, as well as consolidating THF's position as the UK largest hotel 
company, in terms of number of rooms and a leading brand name. 
Fourthly, the big business concept lies in Cassis's (1997) and Schmitz's (1993) 
proposition that a limited number of large companies compete with one another in 
the same industry. In their studies, being big was based on companies owning 
major market shares, in terms of sales figures and production output. In the case 
of the hotel industry, a few major companies competing against one another 
depend not only on financial figures. In general, the number of hotels and rooms 
affiliated to the same hotel company and / or branded under the same name is 
used to present the market share (see Appendices B and F). This is partly 
ascribed to the importance of being present in a number of locations - locally, 
regionally and / or internationally to deliver products (hotel rooms). Particularly 
attractive is the customer loyalty programme which retains and / or attracts 
customers when a hotel company is able to provide many choices of location for 
their convenient use. Thus, the UK hotel industry saw the emergence of big 
business in the context of leading hotel companies, which own a major market 
share in terms of powerful brand names and rights. In 2004, a survey conducted 
by MKG consultants revealed that the ten largest hotel companies in the world 
were managing 75% of the world's 4.6 million rooms (Hotel News Resource, 
2004). The InterContinental Hotels Group, originally Bass Group pIc and Hilton 
International, owned by Ladbroke pic were ranked the largest and the 10 th largest 
hotel group in the world respectively (Hotel News Resource, 2004)2 . The 
acquisition and ownership of brand names enabled UK hotel companies to 
increase market power and gain market share within the UK, and also worldwide. 
10.4. M&A activities and changes in corporate strategies 
The examination of M&A activities in the development of four UK hotel companies 
also reveals how the corporate strategies of these companies changed over time 
2 Notes: 536,318 rooms and 102,602 rooms for InterContinental Hotels Group and Hilton 
International respectively. 
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in response to macro environmental change. Over a span of more than two 
decades, companies changed from conglomerates with diverse business 
portfolios, divested several business divisions and returned to focussed business. 
In the 1980s, corporate resources among the three hotel companies were spread 
in supporting different business divisions. The four companies had distinctive 
strategies because of their different backgrounds in terms of original businesses. 
Strategies changed according to changes in market demand and in conjunction 
with companies' objectives, in order to strengthen their organisations by increasing 
market share and becoming market leaders, and by balancing out deteriorating 
businesses in their business portfolios for growth and survival. The ability to fund 
their asset-heavy hotel business was facilitated through cash flow obtained from 
other business divisions within each group. These had once been a source of 
strength and were effective, particularly in supporting M&A activities and 
expanding the company as a whole. 
I 
For example, Ladbroke's original business 
* 
was gaming and it expanded into hotels 
from the 1970s. The Group's strategy from the early 1980s was one of balancing 
cash flow with asset-based business. This was particularly highlighted via its 
focus on four divisions (gaming, hotels, property, DIY) in 1986. Ladbroke 
expanded its hotel division mainly through management contracts, following the 
purchase of Hilton International, to reduce the ownership of assets and increase 
cash flow for the company. In the case of THF, it had its catering business to 
bring in cash flow for its hotels from the 1970s. Generally, THF used its retained 
profits and loans for hotel expansion and growth, although its expansion mode 
shifted slightly in 1990, as it used sale and leaseback as a means to finance its 
purchase of Crest. Similarly, Bass shifted its dependence on cash flow generated 
by its brewing division, and reduced its ownership of assets; instead, it expanded 
through franchising after purchasing the Holiday Inn group in 1987. 
The companies' modes of expansion via conglomerate strategies changed from 
the early 1990s, in response to changes in the macro environment. The UK and 
world economy went through a major recession between 1989 and 1992, which 
reduced demand for hotel rooms and heralded sales and revenue declines for 
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many hotel companies. At the same time, hotel companies were challenged with 
a rise in interest rates in addition to the reduction in demand for rooms from leisure 
and business visitors. This led to restructuring programmes among the four 
companies. Non-core businesses, which had previously been core and provided 
the means, in terms of financial support, for expansion were disposed of. 
Corporate strategies returned to focus on a few core businesses. For example, 
THF changed its strategy to focus on its hotel and restaurant businesses and sold 
its catering business, Gardner Merchant (AR / THF, 1993). In 1994, THF 
expanded its hotel division via the purchase of Le Meridien, which consisted 
mainly of management contracted hotels. This was obviously a move away from 
ownership and management of hotel properties, towards asset-light hotel 
management. Similarly, Ladbroke narrowed down its strategy to concentrate on 
developing hotel and gaming businesses, and sold its property and IDIY divisions 
to reduce interest costs. ' In the case of Whitbread, it decided to concentrate on its 
more profitable four-star (CCH) and budget (Travel Inns) market sectors and re- 
structured its hotel division by selling off its three-star Lansbury hotels. 
On the other hand, Bass was not as badly affected as the other three companies, 
because the group had already re-structured its company by selling off Crest 
hotels, expanding its hotel division via franchising the Holiday Inn brand from the 
late 1980s and holding fewer hotel assets. This crisis reveals how four companies 
re-structured by concentrating their resources on lesser hotel assets and more 
recognised brand names to achieve better financial performance. This in turn 
shows the change in the UK hotel industry, adopting the US's mode of expansion 
by investing less equity, and expanding through franchising and management 
contracting. More importantly, it reveals the separation of ownership and 
management control in the UK hotel industry, which also reflects on the availability 
of funds outside hotel companies for re-investment, as well as the growing 
importance of the hotel business. 
In the late 1990s, corporate strategies continued to focus on core businesses, as 
the UK and world economic slump emerged, in addition to threats of terrorism, 
epidemics and wars. All companies (except THF, which was taken over in 1996) 
were challenged and this led to a continuous rationalisation of hotel assets, to 
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achieve cost cuffing and profit maximisation. For example, Ladbroke sold 'off 11 
hotel properties in a sale-and-leaseback deal. Likewise, Whitbread and Bass sold 
their brewing divisions in 2000. Whitbread also changed its strategy to 
concentrate on its group of budget hotels, positioned in a market that was growing, 
and sold its four-star hotel sector (Marriott hotels and brand name) in 2004, which 
was seen as not performing as well. On the other hand, Bass started its re- 
structuring in 1998 and sold its non-core business es and focused on two 
businesses - hotel and soft drinks - in 2003. 
The discussion of strategy change in the context of cash flow generation reveals 
the fact that companies used unrelated businesses to finance business and 
corporate growth. More importantly, it shows how macro environmental factors 
greatly influenced the strategies of all four hotel groups, particularly reflected in a 
change from looking to maximise profits through diversification to more focussed 
strategies. Different hotel companies have different objectives, and thus had 
different ways of responding to changes under different industry- and general 
environmental circumstances. 
This is particularly revealed through the case of Ladbroke and its hotel 
development in the four-star market sector. In 1987, after the acquisition of Hilton 
International, Ladbroke decided to stall its budget hotel development and leave 
this market level to other hotel companies. The strategy adopted by Ladbroke 
then was to concentrate on developing its four-star Hilton brand, through 
management contracting, which requires less equity and debt investment, and 
also delivers higher margins compared to the budget sector. In the early 2000s, 
the perception of four-star hotel businesses changed, as demand for this market 
sector was badly affected by economic slow down and other world events. 
Ladbroke found this particular business to be less lucrative than it was in the 
1980s, which no doubt can be attributed to present increasing competition 
between international hotel companies within the UK and worldwide, which was 
not as intensive in the 1980s. Moreover, Ladbroke's original business - gaming - 
was becoming a growing industry at the same time, because of technology 
advancement and increased participation in remote gaming. Similarly, Whitbread 
decided to sell its four-star Marriott brand rights and focus on its budget hotels in 
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2004. Whitbread's plan was also brand dependent, namely to expand its Premier 
Travel Inn brand, then the biggest UK budget hotel group. This change of strategy 
reinforced the motive of brand and brand right acquisition in the hotel industry. 
The adoption of different strategies, due to interactions of company-, industry- and 
general environmental factors, was also seen in the cases of THF and Bass. 
These are two diversified hotel companies, in terms of the range of market levels 
they own and operate at, from one-star to five-star. THF had been operating at 
different market levels since the beginning of its hotel operation, for example, 
operating five-star hotels such as London Waldorf from 1958 and three-star Post 
House from 1969. The Group continued to expand its hotel division by building up 
its strength at different market level, including its budget range (Travelodge) which 
was in high demand since the mid 1980s, and the acquisition of Le Meridien, an 
international five-star hotel company, in recognition of the benefits to be derived 
from a recognised international brand name. Moreover, THF also acknowledged 
that hotel business was moving towards expansion at minimum and / or non-equity 
investment through management contracting and franchising. Bass, the first 
amongst all three to acquire a big international hotel company had also been 
developing its hotel division at different market levels. The focus strategy Bass 
had taken up was more evident when the Group de-merged its hotel and soft drink 
division in 2003 to concentrate on its core hotel business. 
These strategy changes also brought to light the vulnerability of this particular 
industry and showed organisational capabilities in terms of how management was 
able to identify opportunities and threats and engaged in M&A activities, in 
conjunction with balancing different business portfolios to maximise profit, leading 
to the emergence of big business in the hotel industry. In addition, these changes 
also show management concern for increasing shareholders' value, reflecting the 
increasing power of shareholders, in terms of monitoring and intervening with 
companies' strategies and their resulting financial performance. However, this 
emphasis on shareholder value has not changed the hotel industry totally into one 
that is totally driven by short-term financial gains rather than concentrating on a 
long-term business strategy. Unlike companies whose approach to M&A is based 
on acquiring to create value through breaking-up underperforming or undervalued 
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companies, it is observed that several asset disposals that took place after M&A 
activities among these hotel companies reflected long term strategic planning. 
They took place for a variety of reasons: to reduce overlap in locations of hotel 
units, to lower high costs incurred for hotel units that were too expensive and time 
consuming to refurbish, and to adhere to company's objective of selling hotel units 
that did not meet the criteria of the brand quality. 
10.5. Summary 
This chapter sums up the research findings for this thesis, and demonstrates that 
M&A activities enabled hotel companies to grow, leading to the emergence of big 
business in the UK hotel industry between the years 1979 and 2004. Motives for 
M&A activities in the hotel industry are generally value maximising with a small 
degree of non-value maximising motive. The analysis, via the examination of 
interactions between motives on an organisational level and the macro 
environment, provides a comprehensive view of how and why companies 
expanded through the use of M&A. It is also found that the investigation of M&A 
activities using a small sample and through longitudinal study of four hotel 
companies, provides a holistic understanding of how companies make decisions 
and change strategies. 
As shown in the four case studies, it is also found that the motive to acquire brand 
and brand rights is prominent among hotel companies; however, this motive has 
not been widely discussed in the general motivations for M&A literature. The lack 
of study into this particular motive is ascribed to the lack of research into M&A 
activities in the hotel industry in particular. Moreover, previous study has also 
concentrated on a mix of industries, a large sample size and / or a cross- 
examination across national borders. In the hotel industry, a well- recognised 
brand name attracts customers and investors alike, which has enabled hotel 
companies that own recognised brand names to develop and extend their brands. 
Although the hotel industry is still dominated by many independent hotels, 
companies affiliated to a corporate hotel name, or recognised brand name are 
able to generate better revenues than the independent hotels. The spill-over 
effect of the increasing emphasis on branded hotels by customers and investors 
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alike, was to draw in more financial investors, beside hotel companies. In addition, 
hotel companies were motivated to engage in the use of management contracting, 
franchising, sale-and-leaseback and sale-and-manage back methods to expand 
hotel divisions, and reduce capital expenditure. These means of expansion 
enhance value for companies; however, these types of financing methods will only 
be possible if the economy is stable enough to generate demand for 
accommodation and if good brand names dre available to boost the trust of 
investors. 
These interactions between company-specific and industry- and general 
environmental factors shed light on strategy changes among four hotel companies. 
Companies reveal their organisational capabilities via their strategy changes, from 
'conglomeration' to 'focus' over a period of 26 years, in response to external macro 
environmental changes. These changes, presented through the use of M&A 
activities to grow their hotel divisions, in turn show companies' increasing 
emphasis on shareholder value. This was mainly due to the nature of this 
industry, Which requires high investment costs and faces difficulties in obtaining 
financial support for investment via internal means, which led to increasing 
requirement for support from investors such as financial institutions and banks. 
Based on the above discussion, the next chapter presents the contributions to 
knowledge of this study, provides recommendations for further research and 
reflects on the learning outcomes from this research process. 
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Chapter 11: 
Conclusion 
The previous chapters provided the rationale and context for this study and 
evaluated the literature on M&A activities to form a theoretical framework. This 
was followed by the research design chapter, which explained the methodology 
and method used in carrying out this study. Each of the four cases was then 
examined by using comparative historical analysis; this was followed by the 
discussion chapter highlighting the findings, with particular attention to comparing 
and contrasting them with M&A literature. The purpose of this chapter is to 
conclude this study, by answering the research question, highlighting the 
contribution made, identifying areas for further research and reflecting upon the 
learning process. This chapter begins with an account of the contributions to 
knowledge this study makes. The second part presents implications from this 
study. The third part provides recommendations for further research and the final 
part reflects on learning outcomes from this research process. 
11.1. Contributions to knowledge 
The research aim at the outset was to: 
'explore and understand the development of big business in the UK hotel 
industry by examining the motives for M&A activity, the major expansion tool 
used in the creation of big business'. 
The contribution to knowledge is presented in four points, and the achievement of 
the five objectives set out in the first chapter will be highlighted. 
(i) The first contribution concerns the question of the UK hotel industry's 
emergence as big business. The findings from this thesis confirm the existing 
literature on what encompasses big business, underpinned by the description of 
big business as an enterprise that owns huge fixed capital assets and integrates 
production and sales of a diverse number of products and / or has a wide 
geographic spread; big business is characterised by large scale operations and a 
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limited number of large companies dominating the market in terms of sales figures 
and production output (Cassis1997; Schmitz; 1993). Equally important is the 
confirmation that M&A activity was the major tool used in the creation of big 
business, supporting well-established works (Channon 1978; Cassis, 1997; 
Hannah, 1983; Hannah and Kay, 1977) conducted in this area of research. At the 
same time, this thesis also added several new dimensions to big business 
concepts, through illuminating the role of brand and brand right acquisition in the 
context of the UK hotel industry. 
The relevance of this thesis goes beyond the examination of UK hotel industry 
emerging as big business. The consolidation and explanation of four companies 
and their past experiences over time have broadened the research agenda into 
the study of hotel business, business history and business management theory. 
Current studies in business history have neglected the historical development of 
the hotel industry. At the same time, existing studies of the historical development 
of hotel companies provide a general view of the evolution of the hotel industry 
from the A. D. 400 to 1989, but with little analytical study into why this happened. 
Although M&A activities were mentioned in some of these previous works, as a 
mode for growth, there was a lack of in-depth discussion of how and why these 
activities were used. Similarly, existing studies of M&A activities in relation to hotel 
companies covered the period 1945 to 1989; however, they displayed an 
organisational view, with little investigation of external influences from the macro 
environment. Thus, this first contribution also'fulfilled objective Five, namely that 
of contributing to the study of M&A and business history through historical analysis 
of the leading hotel companies in the UK. 
(ii) The second contribution concerns the new empirical data this study has 
constructed. This is the first scholarly attempt to study historical development of 
UK hotel companies, based on the theoretical framework of M&A theory, and 
integrating two levels - organisational and general external environment - as a 
means to evaluate the growth of companies and the emergence of big business in 
this industry. As highlighted in chapter three, most studies of motives for M&A are 
based on one level or the other. Although there have been a limited number of 
studies integrating both levels, these researchers have also acknowledged a lack 
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I 
of affirmative outcomes, attributable to company-specific reasons and the 
aggregated data used in a multi-industry setting. Therefore, a big sample size no 
doubt added robustness to the study, but could not elicit in-depth understanding of 
why companies took this expansion route. 
Part of the originality of this research is that it integrates the two levels of literature 
and reconciles them with a new set of data on UK hotel companies; and that it 
extends what was previously known about growth and M&A to the circumstances 
of the hotel industry in particular. Moreover, this thesis used a small sample and a 
longitudinal approach to examine the how and why companies engaged in M&A 
activities. The findings confirmed the company motives and industry shock 
concepts drawn for M&A in the generic studies. In addition, the use of two levels 
to analyse the data also added insights into why and how companies made these 
decisions (M&A) under different macro environmental factors and within the same 
historical period. 
For instance, in the 1980s, hotel companies acquired other hotel units or 
companies to increase their size and meet the rising demand for conference 
rooms and accommodation. This was a result of a combination of a company's 
intent to expand into a growing industry and the macro environmental factors such 
as increasing disposable income in the UK, rising numbers of overseas visitors, 
deregulation in the UK financial sectors and a general global economy boom. 
However, a further examination also revealed that M&A activities are particularly 
critical for a hotel company to increase its size in the UK because of land scarcity, 
difficulty in obtaining new building permits, particularly in London and the high 
investment cost requiring companies to use a huge amount of internally generated 
funds or external finance for financial support. Similarly, the external driver for 
hotel companies to engage in M&A activities in the 1990s, could be prompted by 
the improvement in IT, particularly the Internet. The Internet has enabled 
companies to benefit from economies of scale as more sophisticated management 
and reservation systems are developed in the hotel industry. This speeds up 
information dissemination and improves marketing and sales operations. Along 
with this technological advancement, competition also intensified in relation to 
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technology, particularly among those hotel companies owning recognised brand 
names. 
In addition, the historical comparative analysis also provides a more accurate 
picture of the motives for and results of M&A activities in the context of each 
company's growth over time, and in turn reinforces the proposition that there are 
company-specific reasons interacting with industry and general shocks. For 
example, Ladbroke bought Hilton International i. n the 1980s, when competition with 
other local hotel and foreign hotel companies intensified in the UK. Ladbroke also 
wanted to attract the major visitors who were the Americans to its group of UK 
hotels. The recognition of owning an international brand name had partly driven 
the purchase of Hilton International. In the same way, the Marriot brand rights 
served its purpose of increasing Whitbread's number of hotel rooms in the mid 
1990s, as well as obtaining the exclusive rights to an international hotel brand in 
the UK, in a period when operating with an international hotel brand in the UK 
serves as a significant competitive advantage. Although these hotel companies 
were sold off in 2005 and 2004 respectively, the historical comparative analysis 
provided the understanding on why and how these was purchased and sold, as 
both decisions were made depending on changes in macro environment. These 
two deals in question are considered value maximising for both companies, in the 
context of the timing of their purchases. 
Therefore, this contribution has addressed objective Three by analysing and 
adding insights into 'how' and 'why' hotel companies expand through M&A 
activities, in relation to organisational motives and external influences from the 
macro environment. 
(iii) The third contribution relates to brand name and / or brand right acquisitions as 
a M&A motive, in the context of hotel industry. In the generic M&A theory, 
acquisition motives have commonly been assumed to be value maximising, 
including economies of scale and scope, market power, strategic fit and speed and 
or non-value maximising motive, such as growth in sales and size of company 
and managerial welfare. This thesis has also made used of these generic theories 
to form the theoretical framework for facilitating the discussion. This thesis argues 
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that brand motive has been widely cited in the hotel industry specifically, and that 
brand motive as a variable has been found to be an important variable in the value 
maximising concept, but that it has been neglected as a variable in discussion of 
organisational and environmental interactions. In particular, the understanding, 
through a comparative historical analysis, of hotel companies' expansion through 
M&A activities, explicitly presented why and how hotel companies acquired brand 
names to grow, and in turn illuminates branding as a specific motive in acquisition, 
based on the company intention to use it as a tool for expansion purposes. 
The structure of the UK hotel industry is fragmented, in terms of the ownership 
pattern being made up of many small owners. However, this structure in part, was 
altered by factors such as consumers' demand for branded hotels and individual 
hotel owners facing disadvantages for not deriving as much from economies of 
scale and scope as branded hotel operators. Increasingly, a number of small 
owners became affiliated to corporate hotels owning an international brand name, 
through management contracting or franchising methods. This in turn highlights 
the importance of owning a recognised brand name and declining fragmentation in 
this industry. 
The acquisition of brand names and rights had also altered the industry structure 
in terms of the separation of ownership and management control. The bigger UK 
hotel companies have gone beyond their traditional expansion methods, which 
had previously emphasised holding assets and / or a strong balance sheet, to 
adopting franchising and management contracting which require minimum to no 
equity investment from the 1980s. This type of growth strategy helped the 
companies to maintain more cash flow for re-investment such as M&A activities. 
Since this mode of expansion also needs the ownership of a recognised brand for 
rapid expansion and to maintain competitive advantage, the notion of brand 
acquisition became the driver for M&A amongst hotel companies, leading to major 
changes in the industry structure. 
The UK hotel structure was also changed, in terms of owning and operating hotels 
worldwide through the acquisition of international branded hotel companies. The 
apparent examples were those of Bass's acquisition of Holiday Inn and Ladbroke's 
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of Hilton, which saw these UK companies beginning to take the route of the US 
hotel industry's expansion via franchising and management contract, based on a 
reputable brand name. Moreover, these purchases contributed to the sudden 
increase in size and pushed UK hotel companies up the world ranking to become 
two of the largest hotel companies worldwide. 
This contribution has thus accomplished the task set in objective Two by analysing 
the use of M&A activity as a mode of expansion among the hotel companies and 
in turn has also fulfilled objective Four in understanding the structural change of 
hotel companies and the impact thereof on the hotel industry in the UK, and vice 
versa. 
(iv) The fourth contribution lies in using a wide range and large quantity of 
secondary information available publicly, but rarely used. Business history studies 
use a variety of research methods, particularly study of archival data. Similarly, 
management research makes use of a range of research methods, particularly 
primary data collection through interviews, surveys and questionnaires. In 
addition, management research tends to use secondary data as a complementary 
source of data collection. In contrast, this thesis made use of secondary data as 
its main source material. It also used primary material gathered in semi-structured 
interviews with industry analysts. The extensive use of historical secondary data 
such as company annual reports, newspapers and trade journals as main sources 
for investigation has not previously been used to this extent in a PhD thesis, 
particularly not in management studies of the hotel industry. Against the general 
data limitations that this information was originally collected for other purposes, the 
use of it consequently not only achieved the aim of this study, but also contributed 
to the broader area of research methodology in terms of puffing the concept of 
secondary data collection into empirical research. In other words, the use of 
secondary data in this thesis is itself new. In addition, this approach has also 
addressed all the objectives, particularly objective One - that of setting out to use 
existing historical data to achieve the aim. 
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11.2. The implications for managers and academics 
In this thesis, the aim is to understand the growth of the UK hotel industry and its 
emergence as big business. Equally important is an aspiration to suggest a 
number of learning points for management practice, as well as highlighting their 
relevance to academia. These points are built upon a few areas of interest that 
emerged from examining four case studies. 
(i) For managers 
Business strategies and company developments as well as the macro 
environment are dynamic phenomena: market demand changes, the rules of 
competition change, technology changes and, therefore, companies' growth and 
success are not uninterrupted. There is no prescription as to how managers can 
maintain that growth and success, but this study will provide insights that may be 
helpful. 
Managerial skills and knowledge are also considered company specific resources, 
in particular those that provide a positive association with company performance. 
The identification of areas where the company is lacking or excelling at can 
provide important guidance as to how to make important investment decisions. In 
these four cases, the managers appeared to have been well aware of the 
importance of acquiring resources that are scarce and valuable to customers, as 
displayed by the motives of acquiring brand and strategic locations. Since these 
are more likely to become underlying sources of competitive advantage, when 
faced with strategic investment decisions, it is imperative for managers to develop 
an understanding of their company's portfolio of resources and those of 
competitors. 
This leads to the important managerial implication of this study, which is that of 
market sensitivity and its positive effect on company performance. The outcome 
of a company's M&A activities, as this study has shown, is highly dependent on 
the characteristics of the macro environment, particularly economic boom or 
slump. It has been shown that awareness of how the economy is performing 
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generally led to an understanding of consumers' spending behaviour and 
competitors' performances, as well as of the company's own organisational 
capabilities. This might not be new knowledge, but it is worth reinforcing because 
developing learning capabilities within a company is also highly dependent on 
accumulated knowledge. Organisational capabilities are shown in the aftermath of 
the late 1980s economic slump which saw companies re-structuring, as a result of 
incurring high cost because of high interest rates and reduced demand for rooms, 
leading to lower sales and profit level. Property divisions and businesses which 
were considered core businesses previously were sold as non-core business 
sectors, in comparison to more profitable hotel businesses, which were retained. 
Managerial skills in these case studies were particularly displayed by the way in 
which companies adjusted their cash flow, by channelling it from one business 
division to another (to support hotel expansion), and the various restructuring 
exercises also revealed acumen for business, particularly in response to market 
demand, such as the sale of declining business divisions (brewing for Bass and 
Whitbread) or those with less growth potential (Bass-Crest, Whitb read- Ma rriott). 
Harvey (1999, pp. 17) argued that 'at a very practical level, history does inform 
strategic decision-making, not so much in a systematic way, but through a 
complex of processes informed by historically devised corporate consciousness'. 
In a similar vein, Jones (1997, pp. 298) posited that in regard to 'a country like 
Britain whose economy has become deeply embedded in the international 
economy, nation-based explanations of what is going on can be misleading'. 
Therefore, understanding of the various factors (political, economical and social 
and cultural) by which the company or industry and their external environment 
interact is important for enhancing the knowledge of change and development of 
companies or industries. 
(ii) For academia 
This thesis illustrates that shareholder value is becoming increasingly important in 
companies' decision making for investment and strategy. Relating this to decision 
making in teaching and learning in an academic setting, stakeholders such as 
students and their learning outcomes become an important issue In business 
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schools and the industry. There is an increasing pedagogic concern for teaching 
and learning processes in the preparation of under-graduates and graduates for 
management practices (Kransdorff, '2006; Lynch, 1999; Pfeffer and Fong, 2002; 
Ulrich, 2005). 
According to Kransdorff (2006), Kolb (1976) had already highlighted the lack of 
experiential learning amongst business students in the 1970s. Thirty years, later, 
Pfeffer and Fong (2002) highlighted the chronic problems of teaching and learning 
for business school students. Lynch (1999, pp. 128) examined the learning 
process in the preparation of graduates for management practice, and identified 
business history as a teaching method that stimulates students to ask questions. 
He posited that business history is a practical way for students to 'gain an 
understanding of change, its creation and consequences, ... (by questioning) why 
it happened in the lives of real organisations and real people over time', and in 
turn, imparting to students some degree of 'practical wisdom' (pp. 129). By the 
same token, Ulrich (2005) researched the relationship between different 
pedagogical strategies and specific business-major curricula, aiming to enhance 
the facilitation of student learning. His study found that management and 
marketing students perceived experiential learning as more helpful in their 
learning. Thus, his finding also supports the proposition regarding experiential 
learning of Kolb (1976), which is similar to the use of business history as a tool to 
develop and prepare business students with the necessary professional skills 
(Kransdorff, 2006; Lynch, 1999). 
This thesis supports the proposition of teaching business history (Kransdorff, 
2006; Lynch, 1999) and alternative ways to explore management issues by 
integrating history into management studies, in the context of a small sample size 
and longitudinal approach (Jones and Khanna, 2006; Jones and Miskell, ' 2007). 
This study supports Warren and Tweedale's position (2002) that business history 
is useful as a practical way of learning about a business, via a multidisciplinary 
study of long-term changes. 'Business history also provides instructive contrasts 
between past and current business practice' (Warren and Tweedale, 2002, pp. 
210). During research for this thesis, the in-depth study of the business history and 
actions of the four companies cited as case studies showed that each company 
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had to actively respond to the dynamic changes in the macro environment and 
sometimes even had to reverse changes when the evolving business environment 
renders current practises irrelevant. For example, Bass and Whitbread expanded 
their brewing businesses in the 1980s'but sold these same businesses in 2000 
when they were no longer meeting the changing lifestyles of the British, which saw 
a lower consumption of beer. Similarly, Ladbroke's and Whitbread's strategies in 
the 1980s and 1990s were to grow their four-star hotel groups. However, both 
companies sold these acquisitions subsequently in 2005 and 2004 respectively, 
due to adverse economic growth and several world events which changed the 
preferences of consumers for four-star hotels. On the industry level, the study of 
company history vis-6-vis their practises also supports Warren and Tweedale's 
view that business history provides instructive contrasts between past and current 
business practice. For instance, UK hotel companies started out by owning hotel 
assets while operating them, however, at an industry level from the 1980s, there 
was a marked change to adopting expansion methods that required minimum to 
no equity investment. These have all demonstrated the contrasting moves made 
by companies between the past and present. This in turn reflects their 
organisational capabilities, in terms of making pragmatic moves to adapt their 
strategies to opportunities and threats in the macro environment, whilst 
endeavouring to maximise value for their companies. 
By the same token, the increasing use of brands to expand, in terms of 
management contracting and franchising, reveals the acknowledgement of brands 
and their market power, and implicitly, represents a move to reduce risks taken 
amongst management. Thus, the study of business history provides the 
opportunity for reflection on the experience of business people and strategic 
changes in companies and industries. This in turn presents the essential tool to 
bridge the gap in teaching and learning for business school students, and provides 
students with the practical insights in business. 
11.3. Recommendations for further research 
The findings are highly suggestive for both theory and concepts of the UK hotel 
industry. However, owing to the limitations of this study, particularly time 
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constraints, the case study research method, and the research framework, any 
conclusion should be regarded with caution. As with any doctoral thesis, there are 
several areas that could be examined to complement the research undertaken in 
this thesis, which are discussed below. 
(i) This study of how and why companies expanded has contributed to knowledge 
through its concentration on four critical cases and a longitudinal approach to elicit 
more understanding of M&A activities. It is important to note that this study is 
based on four biggest UK hotel companies, during the period 1979 - 2004. This 
study could be applied to other domestic hotel companies in another country, to 
further develop understanding of hotel expansion through brands in particular, and 
hotel industry growth in general. This would either confirm these findings, 
particularly regarding brand acquisition, or discover new motives to enhance 
knowledge in this area. 
(ii) With regard to M&A theory, this thesis shows how important brand acquisition 
is and demonstrates its importance in enhancing value and reducing costs for the 
combined companies and shareholders. It provides generalisations and issues 
that can be extended to other industries where brand acquisition has similar 
importance. Therefore, similar studies could be carried out in other service 
industries. In particular, the use of comparative historical analysis and theoretical 
framework - motives for M&A activities - have been explicitly explained and should 
be easy to formulate for generic research. A replica study could confirm whether 
these findings are generalisable to a wider context within the tourism and 
hospitality industry, such as restaurants, catering, airlines and other travel 
companies. Alternatively, they could add new insights with regard to brand 
acquisition, since it is expected that some subtle differences would result because 
different companies and industries would be used. 
(iii) Brand acquisition in the hotel industry, as found in this study, also shows how 
companies' strategic positions change over time, as local brands gave way to 
fewer 'global' brands, supported by investors outside the hotel companies, 
consumers' behaviour and technology advancement. Although this study can be 
generalised to theory, it cannot be generalised to what is happening in the world. 
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This is because only one country has been used for this study. At present, much 
effort has gone into understanding the motives for M&A activities through 
interactions between organisational and macro environmental levels. However, it 
is impossible to enumerate all possible motives and environmental factors in this 
study, due to time and scope constraints. Moreover, every company has its own 
reasons and is made up of a different business mix. Different countries also 
possess different environmental factors, such as political ideology, legislation, 
economic performances and cultural perspectives: thus, country-specific industry 
shocks emerged differently. Therefore, future research may include more motives 
and environmental factors to extend knowledge. This thesis provides a platform to 
extend the study of the development of the UK hotel industry specifically, and of 
the hotel industry in other countries in general.. A further agenda of extending the 
historical period studied to trace developments back and forward in time, could 
also add insights into strategy and structural changes in this particular industry. 
(iv) One area for further research is how hotel branding has grown. The role of 
brand in the acquisition of brand name and brand rights is explicitly linked to the 
intangible value of brand, which lies in its reputation of reliability and consistency, 
built up over time, involving high cost and market saturation (Jones, 2005; Lopes, 
2002). All these add up to the acquisition of brand name and brand rights, 
expecting long-term returns from the brand investment. Therefore, it will be useful 
to study how some hotel brands have stood the test of time since its creation such 
as Hilton (1925), Intercontinental (1946) and Holiday Inn (1952) worldwide, while 
brands such as Crest, which was built up from 1967, and Ladbroke from the 
1970s, were unable to survive and were abandoned. A comparison with more 
international hotel brand names which had established themselves, namely, 
Marriott (Marriott International); Westin (Starwood Hotels & Resorts); Sofitel (Accor 
Group) and so on would also shine light on the'study of brand building in the hotel 
industry. 
(v) In this study, the aim of rapid expansion and better long-term investment 
returns by the four biggest hotel companies in UK were the main motives that 
underpinned the move to purchase established brands as a way to grow. This is 
evidenced by their various re-branding exercises, and reflected clearly through 
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investors' recognition of the value of brand name and its potential to derive profits. 
This study so far projected the views of brand value from the companies' and 
investors' perspectives. It is recommended that other perspectives be sought, 
particularly those of the consumers'. For example, the study of the changing 
structure of consumer demand specifically in the hotel industry could add insights 
to this finding and enhance the understanding of the incremental emphasis on 
owning brand name and rights in the hotel industry. 
(vi) The advancement of technology, particularly IT and Internet, has had a major 
impact on the hotel industry as it improved the effectiveness and efficiency of 
property management and operation, as well as marketing and distribution. The 
case hotel companies enjoyed significant economies of scale, especially with 
regard to post-merger activities, since they could use the same IT systems to 
manage a bigger pool of rooms. However, it is noted that even before the advent 
of the Internet as a tool to manage room reservation functions within the hotel 
industry, several other technologies such as telecommunications, facsimile and 
the booking system (modified from the airline electronic system - GDS) had served 
as a major means of reservations and communications. Thus, further research 
could explore in retrospect the impact of these technologies of that time, to review 
how these pre-Internet reservation systems have reduced the per-unit cost for 
hotel development and contributed to the market growth in this specific industry. 
(vii) The study of UK hotel expansion through M&A mechanism reveals the 
acquisition of brand and brand rights as a major motive for growth. Concurrently, 
it was also revealed that management contract served as a tool of expansion, 
particularly in conjunction with the ownership of a recognised brand name. This 
mode of expansion became commonly adopted in the UK hotel industry only in the 
past two decades, although it was already widely adopted by major hotel 
companies that originated in the US before that period. 
Management contracts are an attractive means of expansion for the capital 
intensive hotel business as the separation of ownership and operations results in 
lower investment demands required for growth. This mode of expansion is 
generally applied to upscale properties as the expectation of quality and 
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consistency in service provision is critical for hotels in the higher end of the 
market. However, the fact that management contracts took off as a popular 
means of expansion in the UK relatively recently, provoke some re-thinking as to 
why they were not used earlier compared to the USA. Moreover, Bass' 
management contract agreement for the three-star Candlewood Suites from HPT, 
in 2003, also highlighted a change in the way management contracts are now 
being used for expansion in different market levels. Therefore, further research 
would be worthwhile to investigate the historical development of management 
contracts as a method of expansion, particularly in terms of understanding the 
recent change in character of management contracts within the UK hotel industry. 
This will serve to add new insights into the growth of hotel management contracts 
and their relationship with M&A activities in general. 
(viii) There is, it seems, an emerging business history literature on M&A activities 
which sets the agenda for further exploration in this particular area. Lopes' (2002) 
work on the growth and survival of alcoholic beverages industry between the 1960 
and 2000 shows that M&A activities which took place in this industry from the 
1960s were ascribed partly to the need to own successful brands. A recent 
longitudinal study based on a small sample size, and evaluating M&A activities in 
relation to their success and failure, is found in Jones and Miskell (2007). Jones 
and Miskell (2007) provide insights into M&A activities in particular, and the 
integration of historical analysis and management theory in general. In addition, 
there is an increasing emphasis in business history studies on integrating the use 
of historical data, management theory and a qualitative approach to business 
history research proposed by distinguished business historian, Geoffrey Jones (in 
Jones and Khanna, 2006). 
The studies conducted by Lopes (2002) and Jones and Miskell (2007) lie in the 
consumer products area while this thesis contributed in terms of extending M&A 
study and historical analysis to the services sector. Although M&A activities have 
been studied widely, the combination of single industry and longitudinal approach 
could be explored further, in order to understand company or industry growth. 
This thesis takes a small step in the direction-of examining M&A activities in the 
study of historical hotel expansion, and contributes to business history studies as 
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well as to the study of the hotel industry, an industry whose growing contribution to 
the economy has been largely ignored. It is hoped that this work could lead on to 
further business history studies in other service industries, as well as stimulating 
arguments for further contribution to historical studies of the hotel industry. 
11.4. Reflections on research process 
Reflecting on the research process, three major outcomes have been achieved 
and these are outlined below: 
(i) Research is an iterative process, and it was found that the literature review was 
one of the most demanding tasks in this research process. M&A literature was 
sought and research questions were established at the beginning of the research 
process. Although a theoretical framework was established for preliminary data 
collection and analysis, the literature needed to be revisited during this initial stage 
of analysis. It was found to be extremely useful to revisit literature during data 
collection, particularly in this study which uses secondary data to establish cases. 
The first hurdle encountered was difficulties in analysis without a sturdy theoretical 
framework. The initial analysis was conducted without the industry shocks 
concept, and the argument was weak with only the organisational points of view, 
i. e. motives for M&A activities. It became increasingly clear that the motives 
explored in the M&A literature provide a useful basis to understand how 
companies expand through these activities, but offer much less insight into why 
they expand. Consequently, the industry shocks concept was incorporated to fill 
this gap and draw out the robustness of this study. 
After the first revisit, the literature was consulted, the industry shocks concept 
established and data was collected specifically about the macro environment. 
Data collection for this area was a particularly massive undertaking. Therefore, 
revisiting the literature became pivotal in maintaining focus on this study. During 
the final analysis, the literature review was visited again to ensure the accuracy of 
synthesis between data and literature. Moreover, the concern of omitting any 
essential literature, or new development of the literature was the prime motivation 
for revisits. Therefore, it is realised that although a sturdy framework Is important 
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from the beginning of the study, a constant review of existing and current literature 
is necessary in order to stay focused on the research, and to be aware of any 
changes and new developments in that particular area of study. 
(ii) Analysing the interaction between motives for M&A activities and the general 
environment by using secondary data has its advantage and disadvantages. The 
advantage is that there is a wide variety and volume of sources to retrieve 
information from, and the disadvantages are time constraint and financial 
limitation. The large amount of information obtainable from secondary sources, in 
conjunction with time and financial constraints, offers the opportunity to learn to 
select sources, particularly in developing the skills of selecting and rejecting 
information, which in turn becomes a transferable skill of analytical thinking. The 
need to collect information from credible sources improves knowledge of research 
methods, in terms of how to use reputable sources to improve the validity of 
results. For instance, newspaper collection has to be based on credible 
newspapers and not those that cater to wider audiences, which reduces the quality 
of news and information. 
Moreover, skill in analytical thinking is sharpened in retrieving and deciding which 
information in articles retrieved is more important and pertinent to the research 
question; and learning to reject those that are of secondary importance, in view of 
the quality of end product and word limit. For example, information pertinent to 
each deal, such as why a company acquires, is very important in this study. 
Equally important are reasons cited by other companies which were competing to 
close the same deal. Information on M&A activities within each company, in other 
business divisions, might be pertinent to this research question, or might not be, 
and require decisions to be made as to whether to accept or reject information for 
this study. For instance, the M&A deal between THF and Hanson was included, 
although it was not a pure hotel acquisition because the transaction involved 
another business division (catering). However, this deal had been considered as 
part of the analysis in understanding the growth of THF, because Anchor hotels 
played a major role in its hotel expansion in the early 1980s. In the same way, 
acquisition of brewers is not investigated extensively in the case of Bass and 
Whitbread. Although these M&A activities serve to increase the size of supplier of 
-292- 
drinks to hotel units which might enhance the hotel's financial performance and the 
company's financial performance on the, whole, they do not play a major role in 
expanding the hotel division, in terms of adding number of rooms or brand to the 
hotels. 
(iii) The whole process of researching one topic for more than four years is a 
challenging journey. The challenges started at the beginning with literature 
review, decision-making with regard to a research topic, the data collection and 
analysis process, and writing up. The learning outcome is not confined to the 
acquisition of academic knowledge, but also the attainment of several transferable 
skills, relating to critical and analytical thinking, interacting with people from all 
walks of life, presenting one's work in public and public speaking, and so on. 
Several activities undertaken and events attended during this research journey 
have provided me with a rounded and fruitful experience (see Appendices P and 
Q). 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Hotel grading in the UK 
In 1999, the English Tourism Council (ETC), the Automobile Association (AA) and 
the Royal Automobile Club (RAC) created a new overall rating scheme for 
serviced accommodation. Following a review involving five bodies - VisitBritain, 
VisitScotland, the Wales Tourist Board, the AA and the RAC and input from the 
industry, the scheme started in 2006. This Uses stars to represent hotels and 
diamonds for guest accommodation (guesthouses, farmhouses, inns). This new 
initiative has the support of (Euromonitor 2006; VisitBritain, 2006 ). 
Classification for Hotels 
One-Star Hotels 
One-star hotels offer practical accommodation with a limited range of facilities and 
services but a high standard of cleanliness throughout. They include a restaurant 
or eating area. 75% of bedrooms will have en-suite or private facilities. 
Two-Star Hotels 
Two-star hotels have better-equipped bedrooms, all with an en-suite/private 
bathroom and a colour television. A lift is normally available. 
Three-Star Hotels 
Three-star hotels have a higher standard of services and facilities, including larger 
public areas and bedrooms, a receptionist, room service and laundry. 
Four-Star Hotels 
Four-star accommodation offers superior comfort and quality. All bedrooms have 
an en-suite bath, fitted overhead shower and WC. There are spacious and well- 
appointed public areas and a greater emphasis. on food and drink. There is room 
service for all meals, with 24-hour availability for drinks, refreshments and snacks. 
A dry-cleaning service is available and overall customer service is excellent. 
Five-Star Hotels 
Five-star hotels are spacious, luxurious establishments offering the highest 
international quality of accommodation, facilities, services and cuisine. There is a 
range of extra facilities. Guests should feel very well cared for by professional, 
attentive staff providing a flawless service. 
Classification for Guest Accommodation 
This includes seaside guesthouses, bed-and-breakfast accommodation, country 
farmhouses and inns. Good customer care and quality of service are emphasised, 
rather than facilities. 
One Diamond - clean and comfortable accommodation, providing breakfast and 
a helpful service. 
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Two Diamonds - an increased level of quality and comfort, with greater 
emphasis on guest care. 
Three Diamond - well maintained, practical decor, a good choice of breakfast dishes, a higher degree of customer care and at least 40% of the bedrooms will 
have private or en-suite bathrooms. 
Four Diamond - an even higher level of quality and comfort, with a good level of 
customer care. 
Five Diamond - excellent levels of customer care. 
Source: Euromonitor 2006; VisitBritain, 2006 
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Appendix G: Semi structured interview questions: 
1. In general, what do you think were the motives behind M&A activity In the UK 
hotel industry, between 1979 and 2004? 
This was meant to be an open question, aiming to find out what industry analysts saw 
as motives for M&A activity in the UK hotel industry, leading to an understanding of 
motives for M&A activities - value maximising or non-value maximising and the 
industry shocks concept. The purpose was to collect contextual data about the 
external environment, e. g. hotel industry and the general economy. This question is 
related to the literature in terms of understanding the motives behind the M&A activities 
that took place and a reflection of the hotel industry in specific and the economy in 
general. This question is able to achieve all the objectives (1 - 5). 
2. What are your views on the reasons for these particular acquisitions in the 
period between the late 1970s and 2004? (A table of all the M&A activities 
engaged by four hotel companies between 1979 and 2004 was shown to remind 
and help respondents in their recollection and discussions). 
This question is related to the literature in terms of understanding the motives for M&A 
activities that took place among four hotel companies on an organisational level and in 
the hotel industry on an industry and general level. These understandings will also 
provide the insight to the general economy. Moreover, it is able to find out any 
emerging pattern amongst M&A activities. This question is able to achieve all the 
objectives (11 - 5). 
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Appendix H: Sample Letter to respondent 
Mary Quek 
Address 
31st January 2006 
Mr Respondent 
Company name 
Address 
Dear Mr Respondent 
Re: Request for an appointment to discuss the development of the UK hotel industry 
I am currently pursuing a PhD at the Department of Hospitality, Leisure and Tourism 
Management, Business School, Oxford Brookes University, UK. I am investigating the 
development of the UK Hotel Industry, 1979-2004, through an in-depth study of four 
companies. 
The period between 1979 and 2004 saw an exponential growth amongst hotel 
companies, especially through the use of merger and acquisition as a growth 
mechanism. In this study, I am investigating the motives behind the major deals 
undertaken by the four largest hotel companies in the UK between 1979 and 2004. 
Your views on these deals and the role that merger and acquisition have played in the 
development of the UK Hotel Industry would be most illuminating. Please see the 
attached Information Sheet for more details. 
With this in mind, I am writing to ask for your participation in this study. I will be happy 
to furnish you with a summary of my findings on completion of the study. I would very 
much like to arrange an interview with you; I envisage that this would take an estimated 
1-1.5 hours. 
I do hope that it will be convenient for me to telephone you in the next couple of weeks 
whert you can let me know if you will be happy to participate. If so, we will then be able 
to arrange an interview date and time that is convenient to you. 
Thank you very much for your kind attention and I look forward to talking with you soon. 
Yours sincerely, 
Mary Quek 
Doctoral Researcher 
Oxford Brookes University 
Tel: 44-(0)07952752650; 44-(0)1865-483858 
Email: nhmqueka-brookes. ac. uk 
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Appendix 1: Participant information sheet 
Study title 
The development of four hotel companies in the UK, 1979-2004 
Introduction 
I would like to invite you to take part in a research study to provide information about 
the development of the UK hotel industry between 1979-2004, particularly through the 
use of mergers and acquisitions. I have already carried out extensive research of 
secondary data sources and have identified the following deals that I would like to 
discuss with you: 
Table 1: Malor Merqer and Acquisition activities, 1979-2004 
THF/ Forte Ladbroke/ Hilton Bass/ lHG Whitbread 
1979 Myddleton Hotels 
1980 Centre Hotels 
1981 Savoy 
1984 Comfort Hotels 
1985 Rodeway(USA) 
1986 Anchor Hotels 
1987 Hilton Hotels Holiday Inn 
1988 Kennedy Brookes Holiday Inn 
1989 Holiday Inn 
1990 Crest Hotels 
1994 Le Meridien 
1995 Marriott 
1998 InterContinental 
Hotels 
1999 Stakis Hotels Swallow Hotels 
2000 Southern Pacific 
Hotels Corporation 
SPHC (Australia) 
Bristol Hotels & 
Resorts 
2001 Scandic 
(North Europe) 
Post House 
2003 Candlewood Suites 
(USA) 
2004 1 Premier Lodge I 
Before you agree to take part, it is important for you to understand why the research Is 
being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information. 
Thanking you in advance for the time and trouble taken to read this. 
Purpose of the study 
The aim of the study is to explore and analyse the development of hotel companies 
and the hotel industry in the UK. This research seeks to broaden an area of business 
history research where no extensive analysis has been carried out on the development 
of these types of firms. 
As part of my PhD studies at Oxford Brookes University, I am trying to develop a better 
understanding of the historical expansion of hotel companies in the UK. Particular 
attention is being given to merger and acquisition activities, which were widely used as 
a method of growth during this period. 
The project is now in its final year. The first stage of the project involved the analysis of 
secondary data such as companies' annual reports, analyst reports, newspapers, trade 
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journals, scholarly journals, and books. In the second stage, interviews will be 
undertaken with a number of industry analysts, as well as gaining the views of senior 
company executives who had been directly involved with these merger and acquisition 
activities. 
Why have you been invited? 
As this project aims to investigate the expansion of a sample of hotel companies, the 
views from industry analysts can provide vital evidence for this project. You have been 
invited to take part in this study because you have many years of experience, both as 
an analyst in this industry and/ or as an executive in these leading hotel companies. 
Moreover, your experience and involvement falls in the period of this study and will be 
invaluable for this project. 
Deciding to take part? 
Your participation in the research is entirely voluntary. It is up to you to decide whether 
or not to take part. If you do decide to take part you will be given this information sheet 
to keep and be asked to sign a consent form. If you decide to take part you are still 
free to withdraw at any time, without giving a reason. You may also withdraw any 
unprocessed data in any case of withdrawing from participating in this project. 
What will happen to you if you take part? 
Before meeting you, I will send you a page of detailed explanation of the data and time 
needed. It is estimated that the interviews will last for 1-1.5 hours. I will take notes 
during the interview and I would also like, with your permission, to record our 
discussion purely as an aide memoir for my research project. Following the interview 
you will receive a transcript of my notes so that you can check they are an accurate 
representation of what you said. A report summarising. the findings for your personal 
reference will be sent to you on completion of the project, estimated to be the end of 
2006. 
The advantages and possible disadvantage in taking part 
Your contribution will be invaluable to this study, which is the first of its kind. In addition, 
through taking part you will help to increase the awareness of hotel companies and the 
industry as 'big' business and the value that historical knowledge can bring to our 
understanding of business practices. The possible disadvantage to you is that this will 
take about 1-1.5 hours of your time, but I will arrange my visit to suit your convenience. 
Confidentiality and Ethics 
All information that you give will be kept strictly confidential, subjecting to legal 
limitation. In the case where you prefer to remain anonymous in any published 
research, your identification will be coded as 'senior executive involved directly with 
merger and acquisition activities in the period 1979-2004'. The only person who will 
have access to the interview records is Ms Mary Quek. The interview notes will be 
stored securely in my cabinets in the research office. Data generated in the course of 
the research will be kept securely in paper or electronic form for a period of five years 
after the completion of a research project. 
The results of the research study 
You will receive a report, which will comprise a summary of the results of this study. 
The results of the research will also appear in my PhD thesis. If this research Is 
published in any scholarly journal, a copy of the published research will be sent to you 
promptly. 
Organisation and funding of the research 
I am conducting the research as a self-funded PhD student at Oxford Brookes 
University. 
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Who has reviewed the study? 
The research has been approved by the University Research Ethics Committee, Oxford 
Brookes University. If you have any concerns about the conduct of this research 
project you can contact the Chair of the University Ethics Committee, contact email: 
ethics(&-brookes. ac. uk. 
Further Information 
If you need to contact the researcher about any aspect of the project, my details are 
below: 
Mary Quek, Doctoral Researcher 
Department of Hospitality, Leisure and Tourism Management, Business School, 
Oxford Brookes University, Gipsy Lane Campus, Headington, Oxford, OX3 OBP, UK 
Email: nhmquek(LDbrookes. ac. uk 
Tel: 44-(0)1865-483858, Fax: 44-(0)1865-483878, Mobile: 44-(0)7952752650 
Supervisors: 
Dr Angela Roper 
Reader of the Doctoral Programme 
Department of Hospitality, Leisure & Tourism Management, Business School, 
Oxford Brookes University 
Email: a*roperca-)brookes. ac. uk 
Tel: 01865-483497 
Ms Judy Slinn 
Reader of Strategy and Business History 
Department of Business Organisation, Skills and Strategy, Business School, 
Oxford Brookes University 
Tel: iaslinn(cbbrookes. ac. uk 
Email: 01865-485655 
Thank you very much for taking time to read this Information sheet. 
Mary Quek, Date 
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Appendix J: Informed consent form 
CONSENTFORM 
OXFORD 
BROOKES 
ý UNIVERSITY 
The Development of four hotel companies in the UK, 1979-2004 
Name, PhD Researcher, Address 
Please Initial Box 
1. 1 confirm that I have read and understand the information - sheet for the above study and have had the opportunity to F1 
ask questions. 
2. 1 understand that my participation is voluntary and that I 
am free to withdraw at any time, without giving reason. 
3. 1 understand that confidentiality is subject 
to legal limitation. F 
4. 1 agree to take part in the above study. 
5. 1 agree to the interview being audio 
recorded F7 
6. 1 agree to the use of anonymised quotes in - 
publications 
1 I 
Name of Participant Date Signature 
Name of Researcher Date Signature 
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Research ethics consent form / Last updated: October 2005 
Appendix K: Disposal of THF's assets after the 1996 takeover by Granada Group plc 
Year Asset disposal 
1996 White Hart hotel chain (E121.7 million) 
21 -strong Welcome Break (E1.2 billion) 
George V Hotel in Paris (El 04 million) 
Hyde Park Hotel (E86 million) 
Alpha Airports (25% stakes) (E52.3 million) 
1997 Brown's Hotel (E45 million) 
Westbury hotels sold (E90 million) 
Plaza Athenee hotel sold to Sultan of Brunei's brother (not disclosed) 
New York Plaza Athenee hotel (E42.5 million) 
1998 Cavendish, the Russell and The Saint-George's hotels in London (E140 million) 
50% shares in a joint venture company with Italian Oil and Gas Company EN I 
was sold back to ENI (not disclosed) 
Savoy 68% shares ($310 million) 
2000 Cavendish hotel ( E60 million) 
2001 Cumberland Hotel (El 50 million) 
Regent Palace Hotel ( El 05 million) 
79 Post House Hotels (E810 million) 
48 Heritage Hotels (E235 million) 
146 Le Meridien Hotels (E1.9 billion) 
2002 368 Little Chef and 220 Travelodge (E712 million) 
'Source: Compass, 2001 b; 2001 c; 2001 d; 2001 e; 2001 f; 2002; 2003; Daneshkhu, 1997; 
Granada Group Hotel, 2003; Walsh, 1998 
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Appendix P: Research related-activities and learning outcome 
Activities Learning Outcome 
Sep 2003 - Nov 2006 The training events conducted by the university were useful. 
Attended research These sessions provided the basic, but essential, knowledge 
student training courses to enhance my skills. 
offered by Brookes 
Graduate Office: Library 
training, Literature and 
Database search; PhD 
Oral examinations; 
Tackling the writing up 
stage of Phl); etc. 
Sep 2003 - Nov 2006 Irrespective of the direct relevance of the topics to this thesis, 
Attended research attending these seminars and lectures gave me a more well- 
seminars and public rounded perspective from academics and practitioners from 
lectures within OBU and other disciplines. 
at other universities Moreover, they are a quick way to stay in touch with topical 
areas and current developments in the world, instead of being 
confined only to the research question and area of the thesis. 
Dec 2003 - Jan 2004 The purpose of attending the Graduate Students Research 
Attended Graduate Conference in Hospitality and Tourism, USA, was a first step 
Students' Research to 'initiating' myself into the academic world. Moreoveritwas 
Conference in useful, to find out what conferences are about, to see what 
Hospitality and Tourism, other students are researching in the hospitality and tourism 
Houston, USA industry and to network. 
March 2004 To find out what kind of information they hold and to collect 
Visits to Hotel and data related to the hotel industry and hotel companies I am 
Catering International researching. 
Management 
Association 
Jun 2004 The purpose of attending the BHC and ABH business history 
Attended Business conferences was to find out what other researchers are 
History Conference researching on, to learn presentation skills, to network and to 
(BHC) prepare myself mentally for a conference paper presentation 
Attend Association of at the European Business History Association conference. 
Business History (ABH) The experience and insights gained from these conferences 
conference were extremely useful and satisfactory. 
Jan - Sep 2004 The main aim of writing a conference paper was to measure 
Wrote and presented a my achievement at the end of my first year. The other 
conference paper at reasons were to set a deadline towards which to motivate 
European Business myself, to find a focus for my research and to get feedback 
History Association from other academics. 
(EBHA) conference Feedback and questions posted to me during Question & 
Answer time: 
Feedback: the overall feedback was positive and the point that 
made the most impact was the suggestion to look at the 
--liti al area in relation to my area of research. This remark 
-322- 
coincided with my second supervisor who had suggested to 
me to look at the historical context when she read my paper. 
Other questions: Why was Bass selling its brewing business? 
Will you be looking into branding and how they market their 
products? 
Oct - Nov 2004 At the London City Library in October and November 2004,1 
Visits to City Business went through the Stock Exchange Yearbooks 1979-2004 to 
Library look for information about the four hotel companies, hoping to 
get to know these companies better. However, the most 
useful information would have been the way the companies 
financed their businesses, their five years financial data, and 
the list of subsidiaries. 
Feb - Mar 2005 The first project provided practical experience of interviewing 
Assisted with two and transcribing, which were valuable in helping me to 
research projects, prepare for my own research later. 
involving interviews and Assisted with recording and observation of four focus group 
focus group discussions for an employability project. This project provided 
me with practical experience in terms of facilitating focus 
group discussion. 
Oct 2004 - Jun 2005 Data collection process was particularly challenging because 
Collected data and of the wide variety and amount of secondary data available. 
wrote four cases and a Other than information gained to answer the research 
literature review question, transferable skills such as analytical thinking and 
information selection were also acquired. 
Jun 2005 Questions during question & answer time: 
Presented a work-in- What is your theoretical framework? Have you thought of the 
progress paper at economy during this period? What about divestment? These 
Brookes Business are questions that I might not have given much thought on my 
School Research own. However, these questions provoked some thoughts and 
Conference helped me to sit down and think more deeply about them in 
relation to my area of research. 
Sep 2004 To acquire knowledge of research methods for business 
Attended EBHA history in specific. One of the important outcomes was to get 
research summer school the assurance that the secondary data that I was using, rather 
than the traditional archival research, is still as valid for the 
Attended Brookes business history research. Secondly, several provoking 
Business School questions and suggestions posted helped to tighten my 
Research Methods thoughts and focus: 'Have you thought of your audience, if 
summer school your topic and discussion will intrigue your readeff 'Maybe 
you can try to buy 1% of each company's share, and they will 
send you the company information'. 'You can put your deals In 
a timeline and connect the events that took place during this 
period'. 
Brookes research summer school took the role of a reminder 
and refresher course for research methods learning. Several 
students' presentations and discussions helped me to 
understand several 'technical' terms in research methods, and 
hnw fn di-f --J ---- - -- -- -'- do so. 
-323- 
Sep 2005 
Attended British 
Academy of 
Management (BAM) 
PhD student 
Symposium 
Attend BAM conference 
The purpose of attending BAM conference was to gain more 
knowledge in the area of business management and 
interdisciplinary studies. -More importantly, this was the first 
year that BAM incorporated Management and Business 
History as a Special Interest Group. It was also valuable to 
network with graduates and academics from other 
univorsities. 
Dec 2005 To find out what kind of information hold in relation to the hotel 
Visited the New York industry and UK hotel companies. Also, to collect news 
Public Library concerning the four hote 'I companies 
in particular and the UK 
hotel industry in general from US newspapers. It was found 
that news items available for the four hotel companies were 
fewer than those found in the UK, which is not surprising, in 
view of the fact that this study concerns UK companies. On 
the other hand, newspapers, such as the Wall Street Journal, 
in electronic format, are available in Proquest from 1984 as 
compared to The Financial Times, which is made available 
from the mid-1990s. 
Sep 2006 The BAM PhD Symposium provided me with continuous 
Attend British Academy training in the area of research, in addition to what OBU 
of Management (BAM) provide. 
PhD student The purpose of attending the BAM conference again is to 
Symposium update information on current business and management 
Attend BAM conference research, and gain more knowledge in the area of business 
history, management and interdisciplinary studies. 
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